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The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental 
performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and 
analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within 
the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again. His 
thinking becomes associative and affective… Even if there were no 
political groups trying to influence him, the typical citizen would in 
political matters tend to yield to extra-rational or irrational 
prejudice and impulse... At certain junctures, this may prove fatal to 
his nation.  
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Democracy purports to accurately reflect the choices of the general public. It is justly 
credited with the creation and expansion of modern mechanisms of redistribution. Yet, 
in recent decades it appears to have become more of an inhibitor than a catalyst in the 
pursuit of an equitable society. Those treated most unequally were not bystanders. Both 
in Britain and Israel, roughly two fifths of them did not support the expansion of the 
welfare state.  
This thesis shows their engagement with politics was often different than others. It 
observes the dynamics in a three-force triangle consisting of poor people, democracy 
and the welfare state. Even though historically this Triangle fuelled the movement 
towards progressive redistribution, the findings suggest it is no longer the pivotal engine 
to mitigate market inequalities. The principal beneficiaries of welfare appear to be 
incapable of mobilising democracy to expand it. 
The research indicates that poor people were alarmingly uncommitted to democracy 
and/or the welfare state. Although these institutions underpinned their social and 
political rights, many barely recognised how they serve their interests. In addition, the 
poor could not identify themselves as a collective, were more vulnerable to fallacies, 
emotions and traditions, and tended to prioritise other policy domains. 
This thesis challenges the operational definitions of political exclusion and illuminates 
the need to scrutinise and theorise the political behaviour of the underprivileged 
electorate. Policy-wise, a new strategy is required to revive relationships between poor 
people, democracies and welfare states. We should be looking at active and inclusive 
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1. Introduction 
120 million USA citizens amounting to 60 per cent of the eligible voters, chose to cast a 
vote in the 2004 US Presidential Elections. After the ballots had been counted, the 
extent to which the Democratic Party had lost some of its traditional strongholds was 
revealed. Millions of underprivileged voters were utterly convinced that the Republican 
Party, committed to tax breaks and free markets, would serve their interests better. It 
was found that the median family income in "safe red states" was almost 20 per cent 
lower than that recorded on "safe blue states".  
The astonishment at this dissonance crossed the Atlantic. The London Times' analyst 
Anatole Kaletsky was dazed to discover how "people can readily be persuaded to vote 
in accordance with the economic interests of people much richer than themselves" (2 
November 2004). The New York Times' columnist Nicholas D. Kristof urged John 
Kerry's supporters to feel "wretched about the millions of farmer, factory workers and 
waitresses who ended up voting – utterly against their own interests – for Republican 
candidates" (3 November 2004). His column‘s title "Living Poor, Voting Rich" was 
remarkably apposite. Against all odds, the US Republican party had made the poor 
favour the rich, revealing a paradox in democracy.  
This research was begun a few months earlier, following a notion of intrinsic imbalance 
in modern democracies. While a reasonable observer would expect the poor to act 
rationally, promoting their own interests as others do, history tells a different story, of a 
vicious circle. The ―Living Poor, Voting Rich‖ phenomenon in many ways reflected the 
age of political poverty which intensified financial inequalities through policy measures. 
Any decision taken by governments affects the distribution of wealth. That is what 
governments do on a daily basis, consciously or unconsciously. Therefore, the 
composition of government as determined by the public has an influence on questions 
of redistribution and equality.  
The patterns of underprivileged voting behaviour as recorded in Britain and Israel 
indicated a similar phenomenon to that found in the United States, even though the 
nature of political alienation was different. The recurring symptoms showed that the US 
is not an exception, hence the alienation of underprivileged populations cannot be 
treated as a local phenomenon. With this in mind, this thesis will concentrate on the 
voters‘ own behaviour, which is the most immediately observable cause of the paradox. 
Among the indirect reasons are power paradigms and political strategies which will not 
form part of this research.  
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In many ways, we face two complementary but distinct analytical paths. Making the 
political parties and their electoral strategies the dominant factor for political poverty is 
testament to the parties' role in cutting off the working class from the leftist parties. By 
doing so, voters are relieved of some of the responsibility and the process is assumed to 
be reversible, as different political strategies might result in different political ends. 
Therefore, the choice of focusing on voters‘ behaviour as the key cause of under-
representation entails significant consequences for the entire project. 
A focus on political strategies was prevalent in What's the Matter with America, written 
by Thomas Frank (2006). This popular book accounts for the rise of "conservative 
populism" and the "great backlash" of American liberalism, claiming that the 
enthusiasm for recruiting white-collar professionals and donors has led liberals to 
abandon their "class warfare" position. The Republicans, on the other hand, were 
"industriously fabricating their own class-based language of the right" (pp. 243-244). 
Kaletsky, in milder language, argued that the "triumph" of the American right has been 
to "advance relentlessly the economic interests of the country's richest people, while 
emphasising a swathe of moral, social and foreign policy issues that motivate – and 
certainly distract – middle-class and poor voters" (2 November 2004).  
These are all electoral strategies. One strategy appeals to the privileged by making 
concessions in economic policy, whereas the other attracts the underprivileged by 
underscoring a non-economic agenda. It might be that although American voters 
"choose self-destructive policies… it is just as clear… that liberalism deserves a large 
part of the blame", since it ceased to speak to its traditional constituencies (Frank 2006, 
p. 242). On the other hand, it is also accurate to say that precisely those underprivileged 
citizens to whom social liberalism should speak desperately failed to recognise where 
their economic interests lay. Therefore, it is no less a question of political tactics than a 
challenge to human behaviour.  
A substantial proportion of the underprivileged electorate in the United States, Britain 
and Israel voted for neo-liberal parties. Many others refrained from voting at all, turning 
abstention into a popular choice in itself. The consequences of this cannot by any means 
be neglected, as the future of any progressive redistribution was put at risk. Even if the 
welfare state was not ―rolled back‖, its history shows that certain electoral behaviour 
has resulted in major liberal transformations. Research has unequivocally shown that in 
a democracy, redistribution is not a self-sustaining mechanism. 
The debate therefore shifts, in this thesis, from the field of political strategy into the 
arenas of electoral behaviour and political choice. In this context, an illuminating 
analogy can be made with economic theory. While the literature has so far 
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conceptualised subordinate levels of participation in the ''commodity markets'', there has 
been no scrutiny of underprivileged behavioural patterns in the ''political markets''. The 
parallels between these markets are appealing, as these are the only venues where social 
choice can be made in liberal democracies. As Arrow put it, there is a "basic set of 
alternatives… in the theory of consumer's choice, each alternative would be a 
commodity bundle… in the theory of elections, the alternatives are candidates" 
(1951/1963, p. 11-12).  
There are clearly failures in both markets that prevent certain groups from maximising 
their utility, creating a non-optimal allocation of wealth. In economics, the 
preoccupation with market failures such as monopolies, externalities and information 
asymmetries is central to the entire theory. Nonetheless, the indicators currently used by 
scholars to monitor the parallel failures in politics are often simplistic and single-
dimensional, measuring mostly turnout. Not only is an integrative analytical framework 
absent, but there has been almost no research focusing solely on the income-deprived 
population. With no proper and elaborated databases to work with, political "market 
failure" theories could not be thoroughly developed.  
This thesis seeks to fill at least some of this void. It develops a theoretical and 
operational framework, while pursuing designated research to find out whether and how 
the poor exercise subordinate levels of political engagement. At least three 
characteristics make this piece of work unique. First, it focuses on the behaviour of 
citizens rather than the strategies of parties. Second, it focuses primarily on the 
underprivileged electorate and monitors their engagement with the apparatus of 
democracy. Third, it assumes that exclusive patterns in the political market cannot be 
depicted merely with the binary variable of physical turnout. On route, the concept of 
political deprivation as part of political exclusion is re-examined.  
The analytical frameworks are central to the development and structure of this thesis. 
History shows that three powerful forces have played a cardinal role in the facilitation 
of progressive redistribution: poor people themselves, the democratic apparatus and the 
welfare state. The pattern of dynamic relationships between these three, situated within 
their wider social milieu, may be diagrammatically represented in the form of a triangle. 
It is this Triangle for Redistribution that has provided both the theoretical framework 
and the boundaries of this thesis, as will be elaborated later in this chapter. However, 
the assessment of the Triangle‘s capacity to be the engine that further mitigates market 
inequalities requires an operational framework through which the various dimensions 
and arguments can be explored in a systematic way. This framework is represented by 
the Pyramid of Political Engagement.  
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The notion of a pyramid turns political engagement into a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon by defining three distinctive but hierarchical elements in it. First, there is 
the commonly used indicator of ballots cast on Election Day. Second, there is the 
amount and quality of knowledge held by the voters about the past performance of 
governments, their own present status and the future platforms of parties. Third, the 
ability of voters to process the knowledge they possess to reach a reasoned and rational 
voting decision. The Pyramid has its own internal relationship. It may be that seeking to 
be informed is irrational, but a deliberate rational vote cannot be made otherwise. 
Accordingly, knowledge has no meaning if no vote is cast. The ultimate level of 
political engagement under these premises occurs when an informed voter makes a 
rational choice. These three facets of individual behaviour together form an analytical 
framework from which to start.  
The major hypothesis underpinning this thesis is that poor people are systematically 
deprived in all three dimensions of political engagement: they vote less, they know less 
and their reasoning can more often be challenged on grounds of rationality. The 
methodological challenge is to turn these dimensions into rigorous and assessable 
indicators. Whereas physical voting can easily be monitored, a structured method of 
tracking individuals' level of political knowledge and assessing their degree of rational 
thinking is a harder task. Both concepts, which are widely used by scholars in economic 
contexts, turned out to be either limited or extremely controversial when used in the 
political arena. A few focal theories reviewed below have made this challenge feasible.  
As for the concept of rationality, this research draws upon the "Downsian voter" 
(1956), who can also be conceptualised as the "substantively rational man", seeking to 
maximise his personal expected utility from any decision he makes. The foundations of 
such thinking were laid by Arrow (1951/1963) as part of his attempt to define laws of 
rational thinking by employing economic tools in the context of social choice. For 
Arrow, "each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all conceivable 
social states in terms of their desirability to him… by whatever standards he deems 
relevant" (p. 17). Thus, a party that can guarantee the highest expected individual utility 
on the basis of predefined standards becomes the rational choice.  
The major conceptual challenge to this approach, aside from theories of uncertainty, 
was put forward by Simon (1955). He argued that human beings are far from following 
logical assumptions and concrete alternatives. His theories of "procedural" or "bounded" 
rationality reframed the concept of rationality as a subjective matter incapable of 
generalisation. In Contrast to Simon, the psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
did succeed in generalising irrationality after showing that there were systematic 
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deviations from Arrow's theories which can be mathematically defined. Sen proposed 
several moral causes for these deviations, such as commitment (1977).  
Having noted some of the key reservations, the contribution of rationality to this thesis 
is twofold. First, it has a major impact on the individual's decision on his/her level of 
political engagement. Second, if one chooses to participate, rationality is also expected 
to shape one‘s preferences.  
The correlation with preferences is particularly controversial. Some might criticise any 
attempt to question the rationality of individual political choice, while others might 
argue that it is paternalistic. Nonetheless, this topic cannot be passed over if one is 
seriously interested in investigating the depths of political exclusion. The analytical 
tools developed by rational choice theorists are extremely useful here.  They include, 
among other, utility functions (based on "whatever standards" the voter deems relevant, 
as Arrow noted) and the concept of transitivity (i.e. if A is preferred to B, and B is 
preferred to C, then A is preferred to C). There is no reason to ignore individual 
reasoning just because one is dealing with politics.  
Rationality theories have been used in this area, but mostly through the prism of 
political parties' strategies. Yet, while Downs' revolutionary thesis investigated parties, 
he also defined the "rational voter" as a future utility maximiser, explicitly giving 
precedence to substantive rationality theories (1956). Acknowledging the shortcomings, 
he noted, "such simplification is necessary for the prediction of behaviour, because 
decisions made at random or without any relation to each other, do not fall into any 
pattern and therefore cannot be analysed" (p. 2). In many aspects, this research adopted 
a similar theoretical approach towards rationality.  
Using substantive rationality as a prop, several theorists focused on political 
engagement. They ruled out the existence of a "rational voter" by simply arguing that 
voting is itself irrational (Olson 1965/1971, Ledyard 1984, Palfrey & Rosenthal 1985). 
Nevertheless, there were serious arguments against this contention even from an 
economists' perception. Some argued, for instance, that the alternative cost of not voting 
is marginal, and therefore such decisions are made "at the margins" (Aldrich 1993, 
Fiorina 1990, Niemi 1976). Other theorists added "civic duty" to the benefit side of the 
equation, making it perfectly rational to participate (Riker & Ordershook 1968, 
Coleman 1988). The same argument applies to the accumulation of information, which 
was compared by Fiorina to football fans who invest time and money to gather any 
piece of information about their team although they know this behaviour cannot make it 
win (1990, p. 336). These arguments weaken the contradiction between rationality and 
political engagement while paving the way towards its measurement.  
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The methodological challenge of gauging the extent of knowledge also proved 
complex. A wide range of indicators have been employed by scholars seeking to 
correlate types of knowledge with political behaviour (Kramer 1971, Lewis-Beck 1986, 
Kinder & Kiewiet 1979, Weatherford 1983). In order to devise an elementary 
classification of these indicators, this thesis looked for three major elements in each 
indicator: the data's level of objectivity, its reference group and the period the indicator 
referred to. Thus, for instance, some studies showed a correlation between voting 
patterns and retrospective, objective and personal oriented indicators (e.g. past 
household income), whereas others succeeded in showing a link with prospective, 
national and subjective oriented ones (e.g. predicted national unemployment figures for 
the forthcoming year). Nonetheless, such correlations can hardly define the knowledge 
required by voters seeking to make a rational choice. These are two different matters.  
Logically, if the rationality assumption is used to define the elements of a 
"knowledgeable voter", voters should have the information necessary for maximising 
their future utility. Arguably, this premise requires three key dimensions of knowledge: 
information about the past performance of governments, parties or candidates; 
information about the present status of an individual in society; and information about 
policy proposals for the future which might affect the voter's utility. In terms of 
preferences, only the integration of these dimensions would allow voters to identify the 
political alternative that would further their own interests. In terms of engagement, the 
existence of such knowledge reflects a greater degree of involvement in the entire 
political process. Voting with no knowledge at all is a gamble, which is often no more 
valuable than abstention.  
After laying down some of this thesis' conceptual infrastructure, the unique 
circumstances that characterise the case of a materially underprivileged electorate must 
be explicitly acknowledged. In many ways, their relative deprivation can serve as the 
"manipulation" needed to compare them with the privileged electorate. It is assumed 
here that in an ideal world of rational voters those at the bottom of the economic 
pyramid would have a greater interest in promoting a more generous welfare state and 
more radical income redistribution. The reason for this is purely economic – this group's 
marginal utility from state benefits is the highest, since their material wealth is the least. 
We can assess their behaviour after the ―veil of ignorance‖ is removed (Rawls 1971). 
Thus, the marginal utility of a poor person from a moderate rise in his income is 
incomparably greater than the marginal utility of a rich person from the same amount. 
The poor are therefore expected to benefit more from the victories of pro-welfare 
parties, given that their pre-electoral pledges materialise. Broadly speaking, this 
argument means that poverty should not only trigger a higher degree of electoral 
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engagement (to influence the results), but it should also have a major effect on 
preferences. Nevertheless, the statistics do not always support this.  
Overall, the findings of this research indicate the depth of political exclusion 
experienced by the underprivileged electorate, both in Israel and in Britain. 
Interestingly, this exclusion is channelled in different ways, although the political 
outcome is the same. Electoral figures suggest that roughly two fifths of underprivileged 
Israelis supported a neo-liberal candidate (in 1992 and 1999) whereas two fifths of 
British underprivileged abstained or voted Conservative (in 1992 and 1997). As a 
consequence, elections could only partially reflect the financial interests of poor people 
and these interests became overtly under-represented. The isolation of British 
underprivileged citizens is demonstrated by electoral abstention, showing a major crisis 
of civic commitment. Their Israeli equivalents face different challenges in the domains 
of knowledge and reasoning. In both countries, the welfare state has become less of a 
priority for its main beneficiaries.  
A short example will illustrate this. In Israel, it will emerge, almost two thirds of the 
underprivileged Likud (Conservative) voters cited political solidarity as the major 
motivation for their party affiliation. In contrast, a similar proportion of the privileged 
electorate chose the other option, citing the party's proposed policies as the justification 
for support. However, it is hard to understand how much past solidarity with neo-
liberalism will contribute to these underprivileged voters' future utility. In Britain on the 
other hand, 72 per cent of the underprivileged abstainers stated they ―did not care very 
much‖ which party won the elections. A turnout gap of approximately 10 to 15 percent 
put the interests of the lower classes in a subordinate position to begin with. This gap 
does not include what is defined here as the "invisible group" of unregistered voters 
who both avoided answering surveys and were more likely to abstain.  
When underprivileged voters did have firm views, some interesting divergences were 
exposed. Ethics of self-reliance and neo-liberal ideas had a strong grip on the 
disadvantaged. Most of them had alarmingly low expectations of democracy and the 
welfare state. As a consequence, two elementary commitments that poor people could 
have had – one to a method of governance that gives them political rights and one to the 
mechanism that provides them with social rights – rarely existed. In addition, 
conservative underprivileged voters in both countries were more likely than their 
Labour counterparts to think inequalities are essential for prosperity. Underprivileged 
voters in general tended to be more influenced by self-experienced incidents from their 
close environment. They felt chronically insecure venturing into the arena of national 
welfare policy. Even if an underprivileged elector eventually voted for Labour, his/her 
discourse had often nothing to do with inequality, redistribution or social justice. 
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The evidence shows that underprivileged political exclusion is not a matter of a sporadic 
and inconsistent trend. This systematic subordinate engagement contributes towards 
imbalanced political outcomes. These in turn might affect the extent of redistribution in 
society, making the poor poorer. Consequently, the risk of political marginalisation is 
further increased. This circle should not be monitored solely through the prism of 
election results, but also by assessing the shifts in middle ground politics. When the 
economic interests of underprivileged voters are not spoken of, the national discourse 
leans further to the neo-liberal right. One could justly wonder whether the so-called 
middle class welfare state (Le Grand 1982, Hills 2004) has something to do with the 
preferences of the electorate. It might be that the relative weakness of the 
underprivileged section has triggered over the years a convergence between the 
strongholds of the welfare state and its major beneficiaries. 
Letting the underprivileged lose the battle for equal political engagement may well 
generate this vicious circle and result in serious consequences – for the poor themselves, 
for the rich, and for the legitimacy of democracy as a mechanism to reflect the people‘s 
aggregated will. The new dynamics and trends explored in this thesis have already 
generated an imbalanced representation of interests, which drive a wedge between the 
"public choice" and the "public aggregated interest". This not only concerns the extent 
of redistribution but also the merits of our system of government. An imbalanced 
political outcome calls for a new inclusive approach to regain the engagement of all 
stakeholders. The systematic alienation of the underprivileged voice is a matter of 
concern, even if no deliberate action has brought it about.  
Theoretically, much of this discussion can be framed in the Triangle for Redistribution 
in which the poor, the welfare state and democracy represent the three opposing corners. 
The analysis of each pair reveals several meaningful insights. The structure of the 
literature review therefore follows this path. Each of the three theoretical chapters 
examines a different pair and proposes various related theories and research. A brief 
description of the key theoretical arguments and issues proposed in Chapters 2-4 will 
define the boundaries of this thesis and its conceptual environment.  
The Welfare State & The Poor examines the basic distinctions between different types 
of welfare regimes that were dominant during the last century (Chapter ‎0, Page 13). The 
chapter links the policies with the electorate in order to review the impact of various 
decisions at national level on the citizenry itself. It clearly shows that state policies 
determined by governments have a significant impact on the underprivileged. The 
historical review is necessary to provide a solid background for the thesis as a whole, 
though it is also a practical tool to classify contemporary policy platforms, defining the 
most beneficial option for the underprivileged electorate.  
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The chapter explores the welfare regime of two states, Britain and Israel, employing the 
typologies devised by Titmuss (1974), Furniss & Tilton (1979) and Esping-Andersen 
(1990). It is interesting to note that both countries based their welfare regimes on 
principles advocated by Beveridge, but later diverged, pursuing completely different 
objectives. The study of their development demonstrates the differences between liberal 
and social-democrat welfare regimes and indicates the major shifts in direction recorded 
since 1948.  
Structurally, a preliminary section analyses the statements and decisions made by 
Bismarck, Lloyd-George and Beveridge, drawing on ideological continuums developed 
by Blundell & Gosschalk (1997) and Dean (2002 & 2005). This overview contributes to 
the conceptualisation of the thesis but not to the development of its argument. It was 
eventually integrated into the Appendices.  
The next chapter looks at the relationship between The Welfare State & Democracy 
(Chapter ‎3, Page 65). It is mainly concerned with the linkage between suffrage, public 
choice and social provision, showing primarily that voting matters. First, it revisits the 
ancient fears of the power of the multitude provoked by the expansion of democracy. 
Then, it proceeds to discuss various attempts to measure democracy's role in creating 
the first state welfare regimes. Industrialism, urbanism and modernism are arguably all 
plausible reasons for the decision taken by national leaderships to nurture the first social 
reforms. However, it is also clear that inclusive democracy or the will to preserve its 
absence were also critical for this process.  
After centuries during which the wealthiest disenfranchised the property-less for fear of 
a democratic class war, the franchise was extended, but the multitude has often failed to 
promote an egalitarian agenda. Rather than debating the dangers of delegating 
democratic powers to the multitude, today the electorate is widely perceived as 
incapable of utilising the vote. While historically, many believed democracy was 
capable of facilitating reform, today many doubt whether it can promote any collective 
action whatsoever. The evidence presented later about the political behaviour of the 
underprivileged underscores the observations of Schumpeter about voters‘ irrational 
behaviour (1942). 
One of the fascinating questions raised in this context is whether capitalism has 
redefined democracy or democracy has been incorrectly defined by its progenitors. 
Economic theorists such as Hayek and Friedman passionately argued that the 
democratic system of government was never intended to curtail economic freedoms for 
the sake of equality. On the contrary, history shows that the realms of civil and political 
rights were inseparable. In many ways, Aristotle's prophecy, "in democracies the poor 
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have more sovereign power than the rich; for they are more numerous and the decisions 
of the majority are sovereign" (1992, p. 362), has failed to materialise. It is a fact that in 
an era of universal suffrage inequality is at all-time record high levels. It should be said 
that redistribution mechanisms do exist in western societies, but they still leave an 
alarming degree of inequality.  
The third theoretical chapter, "The Poor & Democracy" puts the individual citizen at 
the centre (Page 88). Structurally, it defines three axes – economic, political and social – 
which are analysed separately to highlight the various implications of individual 
actions. In discussing political aspects, an analysis of theories of class voting and 
economic voting reveals distinct motives behind the making of voting decisions. When 
exploring economic aspects, the concepts of rationality and information are scrutinised, 
as well as paradoxes suggesting that rational people should not vote or become 
informed at all. Finally, when social implications are assessed, the concepts of 
inequality, exclusion and rights are all explored and linked to the Pyramid of Political 
Engagement.  
These social concepts merit further elaboration as they constitute an important 
background to this thesis. In fact, the inspiration for the entire project came during a 
routine lecture on the measurement of social exclusion. The way in which political 
deprivation was measured, based almost exclusively on turnout, raised questions as to 
the traditional definitions of political rights and social exclusion.  
Beginning with the concept of political rights, the third theoretical chapter recalls 
Thomas Humphrey Marshall's definition, that it is "the right to participate in the 
exercise of political power" (1950, pp. 10-11). Interestingly, Marshall himself 
maintained that since "civil rights are designed for use by reasonable and intelligent 
persons, who have learned to read and write… education is a necessary prerequisite of 
civil freedoms" (p. 25). However, while schooling is widely perceived as a prerequisite 
for successful civil integration, a parallel correlation with politics is rarely expressed. 
The social right to receive an education and the political right to exercise power were 
rarely linked in the context of democratic exclusion. Consequently, the entire discussion 
of political rights is premised on the right to physically cast a vote rather than the right 
to truly exercise power. These processes are inherently different.  
The same logic holds when the concept of social exclusion is examined. Anthony 
Giddens' definition makes the physical act of voting seem almost a non-indicator, as 
"exclusion is not about graduations of inequality, but about mechanisms that act to 
detach groups of people from the social mainstream" (1998, p. 104). It can therefore be 
argued that the true meaning of political exclusion is far broader than the schematic 
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definition of turnout or even party membership. Whilst this invites momentous 
methodological challenges, the merits of making citizens fully included in the political 
process is undisputed. It protects the legitimacy of government no less than it influences 
the outcomes of the process (see, for instance, Young 2000). It seems as if new 
indicators will have to be employed in order to enhance the monitoring of this 
phenomenon and progress from the previous dichotomy of voters and non-voters.  
The most crucial social implication related directly to the relationship between the poor 
and democracy is for the topic of redistribution. As several scholars have noted, the role 
of government as a carrier of equality turns elections into "battlegrounds in the struggle 
over income redistribution" (Filer et al 1991, p. 64). The rolling back of the welfare 
state that began in the late 1970s is an example of this struggle. Three grand sets of 
arguments were developed over the years to explain this fiscal and political "welfare 
crisis". Each set indicates a different direction of research.  
The first set refers to the economy in its broadest sense, suggesting that no western state 
seeking to grow can afford excessive welfare expenditure. Alternatively, it suggests that 
democracy was never intended to guarantee equality and therefore intervention in 
markets must be minimised on principle. The second set of arguments refers to the 
state, either in the context of its inefficient and flawed management of welfare provision 
or in relation to the mounting tensions between solidarity and diversity. Goodhart 
famously argued that by opening the gates to immigrants, governments turned their 
civilians into strangers, and ordinary contributors to the welfare state had to "be 
reassured that strangers… have the same idea of reciprocity" as they do (24 February 
2004). The third set of arguments was concerned with the electorate, identifying the 
voters as a key factor in the rolling back of the welfare state. One school of thought 
seriously doubts the ability of voters in the modern political world to act wisely in order 
to promote their own interests. Another suggests democracy by its very nature excludes 
numerous groups of individuals who cannot fully exercise their political power.  
The last set of arguments is strongly supported by the work of Schumpeter. He wrote in 
his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, "the typical citizen drops down to a lower 
level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field… He becomes a 
primitive again" (1942/1976, p. 262). While the various theories underpinning all three 
arguments are explored in the theoretical chapters, this research is focused on the 
electorate.  
After briefly exploring the three theoretical chapters, which follow the theoretical 
framework of the Triangle for Redistribution, Chapter ‎5 deals with the Research 
Design. It reviews the rationale, strategy and design of the study itself, explores the 
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logic behind it and elaborates on the operational framework of the Pyramid of Political 
Engagement (Page 132). In short, the basic assumption of this project is that the voter is 
accountable for his/her own decisions and there is a need to better understand his/her 
choice. This is especially so when an individual in poverty, votes for a party that would 
apparently cut his "state income". The act is contradictory to the substantive rationality 
theory, making it a "counter-class" vote, which should to be accounted for.  
There are two ways to classify these incidents of "counter-class" voting or of total 
abstention in the framework of substantive rationality. Either such deviations are 
systematic, as Tversky and Kahneman found in relation to commodity markets, or they 
are sporadic and cannot be characterised or generalised. In many ways, this research 
looks for consistencies. It examines whether Conservative underprivileged voters are 
systematically inhibiting lower levels of knowledge or reason differently in comparison 
with their underprivileged Labour counterparts or their privileged party comrades. Such 
conclusions, if verified, could indicate new directions for explanations and ideas.  
The study is based on the case studies of Britain and Israel, both selected due to the 
author's relative familiarity with their culture, history and language. The contextual 
differences make any comparisons problematic, though similar trends can and will be 
noted, with the required reservations. The research questions, however, are identical for 
both countries. The first question is aimed at assessing the differences in terms of 
political engagement between people living in poverty and those who are not; the 
second draws a distinction between those who supported the major "welfarist party" and 
those who supported the major "non-welfarist party", as will be defined later. It was 
generally assumed that the underprivileged would have systematically lower levels of 
engagement such as would affect the Triangle for Redistribution.  
Methodologically, quantitative analysis, sophisticated as it might be, could not reveal 
the entire story of the underprivileged "counter-class" voters. Qualitative research was 
therefore needed to facilitate a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon. Three 
methods were used to examine the hypotheses: in-depth interviews with privileged and 
underprivileged citizens, an exploratory survey gauging personal utilities and a 
secondary analysis of existing large-scale datasets. Conclusions were drawn from the 
outcomes derived from all three methods. The reasons for the selection of these 
methods, as well as the practicalities involved in the field, are discussed in length and 
two localised methodological references are provided in the Appendices.  
The presentation of the findings is split into two chapters, one for Britain and one for 
Israel (Chapters 6 & 7, Pages 162 & 204). Both chapters explore the major insights as 
they relate to the various dimensions of political engagement. Whereas the British 
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chapter elaborates on abstention, the Israeli report is concerned more with variations in 
knowledge and reasoning. While appreciating the danger in making comparisons, one 
should note the different ways in which poor people have lost political power in both 
countries. Yet, in the end, the linkage between the underprivileged electorate and 
mainstream politics was found to be fragile in both countries.  
After reviewing the key qualitative and quantitative evidence from each country, 
Chapters 6 and 7 contain a brief conclusion summarising the findings on the 
relationship between poor people, democracies and welfare states. This brings together 
the operational and theoretical frameworks of this analysis in each of the chapters. 
Overall, both demonstrate the mechanisms that propel the underprivileged electorate 
towards the dark fringes of politics. Thomas Jefferson is famously quoted as saying that 
―if a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what 
never was and never will be‖ (1939, p. 231). The integration of evidence and theory 
echoes the warning implicit in this observation.  
The review of both case studies is followed by a Discussion chapter which engages 
with and reflects upon some key studies in the various fields, while synthesising the 
various arguments into a coherent narrative (Chapter ‎8, Page 240). Contrary to the 
research chapters, the discussion relies on the Triangle: it first explores the relationships 
of the poor with democracy and the welfare state before concentrating on the inter-
relationships of the last two. Finally, the Conclusion chapter reiterates the key insights 
explored in the previous chapters, emphasises some key policy implications and 
proposes a few questions and directions for future research (Chapter 9, Page ‎8). 
*** 
Two preliminary notes are required before reading the thesis. First, the use of the word 
―underprivileged‖ is not related in any way to the ―underclass‖ concept nurtured by 
Charles Murray (1984) and other scholars. I simply preferred to avoid the term ―poor‖, 
because it is primarily focused on the distribution of wealth and income, whereas 
―underprivileged‖ is multi-dimensional in its sub-text. As will be discussed in the 
research chapters, methodological difficulties prevented any reliance on household 
income as the sole indicator in constructing the various samples. Consequently, other 
socio-economic indicators such as the main source of income were integrated into an 
algorithm. Whereas the resulting ―underprivileged‖ group consists mostly of people 
with incomes below the poverty threshold, missing data did not allow for empirical 
verification. 
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Another necessary acknowledgement concerns the bibliography available. Whereas the 
empirical research for this thesis was carried out in Britain and Israel, the literature 
review was based primarily on American literature, which was found to be the most 
comprehensive and available. Nonetheless, the American literature has two 
shortcomings. First, is was almost no special emphasis on underprivileged populations. 
Second, the American underlying concepts and academic terminology are not 
necessarily compatible with the European ones. Whenever specific studies were 
conducted in the local context, concrete references were generally integrated into the 
relevant sections in the research chapter. 
*** 
This thesis challenges three premises found in the existing literature. First, it calls into 
question the traditional definitions of political exclusion and political rights, arguing 
that inclusive engagement with politics cannot be achieved solely through physical 
voting. As a consequence, the current estimations of politically isolated citizens should 
be re-examined and re-assessed. Second, this study integrates political and economic 
concepts of voting behaviour into social policy discourse, arguing that voting patterns 
are also capable of shaping poor people's lives. Therefore, if the underprivileged do 
behave differently from others in the political arena, the politics of the underprivileged 
should be part of social policy studies. Third, this thesis doubts the ability of democracy 
in its current form to truly represent "the will of the people" rather than "the recorded 
choice of the people", considering the unequal level of political engagement.  
If there is a "mission statement" for this project, it is that a fair and just society requires 
equal opportunities for all in all arenas – in the labour market as well as in the political 
sphere. It is therefore in the interest of all of us to guarantee that the underprivileged 
have this opportunity in the deepest sense of the word, rather than in its narrow and 
formal interpretation. 
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2. The Welfare State & the Poor 
2.1 Introduction 
The balance between the state, voluntary and private sectors in the provision of welfare 
has changed significantly over the last two centuries. This transformation has not been 
the same for everyone; it has varied between social classes as they have been adjusting 
to a new mixture of welfare provision. Arguably, today the middle class in Britain 
benefits more from public provision than it has over the previous centuries while the 
working class in Israel is relatively more dependent on the voluntary sector. Within this 
framework, this chapter is seeking to review some historical aspects of the relationship 
between the poor and welfare regimes, in a way that will later enable a critical 
assessment of the relationship between the poor and democracies.  
Leaders and administrations are the key players shaping welfare policies. Yet, a wide 
range of factors stands at the background, many of which are ideologically constructed. 
Marxists would focus on issues related to class domination and production relationship, 
while others might concentrate on equal opportunities, regulated labour markets or 
political vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, as far as ideologies, leaders and administrations 
can shape the formation of policies, they have no exclusivity over the final mixture of 
welfare.  
Other factors, which are external to governments and often outside their powers, 
become more and more powerful. They can take the form of domestic or international 
economic conditions, demographic forces, cultural developments and even 
administrative issues at the local level. They do play a role in shaping governmental 
policies, but their major impact is after such policies are introduced. Although 
reciprocal influences do exist, a distinction between internal and external powers 
shaping policy is essential.  
Exploring the relationship between the poor and the welfare state, some analytical 
boundaries based on this distinction should be defined. Figure ‎2.1.1 illustrates three 
chronological stages of analysis. The right stage deals with the final mixture of 
provision; the middle one represents a variety of factors, internal and external to 
governments, influencing the final provision; and the left stage chronologically takes 
the analysis one-step backward. It refers to leaders' attitudes toward welfare provision, 
which arguably possesses a significant internal influence over governmental policies. 
 
  









Figure ‎2.1.1: Relevant factors contributing to the final mixture of welfare provision 
This thesis focused on two aspects of this framework, namely governmental welfare 
policies and personal ideological perceptions held by political leaders (as much as they 
can be defined as ideologies).  
The section discussing personal aspect looked at the work of three prominent figures 
who succeeded in profoundly reforming the system: Otto Von Bismarck, David Lloyd 
George and William Beveridge. Their personal ideological perceptions were evaluated 
using two typologies developed by Blundell and Gosschalk (1997) and Dean (2002 & 
2005). Whilst this work shaped the first cornerstones of this thesis, it did not fit with its 
final form, not being an essential part of its core argument. Therefore, this piece is to be 
found in the Appendices (Page 303), and is for the reader‘s own discretion. 
The second section, following this introduction, is a historical review of the two states, 
where the research was carried out, namely Britain and Israel. Their social policies since 
1948 will be assessed using three other typologies developed by Titmuss (1974), 
Furniss & Tilton (1979) and Esping-Anderson (1990).  The conclusion will integrate the 
reviews to provide a framework of evaluating policies from the perspective of the 
underprivileged.  
Working with heuristic typologies is appealing but inherently imprecise. For that 
reason, the assessment of leaders' perceptions and states' welfare regimes presented in 
this chapter and in the Appendices can be seen only as an indicative comparative tool 
between different personal and national attitudes toward welfare. However, to answer 
the questions of this thesis, typologies albeit inaccurate are essential. 
The goal of this chapter is not merely to provide an historical review but also to lay the 
foundations toward a critical analysis of poor people's political behaviour. A simplistic 
question as "for whom the poor should vote" cannot be approached without a clear 
distinction between policies of states. It may not be possible to point decisively to one 
Mixture of provision Government's policies Leaders' ideology 
Factors influencing policies 
 
Factors influencing outcome 
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recommended alternative, nevertheless, based upon the typologies and the history 
presented here, it should be possible to point out where the poor are less likely to be 
better off.  
The chronological starting point for the next two sections is 1948. Not only was the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights introduced during that year. For Britain it 
symbolised the beginning of a new era in terms of social provision, while for Israel, it 
was the year of independence when virtues initially collided with pragmatism. 
However, by the new millennium, both countries had undergone several welfare 
reforms. I shall start with a brief theoretical overview as it is required to illuminate the 
guidelines for the entire analysis.  
There is no hegemonic typology for welfare regimes; nevertheless, one can find 
repetition of distinctive themes in the literature written so far. The general deficiencies 
in typological analysis, similar to those of other heuristic models, have already been 
noted. However, for the purpose of this thesis, three distinct models have been chosen: 
those developed by Titmuss (1974), Furniss & Tilton (1979) and Esping-Andersen 
(1990). All have broadly distinguished between three major types of welfare state (with 
no hierarchical order), but only the latest provided a comparative, empirical study 
underpinning the allocation.  
Titmuss asserted that social policy must provide welfare for citizens, include economic 
as well as non-economic objectives and involve measures of progressive redistribution 
(1974, p. 29). He then distinguished between three models of policies. The Residual 
Welfare Model assumed the private market and the family are the "natural" channels for 
welfare provision as "the true object of the welfare state, for the Liberals, is to teach 
people how to do without it" (Peacock 1960, p. 11). The Industrial Achievement-
Performance Model held that social needs "should be met on the basis of merit, work 
performance and productivity." The Institutional Redistributive Model premised upon 
the principle of social equality, is in favour of universal services and, in fact, ignores the 
principle of need (Titmuss 1974, p. 30-31).  
Furniss and Tilton differentiated between the British "Social Security State" aimed at 
guaranteeing a national minimum for subsistence and the Swedish "Social Welfare 
State" that aspired to reduce inequalities of income, poverty and power. While the 
former would perceive the state's role as to "fill the void" of the markets, the latter 
would broaden its scope to environmental problems and redistributive wages policy.  In 
The Case for the Welfare State, Furniss and Tilton presented a third type of "state 
response" to market failures, the "Positive State", which was intended to solely protect 
property holders, but was not defined as a welfare regime (1979, pp. 14-21). 
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Esping-Andersen embraced Titmuss' allocation, writing that it "forced researches to 
move from the black box of expenditures to the content of the Welfare State" (1990, p. 
20). In his empirical-based typology, he defined two variables, namely the degree of 
decommodification and the type of stratification, both determining welfare regimes. The 
Conservative/corporatist regime sought to turn employees' dependency from the market 
to the state simultaneously with the preservation of the existing social stratification. The 
Liberal regime aspired to minimise the state's role, commodify labour and exclusively 
allow market forces to shape stratification. The Social-democrats approach was in 






Figure ‎2.1.2: Different typologies of attitudes toward different welfare regimes 
As Figure ‎2.1.2 illustrates, there are significant but not absolute similarities between the 
three typologies. Titmuss' Residual Model aimed at providing the minimum as a 
temporary supplement to markets' outcome as Espin-Andersen's Liberal Regime. 
Furniss & Tilton's "Social Welfare State" sought egalitarianism to change the current 
distribution of wealth as did Titmuss' Institutional Redistributive Model.  
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2.2 The British Welfare State 
Three major periods in its development of the British welfare state will be 
chronologically explored here. In the three decades after 1948, all governments were 
generally committed to ‎the Beveridgian model. A clear sign of departure from 
Beveridge‘s and Keynes' premises was given by the Labour leaders in 1976, though it 
was not before 1979 when words were turned into radical actions after Margaret 
Thatcher entered office. A third period could be identified since the end of the 
nineteenth, with the rise of the Labour party to power in 1997.  
Back in 1948, the creation of the National Health Service, National Insurance and 
National Assistance establishments signalled the beginning of the Beveridge era in 
welfare provision. Ironically, the Conservative Party ruled Britain through 17 of these 
31 years, contributing its own share to what was later defined as the "golden age" for 
the welfare state (Peden 1985, p. 156). Figure ‎2.2.1 clearly shows the rise in public 









































































































Public Expenditures Transfer Payments
 
Figure ‎2.2.1: Estimates of public expenditure on goods and services vs. transfer payments in 
Britain as a percentage of the gross domestic product between 1870 and 1965 
 (Source: Feinstein 1972, Tables 2 and 14) 
Clement Attlee's government, which held office until 1951, was the first to embark the 
new age of welfare provision in Britain, showing clear-cut success mainly in massive 
nationalization. By the end of 1949, the industries of railways, coal, iron, steel, gas, 
transportation and electricity were all under government control, as was the Bank of 
England (Butler & Butler 1986, p. 397-399). Whereas this policy could have been 
linked with socialist aspirations, it was argued at that time, that the intention was to 
promote efficiency rather than enforce equality (Morgan 1984, pp. 94-141). 
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On a different frontier, the most significant achievement of the Attlee's government was 
in the field of health. The creation of the NHS was credited to this government and its 
dominant Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, who virtually succeeded in detaching the 
insurance principle from health provision. Nonetheless, he resigned a short while 
afterwards, following the introduction of charges for dental and ophthalmic care. 
Retrospectively, such a shift was inevitable for the NHS, considering its financial 
reports.  
The NHS exceeded its budget by almost 40 per cent during its first two years, inviting 
criticism from almost any possible direction (Hill 1993, pp. 41-43; Lowe 1993, pp. 166-
179; Timmins 1995, pp. 101-132). Bevan, who declared in the Appointed Day the NHS 
would "lift the shadow from millions of homes" (Timmins 1995, p. 130), allegedly left 
an "administratively flawed service" that impeded the development of a more cost-
effective and equitably distributed service (Lowe 1993, p. 179; Eckstein 1958, pp. 253-
260; Pater 1981, pp. 181-187).  
On balance, the Attlee's government was arguably successful in relieving absolute 
poverty, but it failed in reducing inequality. The third Rowntree survey conducted in 
York in 1950 found that Labour's new legislation reduced destitution from 22 per cent 
of households to less than 3 per cent (Rowntree & Lavers 1951, p. 40), and even if the 
methods were contested, it was clear that during Labour's years, subsistence poverty 
was dramatically reduced and unemployment ceased to be its major factor (Gazeley 
2003, pp. 158-185).  
On the other hand, the promised goal of equality was apparently neglected. Regarding 
the NHS, Eckstein argued that it had no distributive effect at all as, and in contrast to the 
previous system, it benefited the middle class much more than the working class (1958). 
Regarding wealth, Callaghan (1948) and Morgan (1984) maintained that Labour 
egalitarianism of those years was not at all aimed at redistribution from rich to poor 
(Callaghan 1948, p. 140):  
…in 1947/1948 the lower income groups financed the social security 
schemes through their own direct and indirect tax payment, and in 
the redistribution of incomes that took place the transfer from rich to 
poor was much smaller in size then the transfers of income inside the 
lower income groups themselves. 
History shows the return of the Conservative party to office in 1951 was not because it 
opposed welfare, but because it embraced it. The Conservatives took every opportunity 
to remind people of their share in the enactment of social legislation and pledged to 
succeed where the Labour government had failed, most embarrassing of all in the 
building of 300,000 houses a year (Raison 1990, pp. 26-31). Ironically, all Tories‘ 
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manifestos published until 1964 remarkably reflected the high priority given to social 
services (CCO 1962; CUCO 1963).  
An assessment of public expenditure figures revealed that not only did the party accept 
the pillars of the welfare state during its four terms in office, but it was also responsible 
for a slight rise in its extent, as shown in Figure ‎2.2.3 (Page 37). The One Nation Group 
in their pamphlet "The Responsible Society" proudly proclaimed the Conservatives 
increased expenditure on social services by approximately 20 per cent as "the Welfare 
State has added to the freedom of the citizen." According to the group's estimates, the 
Tories allocated 30 per cent more to pensions, 50 per cent more to education and 10 per 
cent more to health (1959, p. 33-34).  
The success of the Conservative party should not shift attention from its ideological 
weakness exposed during these years (Hill 1993; Raison 1990). Sewill, for instance, 
acknowledged it was hard to find a Conservative philosophy that could be applied 
consistently to the soaring expenditure on social services. In an article published in 
Bow's group journal, Crossbow, he admitted, "both parties claim to have helped in their 
creation [Social Services – g.a.]; both support them enthusiastically; and both attempt to 
outbid each other in expenditure on health, on education and on pensions" (1959, p. 57). 
Raison mentioned that even a governmental research study launched with "a bias in 
favour of radical change", ended up with a conclusion that "most of the social 
services… were broadly on the right lines" (1990, p. 52).  
Under these conditions, the only strategy available for Conservative leaders was to 
pledge modernisation, occupy mid-ground politics and scare the electorate by 
emphasising the socialist aspiration to tax, spend and nationalise. In one of his famous 
speeches, Harold Macmillan dubbed Socialism as "out of date and out of touch", 
proclaiming that equality is in contrast to human nature. Elaborating on the dangers of 
egalitarianism, he said, "when the Fathers of the American Constitution declared that all 
men are created equal it really never occurred to them… that all men are to be kept 
equal" (1958, pp. 8-9). Subsequently, he stated that the only position in politics 
Conservatives can occupy with honour is the "middle ground" (1958, p. 12):  
We do not stand and have never stood for laissez-faire individualism 
or for putting the rights of the individual above his duty to his fellow 
men. We stand today, as we always stood, to block the way to both 
these extremes and to all such extremes, and to point the path 
towards moderate and balanced views. 
Churchill and Eden as premiers slightly reduced income taxes, abolished food subsidies, 
expanded technical education and, most important, accelerated housing provision. 
Among the means used to achieve the housing goals were the controversial 
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liberalisation of land, the boost of building and rental markets and several financial 
incentives given to local authorities (Raison 1990, pp. 35-36; Lower 1993, pp. 244-
254). While in 1951 only 202,000 new houses were built, in 1956 this figure climbed to 
308,000 and in 1966 it soared to 396,000 new houses every year (Butler & Butler 1986, 
p. 333). 
During Macmillan's term, the 1957 Rent Act was introduced, enabling property owners 
to increase rents in order to finance repairs on their property. Further eminent legislation 
included the 1959 National Insurance Act, which introduced stronger earning links and 
encouraged occupational pension schemes to contract out the state system; the 1962 
Education Act, which increased student grant provision; the 1958 Local Government 
Act, which granted greater financial independence to local authorities; and the 1959 
Mental Health Act, which improved and integrated provision for the mentally ill (Peden 
1991; Thane 1982; Laybourn 1995). 
The 1964 General Elections Conservative Manifesto continued to show "little signs of a 
change from the familiar post-war direction" and consequently led voters to search for 
other alternatives (Raison 1990, p. 56). Eventually, Harold Wilson came to power after 
proclaiming benefits "have been allowed to fall below minimum level of human need" 
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Figure ‎2.2.2: Unemployment rates in Britain between 1870 and 2000 
 (Source: Feinstein 1972, table 57; OECD Quarterly Labour Force Statistics 2004) 
Nonetheless, reality fell short of the pledges. Hill described the subsequent seven years 
under the Labour government as simply "a breach of promise", accounted for mainly by 
economic difficulties, which limited the scope of government activity (1993, p. 85). As 
can be seen in Figure ‎2.2.2, unemployment rates were the lowest for almost ten years 
and eventually, the excessive demand led to unsustainable deficits in the Balance of 
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Payments forcing the government to devalue the Sterling in 1967 (Cairncross and 
Eichengreen 1983). A year earlier, the government declared a standstill on increases in 
prices and incomes, generating the first but certainly not the last dispute with the TUC 
(Tomlinson 2004, pp. 53-56). Inevitably, the focus on monetary problems and the move 
from one crisis to another had a negative effect on fiscal promises given before 
elections.  
In terms of social policies, the National Assistance benefits were replaced in 1966 by 
"Supplementary Benefits" administered by the new Ministry of Social Security. It 
reflected a terminological and conceptual shift rather than a substantive one. As from 
1966, the means tested benefit was paid as a right for the most deprived, with no 
contribution requirements (Butler & Butler 1986, p. 336). However, this ―re-badging‖ 
move was in fact another proof for the abandonment of Beveridge‘s universalism 
vision, which relied on means tests as a last resort.   
In terms of redistribution, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and 
Wealth found that, since 1960, the trend toward greater equality continued although "the 
total wealth remains very unevenly distributed" (1975, pp. 139-140). Although the 
methods used and data presented were highly contested, Atkinson and Harrison who re-
examined the findings concluded that, while the "totals of personal wealth are much 
higher… the distribution… is not greatly different" (1978, p. 136).  
Another major development of that period, in the context of poverty and welfare, is 
related to the academic field, which gradually adopted a renewed definition of poverty. 
The process began in the 1950s and accelerated after a growing number of studies 
focused on relative needs and abandoned the absolute line of definitions (Townsend 
1957, pp. 154-165; Abel Smith & Townsend 1965, pp. 13-20). Without implying it is 
"the end of the line" for poverty, it should be noted that subsistence levels of poverty 
have indeed been almost entirely abolished. In 1973, only 0.3 per cent of households 
lived below the "absolute" poverty line, as defined by government (which by itself was 
highly controversial), in comparison to 6.5 per cent in the 1950s (Fiegehen et al. 1977, 
p. 27).  
A positive surplus in the Balance of Payments was eventually achieved in 1970 after the 
electorate, disappointed by the fiscal price Labour paid to cool the economy down, 
granted a victory to the Conservatives. However, while the new Prime Minister Edward 
Heath declared, "we were returned to office to change the course of history of this 
nation – nothing less", his government was quickly required to confront a new 
phenomenon of rising unemployment (Blackaby 1978, pp. 52-53).  
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber eased credit restrictions, increased 
government borrowing and, by fighting unemployment using Keynesian methods, 
allowed inflation to rise again (Peden 1985, pp. 162-167 173-179). In terms of public 
expenditure, the expansion was reduced from 3.5 to 2.8 per cent a year between 1971 
and 1974; nevertheless, the government was still not in a position to fulfil its pre-
election fiscal commitments (Blackaby 1978, pp. 55, 117-123).  
Several significant social reforms were introduced during Heath's years, though many of 
them relied upon means tests, leaving Beveridge‘s ideas far behind. The Social Security 
Act finally approved in 1975 turned the scheme into a completely earnings related one, 
encouraging people to join private occupational pension schemes. The ―basic flat rate‖ 
principle, incapable of providing a decent level of payment, was completely withdrawn. 
The National Insurance Act of 1970 was specifically providing for groups that were 
ineligible for the state insurance schemes, such as elderly, widows and seriously 
disabled people. In education, Secretary Margaret Thatcher significantly expanded the 
scope of provision, but on the other hand limited the provision of school milk to all 
pupils. It qualified her for the label "Margaret Thatcher, milk snatcher" (Timmins 1995, 
pp. 280-310; Laybourn 1995, pp. 241-245; Raison 1990, pp. 72-87). 
The first oil price crises of 1973 had a crucial influence on the fate of the Conservative 
government, as well as the miners' strike, following counter inflation policies. In fact, it 
put an unofficial end to the "golden age" of sustained economic growth, full 
employment and price stability. Raison wrote that, from this point on, "it was clear that 
social policy was of minor importance compared with the economic and industrial 
events of the day" (1990, p. 84). Peden noted that a combination of domestic 
deficiencies and industrial inefficiencies, insistence on strict indexation and high public 
expenditure added to the effect of the global turmoil and led Britain into stagflation 
(1985, p. 199).  
Politically, after two landslide elections, in 1974 the Labour government succeeded in 
winning a fragile majority that was diminished and regained in 1976. Its "Social 
Contract" with the trade unions was aimed at terminating inflation in exchange for a 
"social wage", but unfortunately, it had a limited effect on prices. On the other hand, the 
figures revealed a substantial increase in the level of benefits (Peden 1985, p. 206), as 
well as a record in government's public expenditure (Figure ‎2.2.3). The extensive efforts 
to stabilize the fragile British economy and break the cycle of inflation, Sterling 
devaluation and higher public expenditure eventually failed. It happened mainly 
because of economic reasons but also due to political restrictive decisions, press reports 
fuelling speculative monetary pressures and even crucial human errors in managing the 
already decided devaluation (Donoughue 1987).  















































Figure ‎2.2.3: Public expenditure as percentage of GDP in Britain from 1945 to 1998 
 (Source: Office of National Statistics, Social Trends 30)  
An important turning point was the 1975 budget in which the Labour government chose 
not to reflate the economy and introduced voluntary income policies. The inevitable 
consequence was the creation of unemployment, which symbolised not only the official 
abandonment of Keynesian demand theory (Burk and Cairncross 1992), but also the end 
to one of Beveridge's fundamental prepositions (Lowe 1993; Hill 1993). The striking 
words of Prime Minister James Callaghan a year afterwards were the most profound 
evidence of a new era in the life of the Labour Party, Britain and old socialism (Quoted 
in Donoughue 1987, p. 82): 
We have lived for too long on borrowed time, borrowed money… we 
used to think that you could just spend your way out of a recession 
and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government 
spending. I tell you in all candour, that option no longer exists, and 
that in so far as it ever did exist, it worked by injecting inflation into 
the economy. And each time that happened the average level of 
unemployment has risen. Higher inflation was followed by higher 
unemployment. That is the history of the last twenty years.  
To avoid a collapse of Sterling in 1976, the Labour government was forced to ask the 
International Monetary Fund for a loan and to declare its fiscal targets in a "Letter of 
Intent" (Barnett, 1982, pp. 97-111). The Labour "Social Contract" with the unions 
enabled the introduction of voluntary income policy, but it was gradually eroded and 
disrespected until its collapse in 1979, following the "day of action" and the "winter of 
discontent". Nevertheless, it is no less than remarkable that with the exception of a few 
ministers such as Anthony Crosland, the Labour government was the first to understand 
the need of monetarism and radical fiscal restriction (Donoughue, 1987, pp. 51-102). 
This shift was in line with new negative tendencies in public attitudes toward welfare 
spending: Apparently, the voters preferred a party that would eagerly perform cutbacks 
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rather than one that was reluctant to do so after it was bound, chained and humiliated by 
TUC leaders (Witheley 1981).  
Having said that, a variety of reasons had brought the Labour government's collapse in 
1979. Glennerster asserted the ideological change regarding monetarism was not 
profound by 1979, and therefore the failure of the income policy "left the Labour party 
without a policy on full employment or inflation… [while] the Conservative Party 
adopted a new economic philosophy with enthusiasm." On the other hand, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Dennis Healey blamed the Trade Unions' stubbornness, 
which "took the distribution of the nation's wealth out of my hands" (1989, p. 392). A 
similar allegation was made by the Senior Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister Bernard 
Donoughue, cynically asserting "there is no question that the public sector unions 
elected Mrs. Thatcher in 1979; indeed, she subsequently said thank you to them in her 
own individual way" (1987, p. 187). 
It cannot be said that Thatcher's intentions were not known in advance, although she did 
not declare straightforwardly her plans to chop social expenditures. The theme of 
freedom was eminent in her pre-election speeches, as her attitudes toward "the socialist 
government" and the collectivist welfare state were clearly stated (Harris 1997). 
Addressing the Conservative Political Centre in 1968, she vowed to keep only "the 
basic standards through the state would remain as a foundation for extra private 
provision" (p. 11). In a column published in 1975 in the Daily Telegraph she wrote, 
"one of the reasons for our electoral failure is that people believe too many 
Conservatives have become socialists already" (p. 18). In a speech delivered to young 
Conservatives in 1977 she stated, "we are not just anti socialist, nor primarily anti 
socialists; our opposition to socialism is just one corner of our vision." In the 
Conservative Party Manifesto for 1979 she promised to take from the Trade Unions "the 
power to abuse individual liberties and to thwart Britain's chances of success, to roll 
back the state and restore individual freedoms." 
Britain before the Thatcher era was indeed far from being equal by any criteria - public 
expenditure, personal income or the use, cost and outcome of public services (Le Grand, 
1982). However, the new Conservative regime was not at all preoccupied with 
redistribution. Two comments, one made by Thatcher in an interview to Woman's Own 
magazine and the other by John Moore, her Social Security Secretary, revealed the new 
governing premises as well as discourses, which dominated Britain from 1979. In her 
interview published in October 1987, Thatcher repeatedly argued, "there is no such 
thing as society" (Margaret Thatcher Foundation 3/12/2004): 
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I think we have gone through a period when too many children and 
people have been given to understand "I have a problem, it is the 
Government's job to cope with it!"… and so they are casting their 
problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There 
are individual men and women and there are families and no 
government can do anything except through people and people look 
to themselves first… 
John Moore complemented this extreme liberal view by arguing it is "the end of the line 
for poverty" (1989). Developing the "new-right" terminology, Moore urged people to 
"acknowledge British capitalism's true achievements'", among them the disappearance 
of the "stark want of Dickensian Britain" (quoted in Andrews & Jacobs 1990, p. xvii): 
What the new definition of relative poverty amounts to in the end is 
simply inequality. It means that however rich a society gets it will 
drag the incubus of relative poverty with it up the income scale. The 
poverty lobby would on their definition find poverty in Paradise.  
Meanwhile, during the Thatcher years, the academic concept of relative poverty became 
dominant.  Both Townsend's Poverty in the United Kingdom and Black's Inequality in 
Health should be credited for this conceptual change. The first found that a quarter of 
British citizens had experienced relative poverty (1979). The second proved that poverty 
kills, after showing that unskilled employees were two and a half times more likely to 
die before retirement age. Substantial "death gaps" between classes, it was suggested, 
had been stable for decades (1982). Ironically, following Thatcher's desire to 
marginalize the narrative of poverty, the new comprehensive concept of Social 
Exclusion emerged, extending the notion of deprivation into the various dimensions of 
participation in society (Hills at all 2002).  
In terms of policy decisions, Thatcher was obliged in her first years to meet the fiscal 
targets set by the IMF in 1976. However, she was less concerned with restricting 
incomes as her policy was premised on monetary mechanisms, namely the control of 
money supply through high interest rates (Michie & Wilkinson 1992). In fact, 
Keynesian scholars "found themselves exiled" from the corridors of power, unlike to 
Milton Freedman followers who were now warmly welcomed (Peden 1985, p. 219). As 
demonstrated in Figure ‎2.2.4, the outcome was extraordinary in terms of stabilizing 
prices, but devastating in terms of minimising unemployment. While the value of 
money was successfully retained after the second oil crisis of 1979, the number of 
unemployed doubled in two years to an historical record of more than 2 million people.  
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Figure ‎2.2.4: Unemployment and inflation in Britain from 1972 to 2001 
 (Source: Office of National Statistics 2004, OECD 
Quarterly Labour Force Statistics 2004) 
Two additional major policies were implemented during the two terms of Margaret 
Thatcher: mass privatisation and sharp raids against the power of the Trade Unions. 
Following six different Acts and one police crackdown as part of a miners‘ strike, the 
TUC had gradually lost power and members. During the 1980s, new legislation 
abolished trade unions‘ immunity against liability for damages of unlawful actions, 
changed the definition of legal strikes, forced a secret ballot in unions' elections and 
limited the length of tenure to five years (Roberts 1989). In addition, the government 
embarked on a massive campaign to sell its assets: by 1985, Cable and Wireless, British 
Telecom, British Airways, British Airports, National Bus, Jaguar, Land Rover, Sealink, 
Associated British Ports, British Shipbuilders and parts of British Steel – were all sold 
or planned to be sold (Butler & Butler 1986, p. 397-399).  
The radical reforms implemented before the 1987 General Elections finally succeeded 
to stabilize the Pound. Simultaneously, a Green Paper produced by the government 
offered to change the system's premises so that, in principle, "social security will be 
based on twin pillars of provision - individual and state - with stronger emphasis on 
individual provision than hitherto" (HMSO 1985a, p. 45). The subsequent White Paper, 
introduced after only six months, stated, "social security must not hinder growth - either 
in the way the system affects individuals or in the burden it places on the economy 
generally" (HMSO 1985b, p. 2).  
The papers introduced new policies, which included among others the abolition of State 
Earning-Related Pension Schemes for the benefit of occupational schemes, the 
introduction a family credit scheme to assist two-parent families, the substitution of 
welfare benefits with a basic rate of "income support" and the creation of discretionary 
limited "Social Fund" granting or loaning money to people who "cannot be sensibly 
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catered" for by income support. Having said that, welfare recipients were now obliged 
to pay at least 20 per cent of their local taxes (HMSO 1985a; HMSO 1985b).  
Other policies introduced during the 1980s were the "right to buy", which allowed 
council tenants to buy their homes at discounted prices to abolish "municipal 
monopoly"; the creation of a National Curriculum and unified testing system as well as 
the "opting out" option that enabled schools to receive public funds as semi-autonomous 
institutions; and the encouragement of private care and self-help in health provision as 
well as the introduction of self-governing hospitals within the NHS (Close 1992; 
Kavanagh & Seldon 1989; Glennerster 2000). In general, the goal in all fields of policy 
was to reduce state involvement and encourage choice for consumers. Regarding public 
expenditure, the policy was that "finance must determine expenditure, not expenditure 
finance" (Raison 1990, p. 108).  
While at first sight the aggregated social effect of Thatcherism is hard to analyze, a 
closer look at the figures clearly illustrates the outcome of this period in terms of 
expenditure, poverty and inequality. In spite of the rhetoric of Margaret Thatcher, social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP was not reduced but slightly increased during her 
period in office. Apparently, the main impact of the reforms had been to reduce the 
incomes of the poor, with almost no cumulative effect on the total budget (Glennerster 
2000, p. 171; Evans et al. 1994, p. 79). An empirical study found the people who 
suffered the most between 1985 and 1994 were unemployed couples with children and 
lone parent families (Giles and Johnson 1994).  
As demonstrated in Figure ‎2.2.5, following Thatcher's reforms, the unemployment and 
family cash benefits' budget was indeed falling, but overall the government spent more 
money on social provision. In a few incidents, expenditure was shifted from one 
budget‘s section to another (thus, instead of subsidizing public housing rent, the money 
was shifted to housing benefits as part as the social security budget). Overall, public 
expenditure was slightly reduced as already illustrated in Figure ‎2.2.3, though the 
reduction was specifically modest compared to the opening statement in Thatcher's first 
fiscal White Paper - "Public expenditure is at the heart of Britain's economic 
difficulties" (HMSO 1979).  
Furthermore, Hills found that despite the significant cutbacks in income taxes, higher 
VAT rates actually led to a rise in the overall tax burden during 1973 to 1997 (1998, 
2000). More striking is the fact that the poorest decile of households paid the highest tax 
rates in 1998, as VAT had a significant regressive impact. Official statistics show that 
while the poorest decile paid 55 per cent of its disposable income as National Insurance 
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Contributions, local, direct and indirect taxes, the richest decile paid only 47 per cent of 
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Figure ‎2.2.5: Social expenditures in Britain as percentage of GDP between 1980 and 1997 
 (Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database 2004) 
At the bottom line, in terms of income distribution, the rich became richer and the poor 
became larger and poorer during the 1980s (Goodman & Webb 1994). While the Gini 
coefficient in 1979 after housing costs was 0.257 and the poorest decile earned 4.65 per 
cent of the total income, in 1991 the Gini coefficient soared to 0.365 and the income of 
the poorest decile dropped to 3 per cent (pp. a2-a3). There were more than a million 
new unemployed (p. a1) and the proportion of people earning below half of the mean 
income soared from 8 per cent in 1977 to 20 per cent in 1991 (p. a12). As Figure 2.2.7 
illustrates, during the Thatcher years equality was generally diminishing while poverty 















Figure ‎2.2.6: Shares of the poorest and the richest deciles in income and proportion of people 
earning less than half of the mean income in Britain from 1961 to 1991  
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Hills demonstrated the extreme inequalities with a method first used by the Dutch 
economist Jan Pen, describing a parade of stretched or squashed people (1995). He 
found that the person halfway through the parade, representing the median income, is 
only 4ft 10ins. Nearly two thirds of the parade are below the average while the shortest 
ones must live below ground as they have negative incomes. At the top, the richest 
couple have a height of 15ft 8ins and the super rich could have been 4 miles tall. 
John Major was elected to replace Thatcher following her defeat in the leadership 
challenge of 1990. However, with very few exceptions, Major followed and 
implemented the reforms of his predecessor. Old themes such as immigration control, 
family values, fraud and abuse of the benefits system become eminent again, while a 
novel "Citizen Charter" defining the citizen as a costumer symbolically reflected 
another controversial shift towards the terminology, costumes and possibly outcomes of 
free markets (Glennerster 2000; Ellison & Pierson 1998).  
Although there was an overall reduction in unemployment, poverty and inequality 
remained high throughout Major's period (NOS 2003; DWP 2004). Public spending was 
significantly reduced, but the overall burden of taxation increased as the government 
borrowed less money (Hills 1998). The most alarming development was the continual 
rise in child poverty: by the end of Major's premiership in 1997, one of every three 
children in Britain lived below the poverty line. Among lone families, the proportion 
was almost twice as high (Sutherland, Sefton and Piachaud 2003). These figures were 
not helpful for Major's election campaign, to say the least.  
A comparative review of the Labour and the Conservative manifestos reveals the 
differences in the parties‘ attitudes toward the poor throughout the 1990s. While the 
Conservatives' 1992 manifesto pledged to "keep firm control over public spending" and 
"continue to reduce taxes as fast as we prudently can" (1992, p. 5), the Labour Party 
vowed to attack poverty, proclaiming that "the most effective way to reduce poverty 
quickly is to increase child benefits and pensions and take low paid people out of 
taxation‖ (1992, p. 12). While the Conservatives believed, "those who create prosperity 
should enjoy it, through lower taxes and more opportunity to build up personal wealth" 
(p. 6), the Labour Party wanted employees to "have the opportunity to own collectively 
a significant stake in the company for which they work" (p. 14). Overall, the 
Conservatives' discourse rests upon responsibilities, privatisation, tax reductions, free 
economy and an attempt to "focus" social security, whereas the Labour Party's discourse 
was that of jobs, fair taxes and public services.  
It should be emphasised that the Labour manifesto of 1992 did not mention even once 
the words "redistribution", "inequalities" and "welfare". In 1997, the slogans of 
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"Welfare to Work" (pp. 18-19), "prosperity for all" (pp. 10-11) and "tackling inequality" 
(pp. 2-3) were considerably more dominant. The Tories, on the other hand, continued to 
emphasise security, choice, low taxes and economic prosperity. In their 1997 manifesto 
the Conservatives clearly stated that the social security system should take a "steadily 
declining  share of our national income… by focusing benefits on those most in need" 
(p. 19). Whereas the Labour manifesto's headline was "New Labour because Britain 








Figure ‎2.2.7: Categorisation of the British welfare regimes since 1948 
The transparent manifestos enabled a plain categorisation of the British Welfare 
Regimes. As demonstrated in Figure ‎2.2.7, by the end of the 1970s all parties realized 
the urgency of cutting public expenditure and moving to monetary tools of policy. 
These inclinations were harmful for the poor of two reasons: they were more dependent 
on public services and they were in greater need to borrow rather than save money. 
Hence, if the Beveridgian model served as the archetype of Social Democrat regimes, 
Thatcher's policies easily entered the place of liberal ones.  
In Furniss & Tilton's terminology, while Beveridge resided upon premises of the Social 
welfare state, Thatcher implemented a stricter model of Social Security State. Benefits 
were therefore reduced in order not to stifle private initiative and devalue self-
responsibility. On the other hand, Tony Blair's policies incorporated universal elements 
and facilitated redistribution by tax credits and other hidden and unhidden tools. There 
was a shift in 1997, and Britain has been back on a ―new Social Democrat‖ regime, after 
18 years of liberalism. Without entering the debate around the politics of the Third Way 
(Pierson 2001), several egalitarian policies were implemented under the "New Labour" 
government. Welfare regimes are always hybrids. Yet, it seems as Britain‘s direction 
since 1997 was less liberal and more social-democrat, according to the definitions of 
Esping-Andersen (1990), Furniss & Tilton (1979) and Titmuss (1974).  
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2.3 The Israeli Welfare State 
The Israeli welfare state was founded as a pragmatic compromise of socialism. 
However, its story goes far beyond competing ideologies held by political parties . It 
can easily be taken to the tragedy of the socialist Party ("Mapai"/‖Labour‖), which had 
been leading to the exclusion of a whole generation of African-Asian immigrants. The 
social pledges often made by the national right wing Party ("Likud") were eventually 
found as neo-liberal words. Thus, what began with strong, almost hegemonic, socialist 
agenda of the workers‘ party, turned out to be a different regime than expected.  
There are many explanations to the breakdown of the socialist agenda. Primarily, 
security considerations, of the kind that spiritually damages rather than constructs a 
healthy society, have had a considerable impact on state policies. Too often existential 
threats preceded desires of distributive justice or even formal egalitarianism. It affected 
the academy as well. There are only two research centres exploring exclusively issues of 
Social Policy, and not even one academic department devoted solely to this discipline.  
Professor Richard Titmuss, as a member of the Anglo-Israel Association, had visited 
Israel often during the 1960s. After exploring Britain‘s failure to redistribute income 
and wealth he said, "what is needed is a balance of economic and social growth" (1965, 
p. 14). However, while in the Israeli government, strategic and planning units were 
largely vanished, a deliberate policy of balancing different sorts of growth could hardly 
be created. This section aspires to elaborate on these issues, providing an overview of 
the major occurrences shaping the Israeli welfare state between 1948 and 2001. 
Two turning points are identified here, none of which is related directly to the political 
machinery. The first occurred in 1971 with the establishment of the "Black Panthers 
Movement", which virtually formed the first grass roots ethnic social resistance. The 
second point followed a dreadful period of hyperinflation, leading in 1985 to the 
"Economic Stabilisation Program", which resided on the freezing of wages, prices, 
money printing and public expenditure. Recent policies imposed by former Finance 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from 2002 might constitute another turning point, but 
they are out of this study's scope.  
Before discussing policies, a focus on two founding sources of power, namely Judaism 
and Zionism, is essential. Broadly speaking, the former vested its faith in salvation by 
the Messiah while the latter conceived land cultivation in Israel as the only possible 
redemption for the Jewish peoplehood. Each is derived from a distinct conceptual 
world, incorporating different narratives, premises, values and goals. Nevertheless, in 
1948 these super-powers constituted the pillars of the newly born state.  
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Judaism as a religion preaches modesty, kindness, sharing and assisting the poor by 
charity ("Tsedaka"), as well as cooperation. Linguistically, "Tsedaka" in Hebrew is 
almost synonymous to the word justice, "Tsedek‖. The biblical texts themselves sanctify 
diversity and mutual respect, and they are loaded with social inferences. The Fourth 
Commandment orders the cessation of any work on the seventh day, referring explicitly 
to any manservant, maidservant and stranger "that is within thy gates" (Exodus 20:2-
14). The People of Israel are also ordered, "You shall not wrong a stranger or oppress 
him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Exodus 22:21-24). The Jewish Oral 
Laws ("Mishna") defined a pious person as one willing to contribute to charity 
regardless of others' contributions and as one ready to offer his belongings to others for 
no reward, believing that "what is mine is yours, and what is yours is yours" (The Ethics 
of Our Fathers, 5:13-16). This is arguably the most ancient form of socialism.  
In the 11
th
 century, approximately a thousand years after the "Mishna" was signed, the 
distinguished Jewish Rabbi, Maimonides described the "eight levels of charity". 
Remarkably, the highest virtue urged the formation of a partnership with the poor, 
rather than mere contribution, so they will not be dependent on others (Mishne Tora, 
Sefer Zeraim, 10:7). Another outstanding text was written by Ibn Gabirol in the 16
th
 
century. Referring to the sin of building the Tower of Babel, the Spanish Rabbi almost 
anticipated, in detail, a major challenge faced by modern societies (Sefer Ha'Agada): 
Originally, man shared one universal language and all their 
possessions were common to them all. No man had any private 
property. Everything was in common, just like their language. But 
when they engaged in building the city and tower and the invention 
of artificial works, they forsook their universal brotherhood and 
established private property, through barter and monopolization 
prompted by their covetousness to take everyone for himself and say 
"Mine is mine and yours yours." 
Contrary to Judaism, modern Zionism as a secular national movement was premised 
largely on the ethos of Labour and pioneering spirit, although fierce debates about 
socialism have never ceased. On one hand, were the pragmatic leaders or the "Political 
Zionists". Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, planned the poor would be 
the first to immigrate and "cultivate the soil", as "only the desperate make good 
conquerors." He offered a system of "relief by Labour", furnishing every needy person 
with an easy, unskilled job (1896/1988, pp. 155, 93).  
On the other hand, were the idealist groups. One of them, known as the "Spiritual 
Zionists", were led by the charismatic figure of Asher Ginzburg, better known under his 
pseudonym of Achad Ha'am, ―One of the People‖ in Hebrew. He maintained the Jewish 
State must first constitute a spiritual centre for the Jewish Diaspora, before encountering 
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the physical threat to individuals (1907/1916). Furthermore, he was one of the first 
Zionists to warn that Palestine is not an empty land and the Jews must not humiliate the 
Arab population (Avineri 1981). Discussing social issues in his ―At a Crossroad‖, 
Achad Ha‘am contended that Herzl was never genuinely interested in resolving the 
social question, but rather the Jewish one. He argued that the route to redemption must 
first meet the social challenge if it is to succeed (1902-1913).  
Eventually, "Socialist Zionism" emerged as a dominant political force, which "shaped 
the character of the Zionist movement and subsequently of the State of Israel, to a 
greater extent than any other group" (Laqueur 1972, p. 270)
1
. The Socialist, Nachum 
Sirkin and the Marxist, Ber Borochov had succeeded, in fact, in creating a synthesis of 
Zionism with class ideology. Syrkin asserted Jews were always on the wrong side of the 
social struggle and, since anti-Semitism was fuelled by class relationships, only a new 
socialist society with no private property could solve the Jewish problem. Borochov 
sought to justify Zionism in Marxist terms, contending the social structure of the Jews 
was an "inverted pyramid‖, with no proletariat. He argued, therefore, that only when 
Jews have a proletariat of their own would racial hate disappear (Avineri 1981; 
Lanqueur 1972).  
The "Kibbutzim" (communal villages) and the "Histadrut" (General Federation of 
Labour) are the two major remnants of this period. Regarding the former, it could be 
argued that what began with a strong faith in ideological egalitarian revolution, 
culminated in a total financial breakdown, a privatisation processes, accompanied by 
continuing requests for public funding (Ben Rafael 1997; Dar 2002). The ―Histadrut‖ 
began as a humble "pioneering constructivism" of 4,433 workers in 1920. After the 
Establishment of Israel, it held shares in major industries all over the country. However, 
it ended up as a bankrupted Labour Union that sold most of its major asserts, except a 
few real estates, rarely capable of reviving their nostalgic memories (Tzahor 1996). 
After briefly exploring some of the origins of Judaism and Zionism, the merits and 
fineness concealed in the Declaration of Independence, which integrated these two 
worlds, can be better understood. It stated that the new State "will ensure complete 
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or 
sex" (Provisional Government of Israel 1948). Yet, whereas a strong sense of 
universalism could be inferred from the declaration, it was collectivism that prevailed, 
but to a limited extent and for a limited and privileged group.  
                                                 
1
  An alternative, radical narrative, coming from non-Zionist or Post-Zionist circles, argued Socialism served only as a 
rhetorical means to mobilise the masses and legitimize the creation of a Jewish state (Sternhall 1998; Schulman 
2003).  
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Historically, two separate welfare systems operated in the territory before 1948. The 
Jewish religious movement had assisted its own needy affiliates with money donated 
from abroad in order to allow scholars to study Torah ("Haluka Funds"). In parallel, the 
Zionist national movement channelled its provision through two organisations, The 
General Federation of Labour ("Histadrut") provided social insurance and health 
services and the Labour Company ("Hevrat Ovdim") aimed at holding and managing 
companies "on behalf" of the proletariat.  
After the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Welfare Ministry took control of most of 
the religious provision, as well as the British Mandate‘s indigent social services. 
Simultaneously, the "Histadrut" flourished, supported directly by Prime Minister David 
Ben Gurion, who chaired the union beforehand (Doron & Kramer 1992; Neipris 1984; 
Doron et al. 1969; Kanev 1945). Until the late 1980s, the ―Histadrut‖‘s assets 
guaranteed its robust grip on the entire market. On behalf of the proletariat, the Labour 
Company actively managed the leading commercial bank (―Bank Ha‘poalim‖) and the 
largest holding company (―Kur‖), playing an abnormally dominant part in all markets. 
Their prominence collapsed within a few years, not least because of corruption, 
excessive bureaucracy and liberal ideology. 
Factually, devastating losses have led to the holding firm‘s financial collapse by the end 
of the eighties. Years later, ―Kur‖ was sold to cover the losses of the Labour Union. As 
for the other major assets, the nationalisation of all commercial banks in Israel 
following a stock exchange crisis in 1984, had stripped the ―Histadrut‖ from its key 
financial oxygen mask. The "Histadrut‖‘s monopoly over health provision had ended by 
1995, after a controversial reform shifted the monthly payments from the bankrupted 
Labour Union‘s hospitals to the State. The inefficient and non-transparent grip of the 
―Histadrut‖ over pension funds has eroded during the 1990s, but reached its final stages 
during 2002. Today, almost nothing was left from the historic leviathan, except its role 
as a Labour Union.  
Understanding  the internal composition of Israeli society is a needed in order to assess 
the development of welfare policy. Sociologists would argue Israel faces four major 
cleavages: "Ashkenazi" vs. "Sephardic", Jews vs. Arabs, Orthodox vs. Secular and 
Immigrants vs. Veterans
2
. Above all, the ―Melting Pot‖ concept reflects an ethos  
                                                 
2
   The pioneers of the State of Israel immigrated from Europe and America ("Ashkenazim") and constituted 89 per 
cent of the 380,000 Jews who entered Israel between 1919 and 1948. After the creation, massive immigration from 
poorer Asian and African countries changed the ethnic composition of Israel. In 2003, 29 per cent of the citizens 
were "Sephardic" and 41 per cent "Ashkenazi" (CBS 2004, Tables 2.1, 2.21, 4.2). The Muslim Arab minority in Israel 
constitutes 16 per cent of the whole population. Initially, this minority was merely 8.5 per cent, but significant higher 
rates of birth changed the demographic balance (CBS 2004, Table 2.1). A third cleavage lies in the religious 
dimension:  In 2002, 5 per cent defined themselves as Ultra-Orthodox, 8 per cent as Orthodox, 35 per cent as 
"traditional" and the others as traditional or secular (CBS 2004, Table 7.4). The fourth minority group consists of 
new immigrants who arrived after 1990. During this period, 908,000 Russians and 50,000 Ethiopians settled in 
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of diversity and shared values, enabling the mixture of various groups under one state 
authority. If pluralism is measured by criteria of language, race, religion and 
sectionalism then Israel is no less pluralistic than the United States and Britain (Haug 
1967).  
However, there are significant inequalities within these cleavages, generated by State 
policies as well as cultural, educational, demographic and economic differences. 
Oversimplifying the state of affairs for the purpose of illustration, Arabs and Orthodox 
are more likely to be in poverty, but they also have significantly higher birth rates than 
secular Jews. Sephardic Jews, Arabs, Orthodox and Immigrants are consistently over-
represented in the major deprivation indexes (see, for instance, Smooha 1978; Swirski 
& Konnor-Attias 2004; Lewin-Epstein & Semyonov 1993; Kraus & Hodge 1990; and 
























Ultra Orthodox Orthodox Traditional Secular Other
 
* Veterans: Father was born in Israel; ** Others: Mainly the Arab population.   
Figure ‎2.3.1: Demographic figures of the four major social cleavages in Israel of 2003 
(Source: CBS 2004, Tables 2.1, 2.25, 2.26, 7.4).   
Note: All the above pie charts represent the entire Israeli population [6,690,000 
people], aside of the Religious pie, which refers to Israelis above the age of 20 
Assessing the socio-demographic indicators of the minority groups, many would argue 
that between 1948 and 1971 Israel, consciously or unconsciously, tolerated wider 
inequalities. Relatively low resources were allocated for inclusive policies, whereas the 
ethos was that of work and labour. Stunned by its heroic establishment, blinded by its 
military superiority and overwhelmed by short periods of prosperity, the apparatus 
                                                                                                                                               
Israel, enlarging its population by a fifth (CBS 2004, Tables 2.1, 2.25, 2.26). Broadly speaking, the Muslim Arab and 
the ultra orthodox minorities do not serve in the army. The ultra orthodox are significantly less engaged in the labour 
market as most of them receive state funding directly or indirectly. 
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provided a fragile safety net with no designated treatment to bridge the profound 
cultural and educational gaps of the new Sephardic immigrants. 
The first serious attempt to outline a welfare policy was in 1950. The "Scheme for 
Social Insurance in Israel", equivalent to the Beveridge plan, advocated universal health 
services and compulsory social insurance against illness, work accidents, disabilities, 
ageing, orphanhood and unemployment. The committee, led by Isaac Kanev, paid 
tribute to the pre-state social provision of Jewish and Zionist institutions, but stated it 
"observed a fundamental deficit derived from lack of legislation for compulsory 
insurance" (State of Israel 1950, p. 48). Kanev, although strongly disappointed by the 
lack of social planning in the following years, noted the unique circumstances that 
existed in these times (1964, p. 2):  
The future historians studying this epoch will hardly be able to 
understand how it was possible that the leaders of a small country in 
the midst of a struggle to life and death… had vision and courage to 
plan and prepare the first social laws, pass them in the Knesset and 
carry them into practice as early as the summer of 1949.  
However, the conclusions of the committee were only partially adopted. The National 
Insurance Institute was indeed established in 1953, but provided neither health services 
nor unemployment insurance. While the earlier recommendation faced a robust 
resistance of the "Histadrut", backed by the ruling Labour Party, the latter reflected the 
hegemonic premise of that time, according which labour was the solely acceptable way 
of life. Hence, it is an individual right as well as a collective duty to guarantee 
employment opportunities if the markets fail to do so. Another contested area of policy 
was pensions, leaving the NII to provide a low elderly benefit as the basic pension 
pillar, to be supplemented by private funds managed almost exclusively by the 
"Histadrut" (Doron et al. 1969; Neipris 1984; Tzinamon 1964). 
Welfare benefits were marginalized during the first decade for ideological reasons as 
well as scarce resources. In fact, there were neither binding criteria for entitlement to 
benefits nor any official logic behind their appropriate rate. After his visit to Israel, 
Titmuss concluded, "this large area of discretion in dealing with the poor… allows 
moral judgements to operate" (1965, p. 17), and indeed, immigrants, transit camps' 
residents and the elderly were the major groups suffering from discriminatory decisions 
of bureaucrats (Klain 1959).  
 
The 1958 Act for Welfare Services was not much of a difference. It imposed several 
obligations on local authorities but defined neither government's duties toward 
municipalities nor the rights of the citizens themselves (Kurtz 1968). A professional 
The Poverty of Democracy 51 
 
committee appointed in 1963 was asked to fill this void by defining the necessities of 
life, but after four years, it failed to reach conclusions, noting that such definition 
involves moral and political judgment (Doron et al. 1969). Years later, an inspiring 
legal challenge endeavoured to overturn a cutback in income support benefits resided on 
a similar argument, maintaining the government ignores its elementary duty to enable 
citizens ―life with dignity‖. This bright appeal was eventually overruled by the Israeli 
High Court of Justice, which was not convinced that there should be an absolute 
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Figure ‎2.3.2: Immigration to Israel by ethnic origins between 1919 and 2003 
 (Source: CBS 2004, Table 4.2) 
As for decades, no serious effort was made to relieve poverty and reduce inequalities, 
economic gaps perpetuated, especially between "Ashkenazi" and "Sephardic" Jews, 
leaving scars that would later turn out to be irremovable. As illustrated in Figure ‎2.3.2, a 
significant flow of Asian-African Jews arrived in Israel after 1948, facing similar 
treatment by the veteran establishment. It can be argued, that while the ultra orthodox 
and the Arabs were to some extent "voluntary excluded", or isolated according to 
Barry's distinction (2002), the "Sephardic" Jews were marginalized by state policies, 
even if the leaders‘ intentions cannot be verified today. 
One of the famous violent episodes motivated by the mounting inequalities occurred in 
Vadi Salib slum in Haifa on July 1959. Dozens of police officers and Moroccan 
immigrants clashed following a false rumour regarding the killing of a drunken 
community member by police gunfire. The official committee appointed to study the 
looming events was astonished to discover "parts of the Moroccan community are 
loaded with deep feelings of discrimination and inequality… excluded from the 
mainstream of the society" (1959). Nonetheless, the first uprising in Israel on ethnic 
grounds had almost no influence on state welfare policies.  
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The Income Maintenance Scheme for elderly who were not entitled to NII pensions is a 
unique illustration of the unfair treatment given to the underprivileged during the 1950s. 
It was Professor Abraham Doron, who tracked the tactics used by the State to cut its 
expenditure on benefits. Among other things, information about entitlement was 
deliberately hidden from the elderly to prevent them from exercising their rights, 
deprived populations entitled to benefits were intentionally refused, and bureaucracy 
was deliberately exaggerated on purpose to frustrate and deter potential recipients. 
Additionally, benefits were significantly eroded over the years, proving once again that 
welfare for the poor becomes poor welfare (Doron 1997).  
The scheme was an alarming experiment, but it was not exceptional in Israel of the 
1950s. Only in 1973, the poor were provided with legal service aimed at raising their 
awareness of their legal rights. Ongoing neglect dominated other fields as well, harming 
individuals from specific ethnic origins. Many "Sephardic" immigrants, for instance, 
were not provided with decent housing for years. Some were forced to stay in transit 
camps while others were sent to slums in the periphery. Secondary and higher education 
was not affordable for everyone, especially not within deprived areas, while school 
meals turned out to be marginalizing and stigmatizing (Doron 1972).  
Social mobility within the labour market was very limited considering the educational 
gaps, cultural differences and poor public transportation infrastructure that prevailed 
until recent years (Lewin-Epstein & Semyonov 1986). Statistically, 64 per cent of the 
"Sephardic" Jews were defined in 1961 as "proletariat", double then the proportion of 
the "Ashkenazi" Jews (Ben-Porat 1992).  Consequently, instead of becoming an 
inclusive society, a dangerous notion of "The Second Israel" (similar in a sense to 
Disraeli's Two Nations, though still far away from the definition of an underclass) 
penetrated Israeli society by the end of the decade.  
Although the ideological hold of the labour ethos was loosing height during the 1960s, 
the Welfare Ministry had not reformed its policies. Even after the 1958 Welfare 
Services Act, benefits were still stigmatising and often means-tested as the system relied 
on family assistance, implicitly blaming the poor for their own hardship (Yaffa 1969; 
Doron & Kramer 1992). In fact, Moshe Kurtz, Director General of the Welfare 
Ministry, argued himself in 1964, "There are still people who prefer their ignorance 
upon allowing themselves or their children to acquire knowledge through our open 
access educational systems" (Kurtz 1975, p. 60). It was another proof of the looming 
polarization between two nations. Titmuss referred to this issue, apparently exposing 
some other hidden premises held by the establishment (1965, p. 17, 20):   
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You cannot have two definitions of poverty in Israel, one for the older 
immigrants with a different background and different standards of 
living, and another definition of poverty for the new immigrants and 
their children… I don't think Israel has yet fully understood what may 
be some of the psychological consequences to people – the emotional 
stresses as these children grow up – of the rapidly forced acceptance 
of different cultural values.  
The absence of long-term planning was evident. Ben-Or contested it was a functional 
process, allowing decision makers to avoid any contested ideological verdicts that could 
have risked their political future (1973). Doron maintained the entire policy was "more 
a side effect of historic evolution, inertia and political pressures", contending that "the 
idleness in social policy was worse than any other field of our government" (Hebrew 
University 1969, p. 7). Even Kurtz, under his official capacity, urged the government to 
"revive comprehensive social planning instead of the accidentalness prevailing today" 
(Histadrut 1965, p. 15). Ben-Zadok put a "secondary blame" on the academy, arguing 
that a lack of planning is a historical phenomenon in Israel, failing for one hundred 
years to link ideology and implementation (1985). Nonetheless, during the 1960s the 
government finally had an opportunity to settle down, develop its existing services and 
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Figure ‎2.3.3: Rates of unemployment and long term 
unemployment in Israel between 1955 and 2004 
 (Source: CBS 2004, Table 12.1) 
Although no radical policy reforms were implemented until the end of the 1960s, the 
social uprising as well as new academic studies had gradually broken the illusion of an 
egalitarian society (Doron et al. 1969; Meshel 1970; Elitzur 1969; Histadrut 1965). The 
share of the poorest fifth in the total income, for instance, dropped from 7 to 4.7 per 
cent between 1948 and 1968. Only 7.2 per cent of the "Sephardic" Jews were in the 
wealthy fifth compared to 32 per cent of the "Ashkenazi" Jews (Verter & Shamai 1971). 
The Gini coefficient rose from 0.30 in 1965 to 0.36 during 1968, before gradually 
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declining until it reached 0.28 in 1976 (Dahan 2002; Sharel 2002). Nevertheless, it 
should be emphasised that the overall effect of taxes, contributions and benefits reduced 
the Gini index by  15.9 per cent during 1969 (Habib 1975). 
The years of 1966 and 1967, before the Six Days War, had seen Israel experiencing a 
grave economic recession. As illustrated in Figure ‎2.3.3, unemployment soared to a 
record of 10.4 per cent in 1967 after the government policy of artificially creating jobs 
outside the private market failed to deliver. The incredible war triumph indeed halted 
the deterioration, though an institutional effort to legalize unemployment insurance was 
already underway. Yigal Alon, the Minister for Work, presented the fundamentals of the 
new policy in the Knesset during February 1967, setting up a historical turning point for 
the Labour government (Alon 1967):  
Members of the Knesset, I shall not conceal my view that initiated 
employment is preferable by any means to unemployment benefits. 
Nevertheless, we must provide such awards when we fail to create 
jobs or when the unemployed physically cannot take the job we offer. 
Of course, those capable of work will have to accept any offer; 
otherwise, their benefits will be withdrawn. 
The ideological barriers should not be underestimated. The collision of values and the 
breakdown of old traditions received a rare reflection in the report of a special 
committee appointed to examine the issue. Submitting its recommendations in 1968, it 
suggested combining the new insurance with the previous policy of job creation, stating, 
"Every man must know he has a legitimate right for employment or for an alternative 
income if our society failed to provide him one… The unemployed should perceive 
benefits as a right derived from the law rather than a favour out of mercy" (State of 




Nevertheless, the revolutionary forces within Israeli society were still bubbling. What 
begun as sporadic uprisings in Haifa on July 1959, turned into a national movement 
called "The Black Panthers", established in 1971. It was a rare moment of massive 
"Sephardic" defiance against the ―establishment‖. Kokhavi Shemesh, a movement 
leader, described his motives by recalling the story of a family that for twenty years "sat 
in rotting buildings" in Musrara, a poor neighborhood in Western Jerusalem. As he 
described it, "all that time [they] were told that the military situation prevented the 
improvement of their living conditions", while on the other side of the neighbourhood, 
                                                 
3
  Between 1970/1971 a new policy to subsidize low wage earners was implemented. It was found though that a third 
of the working poor families were not qualified for subsidy, while many non-poor did receive it. Consequently, the 
scheme was replaced by family benefits in 1972 (Doron & Roter 1978). 
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luxury apartments have sprung up, given entirely to "Ashkenazi" new immigrants. 
Resentment and anger were evident in every quotation of the Black Panthers, and 
Shemesh himself (Cohen & Shemesh 1976, pp. 21-22): 
All the political parties had been talking about doing away with the 
poverty problem, but since they did nothing, some young people got 
together to raise the problem… We just have to work for a society with 
social justice and equality and an opportunity to abolish the private 
accumulation of capital.  
Isn't that what is called "socialist"? 
I've never leaned what socialism or Marxism are. If what I am 
describing is socialism, then let it be socialism. Definitions aren't 
important to me… Many people, including myself, have come to the 
conclusion that Zionism hasn't solved anything for us... Zionism solved 
Rabinowitz's problem [a typical Ashcenazi surname – g.a.] without 
doing a thing for Buzaglo [a typical Sephardic surname – g.a.].  
A series of demonstrations and additional violent clashes with the police had forced 
Prime Minister Golda Meir‘s agreement to meet the resistance leaders. This famous 
meeting is still remembered as an embarrassing symbol for arrogance. After Meir 
offered the Panthers her personal cigarettes, she was interested to know their personal 
history as well as their criminal record, consistently exhorting them to be patient and 
stop demonstrating. Meir concluded the meeting with a few words that turned into an 
idiom in Israel: "They are not lovely."  
Symbolically, in the Social Science Library at Tel Aviv University there is not even one 
book covering exclusively the only significant grass-roots struggle for equality in Israel. 
The wonder becomes even bigger given that the Welfare Ministry itself admitted 
officially that "during the last two years, Israeli society has been agitated by the 
recognition that socio economic differences are deepening and social tensions are 
growing" (1972, p. 3). Dr. Sami Shalom-Shitrit, a Sephardic left-wing scholar, even 
argued that the Black Panthers' tremendous success was deliberately marginalised and 
veiled by the Ashkenazi establishment, portrayed as a negative stain in the history of the 
Jewish State (www.kedma.co.il/Panterim/Panterim.htm, Retrieved: 2 January 2005):  
Today I am arguing with no doubt: The Black Panthers were the "Big 
Bang", the generator of a whole social struggle in Israel. They have 
started and formulated all of it. Israel before March 1971 was a 
different state, a state in which an economical and cultural depression 
was received with submission by the Sephardic Jews with the 
exception of few, sporadic outbursts… It is only a matter of time until 
the oppressed masses will fight back.   
Even though Prime Minister Meir refused to give legitimacy to the Black Panthers, she 
appointed two professional committees to review governmental policies regarding 
income distribution and distress among children and youth. Doron & Kramer attributed 
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this decision, which brought an expansion of the welfare state, to the fear of further 
uprising (1992). Indeed, public expenditure and transfer payments did soar to a record 
level, though the devastating loss in the 1973 Yom Kippur War terminated this process. 
The sudden attack on a holy day of fasting, the scandalous investigation regarding the 
"conceptual collapse" of the Israeli intelligence, an inconceivable loss of more than 
2,000 soldiers and the subsequent peace treaty between Israel and Egypt - all helped to 
put the "social genie" back in the bottle. 
Several reforms did take place during the 1970s. Child benefits significantly increased 
after they were converted to tax allowances in 1975. A new policy to subsidize low 
wage earners was implemented
4
, and unemployment benefits were paid from 1973. A 
massive integration process took place in schools, whereas higher education was 
dramatically expanded. Most significant was the comprehensive reform of the tax 
system. Finally, decision makers directed attention to inequality and poverty, easing 
NII's insurance criteria and expanding its social scope (Doron & Kramer 1992; Neipris 
1984; Roter & Shamal 1976). In fact, as Figure ‎2.3.4 and Figure ‎2.3.5 demonstrate, 
social expenditure and transfer payments increased dramatically during the decade, 
reaching a record of 21.6 per cent in 1977. Kop found an average annual increase of 8 
percent in social expenditure over this period (1990, p. 96) while according to Dahan's 
calculations, in 1976, the Gini coefficient for gross incomes was 0.281, reaching an all-























































































































































































































Tax Burden Public Expenditures Transfer Payments
 
Figure ‎2.3.4: Transfer payments, public expenditure and tax burden in 
Israel as a percentage of the GDP between 1960 and 2000 
                                                 
4
  The scheme was canceled a short time afterwards, as it was found that about a third of the working poor families did 
not qualify for this subsidy while many non-poor did. It was therefore replaced by family benefits during 1972 (Doron 
& Roter 1978). 
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 (Source: BOI 2005, Tables 5:1:1, 5:7).  
Note: In 1980, the Bank of Israel amended its measurement methods. 
These measures were probably too little and too late for the Labour party to regain 
popularity. Paradoxically, when both social expenditure and inequality levels were at 
historic record levels, a first political upheaval occurred in Israel. In 1977, The Labour 
Party ("Mapai") had lost its electoral majority and was replaced by the National Party 
("Likud"), which had never been in government before. It was one of the founding 
moments in Israeli politics, which not only terminated the growth of a ―super power‖ in 
political terms, but also uprooted an entire hegemony.  
The socio-economic pledges of the National right-wing party were hardly sustainable, 
especially considering the fiscal developments that took place from 1973. Public 
expenditure financed partially by money printing, soared to almost 80 per cent of GDP 
and generated inconceivable inflationary pressure. While in 1977 prices went up by  
34.6 per cent, in 1980 inflation escalated to 131 per cent and, by 1984, it threatened to 
crumble the whole economy with an annual inflation rate of 374 per cent (BOI 2005, 
Table 3:1).  
The monetary catastrophe had implications in almost all areas of policy. As happened in 
Britain to a much lesser extent, it embarked on a vicious circle in which increased 
salaries and benefits led to higher public expenditure, which, in turn, boosted demand, 
lifted prices, and induced the Labour Union to demand revision of salary agreements 
signed the month before. Israel smoothly tumbled into severe stagflation with growth 
rates of 1.4 per cent in 1982, compared to 12.2 per cent in 1972 (BOI 2005, Table 2:1).  
This process was utterly unconstructive for the underprivileged. Indexation of benefits 
was never designed to be effective in an annual inflation rate of almost 400 per cent, 
whereas the recession itself froze the pie, leaving fewer resources for progressive 
redistribution (Kop 1983; Sharel 2002). Time intervals between benefit adjustments 
were gradually dropped from one year to one month, though even this arrangement 
began to lag behind the hyperinflation of 1984. Consequently, poverty soared by 19.4 
per cent while inequality in net incomes measured by the Gini coefficient rose 8.8 per 
cent (Achdut & Bigman 1987).  
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Figure ‎2.3.5: Size and allocation of social expenditure in Israel as 
percentage of GNP/GDP between 1970 and 2003 
(Source: Kop, 1984, Table 1 and 6; Kop, 1993, Table 1 and 4; 
Kop, 2000, Table N1 and N4; Kop, 2003, Tables N1 and N4)  
Note: There were insignificant, retrospective amendments in some of the data series. The major change 
relevant for this figure occurred between 1979 and 1980, when the Gross National Product was replaced by 
the Gross Domestic Product as the comparative indicator.  
However, the rapid fiscal and monetary deterioration was only one aspect, unrelated to 
governmental policies, which shaped the final mixture of welfare provision at that time. 
As for the newly elected administration, two contradicting trends were shaping policy. 
On the one hand, it was elected based on its social commitment for cohesive, inclusive 
and equitable policies. Under this pledge, the 1980 Act for Income Maintenance was 
finally amended so that the NII administered also non-insured, means-tested benefits to 
all (Neipris 1984; Doron & Kramer1992). Remarkably, the Act implicitly stated the 
right of every individual to welfare after the previous formulation referred only to the 
duties imposed on the Authorities (Doron, 1985, p. 127). In addition, a Deputy Prime 
Minister for social provision was appointed in 1977, side by side with the unification of 
the Labour and Welfare Ministries.  
 
On the other hand, the "Likud" party was also a right-wing party, premised upon 
principles of free markets and minimal intervention. To an extent, the international 
discourse of a "welfare state crisis" during the 1980s was largely shared by the new 
Israeli Government. These liberal trends, as well as the looming economic crisis, 
eventually created the needed pressure to halt the expansion of welfare provision 
(Neipris, 1984). As Kop described it, "the question was no longer whether to cut the 
budget, but by how much and where" (1985a, p. 7). Publicly , it seems as the Lebanon 
war that began in 1982 attracted more attention then the sudden drop in social 
expenditures in 1980, illustrated on Figure ‎2.3.5. Yet, this shift signalled an the end to a 
period of welfare enlargement.  
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The inflationary spiral, derived and inflamed by money printing to finance extra 
government expenditure had to be halted. Evidently, the premise that "Israelis, protected 
by extensive indexation, could live with inflation" and that "unemployment was at all 
costs to be avoided" had become inconsistent with economic reality (Fischer 1987, p. 
275). Retrospectively, it is plausible that this rapid deterioration in the domestic market 
could have served as a prologue to recent Latin American scenarios, considering the 
soaring external debts and the rising doubts regarding Israel's ability to repay them.  
The unity government of 1984 initially refused to impose substantial budget cutbacks. 
Instead, it had achieved a package deal, in which Labour Unions agreed to a wage 
freeze and Employers Unions halted price increases. However, inflation returned, as no 
fiscal changes were conducted, forcing the government to approve a far more decisive 
and determined plan. The "Economic Stabilization Program" (ESP) was finally 
introduced in July 1985. It included not only substantial budget cutbacks, mainly in 
subsidies given, but also a freeze of wages and prices, sharp devaluation, fixed 
exchange rates and a legal ban on dollar-linked short-term deposits. In addition, the Act 
of No Printing had forbidden any further injection of money into the markets (Ben-
Bassat, 2002).  
The outcome in economic terms was impressive: hyperinflation was eradicated, the 
budget deficit was reduced, credit growth and public debt dropped and unemployment 
was under control until the end of the 1980s (Fischer 1987). Inflation was kept below 20 
per cent until 1992, when it dropped to 12 per cent. The public debt dropped from 288 
per cent of GDP in 1984 to 145 per cent in 1990 and 93 per cent in 2000 (BOI 2005, 
Tables 3:1 and 5:1:3).  As illustrated in Figure ‎2.3.4, the size of the Israeli government 
expenditure gradually decreased to less than 60 per cent of GDP. Nevertheless, it was 
still one of the largest in the OECD. From 2001, government expenditure was greater 
than that of the Swedish, Danish and French governments (MOFA, 2003, Graph 5). 
Surprisingly, public services were almost unaffected as the reduction in wages 
compensated for reduced government expenditure (Kop 1985b). Distribution of income 
was not greatly affected, since the regressive amendments in taxation were compensated 
by a refund of National Insurance contributions to the poor (Gabbay 1985).  
The ESP was defined in macro economic terms as only "the first stage in a longer-term 
stabilisation process" (Leiderman & Liviatan, 2003, p. 104). Fiscal discipline was 
indeed maintained over time, possibly due to cutbacks in the defence budgets, allowed 
by relatively peaceful years on the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian fronts (Strawczynski 
& Zeira, 2002). The Oslo Agreement with the Palestinians signed in 1993, also 
increased expectation of long-term prosperity and stability. Nonetheless, precisely in 
1995, the government failed to approve a comprehensive tax reform, missing an 
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opportunity to levy capital and inheritance taxes, two avenues that were exempted from 
paying taxes at all.  
From a social perspective, after a period of expansion, the welfare state entered a third 
phase of fiscal discipline, not to say stagnation. Between 1985 and 2001, only one 
comprehensive reform was implemented, aggressively detaching the "Histadrut" from 
health provision by defining a compulsory "package" of services (and an obligatory 
contribution) to be provided by non-governmental organisations. Choice was finally 
handed over to citizens, though private funding was gradually replacing state funds. 
Since them, severe financial difficulties have endangered the ―Histadrut‖. After losing 
all its major assets, the reform actually abolished its grip on health insurance and cut off 
the Labour Union from its financial remaining source. While the ―Histadrut‖ was closed 
to a total bankrupt, a study found the health system has became more egalitarian, but 
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Figure ‎2.3.6: Poverty and inequality in Israel before and after taxes 
and transfer payments between 1979 and 2002 
 (Source: NII, 2004a, Tables 21 and 22; NII, 2004b, Page 15 and 22) 
 * New Sample 
During the 1990s, social expenditure gradually increased, largely due to an "automatic 
pilot" mechanism of government expenditures. Two factors amended this linearity: A 
massive immigration wave from Russia in 1990 and a second political upheaval that 
brought the late Yizhak Rabin to office in 1992. The earlier development, illustrated in 
Figure ‎2.3.2 (Page 51), forced the government to allocate a significant budget to absorb 
almost one million immigrants. The latter development promoted new priorities in 
public spending, placing education at the top (Kop 1996).  
Nevertheless, as expenditure rose, so did poverty and inequality. The soaring 
unemployment, resulted from the massive immigration, was countered by economic 
growth, which by itself became possible because of the peace euphoria that prevailed 
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until 1995 (Figure ‎2.3.3, Page 53). However, as Figure ‎2.3.6 demonstrates, the extent to 
which State intervention succeeded in reducing poverty rates was gradually decreasing 
since 1989. The increasing levels of social expenditure were not enough, or 
alternatively, they were taken to the wrong direction (Winblat 1996). From 1985, 
poverty and inequality have intensified, whereas the tax system turned to be less 
progressive (Dahan 2002; Sharon 1996; Gabbay 1996). In absolute terms, the number of 
poor families multiplied by three between 1987 and 2001, whereas the extent of poverty 
in Arab populations was six times higher (Levitan 2003).  
A latest recession, starting in 2000, was defined as the longest since the establishment 
of Israel. It was fuelled by the failure of the peace talks with the Palestinians in 2000, 
the violent Intifada, the collapse of the Hi-Tech sector and the world‘s economic 
downturn (BOI 2003). A possible governmental reaction was fiscal restriction, of the 
kind that reduces benefits. This reform did eventually come.  
In 2003, Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved major cutbacks in public 
services and launched a modified and limited version of Wisconsin‘s "Welfare to Work" 
scheme. By significantly lowering the level of benefits for almost all recipients 
(including pensioners), Netanyahu's aim was twofold: forcing the unemployed to 
reengage in the labour market and rolling back government's social expenditure. In his 
words, the ―fat‖ person (i.e. the public sector) has to reduce weight to enable the ―thin‖ 
person (i.e. the private markets) to grow up. For several years, the discourse of cutbacks 
dominates the Israeli economic agenda. History is yet to be written, but apparently, the 
measured rise of social expenditure will not repeat itself in the years to come. 
To conclude, the egalitarian ethos of the Zionist movement was not incorporated into 
inclusive policies between 1948 and 1971. Universal services were provided in theory, 
but initial inequalities between cleavage and certain state policies systematically 
prevented certain groups from pursuing their rights and having equal opportunity. The 
strong economic grip of the ‖Histadrut‖ and the State characterise s corporatist regimes. 
Intervention for the benefit of the underprivileged was very rare, family and private 
markets were perceived as the natural channels for support and physical labour was 
almost a myth. The collective ownership of companies by the ―Histadrut‖ created more 
bureaucracy than solidarity, whereas a major ethnic group was continuously excluded 
from the stratifying ―establishment‖, whether by the powerful Labour Union or ―just‖ 
an intervening State. The characterization of this period is therefore a hybrid of 
corporatist and liberal welfare regimes. 
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Figure ‎2.3.7: Categorisation of the Israeli welfare regimes from 1948 
The social uprising had a dramatic impact on the level of public and political awareness. 
From 1971, the central authorities held themselves responsible for welfare problems and 
stopped marginalizing policies that were essentially redistributive. Factually, the state 
increased its direct social intervention to the benefit of large families, unemployed, low-
income earners and the underprivileged. The growing pledge for equality categorised 
this period under Titmuss' Institutional Redistributive Model and Furniss & Tilton's 
Social Welfare State, although any ideological link between Social Democrats and the 
Israeli National party (―Likud‖) is probably accidental. 
The process of expansion was halted during the 1980s but the significant point was the 
1985 Economic Stabilisation Program. However, even though state intervention was 
gradually reduced, the discourse and the policies still rested upon progressive goals: 
there were fewer subsidies, but transfer payments and social expenditure gradually 
increased. Therefore, although the welfare state entered a new phase of fiscal discipline, 
the regime has not changed. Such a statement cannot be made with regard to the 
previous right-wing government led by Ariel Sharon, Benjamin Netanyahu and Silvan 
Shalom, who had taken Israel back to the arena of residual/liberal welfare regimes. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. First, it sought to explore and categorise the 
development of welfare provision within the history of the two case studies. Second, it 
sought to establish an analytical framework that will later allow for critical discussion of 
the underprivileged‘s political behaviour. Having considered the shortcomings of 
taxonomic analysis, it employed several typologies for an indicative categorisation of 
national welfare regimes. The potential of such regimes to affect poor people was 
exemplified over and again. A similar analysis of personal ideological perceptions is 
provided in Appendix ‎11.1 (Page 303).  
The chronological review of the progress and change undergone by both countries 
showed that a welfare regime does matter for the poor. Periods of liberal policies noted 
in both countries were accompanied by cutbacks in the assistance given to those living 
on the margins of society. Other periods, of rising expenditures, higher benefits and 
more rigorous redistribution, triggered a decline in socio-economic disparities. 
Obviously, such a crude perspective is likely to miss crucial elements in the provision of 
welfare services. Yet, it may be said that the financial interests of those who needed 








Figure ‎2.4.1: National welfare regimes in Britain and Israel from 1948 according to Titmuss 
(1974), Furniss & Tilton (1979) and Esping-Andersen (1990)'s typologies 
Reviewing the contradicting directions of the British and Israeli welfare regimes, as 
exemplified in Figure ‎2.4.1, one might ask how two states initially implementing a 
similar welfare model, have developed it so differently. One explanation is the different 
circumstances and political cultures on the ground. Many Sephardic Jews immigrating 
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to Israel lacked a fundamental understanding of, for instance, the importance of 
education for both genders. Even when this notion existed, several obstacles made it 
difficult for them to benefit from social provision. The universal services offered by the 
Israeli welfare state had been adapted to a very specific sector and the residual services 
were limited to cases of severe deprivation. Consequently, until attitudes and policies 
were modified during the 1970s, Israel had resembled a residual rather than a universal 
welfare regime, accompanied with a strong Labour Union. 
A few years after the social uprising began in Israel, Britain faced inflationary pressures 
and abandoned its Keynesian premises. This process was radical and changed the pillars 
of Britain's economic regime. The welfare state could not escape from the anticipated 
repercussions. In Israel, a similar need to restrain public expenditure evolved a few 
years later. Yet the emergency plan did not harm the principle of universalism and the 
high level of decommodification. Hence, the third phase in Israel that took place after 
1985, was more a halt to the previous state of affairs, followed by a slow process of 
liberalisation of the financial markets.  
Interestingly, whereas in Britain the 1980s and the 1990s were characterised by neo-
liberal policies leading to higher poverty and inequality, in Israel a different, softer 
attitude led to similar outcomes. Whereas in Britain the process was halted with the 
―New Labour‖ political upheaval in 1997, the "Thatcherist" type of Welfare Regime 
gained influence in Israel only after 2001. In Britain, greater expenditure on public 
services was called for, as well as a new set of policies such as quasi markets and tax 
credits.  
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3. The Welfare State & Democracy 
3.1 Introduction 
Within the triangle of "The Poor", "Democracy" and "The Welfare State", the 
relationships between the last two components are most intriguing for social activists. 
Whereas the previous chapter has shown the impact certain welfare regimes have on the 
lives of the poor, this one is looking for the capability of democracy to deliver it. All 
over history, democracy played a central role in promoting (or annihilating) the 
economic interests of the multitudes. However, while historically this correlation was 
broadly accepted and even feared of, the development of welfare states during recent 
decades tells us a different story. Instead of continually supporting the expansion of 
social services, democracy came to play the opposite role. The fear of the power of the 
masses was replaced with the need to account for the inability of the underprivileged to 
utilise democracy for their own benefit.   
A pivotal premise of this chapter can be found in Aristotle's writing. When the infant 
named "democracy" took its first steps two thousand years ago, the Greek philosopher 
wrote in Politics, "in democracies the poor have more sovereign power than the rich; for 
they are numerous and the decisions of the majority are sovereign" (1992, p. 362). Even 
after taking into consideration the enormous change humanity has been through, the gap 
between the vision and its materialization is remarkable. Whether the welfare state is a 
calculated compromise between Capitalism and Democracy or is a by-product of 
industrialism, the modern underprivileged electorate is hardly mobilising its political 
power to shape its design. Independent voting of the poor was indeed essential to 
preserve social achievements, but it seems that many of them are not interested in 
advancing their status any further through democratic means.  
Exploring the relationship between democracy and the welfare state, the extension of 
suffrage by the end of the 19
th
 century is considered here as a first turning point. The 
impact of this transformation lasted almost a century. It is broadly accepted therefore 
that a second decisive moment occurred by the end of the 20
th
 century, when the welfare 
state had arguably reached its peak and democracy failed to enlarge it any further. The 
exact nature and motives leading to this shift are strongly contested. It could have been 
a libertarian revival eliminating, in principle, any sort of state intervention, or a liberal 
takeover creating a legitimation deficit against social provision and the dependency 
culture. It could also be a case of public antagonism against specific welfare schemes, 
due to excessive diversity.  
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An alternative way to analyze the occurrences can be found in the sphere of rights of 
freedoms. Neo-Liberals such as Hayek (1944/2002) and Friedman (1962/1982) would 
argue that economic freedom (i.e., radical constraints on welfare provision) is a 
prerequisite to political freedom, hence democracy should never be perceived as a 
platform for egalitarianism. Neo-Marxists such as Wood (1995) would insist this was 
the true objective of democracy until capitalism redefined it and succeeded in detaching 
the link between political and civil rights. These perceptions will be broadly discussed 
here.  
This chapter therefore aims to analyze the institutional relationship between Democracy 
and the welfare state. It will first explore some historical debates around the 
appropriateness of democracy as a governing method, with a specific interest in the role 
of the poor. Subsequently, it will inquire how the intellectual debate around democracy 
shifted from questions of desirability (taking the consequences for granted, but doubting 
their appropriateness) to the sphere of probability (doubting the capability of democracy 
and the electorate to deliver the outcome previously taken for granted).  
Although decisive answers are a luxury in social sciences, the question why did 
democracy stop being the saviour of the poor and become, in a sense, their new demon 
would be directly addressed here. The subsequent chapter will move forward from 
assessing theoretical and national progress to study individual behaviour, exploring 
several aspects of voting decisions taken by poor people while exercising their 
democratic rights. 
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3.2 Historical Reflections 
The English word "democracy" was born in Greece as "demokratia". Its roots are demos 
(people) and kratos (rule). In one of the first documented accounts of its ideals and aims 
from around 400BC, Pericles the Athenian stated that, "our constitution is called a 
democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people… 
everyone is equal before the law… [and] what counts is not membership of a particular 
class" (Thucydides 1972, p. 145). However, although the strong emphasis was on 
universal participation, suffrage was far from being totally inclusive until recently, and 
most of the poor found themselves excluded, as will be illuminated later.  
The ancient city-states created the distinction between the private and the public spheres 
of life, where private life became subordinate to the common good (Arendt 1958). 
Pericles himself said, "we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a 
man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all" 
(Thucydides 1972, p. 147). Held explained that the Athenian democracy granted 
sovereign power to its citizens and demanded they use it to engage in legislative and 
judicial functions by "participating directly in the affairs of state" (1987, p. 17). Wood 
argued the Greeks "did not invent slavery, but they did in a sense invent free labour" as 
the status enjoyed by the citizens was without known precedent and "in many respects 
has remained unequalled since" (1995, p. 181, 185).  
It is stimulating to imagine the discussions held in polis assemblies, in the context of 
wealth and poverty. Approximately one hundred years after Pericles, Aristotle defined 
the basic principles of a democratic constitution and described the assembly as "the 
sovereign authority in everything, or at least the most important matters" and " whatever 
the majority decides is final and constituted justice" (1992, p. 362-3). For him, an 
elementary principle in democracy was liberty, used to defend the mechanism of "ruling 
and being ruled in turn.‖ This rotation principle was implemented in ancient Greece but 
today, with the exception of the judiciary, has completely diminished.  
This assertion could easily link politics to wealth distribution. Aristotle went even 
further, arguing, "equality exists if the poor exercise no more influence in ruling than 
the rich and do not have sole sovereign power, but all exercise it together on the basis of 
numerical equality‖ (p. 364). Under such circumstances, one can grasp Pericles‘ 
argument more easily, saying that the Greeks "regard wealth as something to be 
properly used, rather than as something to boast about" (Thucydides 1972, p. 147). 
Interestingly, similar notions can be found on Islam, Christianity and Judaism. All, to 
some extent, sanctify the use of wealth to finance ―other‖ causes, mostly social ones.  
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Even though it would be far-reaching to deduce any redistributive agenda from these 
ancient descriptions, the existence of a notion of social justice is beyond doubt. Under 
the ancient Athenian democracy, poor people (with the exception of slaves and women) 
were given equal political power, which was clearly reflected in their economic powers 
as well. In principle, when the poor constituted a majority in the assembly, they could 
easily distribute "properly" the wealth among all, directly associating different realms of 
rights.  
In light of this reality, the resistance of the better-off to the promotion of some 
democratic measures in the domestic arena can be understood. Lee suggested that rich 
people perceived these policies as an "exploitation of the rich for the benefit of the 
irresponsible masses" (1974, p. 13). However, while the wealthy opposed democracy on 
allegedly grounds of self-interest, some of the key contemporary philosophers  
challenged objectively the merits of the idea. On reviewing their arguments, it is 
important to differentiate between the social and political implications. Direct 
democracy could constitute, in principle, the best environment for a fairer social 
allocation and distribution of resources, but it could also impede the adoption of the best 
political policies.  
The major ancient opponent to the Athenian democracy was Plato, who was chiefly 
preoccupied with the political implications. He was against any exploitation of the poor 
by the rich but, nonetheless, he was also disgusted by the mass, rare and populist 
assemblies in which decisions were taken (Lee 1974, p. 27). In "The Republic", he 
explained that troubles would never cease until philosophers ruled society, adding that, 
regrettably, these scholars were useless until that moment came. 
Plato illustrated his view using the analogy of a well-educated captain and his 
crewmembers on a ship. He argued that the crewmembers did not know what 
knowledge a true captain needed and therefore "the sailors on any such ship were bound 
to regard the true navigator as a word spinner and a star gazer" (Plato 1974, p. 223). 
From the political perspective, Plato's analogy makes sense. However, if the captain had 
to allocate the resources in a given society, it would be better for powerful 
crewmembers to stand up for their rights and prevent the captain giving everything to 
himself or his relatives. 
It should be said that ancient Greece was closer to Plato's initial intentions than to 
Aristotle's ideals, as even there the idea of direct democracy was far from being fully 
implemented. Women, slaves and immigrants were excluded from the process (Held 
1984, p. 23), even though the slaves alone seemed to constitute a majority with an 
average of about one and a half slaves to every adult citizen (Andrewes 1967, p. 135). It 
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might as well be argued that the "Athenian democracy was a form of self-government in 
which the members of the small and elite citizenry took turns to rule and to be ruled by 
each other" (Dean 1999, p. 73). This way or another, there is no doubt that the first 
democracy limited the power of the most vulnerable people on purely discriminatory 
grounds.  
These discriminating mechanisms served as a fertile ground for Marxist arguments that 
emerged in the future, asserting that while "classical republicanism had solved the 
problem of propertied elite and labouring multitude by restricting the extent of the 
citizen body… capitalist or liberal democracy would permit the extension of citizenship 
by restricting its powers" (Wood 1995, p. 208). This contention will get the attention it 
deserves later in this chapter.  
The resistance to universal suffrage was shared by several renewed philosophers who 
have never lived in Athenian democracy. Ironically, although liberalism was often 
sought in the economic markets where individuals had a lot to lose, it got only little 
respect in the political realm, in which they could achieve significant gains. Hobbes, in 
Leviathan, dated 1651, was ready to accept discriminating mechanisms of politics by 
writing that "Sovereignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than one; and 
into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every one" (1901, Ch. 
19, p. 129l). In his writing, Hobbes argued for a consensual contract between all 
individuals agreeing to surrender their rights to a sovereign power. Thus, he virtually 
reinforced the necessity to detach the multitude from the decisions makers in order to 
prevent a war of all against all, given all men were selfish.   
Locke, in his Two Treaties of Government written in 1689, excluded the propertyless 
from the political process by saying "It is necessary supposed and required, that People 
should have Property [to enter into Society]" (1960, II Par. 138). Locke not only ruled 
out the slaves and the extremely poor from being equal members of society, but he also 
strongly rejected any sort of a redistribution of resources. To his approach, "The 
Supreme Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own 
consent, for the preservation of Property being the end of Government"
5
. Locke was 
generally in favour of a collective action by elected individuals, but it fell far from 
giving equal political rights to the multitude or allowing any prospect of significant 
redistribution (Held 1987, Laslett 1963).   
                                                 
5
  In some of his writing Locke broadly conceived "property" as "Lives, Liberties and Estates" (1960, II, Par. 123, p. 
368). Even though he defined slavery as inconsistent with property (II, Par. 174, p. 402), it is clear that Locke did not 
advocate equal political liberties for all (Held 1987, p. 54).  
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A significant discourse transformation with regard to equal political rights took place 
approximately one century after Locke passed away, as the "end" goal of government 
was opened for different interpretations. Montesquieu in the eighteenth century 
described the appropriate form of societies and governments, recognising that "the less 
luxury there is in a republic, the more it is perfect" (1977, Book VII, Ch. 2). In theory, 
his renowned proposal of separation of powers could expand the distance between the 
underprivileged and the executive branch (Held 1987, p. 58). However, in practice, the 
governments should have also reallocated the inherited resources, forming "a revolution 
in each family… [that] must produce a general one in the state" (Montesquieu 1977, 
Book VII, Ch. 2). Following this logic, there would be no born-poor left.  
Rousseau was apparently also in favour of substantive egalitarianism, though to a 
certain extent. He interpreted the "social contract" in a different way than the originators 
of this concept, Hobbes and Locke, did. According to Rousseau, this contract should 
"establish equality among the citizens in that they… must all enjoy the same rights" 
(1968, p. 76). Held took the idea one step further by suggesting that Rousseau did not 
simply mean equal political rights, as "however equal political rights may be in law, 
they cannot be safeguarded in the face of vast inequalities of wealth and power" (1987, 
p. 76). One might suggest that this is the reason why equality was defined by Rousseau 
as "the greatest good of all", although he did not advocate for absolute similarity in the 
degrees of power and wealth. The balance of interests was achieved in his famous 
statement, "where wealth is concerned, no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another 
and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself" (1968, p. 96).  
While the discourse of Montesquieu and Rousseau sought equality, Mill's "liberal" 
ideology took the opposite side. He maintained that there was a constant danger in equal 
political rights, as it may create an interventionist state. The existence of a 
representative government and strong patterns of participation in political life were 
grasped by Mill as vital, though he did fear the wisest and ablest would be 
overshadowed by the lack of knowledge, skill and experience of the multitude (Held 
1987). In his book On Liberty, published in 1859, Mill pounced on the masses‘ 
"collective mediocrity", proclaiming "no government by a democracy… either in its 
political acts or in the opinion, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or 
could rise above mediocrity" (1974, p. 131). He doubted the ability of the masses to 
fully participate in the political process, although he saw no better alternative to a 
representative democracy in which "every citizen not only having a voice…  but being, 
at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government" (1993, p. 223).  
To resolve this internal contradiction, Mill advocated a varying value for every ballot, 
where "the wiser and more talented should have more votes than the ignorant and less 
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able" (Held 1984, p. 94). As a consequent, the power of the underprivileged would have 
probably been devalued, whereas the chances for significant redistribution from the 
wealthy to the disadvantaged should have been curtailed. However, while seeking to 
guarantee that public order and political decisions would not be subjected to the 
multitude mediocrity, Mill also sought to avoid uncontrolled competition showing great 
care to the interest of the needed (1987/1989, pp. 236-237): 
Cheapness is, so to speak, the hammer with which the rich among 
the producers crush their poorer rivals. Cheapness is the trap into 
which the daring speculators entice the hard workers. Cheapness is 
the sentence of death to the producer on a small scale who has no 
money to invest in the purchase of machinery that his rich rivals can 
easily produce.  
After reviewing some of the key political philosophers in human history, a few 
disagreements could be outlined within the framework of democracy, egalitarianism and 
liberalism. Montesquieu and Rousseau followed Aristotle in their limited acceptance of 
a relatively wide mode of substantive egalitarianism (although for Aristotle, most of the 
population was not qualified to enter this field at all). However, it would be justified to 
argue the acceptance of a relatively egalitarian notion of social justice was generally 
followed a preliminary acknowledgment of the democratic principle of the equitable 
vote. Plato, on the other hand, rejected democracy, ruled out equal political rights and 
was actually giving up the very idea of egalitarianism within Greece. In a sense, Mill 
walked through the same path by defending liberalism and limiting political rights. His 
support of restrictions to prevent unlimited competition could hardly lift the poor up.  
This entire debate however is premised on an elementary assumption, which has to be 
explicitly stated: all thinkers of that time presumed political and civil rights were linked 
to each other. This linkage was almost taken for granted. Borrowing contemporary 
terminology, the space for compromise between capitalism and democracy was very 
limited as, at least in the philosophers‘ mindset, equal political rights were directly 
linked with equal property rights. Thus, the political economist David Ricardo 
contemplated suffrage extension only ―to that part of them which cannot be supposed to 
have an interest in overturning the right to property‖ (Cited in Przeworski & Limongi 
1993, p. 52). Lord Thomas Macaulay noted in a speech delivered in 1842 that universal 
suffrage is ―the end of property and thus of all civilization‖ (ibid.). Esping-Andersen 
concluded that for the proletariat emerged with industrialization, "democracy was a 
means to curtail the privileges of property", therefore the liberals feared universal 
suffrage "would be likely to politicize the distributional struggle, pervert the market, 
and fuel inefficiencies" (1990, p. 10). 
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This unchallenged truth was one of the strongest deterrent forces of democracy, making 
it the "Achilles' heel" of many liberals. In this context, Mill's willingness to limit 
political rights, side by side with imposing of restrictions on market fundamentalism, 
was a first, premature and indecisive example of an emerging conceptual detachment 
between different realms of rights. Wood perceived this detachment as no less than a 
cornerstone in human history (1995). Indeed, when the similarity premise ceased to 
exist, one could have sought equality of political rights, without having significant 
repercussions in the civil realm.  
Practically, it allowed scholars and politicians to gain public support by advancing 
democracy simultaneously with preserving the old social order through the promotion 
of liberalism. Thus, a new discourse of rights emerged, one that accepts universal 
franchise but rejects any spilling of political rights into the civil realm. The following 
debate was fascinating: while Wood accused Capitalism of the "redefinition of 
democracy" or "its reduction to liberalism" (1995, p. 234), other scholars 
acknowledging the shift provided inherently different explanations. Rather than 
portraying the change with colours of class war, they employed the ideology of political 
liberalism to justify the necessity of a free economy.  
Hayek, for instance, ascribed totally different goals to democracy, arguing "our 
generation talks and thinks too much of democracy and too little of the values which it 
serves… democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safe-guarding internal 
peace and individual freedom" (1944/2002, p. 73). In his The Road to Serfdom, Hayek 
subsequently warned that the abandonment of freedom in economic affairs would 
tumble personal and political freedom. Not only would democracy diminish but also, he 
proclaimed, totalitarian regimes like Nazism and Fascism might arise, as had already 
happened.  
Friedman shaped the argument even further, arguing that capitalism is a necessary 
though not sufficient condition for political freedom. He believed economic 
arrangements played a dual role in the promotion of a free society (1962/1982, p, 8-9): 
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On the one hand, freedom in economic arrangements is itself a 
component of freedom broadly understood, so economic freedom is 
an end in itself. In the second place, economic freedom is also an 
indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom… 
The kind of economic organisation that provides economic freedom 
directly, namely competitive capitalism, also promotes political 
freedom because it separates economic power from political power 
and in this way enables the one to offset the other.6   
The disentanglement between political and civil realms of rights brings us closer to the 
present day. However, in order to place the argument in its historical context, it is useful 
to describe first the process of democratisation from a welfare perspective. Three major 
periods can be identified through the centuries, distinguished by two fundamental 
transformations: the vast expansion of the franchise by the end of the 19
th
 century and 
the legitimation crisis of the welfare state toward the end of the 20
th
 century. A 










Figure ‎3.2.1: A schematic illustration of the enlargement of 
welfare states and universal suffrage 
As for welfare provision, during the first period, Poor Laws prevailed and franchise 
was radically limited as rulers imposed various means to curtail the power of the 
masses. These were times when people truly believed, "the poor will always be with 
us", and poverty was perceived as "the normal condition of a substantial proportion of 
the population in all known societies" (Thane 1996, p. 11). However, this optimistic 
belief gradually disappeared during the second period, which evidenced the rising 
                                                 
6
  It should be acknowledged that Friedman actually reinforced Wood's assertions by acknowledging that capitalism 
"separates economic power from political power".  
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importance of welfare issues, starting from early social insurance schemes and ending 
with the modern concept of a welfare state (both, in principle, were redistributive 
mechanisms). Mishra stated this trend was "quite unmistakeable", describing it as a 
process in which the "nightwatchman state" has been superseded by a form of the 
welfare state (1977). Dean argued that two different traditions - republican/solidaristic 
and liberal/contraction - accompanied the public debate since then, although to his view, 
neither of them was necessarily concerned with issues of egalitarianism (2002). It is 
beyond doubt however that the third period has seen a partial triumph for the liberal 
discourse, evidencing a u-turn in attitudes toward social policies. After almost a century 
of expansion and while, finally, suffrage was universally granted, the welfare 
development was halted; some would argue it was even reversed (see, for instance, 
Andrews & Jacobs 1990). 
The battle for universal suffrage was managed in two major frontiers. The first one 
challenged the prerequisite of property holding to gain political rights. This restriction, 
backed by some of the key philosophers quoted earlier, was perceived as natural at that 
time, so that a Virginia act from 1736 could not had made it brighter: ―no person 
whatsoever shall hereafter have a right to vote at any election of members to serve in the 
general assembly, for any country, who hath not an estate of freehold, or other greater 
estate, in one hundred acres of land, at least, if no settlement be made upon it‖ (quoted 
in Key 1947, p. 495). In fact, even at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Britain, 
out of 16 million people only 400,000 were eligible to vote for the Parliament 
(Kingdom 2003, p. 240).  
This successful campaign ended up with franchise to all males, including blacks and 
slaves, although, as Filer, Lenny and Morton stunningly demonstrate, ―equitable‖ 
policies such as poll tax and literacy tests had de facto disfranchised the black 
population (1991). Thus, a president of Louisiana constitutional convention was quoted 
as saying ―Doesn‘t [the new constitution]… led the white man vote, and doesn‘t it stop 
the Negro from voting, and isn‘t that what we came here for? [Applause]‖ (p. 373). 
Whereas the history of blacks is explored separately on Section ‎4.4.1 (Page 112), the 
women were also left disfranchised for several more years.  
Women suffrage constituted a major frontier in the battle for universal suffrage. Among 
the famous petitions urged for equality was that led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, which 
was read in 1866 at the Senate and House of Representative on behalf of ―fifteen 
million people… intelligent, virtuous, native-born American citizens." In the petition, 
the women complained they were ―governed without our consent, compelled to pay 
taxes without appeal, and punished for violations of law without choice of judge or 
juror‖ (Stanton 1866). Nonetheless, their call to ―extend the right of Suffrage to Women 
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– the only remaining class of disfranchised citizen‖ was accepted only fifty years later, 
becoming the 19
th
 Amendment to the US Constitution in 1920, following a series of 
parliamentary defeats. In Britain, the Representation of the People Act was passed in 
1918, though age and property limitations imposed solely on women were removed 
only in 1928.  
The question electoral systems turned relevant in these years, following the failure of 
the British Fascist Party during the 1930s. The two major alternatives , of Proportional 
Representation (PR) and First-past-the-post (FPTP), had merits and shortcomings each. 
Whereas the former system, implemented today in Israel, provides any citizen with an 
equal chance to have an impact, it has also led politics into never-ending coalition 
bargains and extreme instability. General elections are called in Israel every two years 
on average. The latter system, characterizing Britain, is strongly criticized for excluding 
minorities, but it also offers a clear choice, one authority and stable majorities in 
Parliament. Some argued it is accounted for a modern crisis of legitimacy, as more 
people in Britain feel they have no means the influence. The argument around electoral 
systems has latitudinal effects on the process described here, but it is not at the core of 
this study‘s objectives (for more details, see Kingdom 2003, 262-272).  
Back to Figure ‎3.2.1, the Neo-Liberal and Neo-Marxist schools of thought progressed 
during the second period, with the expansion of welfare and franchise. Wood 
questioned the structural features of the newly developed democracy and argued that the 
expansion of political rights was paralleled by erosion in the privileges attached to it. 
Hayek and Friedman acknowledged the link between economic and political rights was 
broken, claiming it was the optimal state of affairs. However, there was a third 
influential school of thought, which is particularly relevant to this thesis, precisely 
because it was less concerned with the appropriate relationship between democracy and 
capitalism. Thinkers such as Schumpeter (1976), Michels (1915/1959), Young (2000) 
and Offe (1987; 1996) were pursuing different ideas, but all challenged, each in its own 
way, the very capability of democracy to fulfil the underprivileged‘s will for a greater 
welfare provision.  
Their writing reflected implicitly and explicitly a dramatic shift in the image of the 
multitude. Rather than a strong and threatening force leaders must be afraid of, it was 
gradually perceived as a variety of weak individuals incapable of collectively pursuing 
their goals. One cannot exaggerate more the importance of this pivotal change. Whether 
this premise reflected or distorted the strength of democracies, the resulted atmosphere 
allowed political leaders to underestimate, as it were, the class struggle. While Lipset 
proclaimed elections are ―the expression of the democratic class struggle‖ (1960, p. 
220), the rising belief according which the multitude was incapable or disinterested in 
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pursuing its financial interests, could have produced spiral repercussions averting the 
entire history of welfare states. 
In a sense, the seeds of this perception were planted by Marx and Engels. Remarkably, 
in their Communist Manifesto published in 1848, they defied democracy but did not call 
for a prompt violent revolution, stating that the first step towards a revolution will 
happen when "the proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all 
capital from the bourgeoisie" (1848/1959, p. 144, the italics are mine). Apparently, they 
were among the first scholars to blame the disadvantaged themselves for the unjust 
allocation of resources, since "the organization of the proletarians into a class, and 
consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition 
between the workers" (Marx & Engels 1848/1959, p. 131).  
Schumpeter not only underestimated voters' capabilities but also questioned the ability 
of modern democracies to have an impact at all. In his Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, published in the 1930s, he wrote, "democracy does not mean and cannot 
mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the term 'people' and 'rule'. 
Democracy means only that people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the 
men who are to rule them" (1976, p. 284-284). In his account of the practical 
mechanisms behind democracies, Schumpeter asserted that in modern democracies, 
politics will unavoidably become a career and therefore, "we immediately cease to 
wonder why it is that politicians so often fail to serve the interest of their class" (p. 285). 
Nevertheless, Schumpeter also put significant blame on the "ignorant" electorate, 
asserting "the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon 
as he enters the political field." Controversially, he ruled out a possibility to cure this 
deficiency, as "people cannot be carried up the ladder" (p. 262-263). 
Michels offered a similar but slightly more radical perception, suggesting that 
democracy is simply incapable of providing any genuine pluralist outcome as it follows 
"the iron law of oligarchy". The very mechanism of the democratic method of 
governing produces, according to Michels, "an inherent preference for the authoritarian 
solution of important questions" and therefore "class struggles consist merely of 
struggles between successively dominant minorities" (1915/1959, p. 377-388). Since all 
political parties want to overthrow the government, they all end up leaving matters as 
they were beforehand and consequently, creating a situation of oligarchy, in which one 
dominant class is substituted by another.   
Offe‘s decisive manuscript entitled ―Democracy against the Welfare State?‖ was among 
the first to notice the macro social implications of this course. He defined two 
assumptions underlying the linkage between welfare and democracy, namely the 
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existence of a rational collective action through democratic politics and self-stabilizing 
or self-reinforcing institutional dynamics preserving social achievements. He argued, 
that when these prepositions failed to materialise, welfare state‘s defenders were forced 
to ―reformulate‖ their political vision since democracy could not advance it as it was 
previously conceived (1987, p. 514). Indeed, Offe noted, "democracy has changed from 
being a virtue we should adhere to and has become a fact that we have to get by with." 
Nevertheless, he maintains that its major merit, namely its capability to present the "will 
of the people", transformed into so many interim stages that "the people themselves are 
hardly able to recognise the results of their will in the double sense of the word" (1996, 
p. 90).  
Young also recognised the intrinsic deficits of modern democracy but while Offe 
focused on the needed structural and conceptual changes in the way the welfare state is 
conceived (1987), Young called for the revival of democracy by restructuring it around 
principles of inclusion (2000). Today, she argued, "democratic processes do not have 
the capability to accomplish something… We have arrived at a paradoxical historical 
moment, when nearly everyone favours democracy, but apparently few believe that 
democratic governance can do anything" (p. 4-5). In his latter account, Offe joined 
Young in stressing the necessity of "direct" or "inclusive" democracy. However, while 
both scholars reflected the growing frustration with democracy‘s ability to deliver, none 
of them turned to the voters themselves asking what their contribution to the current 
state of affairs was.  
Historical Level of Consent Dilemma Contemporary Level of Consent 
Controversial   Desirability of Democracy Consensus (desirable) 
Consensus (equality) Outcome of Democracy Controversial 
Consensus (capable)  Behaviour of the Electorate Consensus (incapable) 
Figure ‎3.2.2: Major changes in the level of consent around major dilemmas of democracy 
Figure ‎3.2.2 summarises simply the rough changes in the degree of consent around 
several fundamental dilemmas related to democracy. This also reflects the shift in 
academic discourse from examining the desirability of democracy to assessing its 
capacity to deliver. Unlike Figure ‎3.2.1, it has no time framework, though the turning 
point between historical and contemporary levels of consent occurred roughly when 
democracy became a hegemonic concept, when Fukuyama‘s ―End of History‖ idea 
started to be materialised (1989, 1992).  
Thus, the dilemma around the desirability of democracy that was controversial 
historically, became under consensus (it is broadly desirable), whereas the outcome of 
democracy that was historically under consensus (it was thought to promote equality), 
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has become controversial. The consensus about the capabilities of the electorate 
remains, although its substance is reversed. Today the electorate is broadly perceived as 
incapable.   
This shift still tells us nothing about the practical reasons behind the emergence of the 
welfare state, its stagnation or regression. It also does not account for the various causes 
responsible for it. An interesting direction can be found in Beck‘s ideas of the crisis of 
trust, which gradually eroded from the ―back stairs‖ the power of democracy (1998; 
1992). However, what remained in vague at this point, is the link between the growth of 
democracy and social provision during the twentieth century. Two major questions 
should be asked. Was democracy alone a crucial factor behind the evolution of social 
provision? If so, what changed during the 1970‘s prompting the loss of its influence or, 
more accurately, the emergence of contrary policies? Both questions are to be addressed 
in the subsequent section.  
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3.3 Contemporary Reflections 
The expectations for radical transformation to follow the enlargement of democracy had 
been through a sea change during the last two centuries. Now, when most of the 
developed world exercises universal suffrage, it is clear that economic inequalities 
cannot be eradicated by equal political rights
7
. This truth was employed by different 
thinkers to justify their own ideological propositions. The followers of Friedman and 
Hayek suggested that it was a genuine fulfilment of the liberal promise of democracy, 
perceiving the economic crisis as proof of the unfeasibility of increasing welfare 
provision. Scholars from the school of Titmuss and Beveridge suggested that something 
―went wrong" in the development of welfare rights.  
Before analyzing welfare regression, a comprehensive account of welfare emergence is 
needed. In a sense, the two processes are bonded together. Fair assessment of the 
distinctive role democracy played, or did not play, in erecting welfare provision should 
generate more prudent grounds to understand the factors behind its regression.  
Several theoretical frameworks were developed to discuss the emergence and 
development of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen endorsed the existence of a 
paradigmatic schism within social sciences, between power-centred theories linking 
politics to society and opposite models assuming power relationships played no role in 
enabling social progress. The latter premise meant the welfare state would have 
developed regardless of any political processes, as a side effect of industrialization and 
urbanization (1990, p. 105).  
Gough distinguished between three groups of theories: functionalist theories that leave 
"no room for humans as active, initiating groups"; economic theories which utilised 
individual methods but focused on liberal policies imposed by the government; and 
pluralist theories that preferred to deal separately with case studies of policymaking 
interpreted from the individual perspective (1979, p. 7). Korpi advocated a slightly 
different allocation that resided upon a distinction between the relevance of class, the 
nature of the distribution of power resources and the new possibilities that resulted from 
democratic politics (1989, p. 309). 
Korpi also argued that the relative importance of each factor is subjected to ideological 
interpretations. Thus, for instance, while a pluralist approach might attach principal 
                                                 
7
  Interestingly, the opposite link between these concepts does exist (i.e., while democracy cannot fully eradicate 
inequalities, inequalities can strike at the foundations of democracy). While Lipset’s seminal work accounted for 
various economic, cultural and social prerequisites of sustained democracy (1959), Muller has shown that income 
inequalities are a major explanation for the exceptional cases, in which impressive economic developments were 
not correlated with stable, strong democracies (1988, 1995).  
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importance to the emergence of democracy, an industrialist attitude would perceive 
economic growth as a prerequisite for the expansion of social provision. A neo-Marxist 
perspective, on the other hand, would emphasise the replication of class hierarchy 
through any fiscal policy imposed by the government.  
The ideological construction can be traced in the literature: O'Connor, for instance, 
argued that any fiscal decision should be assessed from a class perspective, as 
eventually any capitalist state faces a "fiscal crisis" inducing government to reduce 
welfare provision to the minimum necessary in order to preserve legitimacy (1973). 
Rimlinger attached grave importance to industrialization, supposing the "modern social 
security is a by-product of the shift from agrarian to industrial society" (1971, p. 7). 
Gough combined both attitudes by arguing the welfare state consists of an inherent 
conflict between forces and relations of production, therefore class conflict alone "will 
not suffice to explain [its]… origins and development" (1979, p. 62).  
The unravelling of this analytical framework brings us back to Korpi's pluralistic 
approach, seeking to correlate democracy and welfare. While significant empirical 
research was conducted in this direction, one can hardly argue it is over-theorized. As 
Esping-Andersen explained, "most scholars are less interested in the welfare state than 
in the validity of their explanatory theories of power, modernization, or 
industrialization." The renowned scholar also accused the academy of exploiting the 
welfare state as "another vehicle for testing theories" (1990, p. 107). Although this 
chapter cannot fill the void, it still seeks to give a fair account of the empirical evidence 
reinforcing or rebutting the pluralistic premise.  
Several empirical studies identified democracy in general, and left representation in 
particular, as a dominant explanation for the development of welfare provision, 
overtaking competing dynamics of industrialisation and class conflict. Korpi himself 
tracked the development of sickness insurance in 18 OECD countries from 1930, 
showing that "left party government participation clearly has been an important factor 
during both the prewar and the postwar periods" in the development of social rights in 
sickness insurance (1989, p. 323). Esping-Andersen, also using a cross-national 
database, succeeded in explaining a significant part of the variance between structural 
differences of welfare states, their level of de-commodification and their degree of 
stratification using working-class mobilisation variables. The "Weighted Cabinet 
Shares" of left-wing parties was discovered to be highly dominant in shaping welfare 
regimes, while economic and demographic variables influenced mainly non-structural 
features of social policy after WWII (1990, pp. 105-138). Pamper and Williamson 
found social security spending slightly increased in non-democracies between 1960 and 
1975, but it doubled itself in developing democracies, benefiting mainly the pensioners 
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and the sick (1989, p. 91). In addition, Cameron (1978), Hicks & Misra (1993) and 
Huber, Ragin & Stephens (1993) were all reaching similar conclusions, providing 
empirical evidence for the existence of a political class struggle and highlighting the 
contribution of social-democratic parties
8
.  
On the other hand, several studies contradicted, at least at first glance, the importance of 
suffrage on the formulation of welfare rughts. Cutright gathered figures from seventy-
six countries, showing that the degree of social security coverage was highly correlated 
with the level of economic development, as measured by energy consumption, 
urbanization and literacy. Nevertheless, when economic variables were held fixed, the 
degree of political representation did have a positive influence on the emergence of such 
schemes (1965). Pryor systematically compared the public expenditure of seven 
centrally planned economies with seven market economies, demonstrating that when 
political factors were held constant, the overall expenditure on health, welfare and 
education was remarkably similar in the period between 1956 and 1962. However, a 
closer look reveals higher expenditure on health and education in the communist 
countries and higher expenditure on welfare benefits in the capitalist ones (1968 p. 283). 
Wilensky focused on the public expenditure of 64 liberal democracies and totalitarian 
regimes to prove the correlation is better explained by economic factors, either with a 
regression or by using the method of path analysis. Yet, his findings referred to a static 
status of welfare provision in the year 1966, a fact that should be taken into account 
following his firm conclusion (1977, p. xiii)
9
:  
Economic growth and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes are 
the root cause of the general emergence of the welfare state… In any 
systematic comparison of many countries over many years, 
alternative explanations collapse under the weight of such heavy, 
brittle categories as "socialist" versus "capitalist" economies, 
"collectivistic" versus "individualistic" ideologies, or even "democratic" 
versus "totalitarian" political systems. However useful they may be in 
the understanding of other problems, these categories are almost 
useless in explaining the origins and general development of the 
welfare state. 
                                                 
8
  A stimulating study linking elections to benefits deserves mentioning as well. Tufte classified the change in the real 
disposable income growth in 27 developed countries between 1961 and 1972, gathering evidence for significant 
convergence in 19 states, among them Britain and Israel. Surprisingly, in these countries, average income 
increased in 77 per cent during election years, higher than the average of 46 per cent during normal years (1978). 
9
  The importance of accurate methods cannot be exaggerated. It was overwhelmingly shown in the work of Blais, 
Blake and Dion, who suggested in 1993, “parties of the left do spend a little more than parties of the right”, but the 
difference “emerges only for majority governments whose party composition remains unchanged over a number of 
years” (p. 40). However, in their 1996 “reappraisal”, published also in the American Journal of Political Science, they 
abandoned their “majority government” prerequisite after re-defining their dependent indicator from “level of 
spending" to "change in spending” (p. 514).   
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A remarkable empirical work was prepared by Flora and Albar (1984) who sought to 
develop an integrated, multidimensional approach to account for welfare advancement. 
After identifying periods of social insurance legislation, they looked for distinctive 
characters of political mobilisation and socioeconomic development for each legislative 
period. Eventually, three potential regression lines were identified, each referred 
roughly to a different chronological period. Subset I reflected early social reforms in 
constitutional-dualistic monarchies such as Denmark and Germany, which implemented 
between 1880 and 1900. Subset II consisted chiefly of the major social insurance 
legislation of parliamentary democracies between 1900 and 1920. Subset III represented 







Figure ‎3.3.1: Political mobilisation and socioeconomic development in periods of welfare 
legislation, as monitored within groups of countries 
 (Source: Flora and Albar 1984) 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the findings copied in Figure ‎3.3.1. Clearly, in 
modern democracies, there was a trade off between the level of political mobilisation 
measured by the percentage of votes for left wing parties and the socioeconomic 
developments measured by the extent of industrialization and urbanization. It was found 
that that higher political mobilisation, even in conditions of lagging socioeconomic 
development, induced periods of social legislation in democracies after 1920 and vice 
versa. However, as subset I demonstrates, the indicators had the opposite correlation in 
non-democracies implementing welfare reforms years before countries with 
parliamentary democracy. 
The relative importance of democracy and left-wing parties in advancing redistributive 
mechanisms was contested (Wilensky 1975, Cutright 1965, Pryor 1968), as were the 
methods used to operationalize the variables in these studies (Shalev 1983). Yet, 
apparently not one empirical study argued decisively that democracy had no role in the 
emergence and the development of the welfare state. Gilbert suggests the evolution of 
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franchise in 1885, as when the poor obtained the vote "the choice of the warden had 
been turned over to the prisoners" (1966, p. 448). Marshall contended that Lloyd 
George‘s reforms were induced by the growing public awareness and the universal 
franchise (1975). Gough maintained the major social reforms in Germany, Britain and 




Figure ‎3.3.2: The channels through which democracy can influence social policies from the 
perspective of political leaders 
The various studies can be placed in a coherent framework. As illustrated in Figure 
‎3.3.2, in addition to direct elections, democracy can be utilised for the benefit of the 
welfare state through two major institutional routes. The first refers to absolutist 
regimes where the leader or despot attempts to impede democracy by improving the 
living conditions of those who might demand it violently. Mishra observed Bismark's 
policies, suggesting that a strategy in which "reform and repression went hand in hand" 
eventually ensured ―the compliance of the broad masses to the capitalist social order" 
(1977, p. 107).  
A second scenario might occur within existing democracies when politicians struggle to 
preserve their power. Before elections, they might acquire popularity by benefiting the 
public (see, for instance, footnote 8 on page 81). A radical outcome of such a strategy 
might be what the French political philosopher Duverger described as "contagion from 
the Left", leading middle ground politics leftwards (1954, p. xxvii)
10
. A more moderate 
outcome can be tracked daily, as modern politics resides on public opinion that "helps to 
set agendas, limit choices and legitimize policies" (Whiteley 1981, p. 461). This trend 
has become so radical that occasionally ―the elite changes policy directly in response to 
shifts in opinion" (ibid.). The third scenario would therefore be the most common one, 
of policy shifts after the public choice is heard.  
                                                 
10
  Interestingly, Duverger conceived this process as one that directly resulted from the extension of the franchise. In 
his Political Parties, he asserted that lifting limitations upon suffrage, as well as the "development of egalitarian 
feelings" and the desire to "oust traditional social elites", led to the creation of "local electoral committees". In places 
where such committees secured the confidence of the new electors by relatively left-wing policies, new elites 
became dominant and the right-wing parties were obliged to "follow the example" if they wished to retain their 
influence (1954, p. xxvii).  
Preserving the 
absence of democracy 
Influencing the 
outcome of democracy 
Accepting the  
verdict of democracy 
No link to elections Before elections  After elections  
Inside the democratic game Outside the democratic game 
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An important distinction that underpins the allocation presented in Figure ‎3.3.2 is 
between routes inside and outside the democratic yard. In both, democracy has a role to 
play, internally or externally. Germany and Britain, for instance, were among the first 
democracies to implement social insurance reforms, but as Section ‎11.1 clarified (Page 
303), the contribution of democracy as a warning sign to the policies of Otto Von 
Bismarck was no less significant. Even though the German system emerged outside the 
boundaries of democracy, the role of democracy as a threat was highly influential. 
In the particular case studies of Germany and Britain, historical facts put into question 
not only the importance of democracy in the welfare development process, but also the 
role of industrialization and urbanization. In 1900, the GNP per capita in Britain was 
twice as high as that in Germany: $3,792 in comparison to $1,743. Britain was 
significantly more urbanized, with 78% of its population lived in urban places in 
comparison to 54% of Germany (Steckel & Floud 1997, Table 11.1). These figures not 
only rule out the democratic factor as an explanation for the emergence of a German 
social insurance scheme, but they thwart the argument of economic dynamics as well11.  
Several routes, examples, theories and studies linking democracy to welfare were 
explored up to this stage. The focus now shifts to the reasons behind the welfare state's 
tumble during the 1970s. Evidently, it occurred "within" the democratic boundaries and 
was aggravated by different interpretations of the substance of democracy. Neo-Liberals 
perceived the welfare crisis as a triumph of democracy, as "capitalism is a necessary 
condition for political freedom" (Friedman 1962/1982, p. 10), while Fabians or Social 
Democrats maintained liberal democracy must encompass redistributive policies and 
universal social services. At least in the British context, the triumph of the earlier 
ideology was even more radical, as Thatcher did not only reverse the policies of rival 
parties, but she also specifically broke conventions within her own party. 
The fundamental transformation in welfare provision is generally acknowledged, 
though the factors underlying this change are highly controversial and even the very 
terminology is under debate. Habermas coined the term ‗legitimation deficit‘ (1976). 
Moran, on the other hand, argued, ―there is no crisis of the welfare state because there is 
no model welfare state‖ (1988, p. 412). Golding and Middleton preferred to describe it 
as an organized assault by right-wing politicians collaborating with the mass media 
against the welfare state.  
                                                 
11
  It should be noted that although Germany was the first to introduce social expenditure, the coverage of its social 
insurance scheme was lower in comparison with that of Britain (Flora & Alber 1995, Figures 2.3 and 2.4). 
Nevertheless, Germany is repeatedly discussed in the literature as an example of non-democratic state that 
implemented welfare reforms without democratic pressures. Rimlinger, for instance, mentioned Germany when 
arguing that "more democratic governments were slower to introduce social protection than the authoritarian and 
totalitarian governments" (1971, p. 9). However, it seems as democratic inspirations did play a role as a deterrent 
force. In fact, Rimlinger himself noted that Bismarck "was acting in response to pressure from below", although "the 
system he created was guided by the interests of the existing political order" (ibid.). 
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In their study, Golding and Middleton found that "there is considerable suspicion of 
additional public expenditure on social security and welfare among groups who feel 
they have more to lose as taxpayers, than to gain as beneficiaries" (1981, p. 165). Alt 
also agreed with some aspects of this view, noting that "on questions of spending on 
social services, people are supporting an idea which is altruistic: they are supporting a 
benefit which will largely go to others." Therefore, the Labour party had to "make 
people feel better off in order to make them feel able to afford altruistic policies" (197,. 
p. 258). Notably, the focus of all these statements is on the electorate and the way the 
welfare state was operating in relation to the voters‘ initial expectation.  
It should be emphasised that the electorate is not a homogenous group, and different 
opinions might be held by different sectors. Hence, a more cautious and moderate 
approach is needed, such as the one presented by Taylor-Gooby. He accepted the 
existence of a change but argued it "does not amount to a shift into reverse gear" (1985, 
p. 2). In his Public Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare, he defied previous accounts, 
arguing they were "based on extrapolation from particular areas" or alternatively 
derived from an "incorrect assumption that support for the market implies antagonism to 
the state" (1985, p. 52). Nevertheless, he also found evidence for "antipathy to welfare 
for needy minorities", suggesting that "ideological judgments about the desert of 
different groups" have a major share in the legitimation deficit evidenced by certain 
populations (p. 29, 32)
12
.  
A different line of thinking is that of power paradigms. In this context, the ―legitimation 
deficit‖ can be framed as a tool through which the masses were unintentionally 
influenced by powerful players. In a way, Offe‘s arguments fit into this prevalent 
paradigm of mindset oppression. According to his theory, developed countries had 
evidenced a process of ―structural disintegration‖, spreading distrust in social policies 
and generating individualism. Consequently, welfare policies were interpreted in terms 
of gains and losses held by the individualist ―economic man‖ (1987, p. 528). We are left 
with a novel discourse but with little altruism and social conscience (p. 535):  
                                                 
12
  Although Taylor-Gooby concluded that "there has been no strong shift against the welfare state" (p. 51), some of his 
findings are remarkable. It was found, for instance, that a third of the low-income individuals believed the rich got the 
best value for money from the welfare state while only one fifth thought the low-income groups benefited the most 
(Table 4). Two thirds of the population said the system of taxes and benefits did not make people more equal and 
actually did not affect people much (Table 3). Indeed, the figures reflected the level of complexity in public opinion 
divided by the type of provision and other relevant factors. Taylor-Gooby describe the findings as an "ambivalence 
in support for the welfare state", which derived chiefly from a "concern at its practice" (p. 37).  
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As a combined effect of these structural changes, we may anticipate 
the rise of behavioural orientations of voters and citizens that give 
support to anti-welfare policies — not primarily for reasons of bad 
intentions, irrational drives, or a sudden shift to neoconservative or 
market-liberal values or attitudes, but because of beliefs and 
preferences that are rationally formed in response to perceived social 
realities as well as to the actual experience with the practice of 
existing welfare states.  
Exploring some of the existing theories, it is clear that there can be no decisive answer. 
Most explanations to the crisis are ideologically constructed. The left followers attached 
attributes of class relationship to the rise of right-wing politics, whereas the right 
supporters focused on fiscal constraints. Neo-Liberals argued the soaring public 
expenditure left no choice to governments, while neo-Marxists accused the liberals of 
protecting the interests of the wealthy and undermining prospects for a fair society and 
social justice. Each ideology would probably have its own interpretations to the 
statistical figures.  
These ideologies not only interpret differently the dynamics of the crises, but also 
propose different solutions on the basis of these interpretations. Whereas the new left 
learned to accept market liberalism, the new right internalized the importance of social 
provision. New mechanisms were developed, such as quasi markets and tax credits (see, 
for instance, Le Grand 1990 and Hills 2000); though the initial inclinations in favour of 
and against state intervention and public expenditure prevailed.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
The philosophical debate was preoccupied for centuries with the desirability of equal 
political rights for the masses. It almost took for granted the outcome of equal 
distribution of wealth. However, reality took the opposite course and nowadays, 
suffrage could not guarantee equality. It was shown in this chapter that the democratic 
revolution did change the premises of our public debate. We all acknowledge today the 
detachment between the political and civil realms of rights. The debate was shifted to 
other domains. One dealt with the desirability of economic liberties, whereas the other 
challenged the ability of universal political rights to deliver the genuine will of the 
electorate.  
This conceptual shift only distracted the poor from exercising their full political power. 
Democracy gradually stopped being their saviour and became a facilitator of regressive 
redistribution. The narratives accounting for the 1970s welfare crisis are ideologically 
constructed. The neo-Liberals would suggest it was inevitable, following a century of 
welfare expansion. The neo-Marxists would look for power paradigms. Yet, the ballots 
(or abstentions) that rolled back the welfare state were cast by the same electorate, 
which includes also the underprivileged. Their motives are worth careful study.  
In theory, Plato's fears can be realised today through the Triangle of poor, welfare states 
and democracies. If all the low and the middle-income citizens living in the United 
States banded together and form an electoral majority, they could potentially decide to 
reallocate all the shares of Microsoft. A more realistic scenario is the emergence of a 
new political party that will represent the interests of fifth of the British electorate living 
below the poverty line. This might bring closer Aristotle's vision, that "in democracies 
the poor have more sovereign power than the rich" (1992, p. 362).  
However, at present, the political power of the poor in democracy is barely deterring. 
The expansion of the franchise assisted the needy until the 1970s, but today, those who 
are excluded do not embark on an organised fight for their rights, as did the slaves, the 
needy and women a hundred years ago. In fact, contrary to historical fears of a radical 
redistribution, modernity has ended up with many underprivileged members of society 
utilising democracy against their own financial interests. This reality cannot be 
explained by natural evolutionary forces alone. 
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4. The Poor & Democracy 
4.1 Introduction 
Nothing can be more directly accountable for a distorted outcome of democracy than 
the voters themselves are, as in an era of universal suffrage voting behaviour stands 
between "the will of the people" and "the vote of the people". The most simplistic 
scenario capable of producing a deviation is the low turnout of a specific group. Other 
scenarios, including systematic political illiteracies or different types of reasoning, are 
more complex and require deeper analysis. However, we are missing an integrative 
analytical framework to account for the various aspects of the relationship between poor 
people and democracies.  
This chapter examines several aspects of voting behaviour and establishes a rigorous 
theoretical basis for the rationale of this thesis. It draws upon concepts and topics 
related to three different academic arenas – the political, economic and social. First, it 
will illuminate hypotheses incorporated in the political theory, such as class voting and 
economic voting. The various nuances underlying the competing motivations leading to 
party affiliation will be thoroughly explored. Consequently, some concepts employed 
usually in economic theory to describe market competition would be restructured 
around electoral competition. The role knowledge and rationality plays in setting up 
voters‘ preferences will be critically discussed.  
The focus shifts to the social policy arena, which is at the core of this entire thesis. After 
elaborating on economic voting, class voting, information deficits and different types of 
reasoning, the questions of equality, exclusion and citizenship will be brought to the 
fore.  Inequalities within the various dimensions of political engagement are examined, 
as well as the way political exclusion and political rights should be defined. It will be 
argued that a redefinition of these concepts is needed.   
The author believes that poor people should actively pursue their financial interests 
through democratic means. This premise has two practical implications. First, the 
concept of rationality employed here is that of the economics-based substantive 
rationality rather than the psychology-derived bounded (procedural) rationality (this 
debate is explored on Pages 100-102). Second, the intentions underlying this thesis were 
essentially prescriptive. It should be acknowledged that the pioneer of field had 
completely different ambitions. Anthony Downs conceived his influential work, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (1956), while running for the presidency of Carleton 
College Student Union. Aside from obtaining a PhD, his motivation was to find out how 
political decisions were made, using his own insights.  
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One of Downs‘ famous conclusions, which does not fall within the scope of this 
research, was that parties' policies are likely to converge in order to attract (or, more 
accurately, appease) the median voter. By applying economic concepts of information 
costs, utility calculus and uncertainty into the world of voters and politicians, he 
produced the first systematic account comparing the political and the commodity 
markets. The seeds of this equation were planted by Down's academic advisor, Ken 
Arrow, who perceived voting and consuming as the only two methods by which social 
choices can be made in a capitalist democracy (1951/1963).  
However, while economists such as Rubinshtein (1988) and psychologists such as 
Kehnmen & Tversky (1979) challenged the validity of conventional rationality 
assumptions and their logic of utility maximization, very little research was studying the 
voting behaviour of the underprivileged. If there are systematic deviations from 
economic rationality in the political market as there are in the commodities market, it is 
inevitable that distortions and inequalities will deflect the democratic verdict as well. 
Nonetheless, the reasoning behind conventional economic theories was challenged 
much more than the reasoning behind the "people's choice" philosophy, although the 
social significance of the latter is no less important than that of the former.  
While this chapter does not intend to invent new econometric calculations, it does seek 
to consolidate an analytical framework, based on previous works. This is centred on 
three hierarchical levels of political engagement, namely physical, informed and rational 






Figure ‎4.1.1: The Pyramid of Political Engagement 
Before elaborating on the Pyramid, two important clarifications should be made. First, 
this chapter is not going to cover the topic of uncertainty although some relevant 
implications might be raised. Evidently, the consequences of lack of trust in politicians 
and/or in specific political parties were intensively discussed in the literature (see, for 
instance, Beck 1992 and Beck 1998). While no strong evidence was found to link trust 
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third parties (Keefer & Khemani 2003, Peterson & Wrighton 1998, Hetherington 1999, 
Miller 1974). As for the context of this thesis, when trust levels are low, any rational 
calculation of gains and losses becomes distorted, as promised policies are less likely to 
be realised. However, such scenarios should be studied separately in the future.  
A second required clarification is that this thesis does not intend to judge voting 
behaviour on moral grounds. It does however aim to expand the analysis beyond the 
question of knowledge, into a more sophisticated perception that involves preferences 
and priorities. Thus, while several studies perceive the decisions of a fully informed 
voter as "correct" (McKeley & Ordershook 1984, Gilens 2001, Miller 1986), this work 
also examines whether voters are capable of pursuing their interests after being 
informed. In economic terms, it looks for coherency and transitivity.   
There are two ways of identifying voters' interests. Lau and Redlawsk chose a 
subjective way and showed that fully informed voters often act against their own stated 
preferences (1997). They asked for the voters' own preferences and eventually 
compared it with their voting decisions. The alternative route takes the discussion into 
the conceptual analysis of power. Thinkers such as Steven Lukes maintained people 
could not always identify their ―objective interests‖, which were diverted and 
manipulated by external powers.  
In fact, Lukes‘ third dimension of power is materialised when an individual is entirely 
unaware of him/her being affected, as ―men‘s wants may themselves be a product of a 
system which works against their interests‖ (1974, p. 34).  This path leads to the radical 
conclusion according which the notion of ―interests‖ is an ―irreducibly evaluative‖ one, 
depending on ―normative judgment of a moral and political character‖ (ibid.). Assuming 
subjective and objective interests do not always fit, it allows scholars to hypothesize 
about the latter. Obviously, while certain scholars would perceive it as paternalism, 
some would argue it is inevitable and others would utterly reject it (Haugaard 2002 
integrates the major writings in this field)  
In contrast to Lukes, the argumentation of Dahl resided on a study of "actual" rather 
than "potential" power, or in other words, ―nothing could be assumed about power 
structures prior to analysis of events‖ (Dowding 1991, p. 25). The focus on conscious 
decisions, or overt conflict of interests, virtually prevented the analysis of interests that 
were beyond sight. Polsby, Dahl‘s colleague, was defining the latter as ―perverse‖, 
maintaining that ―the presumption that the ‗real‘ interests of a class can be assigned to 
them by an analyst allows the analyst to charge ‗false class consciousness‘ when the 
class in question disagrees with the analysis‖ (1963, p. 23). It was also argued that any 
hypotheses of interests would expose the analyst‘s own preferences, whereas in general, 
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the rational choice theory in itself assumes ―individual preferences are exogenous to the 
model‖ (Dowding 1991, p. 31)13. Indeed, this debate reflects the open gulf between a 
―pluralist‖ or a ―liberal‖ one-dimensional view of power and a ―radical‖ three-
dimensional approach.  
Nonetheless, in his late writing, Dahl does argue for a superior interest, which is the 
preservation of the democratic order (1989). His approach might indeed reconcile the 
radical approaches, defining person‘s interests as "whatever that person would choose 
with fullest attainable understanding of the experience resulting from that choice and its 
most relevant alternatives" (p. 180). Asked how one can define the interests of others, 
Dahl replied it is possible, "only by a process of enlightened sympathy through which 
we try to grasp the desires, wants, needs and values of other human beings, and, by a 
thought experiment, try to imagine what they would choose to do if they understood the 
consequences of their choices" (p. 181). This conclusion can directly lead to the 
examination of political, economic and social aspects of the engagement of poor people 




                                                 
13
  It should be noted that precisely because rational choice theory is resided on the subjects’ preferences, this 
research will seek to identify the initial set of priorities held by the individuals themselves. Conceptually, it is still 
closer to Lukes than Polsby, though empirically, it certainly intends to find the structure of the voters’ own utility 
function.  
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4.2 Political Aspects 
Two major theories dominated the research of voting behaviour during the 20
th
 century, 
those of economic voting and class voting
14
. While the latter perceived social status, 
often measured by occupation, to be the major factor shaping political decisions, the 
former concentrated on personal, sectional or national economic developments as the 
factors possessing the decisive influence. Remarkably, in both cases, the literature 
seldom portrays voters as future utility maximisers; rather, it usually attaches grave 
importance to past economic performance or present class affiliation in the formation of 
individual political inclinations.  
Theories of economic and class voting might differ from each other in three dimensions: 
the factors assumed to shape voting decisions, the indicators used to classify subjects  
and the nature of findings derived from the entire analysis. Thus, each theory holds 
different premises of the principal determinant factor of a vote (general class affiliation 
or concrete economic interests), and each adopts different indicators to categorise voters 
(occupation, income or wealth). What often unites the theories are the findings derived 
from time-series analysis, which might point at similar directions (polarisation or 
convergence). Nonetheless, as illustrated in Figure ‎4.2.1, even if the findings are similar 
(green), the hypotheses for the influential factors (pink) and the independent indicators 









Figure ‎4.2.1: Illustration of differences and similarities in 
theories of economic and class voting 
                                                 
14
  There are competing conceptions of class. In the context of this thesis, it is used in the Weberian context rather than 
the Marxist one. It should also be noted that these two interpretations often match each other in reality. 
Indicators used to characterize individuals (the Independent Variable): 
Occupation / Income / Wealth 
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Obviously, when the personal economic status is similar with that of an entire class, 
both theories would come up with similar conclusions. This potential similarity might 
explain why the first scholars studying the political consequences of business cycles or 
the correlation between voting and income, often did not distinguish between economic 
motives and class affiliation (see, for instance, Ogburn & Peterson 1916 and Ogburn & 
Hill 1935). However, with the establishment of the "Columbia School" (Lazarsfeld et al. 
1948) and the "Michigan School" (Campbell et al. 1960), both dealing solely with 
voting behaviour, the entire field developed rapidly
15
.  
The most influential finding of Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet was the political 
vulnerability of voters who had the lowest interest in politics. Such citizens, to quote the 
original text, were "available to the person who saw them last before Election Day" 
(1948, p. 69). According to the Columbia school, class voting was the product of 
common experience and intra-class networks, which reinforced a continual political 
identification with a specific party held by an entire class. The Michigan School 
adopted a different approach, resided on psychological and sociological theory 
(Campbell et al 1960, p. 18), which conceived certain capabilities such as class 
awareness as necessary for the formation of class voting. Consequently, the reason for 
relatively low class voting was not "because people are disinterested in their social class 
location, but because they fail to translate class interest into political terms" (pp. 351–
352).  
Aside from these contentions, the invaluable contribution of the Michigan team was in 
the methodological field. Their first National Election Studies (NES) have become the 
archetype of hundreds of similar studies performed all over the world. Their 
methodology has paved the way for a consistent examination of voting behaviour in 
different countries since the 1960s. The database in itself enabled scholars to ground 
their arguments regarding the diminishing importance of class politics in industrial 
capitalism. In the British context, Scarbrough analysed election surveys carried out 
between 1963 and 1983 and concluded, "the Labour vote among manual workers has 
suffered the greater haemorrhage… but the non-manual Conservative vote too is a less 
predictable electoral force" (1987, p. 219–220). In the American context, Campbell and 
others showed a steady but rapid process of depolarisation after World War II, 
suggesting its extent is "unduly influenced by superficial aspects of the immediate 
political situation" (1960, p. 346–348).  
                                                 
15
  Notably, another fundamental development was in the methods adopted to study the field. Panel studies invented 
by Paul Lazarsfeld, enabled scholars to trace changes in voters' behaviour over time. This methodological 
advancement radically changed the academic approach toward election studies.  
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The new methodological tools monitoring class voting fuelled a furious debate, brought 
to a record by Clark and Lipset publicly asking "Are Social Classes Dying?" They 
argued that "class is an increasingly outmoded concept" for the study of voting due to 
changes in the nature of social stratification (1991, p. 397). Two years later Clark and 
others slightly lessen this terminology, stating that "social classes have not died, but 
their political significance has declined substantially; this justifies a shift from class 
centred analysis toward multi casual explanations of political behaviour" (1993, p. 293). 
In these years, scholars expanded the study of class dealignment (Inglehart 1977, 
Sarlvik & Crewe 1983), and newer types of social cleavage were explored, based on 
gender, identity, values or other "post materialist" divisions (Inglehart 1981, Dalton 
1988, Clark et al. 1993, Kitschelt 1994, Evans 1999). A comparative study found the 
decline of class voting is global (Franklin et al 1992).  
Nevertheless, the academic world was far from unanimously embracing this narrative. 
Manze, Hout and Brooks proclaimed most of the findings cited above "reflect a 
misreading of the empirical evidence and/or exaggerate the significance of these 
developments" (1995, p. 137). They concluded that the empirical studies fluctuated and 
therefore a solid case can be made for neither of the theories. Alford, who developed a 
commonly used index to measure class voting, was even more decisive in his 
arguments. Referring to the American context, he wrote, "no evidence of either a 
decline of class-voting, or any substantial change in the pattern of class voting… has 
been found" (1963b, p. 193). Lipset examined the dispute from a different angle and 
eventually stated, "even though many parties renounce the principle of class conflict or 
loyalty, an analysis of their appeals and their support suggests that they do represent the 
interests of different classes" (1960, p. 220).  
The debate around the meaning and relevance of class did not hamper the emergence of 
economic theories of voting. As discussed earlier, one of the major dissimilarities 
between the theories lies in the sphere of measurement, and more specifically the 
methods used to define and track social stratification. The classical structure developed 
by sociologists was established on occupational allocation, distinguishing between 
manual and non-manual workers, or between the working class, middle class and upper 
class. Thus, the simple but extensively used Alford index for class voting was devised 
to represent the difference between the percentages of non-manual workers and manual 
workers voting for left parties (Alford 1963a, pp. 79-86). However, during recent 
decades, the labour market has been through a profound structural change and 
occupation has turned out to be a less favourable variable in determining stratification.  
It can also be argued, that the growing dominancy of economic theories is related to a 
renewed belief in individual powers. It seems that Schumpeter's pessimism regarding 
the eternal failure of citizens to wisely direct their political power (1942/1976) and 
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Lazaersfeld's assertions about the great power that societies possess in determining 
political decisions of individuals (1948) gave way to Key's belief in "the responsible 
electorate" (1966). His landmark paper confronted directly and successfully many of the 
common wisdoms held until that time. Published in an era of grave concern about 
voters' capacity, Key defiantly challenged this ruling hegemony at the outset of his book 
(pp. 7–8):  
The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that 
voters are not fools. To be sure, many individual voters act in odd 
ways indeed; yet in the large the electorate behaves about as 
rationally and responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of 
the alternatives presented to it and the character of the information 
available to it… the portrait of the American electorate that develops 
from the data is not one of an electorate strait-jacketed by social 
determinants or moves by subconscious urges triggered by devilishly 
skilful propagandists.  
Studying the behaviour of the switching voters in the US General Elections from 1936 
until 1960, Key concluded that many of their decisions are "consistent with the 
supposition that voters, or at least a large number of them, are moved by their 
perceptions and appraisals of policy and performance" (p. 150). Thus, for instance, he 
found that after the New Deal was introduced, "business and professional Democratic 
voters… were far more likely to defect to the Republican candidate at the next election 
than were unskilled workers" (p. 35–37). Unsurprisingly, they had the most the lose 
from the emerging redistributive schemes.  
After refuting the "older tradition" regarding voters as "an erratic and irrational 
fellow[s] susceptible to manipulation by skilled humbugs" (p. 4), Key argued that the 
impact on political leaders is the most dangerous one, as they might believe voters are 
impotent and act "as though they regarded the people as manageable fools" (pp. 4–5). In 
a way, the recent emergence of "spin doctors" and "election strategists" only serves to 
reinforce Key's deep fears. Although various writers reinforced his optimistic perception 
of the electorate (see, for instance, Page and Shapiro 1992), the concern from political 
manipulations of the utmost important state matters is relevant today more than ever.  
Theories of economic voting are premised on the assumption that voters are rational 
actors seeking to maximise their utility. Borrowing Redlawsk and Lau's terminology, 
voters were expected to vote for candidates they agree with rather than candidates they 
like (2003). Downs was to pioneer the economic analysis of voting behaviour, forming 
with his own intuitions new concepts and a new school of thinking that greatly affected 
this thesis as well (1956). Returning to his original work, his primary objective was to 
define the actions of a "rational government" under the supposition that voters are 
selfish utility maximisers (p. 335): 
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Our main thesis is that parties in democratic politics are analogous to 
entrepreneurs in a profit seeking company. So as to attain their 
private ends, they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain 
the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce whatever products 
they believe will gain the most profit for the same reason. In order to 
examine the implications of this thesis, we have also assumed that 
citizens behave rationally in politics  
While the rationality theory employed by Downs will be explored in the subsequent 
section, it is vital to identify some cornerstones of his seminal analysis. First, he 
assumed voters were rational and selfish, asserting that "such simplification is necessary 
for the prediction of behaviour, because decisions made at random or without any 
relation to each other, do not fall into any pattern and therefore cannot be analysed" (p. 
2). In this way, Downs actually dismissed Lazarsfeld's theory of personal influences as 
the principal force behind voting behaviour, arguing that such an approach would turn 
the analysis into a "mere adjunct of primary group sociology".  
In addition, he assumed "every government seeks to maximise political support" (p. 12) 
and supposed no government can restrict freedom of speech or the ability to campaign 
vigorously. It was proclaimed, that political parties formulate policies in order to win 
elections rather than winning elections in order to formulate policies. In this context, the 
voter's ultimate goal was perceived as the maximization of his personal utility. Notably, 
three contentions were prominent within the analysis itself. First, most utility 
calculations were based on the subjective observations of voters themselves. Second, 
economic expectations were driven only from individuals, without a specific reference 
to national gains and losses. Third, the primary factor was the expected streams of 
utility rather than past or present indicators.  
All these contentions have been challenged by later studies in this field. Thus, objective 
indexes such as income and inflation rates were used as economic indicators rather than 
voters‘ expectations. Three "reference levels" for economic performance, namely the 
state, the sector and the individual, were set up. In addition, attention was also paid to 
the historical performance of incumbent parties. A multi-dimensional concept of 
political knowledge is created by integrating the competing structures. Table ‎4.2.1 ‎
attempts to do that in an illustrative matrix, framing the correlations investigated in 
some of the major empirical investigations done so far. 












































































Prospective NA NA NA 
Table ‎4.2.1: The three different dimensions of economic voting explored in existing research 
 Note: The reference to specific studies is based on one or more major hypotheses 
examined within the research. There could be more hypotheses that were not included.  
Within the table, the vertical distinctions between the reference groups form a broad 
continuum between two extremes (the state and the individual), whereas various sectors 
are left in between. The horizontal separation is between theories looking for objective 
indicators of performance and those residing on the subject‘s own assessments. The 
subsequent horizontal distinction is between future prospects and past assessment.  
Dozens of studies have explored different facets and hypotheses related to the theory of 
economic voting. Some experiments tested the validity of one cell in the table, while 
others used regression to assess the relative importance of several dimensions. Lewis-
Beck, for instance proved the political significance of voters' subjective assessments of 
national economic performance in Britain, France, Germany and Italy (1986). Kinder 
and Kiewiet reached similar conclusions after exploring election campaigns in the 
United States, noting that "those voters unhappy with changes in their financial 
circumstances… showed little inclination to punish candidates of the incumbent party 
for their personal misfortunes" (1979, p. 495). While these studies fit into cell no. 1, the 
empirical work done by Campbell and others supports cell no. 3, showing that voters 
saying they were personally affected by economic downturns were more likely to 
criticize the incumbent government (1960). This subjective personal approach was 
reinforced in two other papers presented at public meetings, in which Fiorina (1979) 
and Brody (1977) confirmed the link between personal conditions and shifts in party 
affiliation (both cited in Weatherford 1983).  
Kramer succeeded in providing numerical representation of the importance of objective, 
personal and retrospective information. He observed, "a 10% decrease in per capita real 
personal income would cost the incumbent administration 4 or 5 percent of the 
congressional vote" (1971, p. 141). While Kramer's study fitted into cell no. 9, 
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Weatherford complicated his analysis by showing the importance of such information 
varies among voters. Those with lower socioeconomic backgrounds are likely to attach 
greater importance to their individual financial situation, while the state serves as an 
anchor for assessments of the wealthier voters (1983)
16
. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, Smith 
and Young followed Downs' subjective, prospective approach represented in cell no. 6, 
and explained 68 per cent of the unexpected variance of voting decisions based on 
expected utilities (1978). Cell no. 7 was the basis for the empirical work done by Rees 
and others in the US, showing that objective retrospective and personal knowledge of 
unemployment figures was strongly correlated with a Republican vote (1962). 
The middle column of the matrix received relatively little attention in the literature. 
Therefore, the unique research of Welch and Foster about the voting behaviour of black 
African-Americans deserves special attention (1992). Their empirical analysis found 
blacks' retrospective subjective assessment of the status of their ethnic minority group 
was a significant predictor of their voting behaviour, in addition to the status of their 
households and their nation. As a result, "those who are more positive about the 
economic fortunes of the past year are much more likely to vote Republican" (p. 229). 
Tufte adopted a different methodology to suggest 20 per cent of the variation in the 
1976 US Presidential Elections derived from subjective perceptions of voters regarding 
their family condition while 70 per cent of the variations stemmed from traditional party 
identification (1978, Chapter 5). As this insight was only one among several influential 
insights he put forward, his work merits specific reference.  
In his Political Control of the Economy, Tufte argued that voters were influenced by 
short-term fluctuations in the economy, but he also managed to establish a solid case to 
claim politicians are manipulating the economy, mainly through welfare benefits, to 
gain public support. He showed that in election years, real disposable income was more 
likely to rise while unemployment was repeatedly more likely to decline. After Tufte 
succeeded to "establish a motive and to find a pattern" (p. 27), he went on to illustrate 
how US Presidents cynically directed welfare policies to gain ballots. The evidence he 
collected reflected "the key role of transfer payments in producing election-year 
economic stimulation" (p. 44) and served as fertile ground to argue for a deliberate 
intention of politicians to manipulate the economy through fiscal policies.  
                                                 
16
  There is a fierce debate around the nature of human beings as self-interested or altruistic. It can be traced back to 
ancient Greece, where a distinction was made between the virtues of the private and the public realm (Arendt 
1958). It was also at the heart of the quarrel between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, debating about 
the core values of the United States (Sandel 1996). In this context, Downs (1956) and Arrow (1951/1963) assumed 
people are personal utility maximisers, whilst Titmuss (1997/1971) and Frey (1997), for instance, argued that 
conventional rationality assumptions are often erroneous in this respect. Generally, it could be said that economic 
rationality refers solely to private utility.  
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All the accounts cited above presumed that voters were proficient information 
processors. This supposition was challenged by Kramer, who argued the ordinary voter 
could not follow such a model. His proposed model stemmed from cognitive decision 
rules, suggesting, "if the performance of the incumbent party is 'satisfactory' according 
to some simple standard, the voter votes to retain the incumbent governing party" (1971, 
p. 134). Kiewiet and Rivers split Kramer's influential argument into three separate 
elements, holding that economic heuristic voting is retrospective, incumbency-oriented 
and based upon the results of economic policies and not upon the actual policies 
themselves (1984, p. 370). Accordingly, voters can potentially support a failing 
government if its achievements were above a certain subjective threshold. However, it is 
vital to note the major difficulty has not been solved, as Kramer's "simple standard" is 
still not defined decisively.   
To summarise, the task of exploring the political dimension of the relationship between 
poor people and democracies goes through theories of economic and class voting, both 
derived from entirely different views about the key issues affecting voters. It is possible 
that both theories would identify the same outcome (i.e. increasing or decreasing 
polarisation), though the rationale and the disciplines employed to identify the 
underpinning dynamics are inherently different. In the context of this thesis, both 
theories can be called descriptive, focusing on the behaviour of the majority rather than 
of the exceptional minority.  
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4.3 Economic Aspects 
Concepts of information and rationality are inseparable from any economic analysis of 
voting behaviour. Knowledge is essential for establishing a fair assessment of past 
performance of parties, present circumstances of the individual and future alternatives 
offered by candidates. Rationality thinking is vital to incorporate these pieces of 
information into a voting decision that would pursue the voter's own interests, whatever 
they are and however they are defined by him/her. The Pyramid of Political 
Engagement distinguishes between physical, informed and rational voting in the sense 
that at each level, voters can be diverted from casting their optimal vote. As this 
Pyramid also represents different levels of participation, such a diversion can also imply 
exclusion from the entire political process.  
After exploring theories of voting from the political science arena, this section aims to 
incorporate economic concepts and economistic thinking into the discussion. It will first 
address the question of rationality, facing theories that suggest rational people never 
vote or inform themselves, as their chances of casting a decisive vote are virtually zero. 
After posing some challenges to this popular argument, the concept of information will 
be thoroughly examined with a specific reference to the theories suggesting that being 
informed is not necessarily a pre-requisite to voting rationally. The next section will 
highlight some social reflections on the relationship between the poor and democracies, 
by integrating the concepts of equality, exclusion and citizenship into the discussion.  
The enigma of human rationality is far from being fully revealed. Over the years, this 
field served as a mini-battlefield between economists, psychologists and even 
sociologists (Wallas 1909/1910, Simon 1955, Shapiro 1969, Chong 2000), who aspired 
to provide new insights into it. In scholarly terms, two analytical frameworks emerged: 
the traditional substantive rationality and the contemporary bounded rationality. This 
distinction created two different discourses, each relied and developed its own premises, 
methods and outcomes. The concept of bounded rationality tends to be radically 
descriptive, while theories of substantive rationality were evolving around the "rational 
man", thus reflecting a strong prescriptive motives. However, one cannot investigate 
bounded rationality without hypothesising about substantive rationality, as systematic 
deviations can be recognised only after some definite rules are set.  
Assuming that social choices can be made either through commodity markets or 
through political markets, Arrows outlines the elementary steps necessary to reach a 
rational decision (1951/1963). These fundamental cornerstones were repeatedly adopted 
with slight modifications by other scholars from various disciplines (Downs 1956, 
Goldberg 1969, Kramer 1971, Hogarth & Reder 1986, Osborne & Rubinstein 1990). It 
suggests individuals should rank their alternatives using a preference/satisfaction/utility 
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function in a transitive way, so that each alternative is either preferred to, indifferent to, 
or inferior to the other
17
. The transitivity hypothesis implies that a voter who preferred 
party A to B and party B to C, would also prefer party A to C. Hence, rational voters, 
when confronting similar scenarios, would consistently choose the alternative classified 
higher according to their individual preference ordering
18
. In practice, this method 
assumes people are utility maximisers.  
However, over the years scholars repeatedly challenged this preposition, resided on 
concepts developed by traditional economists. Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos 
Tversky identified some of the systematic deviations from conventional rationality 
calculations and founded the "prospect theory" (1979), which led to Kahneman being 
the first ever psychologist to receive a Nobel Prize in Economics. Quattrone and 
Tversky successfully linked this logic to the field of voting behaviour, arguing that risk 
aversion normally reinforces incumbent parties (1988). Notably, the significance of 
these findings was their consistency, as random deviations from rationality assumptions 
were already discussed a hundred years ago by, for instance, Graham Wallas 
(1909/1910). It was the systematic deviation from Substantive Rationality principles 
that ushered in the dawn of concepts of Bounded (Procedural) Rationality   
The idea of bounded rationality was pioneered by Herbert Simon, utilising his 
knowledge of psychological behaviourism. In an innovative paper he argued that "actual 
human rationality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and simplified 
approximation to the kind of global rationality that is implied, for example, by game-
theoretical models" (1955, p. 101). Thirty years later, he integrated the terms 
―procedural‖ and ―substantive‖ with constitutional law, where "we can judge a person to 
be rational who uses a reasonable process for choosing; or, alternatively, we can judge 
a person to be rational who arrives at a reasonable choice" (1985, p. 294, the emphasis 
is mine). In fact, he challenged the then narrow analysis, arguing that academia cannot 
ground its conclusions merely on outcomes with no reference to the process.  
Simon outstandingly succeeded in transforming the hegemony. His novel observation 
pioneered an entire research tradition focusing on the intrinsic and extrinsic constraints 
                                                 
17
  Goldberg enhanced this formula by putting forward the concept of "effective rationality", which is "the accuracy of 
one's expected value calculations" (1969, p. 63). He argued that education enables individuals to lower their 
information costs and thus improve the accuracy of their probability-based estimations. Hence, a low level of 
education might interfere with rational voting through lower information levels.   
18
  Although this thesis has no ambitions to deal with econometric aspects, it should be noted that several methods and 
decision roles might apply to utility calculation under conditions of uncertainty. Min-Max Strategies (minimizing the 
worst possibility, maximizing the best one), Probabilistic Rules (maximizing the expected value of the probability 
distribution) or Certainty Rules (maximizing the certain pay-offs) are only some of the available alternatives to tackle 
these equations (Simon 1985). In the context of abstentions, Ferejohn and Fiorina employed an interesting model of 
"Min-Max Regret", according to which voters minimize their maximum regret that can possibly occur if the worst 
comes to the worst (1974).  
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limiting human behaviour in markets. In the decades to follow, Bounded Rationality 
was extensively studied. As Simon noted in his Nobel Prize Lecture, "economic science 
has focused on just one aspect of Man‘s character, his reason… There can no longer be 
any doubt that the micro assumptions of the theory - the assumptions of perfect 
rationality - are contrary to fact. It is not a question of approximation; they do not even 
remotely describe the processes that human beings use for making decisions in complex 
situations" (1978, pp. 342, 366). Since then, human reasoning was studied differently, 
as it integrated not only economics and political science concepts, but also themes from 
sociology and psychology.  
Obviously, this approach was not easily endorsed by traditional economists like Arrow 
(who received his Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972). He admitted rationality might not 
be always compatible with descriptive empirical evidence, but proclaimed that if one 
chooses to adopt rationality, one must realize it is "not a property of the individual 
alone" (1987, p. 201). Therefore, Arrow noted, although "the rationality hypothesis is 
by itself weak… there is no general principle that prevents the creation of an economic 
theory based on other hypotheses than that of rationality" (p. 206, 202). This debate has 
significant practical and tangible implications. One example was specifically analysed 
in Downs‘ seminal book (1956, p. 6): 
Let us assume a certain man prefers party A for political reasons, but 
his wife has a tantrum whenever he fails to vote for party B. It is 
perfectly rational personally for this man to vote for party B if 
preventing his wife's tantrums is more important to him than having 
A win instead of B. Nevertheless, in our model such behaviour is 
considered irrational because it employs a political device for non-
political purpose. 
The rift between these two schools of thought was also in the methodological arena. 
Essentially, bounded rationality theorists have always sought to avoid monochromatic 
economic models to allow a wide spectrum of cognitive decisions. On the other hand, 
economists search for rigorous and consistent models to "expand the scope of the 
theory" (Rubinsten 1998, p. 5). The practical difference is obvious: while Kahneman 
and Tversky had developed their "prospect theory" through a series of experiments 
(1979), economists like Arrow (1951/1963) and Downs (1956) followed a completely 
different route of proof. Rather than deducing general principles from empirical 
observations, they imposed from above a theory of rational behaviour that might or 
might not be grounded in facts (for a furious debate evolved between Simon and 
Rubinstein, see Chapter 11 in Rubinstein 1998).  
Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, systematic deviations from substantive rationality 
theory can only be tracked after establishing an empirical starting point, based on 
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substantive rationality theory. This analytical order is at the core of this thesis, as it was 
for Kahneman and Tversky's work. However, the decision to use the concept of 
substantive rationality creates a momentous challenge for this thesis, as the same theory 
is frequently used by scholars to prove that rational citizens should not vote at all (Olson 
1965/1971, Ledyard 1984, Palfrey & Rosenthal 1985). According to this school of 
thought, turnout should be zero and any systematic comparison of reasoning is 
essentially meaningless. Logically, if citizens were so irrational as to vote in the first 
place, rational motives cannot be ascribed to their behaviour afterwards. Being rational 
and informed are therefore no less irrational than the very act of voting.  
Reality constitutes the most solid argument against these theories, as most people do 
contribute towards collective action by voting (see Sen 1977). However, there are 
several theoretical explanations, which provide fairly convincing arguments to reconcile 
the gap between substantive rationality theories and the democratic reality. Prior to 
elaborating on these counterarguments, basic knowledge about the premises 
underpinning the original attack is needed. Olson's "Paradox of Collective Action" that 
underpins the "Paradox of Voter Turnout" and Downs' "Rationally Ignorant Voter" 
theory is focal to this review.  
Olson‘s paradox holds that there is no natural reason for individuals to support any 
collective action aimed at promoting the welfare state or other public good (1965/71). In 
his work, Olson showed the only rational strategy in such scenarios is to "free ride", i.e. 
to benefit from others' efforts while contributing nothing to the collective. Since 
everyone can benefit from the public good (due to its non-exclusive character), the 
utility derived from it cannot be limited to those who actively contributed to its 
production. Therefore, according to Olson, free riding is the ultimate strategy for 
minimising costs and maximising utility, and as a result, while everyone waits for others 
to contribute towards a collective good, the good, although beneficial, will never be 
produced.  
Free riding can intuitively be linked to political activism. Taking the Trade Unions as an 
example, Olson asserted that "just as it was not rational for a particular producer to 
restrict his output… so it would not be rational for him to sacrifice his time and money 
to support a lobbying organisation… In neither case would it be in the interest of the 
individual producer to assume any of the costs himself" (p. 11). Paradoxically, while 
"The Invisible Hand" should benefit the collective, the process is proved to be reversed 
in this context.  
Marxism, in many ways, is premised on collective action, which arguably should have 
been in the interest of all the proletariat players. However, it did not succeed in 
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delivering its objectives. Two different explanations were put forward by Mills and 
Oslon to resolve this dissonance:  
Mills argued that the mistake of Marxism was the wrong assumption that people would 
be utilitarian and rational enough to see the wisdom of engaging in a class action 
(1951). According to Mills, "rational awareness and identification with one's own class 
interests", as well as "awareness of and a rejection of other class interests as 
illegitimate" were crucial to the materialization of such an action (p. 325). He also 
argued that Marxists and Liberals made a similar error: they both assumed people would 
pursue their own interests, and they both were frustrated to discover they do not. With 
regard to Marxism, the failure was exposed when apathy eclipsed rationality, leading to 
socialism‘s collapse.  
Olson, on the other hand, asserted it was not "indifference, inaction or pessimism", but a 
fully rational decision that led people not to join a class war and risk their lives for the 
collective interest. Hence, although the individual interests of the players were identical, 
they still had no exclusive benefit in taking a risk. Envisaging the long-term 
consequences of this paradox, Olson noted, "it is hard to believe that irrational 
behaviour could provide the motive power for all social change throughout human 
history" (1965/1971, p. 110). This pessimistic view is probably shared today by many 
other scholars and politicians.  
The Paradox of Voter Turnout can be seen as a combination of Olson Paradox and 
Game Theory. Essentially, when each individual sticks to his own dominant strategies, 
leading him/her to defect, the interests of the group lose ground. The Prisoner Dilemma 
demonstrates this paradox in a two-player group. The Paradox of Voter Turnout deals 
with the political implications for larger groups. Palfrey and Rosenthal followed this 
reasoning to show that unless voters have full information about all the other players, 
they derive no utility from voting with uncertainties (1985). Ledyard employed similar 
logic to proclaim, "if everyone is rational… then, presumably, no one will vote" (1984, 
p. 12). According to his analysis, "irrational" voters who benefit from the act of voting 
are no less than an "externality" which interferes with the selection of the socially 
desirable outcome. The conclusion is strikingly clear: in principle, rational citizens 
should simply not vote. 
The political consequences of low turnout cannot be ignored here. In a comparative 
study of nineteen countries, Pacek and Radcliff found turnout positively contributes to 
the "the electoral fate of the left" (1995, p. 142). In the US, Key suggested back in the 
1940s that the younger, poorer and less educated, who were less likely to vote, had 
often been affiliated to the Democratic Party (1942/1947, p. 594). Fenton showed that 
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sixty percent of the variation in the size of Republican victories could be explained by 
turnout (1979). In Switzerland, Lutz concluded the strengthening of "government and 
right wing positions [occurs] when citizens do not vote to a large extent" (2003, p. 16). 
The conclusion is in line with Lijphart's work, holding the view that the inequalities in 
physical participation are not distributed randomly, but rather contain a consistent bias 
in favour of the wealthiest and the best educated (1997).  
It should be noted however that some scholars challenged empirically the core of this 
argument. Studlar and Welch, for instance, showed that the ideological variance 
between British voters and non-voters is marginal and cannot alter the outcomes of 
elections (1986). Similar conclusions were found in the US context by Shaffer (1982), 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) and Teixeira who proclaimed, "most electoral 
outcomes are not determined in any meaningful sense by turnout" (1992, p. 96–100). 
Citrin and others suggested non-voters were more likely to be Democrats, but a very 
few elections could have been overturned "if everyone voted" (2003, p. 75). Rubenson 
and others showed similar results when analyzing the Canadian elections (2005). 
DeNardo, who was leading this school of thought, concluded, "the recent decay of 




Downs, in a way, "left the decision to vote somewhat up in the air" (Ferejohn & Fiorina 
1974, p. 525), focusing primarily on the low benefits expected from investment in 
acquiring information. As quality information is costly, he asserted that voters were 
expected to become "rationally ignorant", hence, "any concept of democracy based on 
an electorate of equally well informed citizens is irrational" (1957, p. 236). Downs 
based his conclusion on the plainest cost-return calculation. His conclusion necessarily 
brings information asymmetries, which, in economic theory, might lead a costumer to 
"buy" undesirable "products" in the same way that uninformed voter can choose 
undesirable parties. Whether such asymmetries were caused by high information costs 
or deliberate deceit, politics and markets are both subjected to a similar distortion.  
Interestingly, this idea of Rationally Ignorant Voters stemmed from Downs' own 
experience as the President of his Student Union. Retrospectively he recalled how his 
fellow students, who enthusiastically participated in his election campaign, were 
embarrassingly indifferent to his achievements when in office (1993). This phenomenon 
taught him that in democracy, people tend to rely on cost-free information, which 
                                                 
19  Scholars also wondered whether bad weather supports the Republicans, assuming that rain is likely to reduce 
turnout. While Merrifield found weather has a significant correlation with participation rates (1993), Knack refuted 
this link between weather and the Democrat vote (1994). 
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requires no effort and no time to consume (1956). Another possibility is an overflow of 
information, which ends up with similar consequences: the knowledge that is eventually 
held by the individual is usually the poorest and the most inaccurate type available. In 
contrast to restaurants or supermarkets, in voting such an attribute might challenge the 
legitimacy of an individual's decisions.  
Nevertheless, when voters are faithless in their chance to make a difference, there is 
allegedly no benefit in seeking to gain even the most simplistic form of knowledge. This 
is why the reasoning behind the "Rationally Ignorant Voter" is quite similar to the 
previous paradoxes. As Fiorina put it, "just as most people regard high participation as a 
collective good, so most people regard a well-informed electorate as a collective good. 
But just as citizens have no apparent personal incentive to vote, so they appear to have 
no apparent personal incentive to be informed" (1990, p. 335). Although reality does not 
necessarily follow (not all are political illiterate), the goal of this section is not to 
challenge the validity of the paradox empirically, but rather to destabilize its internal 
logic on theoretical grounds.  
The most popular approach adopted by scholars defending the electorate‘s rationality 
was to question the structure of the utility function underlying Olson and Downs' 
accounts. It was usually defined separately, either from the side of the costs or from that 
of the benefits. Aldrich for instance focused mainly on the costs resulting from voting. 
He argued that "turnout is not a particularly good example of the problem of collective 
action… [as voting is] for many people most of the time, a low-cost, low-benefit action" 
(1993, p. 261). Niemi made the same argument, by stating the cost attached to voting 
"has been tremendously exaggerated" as the current literature is "using elephant guns to 
hunt fleas" (1976, p. 115). If indeed such a conclusion is acceptable, one can argue 
voting decisions are often made 'at the margins' and the utility function of individuals is 
far from being unbalanced.  
Similar reasoning was used to defy the arguments in favour of rationally ignorant 
voters. Fiorina noted that some theories not only ignored the possibility of accidental 
and incidental exposure to political knowledge but also paid no attention to scenarios in 
which no better alternatives were available at the time of gathering information (1990, 
p. 336). Popkin argued "most of the information voters use when they vote is acquired 
as a by-product of activities they pursue as part of their daily lives" and exemplified this 
assertion by demonstrating that "one need not be an economist to see which way the 
economy is going" (1991, p. 23). Ferejohn took the discussion a step forward by 
wondering whether the character of accidental or incidental knowledge is unequally 
distributed and is thus leading voters from different backgrounds to be systematically 
exposed to different types of information (1990, p. 13).  
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Niemi put forward another creative approach to deal with the cost of voting. He 
suggested scholars completely ignored the cost of not voting, although it might have a 
considerable influence on the decision to participate. While the act of voting "usually 
takes little time" and is "relatively costless in the sense of opportunity costs", it was 
argued that there is a "psychological cost of saying 'no' when asked whether or not you 
voted" (1976, pp. 115–117). Similar conclusions can be deduced from his analysis to 
explain the existence of informed voters, although it was not mentioned in the paper.  
Given that decisions of physical participation are accepted "at the margins", one can 
argue that the bureaucratic costs attached to voting can often possess a decisive 
influence on voters' decisions. Several studies supported this contention, showing that 
most citizens in the US would vote if the procedures of registration were different 
(Brians & Grofman 2001, Highton 1997). Other cross-national studies expanded the 
argument by showing that the institutional patterns of the political systems have had a 
significant influence on voter turnout (Powell 1986, Jackman 1987). Nevertheless, other 
accounts suggested different conclusions. Highton, for instance, concluded that 
registration requirements have an impact, but they "do not appear to be the main reason 
for the socioeconomic skew of American voters" (1997, p. 573). 
The benefits-oriented explanations are no less powerful than the cost-oriented ones. 
Among the various scholars defying the dominant paradigm, Riker and Ordeshook 
stated at the outset that their goal was to "interpret the voting calculus so that it can fit 
comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behaviour" (1968, p. 25). They 
reformulated Downs' theory and complemented it with benefits of intrinsic satisfaction 
from democratic participation, whereas none was related directly to the possibility of 
casting a decisive vote. Interestingly, Fiorina compared this political argument to the 
football arena, noting that although fans can hardly increase the chances of their 
"favourite team", they are still enthusiastically investing time and money, in probably an 
irrational way, to gather any available piece of information (1990, p. 336). These 
utilities certainly do not fall into the classical type reckoned by theories.  
Kanazawa suggested analyzing voters not as future utility maximisers, but rather as 
adaptive learners of the past. According to her empirical study, "actors seem to be 
looking backward, not forward, and to take decisions on the basis of whether their prior 
choice was reinforced or punished" (1998, p. 991). Essentially, it was shown that voters 
derived greater benefits from voting in elections, only if they did not bother to 
participate previously and their favourite candidate lost. Another relatively radical 
approach was put forward by Quattrone and Tversky who hypothesized that some 
people might think their decision is correlated with that of others. Consequently, "each 
citizen may regard his or her single vote as diagnostic of millions of votes, which would 
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substantially inflate the subjective probability of one's vote making a difference" (1988, 
p. 733).  
A different approach was advocated by Coleman, who focused particularly on the 
influence of group pressures on defections. He showed how "social networks can 
overcome free rider activity" and suggested counting also "the rewards provided by the 
others for helping to achieve that same outcome" (1988, p. 56, 53). Notably, his finding 
falls within one of Olson's exceptions due to the relatively small-scale group; 
nevertheless, his analysis of the rational reasons behind zealotry in scenarios of war, 
terror attack or even sports teams is thought provoking. The conclusions can easily fit 
into the political arena as well.  
Clearly, the exact course of human reasoning is far from being fully revealed. 
Nevertheless, the argument that rational people should not exercise physical or informed 
voting at all cannot be perceived anymore as superior, under any of the theories. The 
motives and methods cited above followed the economic theory and therefore, they 
could easily be modelled and generalised. By this stage, relatively little attention was 
given to altruists who would not follow the vigorous economic calculations, not due to 
their bounded rationality but because of their intrinsic motivation to help people 
(Titmuss 1970/1997, Frey 1997, Le-Grand 2003). Such thinking facilitated a parallel 
line of research that sought to identify selfish individuals ("defectors") who were more 
likely to free ride on others.  
The paper of Marwell and Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? achieved 
this goal by showing economics students were far more likely to adopt "defection" 
strategies (1981). An experimental, small-scale experience conducted by Leuthold 
during one of his public finance lectures, found conflicting results, as female and art 
students free rode more than males and business students (1993). Isaac, McCue and 
Plott performed a repetitive experiment and confirmed their hypothesis that free riding 
is a learned behaviour, whose extent increases with replication (1985). Based on their 
study, one might argue that the elderly are more likely to defect due to their life 
experience. However, interesting as it may be, this field has been poorly researched and 
correlations between socio-economic conditions and free riding are still obscure.  
After discussing rationality theories and some of their implications and complexities, a 
challenging question has to be answered: is it possible for an political illiterate voter 
to cast a fully rational vote? There are two major schools of thought whose answer is 
positive. One is focused on the individual level showing that the personal risk of 
"getting it wrong" is less than is apparent. The other school comes to similar 
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conclusions by demonstrating how, on average, the personal deviations from the "right" 
decision cancel each other out.  
The first school of theories was pioneered by Kramer, who suggested voters 
successfully employ heuristics and shortcuts to deal with complicated informational 
environments (1971), and was supported by several other scholars. Wittman argued, 
"efficiency does not require perfectly informed voters any more than efficient economic 
markets require all stockholders to know the intimate workings of the firms in which 
they hold stock" (1989, p. 1400). Page and Shapiro stated, "people probably do not need 
large amounts of information to make rational voting choices" as cues may be sufficient 
"to permit votes to act as if they had all the available information" (1992, pp. 387–388). 
All these accounts are based on the pioneering studies performed by McKeley and 
Ordershook, which produced a meaningful amount of empirical evidence to 
demonstrate ignorant voters do function reasonably well in complicated environments 
(1984, 1985).  
They found that approximately one fifth of the voters from the "uninformed" group 
voted "wrong" in the sense that full information would have possibly changed their 
preferences, whereas "the errors… are concentrated in a few subjects who never learn 
what is going on in the experiment" (1984, p. 84). A critical assessment would however, 
suggest all is dependent on the type of information provided to the group. Essentially, if 
a specific sort of information was found to be insignificant in the sense that it had not 
shaped voting behaviour, voters are obviously expected to have similar preferences 
without being exposed to it. Gilens, for instance, showed that lack of concrete details 
about governments' performance such as unemployment levels and budget deficits 
"leads many Americans to hold political views different from those they would hold 
otherwise" (2001, p. 379). Therefore, even though heuristics and shortcuts might be 
commonly used, decisive conclusions about their precise influence on the political 
process should be carefully made
20
. 
The second school of thought has sought to demonstrate that information deficits do not 
necessarily divert aggregated public choice. It is argued that as the number of voters 
rises, so does the probability that individual mistakes would cancel out each other. As 
Miller explained, "a group of n voters, each with the same differentials… does as well 
as a single well informed voter" (1986, p. 186). Wittman was more specific, stating, "if 
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  Another facet of the same problem can be found in studies which defined "correct voting" as voting under the 
conditions of full information (see, for instance, Lau & Redlawsk 1997). Information is crucial, but one cannot argue 
that it can generate "correct" or even "desirable" outcome. The work of Wolders (2002) illustrated the risk in this 
perception by showing how exogenous factors such as oil prices influenced voting behaviour in oil producing states 
by benefiting incumbent parties, which arguably contributed nothing to the temporary prosperity. 
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some individuals make incorrect choices, the law of large numbers is likely to yield the 
correct majority choice" (1989, p. 1402), whereas Converse concluded, "the process of 
aggregation drives out noise" and therefore, "the quickest 'fix' for a poor signal-to-noise 
ratio is to aggregate your data" (1990, p. 378). The mathematical and philosophical 
origins of these arguments can be traced back to the 1785 seminal work of Condorcet 
defining the classic Jury Problem (translated by Sommerlad and McLean 1989). All 
these accounts utilised statistical methods to show, again, information matters much less 
than we think it does.   
This theory was seriously challenged. Miller argued that statistically, "it is inequalities 
or biases (of a particular sort) in the information levels in the electorate, and not 
generally low levels of information, that threaten the 'success' of the electoral process" 
(1986, p. 191). Bartels showed that the actual aggregate preference "deviates in 
significant and politically consequential ways" from that of a theoretically fully 
informed electorate and that "these deviations were significantly diluted by aggregation, 
but by no means eliminated" (1996, pp. 194–195). According to his predictions, the 
support in the incumbent presidents of the US should have been five percent lower if the 
electorate was fully informed. These findings fundamentally subvert the ability of the 
Jury Theorem to portray the democratic outcome as accurate and reliable.  
These empirical evaluation studies bring us back to the starting point. While it might be 
irrational to accumulate information, the presence of it can certainly influence 
individual and collective preferences. Delli Carpini and Keeter were right to declare, 
"democracy functions best when its citizens are politically informed", as the link 
between political knowledge, political power and socio-economic power cannot be 
denied (1996, p.1). After all, it was Thomas Jefferson who wrote in 1816, "If a nation 
expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and 
never will be" (1944, p. 648). Although the particular importance of each segment of 
knowledge might be disputed, one can hardly exaggerate the contribution of 
information to the proper functioning of the democratic machine. As the Pyramid of 
Political Engagement shows, this is a major prerequisite to reduce the gap between the 
"will of the voters" and the "choice of the voters".  
The final issue to be addressed in this section is the relationship between information 
and rationality. The political literature did not converge to a decisive conclusion on 
whether the first is a prerequisite of the second. Fiorina, recalling the progression of the 
academic debate, noted that several scholars in the 1950s and 1960s assumed that 
"information is a major indicator of rationality" while others held the view that "to be 
rational a voter must know certain things… and rely on that knowledge" (1990, p.322). 
However, it seems that the latter view accumulated more support in the academic world.  
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Alesina and Rosenthal operationalized rationality for their econometric calculation as 
the capability of voters to "efficiently use all the available information to disentangle the 
effects of administrative competence" (1995, p. 189). Simpson contended the triumph of 
democracy depends not only on open channels of communication, but also on 
"individual's willingness and skills in utilising the information" (1997, p. 159). Delli 
Carpini and Keeter noted that "in the absence of adequate information neither passion 
nor reason is likely to lead to decisions that reflect the real interests of the public" 
(1997, p. 5). Overall, the observation of hierarchical correlation between information 
and rationality, and a clear separation of the concepts, as implemented in the Pyramid of 
Political Engagement, was almost within a consensus.  
It seems, however, that the actual challenge lies in the conceptualization of rationality in 
the political markets. Possibly, since this concept was seldom theorized, the most 
comfortable way of bypassing the challenge was to exaggerate the importance of 
information, portraying it as the major prerequisite for "correct voting". Even though 
full information occasionally failed to address voters' own interests, little was done in 
academic terms to crystallize a consistent theory of rational voting. Evidently, one 
cannot study political decisions without confronting the individual capability of 
reaching rational decisions.  
Assessing rationality, this research will follow the elementary framework developed by 
Arrow (1951/1963) and his initial terminology: there is a "basic set of alternatives… in 
the theory of consumer's choice, each alternative would be a commodity bundle… in 
welfare economics, each alternative would be a distribution of commodities and labor 
requirements… in the theory of elections, the alternatives are candidates" (p. 11-12). 
Consequently, he wrote, "each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all 
conceivable social states, in terms of their desirability to him… by whatever standards 
he deems relevant" (p. 17). Eventually, the party maximising the individual utility is the 
rational choice of the voter.  
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4.4 Social Aspects 
After exploring some political and economic facets of the relationship between poor and 
democracies, this section intends to redirect the discussion back into the discipline of 
social policy. A light will be shone on the fundamental concepts of equality, exclusion 
and citizenship rights. These will then be confronted by the various arguments raised so 
far. This section will seek to convince that the current "deprivation threshold" of 
physical voting provides all concepts with a formal solution, rather than substantive 
one. The scope of political equality, political exclusion and political rights go far 
beyond the mere presence of a vote in the ballot box on Polling Day. 
   
4.4.1 The Discourse of Equality 
The unequal distribution of political power is one of the most documented phenomena, 
though it is also one of the least discussed ones. While it is only reasonable to assume 
people in need would turn to their government for a solution, the extent to which this 
faith remains groundless in modern democracies is striking (see, in this context, 
Feldman 1982). Among the few scholars studying the unequal vote was Lijphart, who 
concluded political disparities are "not randomly distributed but systematically biased in 
favour of more privileged citizens" (1997, p. 1). Consequently, he endeavoured to make 
a case for compulsory voting as the only way to achieve effective equality.   
Unlike the integrative framework pursued here, the existing literature about political 
equality has dealt separately with physical and informed voting, leaving aside the 
dimension of reasoning. Generally speaking, scholars were concerned more with the 
unequal political participation of the disadvantaged than with their political preferences. 
As reviewed earlier, several studies have sought to link participation and electoral 
outcomes by simulating what would happen "if everyone voted", generating 
contradictory results.  
4.4.1.1 Physical Participation 
Voting is the first barrier. Back in 1927, Gosnell linked turnout to socio-economic 
factors in the US, finding that "the more schooling the individual has the more likely he 
is to register and vote in presidential elections" (1927, p. 98). A few years later, 
Tingsten demonstrated "electoral participation tends to increase with the social 
standard" also in Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and Austria (1937, p. 120), while 
Key confirmed that in the US, participation was still declining "at each stage down the 
socio-economic ladder" (1942/1947, p. 590). Eventually, Lipset summarised his wide-
ranging comparative research by noting patterns of participation are certainly different 
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between countries, though they "are strikingly the same" within them (p. 182). His table 
of key determinant of physical voting is in many ways still relevant today:  
High turnout Low turnout 
High income Low income 
High education Low education 
Occupational groups: businessmen, 
white-collar, government employees, 
commercial crop farmers, miners 
Occupational groups: unskilled 
workers, servants, service workers, 
peasants, subsistence farmers 
Whites Negroes 
Men Women 
Older people (above 35) Young people (under 35) 
Old residents in community Newcomers in community 
Married people Single people 
Members of organizations Isolated individuals 
Table ‎4.4.1: Dominant characteristics of voters and absentees  
 (Source: Lipset 1960/1963, p. 184) 
The correlation between socio-economic variables and physical voting was confirmed in 
many other historical and contemporary studies (see, for instance, Arneson 1925, Olsen 
1972, Powell 1986, Abramson and Claggett 1991 and Burchardt et al. 2000b). However, 
the socio-economic approach was only one of three dominant research traditions that 
endeavoured to explain turnout. Two other schools of thought, focusing on political 
mobilisation and institutional barriers, have rarely referred specifically to the poor 
electorate. All, though, have sought to find the powerful indicators inducing 
mobilisation or withdrawal of voters. In the context of this thesis, a larger attention 
would be given to the socio-economic analysis, though the two other explanatory 
theories will be subsequently explored, starting from page 116.  
Rosenstone raised three possible explanations for the systematically lower turnout of the 
poor and the unemployed (1982, pp. 41-44). First, he argued, the opportunity cost is 
significantly higher for those desperately seeking to guarantee their very own future. 
Second, the sudden breakdown of social interactions, generated by the misery of 
poverty, also depresses the intrinsic incentives to participate. Third, the unemployment 
shock and the survival anxiety might breed psychological complexities, capable of 
deterring voters from the ballot polls. After Rosenstone confirmed his withdrawal 
hypothesis by showing the worse off financially were more likely to abstain in 1974 US 
elections, he suggested the deprived citizens had spent their scarce resources solely on 
"holding body and soul together – surviving – not on remote concerns like politics" (p. 
26). Eventually, he concluded, "when economic adversity strikes, withdrawal from 
politics is the likely result" (p. 41).  
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Brody and Sniderman conceived a different theory to explain the disparities. They 
assembled individual troubles into three groups — self-located, personal economic and 
socially located problems — and examined the likelihood that these problems would 
influence individuals‘ physical participation (1977). Eventually, it was found that 
citizens suffering from problems of the second type showed the least interest in politics. 
They were desperate to find "a way to deal now, or as soon as possible, with the most 
immediate and pressing of 'bread-and-butter' problems" rather than devoting time to 
determining preferences (p. 346). Similarly, those with socially located problems were 
found to be more interested and involved in politics. This conclusion, however, prompts 
the question of whether one group was motivated to vote due to its social concerns or 
the other was inhibited due to its personal difficulties. Brody and Sniderman, by 
calculating the "expected turnout" of voters, supported the hypothesis of an "inhibitory 
effect" rather than the "activation/stimulation effect" (pp. 350–351).  
Another noteworthy observation referred to the enormous divergence of self-reliance 
levels between those reporting personal economic problems and those suffering from 
socially located difficulties. While three quarters of the first group relied solely on 
themselves or on private assistance, the majority of the second group continued to put 
their faith in the government. This phenomenon was not sporadic, and was even 
reinforced in another paper by Sniderman and Brody, The Ethic of Self-Reliance (1977). 
It was shown that two thirds of those who faced problems of unemployment or an 
unbearable tax burden were not even expecting assistance from the government, 
although "candidates stumping for public office have insisted for decades that jobs and 
process are a prime responsibility of government" (p. 507). Paradoxically, families with 
medium incomes relied on governments more than those who were left behind did.  
The unique ethos of the US, of private initiative as well as private handling with 
difficulties, is certainly reflected (Kinder 1981, p. 404). It was already shown, that the 
"dream" was embedded so deeply within the souls of the unemployed that it ruled out 
completely the emergence of a working class consciousness (Scholzman and Verba 
1979, Chapter 5). The evidence for robust self-blaming was astonishing: two thirds of 
the unemployed believed "hard work is the most important factor in getting ahead" (p. 
141) and their support in redistribution was not even correlated with their personal 
troubles (p. 205). Politically, the consequences were all but surprising: partisan loyalty 
was higher than 80 per cent all the time, although at the margins Republican 
unemployed were more likely to switch sides (p. 307).  
Unless radical change emerges, it seems as social mobilisation would never materialise 
along the lines of personal economic conditions, and not only due to a sophisticated 
conspiracy of capitalism. As Scholzman and Verba noted, "the unemployed are kept out 
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of the political arena not only – and perhaps not primarily – by their lack of political 
resources, but also by their failure to politicize fully the stresses they undergo"  (1979, 
p. 352). Two major causes can explain this perverse outcome. Either, as Kinder and 
Kiewiet observed, "economic discontents and political judgments inhabit separate 
mental domains" (1979, p. 523), or, as Rosenstone suggested, government schemes 
might "have reduced the pain of poverty and other economic problems to the point that 
they no longer produce enough sting to generate a political effect" (1982, p. 27, see also 
Radcliff 1992).  
The political silence of this group is louder than any protest. It might be that the 
unemployed "quite rationally decide the most effective expenditure of their limited 
resources… would be in redoubling their effort to find work or to raise financial 
resources" (Scholzman and Verba 1979, p. 238), but the implications of such a decision 
cannot be promptly accepted by leaders concerned for the virtues of democracy. Even 
though several studies utilised mathematical simulations to suggest election results 
would not be much affected if "everyone voted" (DeNardo 1980, Citrin et al. 2003, 
Runebson et al. 2005), one should be genuinely naïve or a fool to consider 
systematically biased participation as unrelated to the unequal distribution of political 
power.  
Implications can be identified in two distinct though correlated arenas. The most 
abstract influence is in the sphere of electoral competition. As explored on page 104, not 
all scholars accepted the wisdom that biased turnout could not determine electoral 
results, and many firmly argued for a substantial influence on left representation (see, 
for instance, Pacek and Fenton 1979, Radcliff 1995, Lutz 2003). A second sphere of 
influence is directly related to the level of welfare expenditure, and in particular social 
security benefits. Whereas the correlation between democracy and welfare spending 
were already explored on Page 80, several studies have succeeded to directly link 
turnout and social expenditures. As Krueger wrote in the context of black‘s 
disenfranchisement, "since decisions on the direction of public investment are made 
through the ballot box, white labor might, through its majority position, attain effective 
decision-making power" and consequently, pursue its interest by investing "as much 
public capital in itself, and as little in Negroes as possible" (1963, p. 483). 
The list of empirical studies that were not cited earlier is particularly long. Schneider 
and Ingraham's study pointed out that between 1919 and 1975, "the most important 
determinant of program enactments is voter participation" (1984, p. 115). Crepaz 
correlated higher turnout and stronger political consensus with the extent of 
decommodification, maintaining, "inclusive political institutions… tend to increase 
welfare expenditures" (1998, p. 76). Pamper and Williamson found social welfare 
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spending in 18 advanced industrial democracies from 1950 to 1980 was strongly 
correlated with the proportion of the aged and the level of turnout (1989, p. 62). Hicks 
and Swank accounted for 90 per cent of the unexplained variance in welfare expenditure 
among 18 capitalist democracies, concluding decisively, "electoral turnout, as well as 
left and centre governments increase welfare effort" (1992, p. 658). Interestingly, they 
also pointed out that during the 1960–1982 period in countries where the social-
democrats were in opposition, their functioning created "contagion from the left", 
discovered to possess immense influence also on right wing governments (p. 669).  
In a way, these studies revitalized politics by reinforcing the obvious: voting matters. 
They also disentangled the weakest link: abstention counts. Within the Triangle of poor 
people, welfare states and democracy, a systematically biased participation probably 
does entail policy implications
21
. However, if up to this point the socio-economic 
tradition was explored, two competing arguments should be assessed as well. The 
mobilisation hypothesis perceived turnout as dependent on the political atmosphere and 
the parties' campaigns, whereas the institutional hypotheses looked at government 
mechanisms and policies shaping turnout.  
The mobilisation hypotheses rested on the assumption that "rather than simply 
reinforcing individuals' pre-existing vote intentions, the campaigns served mainly to 
activate existing political predispositions and make them electorally relevant" (Finkel 
1993, p. 1). Notably, negative campaigns were found to be more likely to mobilise 
voters, as they reinforced the "civil duty", created electoral anxiety and fuelled 
expectation of a close race (Martin 2004, p. 549). Empirically, Hillygus found, for 
instance, that 56 per cent of the previously non-voters who had the highest exposure to 
the 2000 US election campaign showed up at the polls, compared to 16 per cent of the 
least exposed electors (2005). In the context of political atmosphere, special attention 
was given to policy differences between the parties and the perceived closeness of the 
contest, two factors that might account for the all-time-low turnout in the 1997 election 
in Britain, where a landslide victory for "New Labour" was anticipated (Pattie & 
Johnston 2001a, Heath and Taylor 1999).  
A third hypothesis links abstention to institutional arrangements hampering physical 
participation by increasing its cost and setting up certain conditions. Burnham 
maintained, "no one can doubt that rules of the game have major effects on electoral 
behaviour" (1987, p. 105), and drew on two types of institutional influence. The first 
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  It should be noted that there is an ongoing debate around the evolution of class biases in turnout.  Some scholars 
showed the predispositions of political exclusion have been stable in the last decades (Leighley and Nagler 1992, 
Shields and Goidel 1997), whereas others argued the bias soared and contaminated new clusters (see, for 
instance, Reiter et al 1979, Burnham 1987 and Bennet 1988).  
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referred to the mechanisms through which votes are translated into political 
representation (such as postal voting), whereas the second dealt with the measures 
imposed by the establishment to control or monitor citizens' access to ballot boxes. 
Institutional arrangements of the second type include registration requirements, 
paperwork needed for voting and any other prerequisites that may inhibit elements of 
the electorate (Powell 1986; Tingsten 1937; Gosnell 1930).  
The history of black voting, discussed already in a different context (Page 74), is an 
extreme example of turnout arrangements, which were ―equal for all‖ but deliberately 
targeting and oppressing a specific group. Data gathered by Kousser suggests that in 
eight out of eleven US Southern states the turnout rate of the African-Americans was as 
high as that of the whites in 1880 US presidential elections (1974, p. 15). Filer and 
others showed how measures of voter literacy tests, poll taxes and complicated 
registration procedures, quickly changed these records (1991, p. 372).  
Having said all that, one insight of Rosenstone and Wolfinger merits reiteration. 
Discussing the influence of institutional barriers of voting, they noted the "modern peak 
of voter turnout was reached in 1960, when one and two-year residency requirements, 
poll taxes, and literacy tests were common; and when millions of southern blacks were 
disenfranchised through maladministration of the laws" (1978, p. 41). In recent years, 
the cost of voting has become marginal and suffrage has become universal, but turnout 
has slumped. This observation might induce some readers to doubt the importance of 
institutional differences, as the obstacles of today can hardly be compared to those of 
the past. 
After exploring three major hypotheses of the key causes behind abstention, the 
proposition of compulsory voting requires examination. Apparently, the fate of "cost 
reforms", which lowered the institutional barriers for electoral participation, reinforced 
the proposals for compulsory voting, promoted in recent years by Lijphart. In his words, 
"citizens should not be allowed to be free riders" (1997, p. 9), although their right to 
abstain should remain, since their forced presence at the polls "does not mean an actual 
duty to cast a valid ballot" (p. 11). Based on studies showing high correlation between 
individual participation in various arenas (Almond & Verba 1963/1989, Olsen 1972, 
Greenberg 1986, Peterson 1992), Lijphart contended that compulsory voting would be 
inclusive and beneficial in many different facets.  
However, the policy of compulsory voting has nothing to do with pouring substance 
into citizens‘ democratic engagement or creating any new benefit. It does not even 
aspire to tackle problems of ill-informed and irrational electorate, as it presupposes 
turnout is the key to inclusive democracy. If one assumes abstention is often 
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accompanied by political illiteracy, he may well conclude that higher participation of 
uninformed voters might fall short of advancing those voters‘ interests. There will be 
one fundamental difference: the visibility of the political disparities would probably fall 
dramatically, not because class bias will strikingly disappear, but only due to the 
superficial level by which political engagement is currently measured.  
4.4.1.2 Informed Participation  
As discussed earlier, the aggregate consequences of individual information deficits have 
the potential to distort electoral outcome no less than biased turnout. After all, "if people 
are to pursue actions that promote individual or collective interests, they first must 
understand what choices are available to them, and what implications are likely to be 
associated with those choices" (Mondak & Canache 2004, p. 539). A few empirical and 
econometrical attempts to undervalue the role of knowledge were already explored on 
pages 108-110, raising two arguments: that rational choice can be made in cases of 
imperfect information and that the role of large numbers guarantees a rational group 
choice despite individual deviations.  
In the context of this chapter, it should be stressed that information plays a greater 
social role than merely shaping voting behaviour. It was found for example that federal 
assistance to low income households during the 1930s was greater in countries that had 
more radios, enabling citizens to be better informed about governmental policies 
(Stromberg 2001). The conclusion is highly relevant: it is not only that less-informed 
citizens might cast a sub-optimal vote, but also that the governments of those voters 
might be less concerned with satisfying their needs. If one group ceases to hold its 
governments to account, one can easily argue there is no reason the rational government 
would take its desires seriously. Despite relatively low research around the 
consequences of political illiteracy, the suggestion information does not matter at all 
seems to be flawed.    
There have been long debates around the measurement of knowledge, and specifically 
around the inclusion of a ―Don‘t Know‖ alternative in questionnaires (Mondak 2001, 
Mondak & Davis 2001). However, what matters for this thesis is whether inequalities 
along lines of the familiar social cleavages exist here as well. In the US context, Delli 
Carpini and Keeter defined three relevant domains of knowledge; one refers to the rules 
of the game, the second to the substance of politics and the third to people and parties 
(1996, p. 65). After summarising their results, socio-economic and demographic 
variables, such as education, gender, race and income, were found to have a significant 
role in all three domains (p. 144). If one allocates the sample to three classes (30:40:30) 
according to their knowledge, the mean of correct answers among the "lower class" was 
26 per cent while the "upper class" reached a mean score of 71 per cent (p. 154).  Out of 
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the 68 questions asked, there was not even one case in which the poorest citizens passed 
the wealthiest ones, or the white group overtook the black (p. 157). Generally, voters 
were more likely to be informed than abstainers were.  
Knowledge shapes preferences. Delli Carpini and Keefer found it is not only a good 
predictor of opinion holding, but also influences the "quality of opinion" by leading 
citizens "to develop more numerous, stable, and internally consistent attitudes" (1996, p. 
228). It was found, among other things, that the degree of conservatism among people 
suffering from financial problems was linked to the knowledge they possessed. This 
correlation makes it clear that ―group opinions about government's role in promoting 
social welfare are affected by how much citizens know about politics… [as] political 
knowledge appears to facilitate a closer linkage between group interests and political 
attitudes" (p. 242).  
These insights have led Delli Carpini and Keefer to forecast correctly nine out of ten 
presidential votes among the well-informed voters, based on their scores on a 
liberal/conservative attitude scale. Unsurprisingly, the prediction rates of the least 
informed voters did not exceed 15–20 per cent. They concluded, "issue voting is alive 
and well‖, but ―the voter's information level is the key factor in determining who 
engages in it" (p. 258).  
4.4.1.3 Rational Participation 
The idea of knowledge as a facilitator of better reasoning can be tracked in some 
analyses, although it has never been subjected to a systematic evaluation. As already 
demonstrated on page 110, several scholars were aware that informed voting is a 
prerequisite for a superior end in terms of decision-taking (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, 
Simpson 1997, Wolfers 2002). However, the socio-economic disparities represented in 
the "quality" of preferences remained an enigma. 
The study of Sniderman, Glaser and Griffin illustrates this vagueness. Although it was 
presumed that "information assists rational choice" and that a "well-informed voter may 
be capable of it but the poorly informed one may not", the discussion did not enter the 
contentious sphere of rational voting (1990, p. 118). The empirical work attempted to 
trace the different reasoning of less-educated and well-educated voters and succeeded in 
identifying the various factors taken into account by each of the groups. This approach 
generated a trajectory analysis of differences rather than of deviations from a defined 
way of thinking.  
The results are nonetheless intriguing: the dominant consideration of the less educated 
group was "whether the incumbent is doing a satisfactory job, not whether the 
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challenger will do a better job" (p. 124). In addition, "the well educated accentuate the 
differences between the parties and between the candidates, whereas the less educated 
minimize them" (p. 130-131). These two phenomena reduced the chances that a 
satisfactory prediction of policies would occur and turned the voters into a 
"systematically heterogeneous" group (p. 133-134). Although these observations are 
appealing, they still avoided confronting the rationality question. Additionally, they 
defined formal education rather than income as their independent variable.  
Overall, it seems that Burnham‘s conclusion is the most accurate one, although, again, it 
does not rely on any empirical evaluation. Evidently, "if people are left to their own 
devices in a society with marked inequalities on all relevant dimensions of political 
consciousness, education and information, some people will remain far better positioned 
to make accurate utility calculations than others" (1987, p. 132). 
4.4.1.4 A Multi-Dimensional Inequality 
After separately unfolding the social implications of the three levels of political 
participation for analytical purposes, they can and should be re-integrated. This section 
has sought to prove inequalities accompany the entire political process, starting from 
physical participation and going through political knowledge to the endpoint of the 
"quality" of the vote. While the causes and the implications of each of these layers were 
analysed here separately, there were almost no studies employing multi-dimensional 
techniques to identify systematic inequalities in all levels of participation along socio-
economic lines. The two integrative works found merit particular attention. It is Toka's 
account was published in the Review of Sociology of the Hungarian Sociological 
Association (2003, 2004) and Keefer and Khemani's working paper was issued by the 
World Bank (2003).  
Toka looked for repeating inequalities in two of the three levels of participation defined 
here, namely physical and informed voting. His intentions were to demonstrate that 
substantive inequalities exist although "formal equality of all citizens before the law is 
rigorously upheld" (p. 51-52). Eventually, he showed the political behaviour of some 
voters did violate the democratic principle of equality but the electoral impact was 
defined as "rather small". In his local study, the cumulative effect of unequal 
participation and unequal information ended up being marginal. Nonetheless, Toka's 
work was by far the most significant attempt to employ a multi-dimensional approach 
for the analysis of political deprivations in the context of social inequalities.  
A second integrative paper was put forward by Keefer and Khemani who drew their 
conclusion from the arena of developing countries and showed how, in certain 
countries, democracy diverted government resources from the poor to the wealthy. 
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Providing several concrete examples, they noted, ―the same formal institutions of 
democracy can sustain very different forms of electoral competition‖, which depends 
largely on the imperfections of political markets (2003, p. 26). Thus, in developing 
countries in which democracy failed to improve services for the poor (such as Pakistan 
and northern states of India), the authors pointed at the absence of information about 
politicians‘ performance, the flourishing of identity based voting and the 
underprivileged‘s habit of setting up past performance thresholds rather than assessing 
utilities. The critical conclusion conditioned the success of democratic "empowerment" 
with the tackling of the imperfections in the political markets.  
If inequalities are replicated in the political market, one cannot avoid the thinking of a 
"vicious circle of democracy". A process in which social inequalities are replicated into 
political ones that in turn preserve or even deepen the existing social disparities - is a 
blow to the virtues underlying the democratic ideal. While some used to believe 
democratic regimes distributed the resources according to the "will of the people", it 
seems that the existing unequal conditions are replicated with the "choice of the 
people", leaving the underprivileged in a political and social trap. 
 
4.4.2 The Discourse of Exclusion  
Unlike the concepts of rights and equality, the concept of exclusion is elusive and 
controversial. Different scholars with different goals adopted various definitions and 
emphasised different facets of it (Gore 1995, Silver 1995, Levitas 1998, Sen 2000, Hills 
et al. 2002, Lister 2004). Dean warned against the manipulation of the concept in a 
manner that "subordinates concerns with structural inequality to a concern for social 
cohesion" (2004, p. 182). However, as the scope of ―exclusion‖ has never ceased to 
grow, it might be beneficial to recall the original intentions of its inventor, Rene Lenoir, 
who served as the French Secretary for Budget and Social Action between 1974 and 
1978. 
In Les Exclus (1974), Rene Lenoir used ―exclusion‖ to describe "mentally and 
physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, substance 
abusers, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal, asocial 
persons, and other social 'misfits'" (translated and summarised in Silver 1995, p. 63). 
Despite the broad parameters, the definition was virtually technical, categorizing into 
one-group individuals who were unprotected by the social insurance system of that 
time. The correlation between exclusion and poverty evolved after both concepts were 
redefined by scholars and political leaders.  
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Commencing his research in the late 1960s, Peter Townsend redefined poverty as a 
relative concept, contributing indirectly to the conceptualization of exclusion as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon. By linking poverty with the resources needed to "participate 
in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or 
are at least widely encouraged or approved" in a specific society (1979, p. 31), 
Townsend had a vital share in the eradication of the absolute threshold of subsistence. 
His deprivation indexes, though being absolute and mechanistic in their own nature, 
incorporated for the first time various social activities rather than mere physical 
conditions.  
The European Commission adopted a similar approach in December 1984, stating, "The 
poor shall be taken to mean persons, families and groups of persons whose resources 
(material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum 
acceptable way of life in the Member State in which they live." Remarkably, although 
both definitions intended to outline poverty, their wordings paved the way toward the 
re-conceptualization of social exclusion as a phenomenon in its own right, far from 
being linked to any technical consideration as occurred in France
22
.  
Following the integration of the concept into mainstream European discourse, the last 
few years have produced a flood of definitions and interpretations. The United Nations 
Development Programme, for instance, preferred to locate Social Exclusion in the 
domain of rights, suggesting it is the "lack of recognition of basic rights, or where that 
recognition existed, lack of access to political and legal systems necessary to make 
those rights a reality" (Burchardt et al. 2002a, p. 3). The Labour Party led by Tony Blair 
conceptualized exclusion using primarily a Redistributive Discourse, which was 
arguably turned after its electoral triumph into a combination of the Moral Underclass 
Discourse and the Social Integration Discourse (Levitas 1998, pp. 7–28). However, the 
Social Exclusion Unit established by Blair defined exclusion as "a shorthand term for 
what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems 
such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health 
and family breakdown" (SEU 2001, p. 11).  
Amartya Sen grasped exclusion as a "capability deprivation", utilising Adam Smith's 
interpretation of deprivation as the inability to appear in public without shame (2000, 
pp. 6-9). Anthony Giddens wrote "exclusion is not about graduations of inequality, but 
                                                 
22
  It was suggested several times that the concept of "social exclusion" was planned to replace "poverty" in the EU 
following the pressures from the British government led by Margaret Thatcher, who then denied the existence of 
poverty in the developed world (Atkinson 1998, Dean 2004). Ironically, while Thatcher's intentions were to minimize 
the debate by diluting the relevant terminology, both concepts have been widely used jointly by scholars and 
politicians to describe completely different phenomena.  
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about mechanisms that act to detach groups of people from the social mainstream" 
(1998, p. 104). Walker and Walker in their Britain Divided defined exclusion as a 
"dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, 
political or cultural systems which determine the social integration of a person in 
society" (1997, p. 8). Atkinson noted three recurring elements appearing in all 
definitions of exclusion: relativity, as people are excluded from a particular society; 
agency, as people are excluded by an agent or agents; and dynamics, as people are 
excluded because they have little prospect for the future (1998, pp. 13–14). 
As in the case of  academic definitions of poverty, the linkage between these definitions 
and the original meaning of the concept of exclusion is limited. However, a proper 
working definition was still missing. Room refined the entire analysis by describing the 
move from poverty to exclusion as entailing three conceptual shifts (1995). Instead of 
focusing solely on income, it required the adaptation of a multidimensional approach to 
measure disadvantage. Instead of static analysis, it required the utilisation of dynamic 
methods to track changes. Instead of looking at the individual level, a focus on the 
broader community was required. However, the most prominent working definition was 
put forward by Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud, stating "an individual is socially 
excluded if he or she does not participate in key activities of the society in which he or 
she lives" (2002, p. 30, for an earlier version of this paper see 1999). As for the "key 
activities", four major domains were defined as dimensions of exclusion: consumption, 
production, political engagement and social interaction. This operational definition has 
been generally adopted by scholars.  
Amid the various interpretations of social exclusion, it should be emphasised that not all 
theoretical definitions cited above explicitly referred to political engagement. However, 
the political/civic domain was almost unanimously integrated into the empirical 
assessment, as an inseparable dimension for social inclusion. Thus, in Social Exclusion 
in Britain 1991–1995, political activity was defined as "engaging in some collective 
effort to improve or protect the immediate or wider social or physical environment" and 
operationalized as voting in the general elections or membership in a "political or 
campaigning organisation" (Burchardt et al. 1999, p. 231-233). In Poverty and Social 
Exclusion in Britain, "lack of civic engagement is sometimes deemed to be an important 
aspect of social exclusion", whereas physical voting in local and in general elections 
was the most popular indicator to measure "disengagement" (Gordon  et al. 2000, p. 65). 
In Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion 2001, involvement of individuals in civic 
organisation was one of the indicators for "social cohesion", ranging "from political 
parties, trade unions and tenants' groups to social groups and sports clubs" (Rahman 
2001, p. 76).  
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Notably, the latest two definitions referred to civic engagement, whereas political 
deprivation was most prominent in the earlier endeavour to operationalize the concept. 
As the general trends, correlations and occasionally even the numbers found in all 
studies were more or less similar, the work of Burchardt, Le Grand and Piachaud will 
receive greater attention here. After defining four dimensions of social exclusion, the 
authors found that between 1991 and 1998 the degree of political exclusion varied from 
17 per cent to 21 per cent, while approximately 10 per cent of the British population 
were excluded in two or more dimensions (2002, p. 35). It was also shown that 28 per 
cent of the lower income quintile group were politically excluded compared to 14 per 
cent among the top group. The earlier paper noted that 10 per cent of the politically 
unengaged individuals were excluded for five subsequent years, whereas 85 per cent 
were excluded for the first time (1999, p. 238). Overall, it was maintained, the 
developed working definition of social exclusion "yields a workable, if crude, 
multidimensional measure of the concept", although "no clear-cut multidimensional 
category of socially excluded people can be identified" (p. 240–241).  
This research challenges this working definition of political deprivation. Burchardt, Le 
Grand and Piachaud constructed their concept primarily on the condition of physical 
engagement. In fact, their definition does not measure the more sophisticated 
dimensions of political engagement and makes no distinction between abstainers of 
different types. The idea that inclusion can be measured merely by a physical action 







Figure ‎4.4.1: Current threshold of deprivation on the Pyramid of Political Engagement 
The appropriate threshold of exclusion is a matter for judgment, though there are 
elementary questions guiding us when theorising exclusion. One of them is why at all 
should we care about politically excluded individuals. The particular case study of 
voluntary exclusion stimulated a constructive debate around this question. It emerged 
after Le Grand disqualified voluntary isolated individuals from his definition of social 
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other scholars, arguing that "even if social exclusion is preferred by the individuals 
themselves, it is not good for the wider society..." (p. 230). 
Barry tried to define the ideological justifications for any preoccupation with social 
exclusion (2002). He  identified two types of rationale: the damage caused by exclusion 
to social justice created by the unequal distribution of opportunities, and the damage 
caused to democracy due to the inability of the excluded "to participate as equals in 
politics… making it easier for ambitious politicians to advance their careers by 
demonizing and ultimately dehumanizing" the minorities (p. 25). Since the dynamics of 
contemporary politics often generated a virtual "median voter" politicians endeavour to 
appease, Barry maintained that "the more attenuated the bonds of social solidarity 
become, the less inclusive the concerns of the median voters will be" (p. 26).  
Le Grand's response was no less provocative. Taking the argument back to the Roman 
distinction between "deserving" and "undeserving" poor, he argued that voluntary 
exclusion violates neither of these justifications (2003). In the context of social justice, 
he insisted that an "individual who makes a conscious, properly informed decision not 
to go to university… and in consequence ends up unemployed" does not infringe the 
values of social justice if conceptualized as equality of opportunities (p. 3).  In the 
context of social solidarity, Le Grand noted that policies that promote inclusion but do 
so in violation of individuals' expressed will "are likely to involve a measure of 
coercion; and that is unlikely to foster feeling in the people concerned of social 
solidarity" (p. 4). Hence, if social exclusion is a matter of concern due to its 
implications on social justice, Le Grand maintained that voluntary exclusion does not 
pose a serious threat at all
23
.  
Nevertheless, Le Grand suggested a third justification for preventing exclusion. 
Essentially, he argued, long-term externalities caused by individual exclusion, even 
when it is voluntary, might easily reduce the social aggregate welfare. In addition, 
there might also be long-term personal implications. In this respect, the role of a 
responsible society is to prevent such damage from materializing. The simplest example 
is myopia: "a 65 year old may be poor because of myopic decisions taken by her 25 year 
old self" as essentially, she did not give at the time "her future self" the appropriate 
weight in the balance of interests. Eventually, this behaviour generates decisions "that 
are not 'optimal' from the point of view of aggregate welfare" (p. 9).  
                                                 
23
  Atkinson's work also singled out voluntary exclusion by arguing personal responsibility is vital to measure exclusion 
and assuming the presence of one or more agents is necessary to "exclude" an individual from the social 
mainstream (1998).  
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We end up with three types of explanations why social exclusion should concern us: its 
negative impact on social justice, on democracy and on the aggregate welfare. If there is 
a justification to re-examine the borders of political exclusion, and lift the current 
threshold from its basic bank position of physical participation, it must converge with 
these root causes. I shall argue that a higher threshold of political exclusion addresses 
better all three arguments.  
In terms of social justice, if individuals choose voluntarily not to vote, although they 
had an equal opportunity for doing so, one can hardly argue that they were subjected to 
an unjust policy. However, the unequal distribution of information certainly inhibits 
equality of opportunities for those poorly informed, as their political power will be 
exercised differently from that of the others. Knowledge is power, and when the level of 
political knowledge is systematically lower in a specific sector, social injustice may 
occur. As Le-Grand suggested, those who prefer to stay ignorant or abstain voluntarily, 
do not fall within any definition of social injustice. However, one can hardly argue that 
all ignorant voters choose to be ignorant. Therefore, we are no longer concerned with 
unequal physical participation, but with unjust political illiteracies.  
In the context of democracy, unequal physical participation might pave the way for 
politicians to ignore minorities, relying on their inferior political power. Consequently, 
electoral competition ceases, formally and informally, to follow the existing socio-
economic allocation, leaving one sector under-represented. If turnout is the only factor 
taken into account here, the problem could not be solved, as politicians may as well 
neglect, and consequently mistreat, minorities that vote with no awareness to their 
alternatives. A reasonable and knowledgeable vote would not only improve the quality 
of any democratic decision, but would also force candidates to consider the needs and 
interests of all voters. Physical participation is therefore insufficient, and voting in 
favour of an "anti-welfare" party could even aggravate the irony.  
The same argument holds for the aggregate welfare calculus. If the powerless 
minorities exercise uninformed and irrational voting, redistributive policies will cater 
only for the politically empowered sectors. The residual increase in the general welfare 
would therefore derive only from the privileged sector, whose marginal utility from 
money is supposed to be the lowest. The reallocation of wealth through redistributive 
mechanisms will not be optimal. 
This section attempted to provide the theoretical justification for expanding the borders 
of political exclusion. It was argued that the current deprivation threshold is not 
satisfactory as it does not account for the full range of exclusionary circumstances. 
Defining where the appropriate "inclusive" threshold should be set entails a sort of 
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moral judgment by the definer. Sen has already written, "the language of exclusion is so 
versatile and adaptable that there may be a temptation to dress up every deprivation as a 
case of social exclusion" (2000, p. 9). Nonetheless, the concept in its current form is so 
narrow, that it does not addresses the concerns that turned social exclusion into an 
academic concern at the first place.  
In Inclusion and Democracy, Young argued that the normative legitimacy of democracy 
"depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision 
making process and have had the opportunity to influence the outcome" (2000,p. 6). 
Hence, "what counts as a just result is what participants would arrive at under ideal 
conditions of inclusion, equality, reasonableness and publicity" (p. 31). Embracing the 
current definition of political deprivation could hardly bring these ideal conditions. The 
way in which problems are defined constitute the world of reference for policy makers. 
Hence, by limiting the discourse of exclusion and focusing it on the lower layer, 
comprehensive attempts to advance knowledge and reasoning might be thwarted before 
they were even conceived. If concerns are solely devoted to physical participation, we 
might end up with compulsory voting and a continuing neglect of other dimensions.  
 
4.4.3 The Discourse of Citizenship 
The integration of citizenship rights into the discussion of poor people and democracies 
seems to be natural. In fact, citizenship rights can be linked to each of the previously 
explored discourses. Sen, for instance, argued that each theory of social arrangement 
demands equality of certain rights to defend its concept of justice, though the nature of 
these rights varies (1992, p. 12). Walker and Walker linked rights and citizenship to the 
discourse of exclusion, proclaiming that social exclusion may be seen "as the denial (or 
non-realisation) of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship" (1997, p. 8).  
The entire conceptualisation of citizenship rights is widely attributed to Alfred 
Marshall. During his speech  at the Cambridge "Reform Club" in November 1873, 
Marshall introduced the first (albeit ambiguous) notion of equal citizenship by arguing 
that working men will never be all equal, but they must all become "gentlemen" (1873, 
p. 102). Although he was strongly in favour of free markets, he proposed compulsory 
education as a necessary instrument, since "the society bounds to compel children and 
to help them to take the first step upwards" (p. 117). An intriguing contention was put 
forward by Thomas Humphrey Marshall, who suggested almost eighty years later that, 
in a way, Alfred Marshall sacrificed the campaign against inequality of the class system 
for equality of citizenship (1950).  
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However, the contribution of the sociologist T.H. Marshall was no less influential than 
the interpretative comments of Alfred Marshall's remarks. If the latter conceived the 
idea of social rights, the former pioneered the first synopsis of contemporary 
citizenship. By dividing the concept into three realms of rights—civil, political and 
social—Marshall not only succeeded in defining an elementary pillar of democracy but 
he also depicted the chronological development of contemporary humanity. He assigned 
civil rights to the eighteenth century, political rights to the nineteenth century and social 
rights to the twentieth century (1950, p. 14).  
At the core of his entire concept was the belief that all, including the poor, are an 
integral part of the state and therefore entitled to various provisions, not due to kindness 
but as of a right. This whole narrative, which had prominent and revolutionary 
implications on social rights, was in clear contradiction to the Poor Laws. While 
citizenship guaranteed a certain set of rights to each citizen, the dominant discourse of 
the Poor Laws forced the poor to metaphorically cross the road and exclude themselves 
from the community in order to get support.  
The reciprocal relationships between different realms of rights were noted both by 
Alfred Marshall and by Thomas Humphrey Marshall as both perceived the social right 
of education as a prerequisite for the materialization of other rights. Alfred Marshall 
stated, "it is abundantly clear that, unless we can compel children into the schools, we 
cannot enable multitudes of them to escape from the life of ignorance so complete that 
they cannot fail to be brutish and degraded" (1873, p. 117). Thomas Humphrey 
Marshall maintained that since "civil rights are designed for use by reasonable and 
intelligent persons, who have learned to read and write… education is a necessary 
prerequisite of civil freedom" (1950, p. 25). Later, he noted that the right to freedom of 
speech "has little real substance if, from lack of education, you have nothing to say that 
is worth saying, and no means of making yourself heard if you say it" (p. 35). It was 
also mentioned that even when the franchise was relatively wide by the end of the 
nineteenth century, "those who had recently received the vote had not yet learned how 
to use it" (p. 41).  
These contentions pave the way to this thesis‘ premise, according to which political 
rights cannot be exercised in a void. The role of social rights in fostering civil rights, 
enterprise and economic prosperity is equally important to role of education on the 
exercise of political rights. Many scholars showed the correlation between education, 
political illiteracy and political participation (one of the earliest examples is Gosbell 
1927). However, as the definition of political rights was preoccupied merely with 
physical voting, the link between social rights and deeper layers of political inclusion 
was rarely made. Consequently, conventional wisdom linked social and civil rights (as 
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education was needed for engaging the private market), whereas the functioning of 
citizens exercising political power was to some extent left neglected.  
Dean linked the three spheres of rights in a different way. He maintained that both 
political and social rights were aimed at minimising the inequalities derived from civil 
rights. Thus, education, welfare and universal suffrage were in a way an intermediary 
that eased the polarization of civil liberties. Dean argued that social and political rights 
were probably not enough. Even though social rights were the only basis "on which all 
citizens ought to be equally able to participate in the spheres of civil and political 
society", political rights were incapable to "equip the powerless" on their own due to 
existing inequalities (p. 84). This observation essentially reinforces a core argument 
pursued in this thesis: unequal citizens can hardly exercise equally their political rights. 
Social rights are vital for the equal implementation of the political ones.  
The exact definition of political rights lies at the centre of this debate. Here, again, one 
should recall T.H. Marshall, who described this specific component of citizenship as 
"the right to participate in the exercise of political power" (1950, pp. 10-11).  This 
definition can be interpreted in at least two ways: the "exercise" of power can be 
portrayed simply in superficial terms of physical participation, or it can be taken to 
represent much deeper involvement in the political domain. If one recalls the Pyramid 
of Political Engagement (Figure ‎4.1.1, Page 89), it can easily be argued that the 
mechanical action of putting a ballot into a box is worthless unless real substance is 
behind it. By the same token, Marshall has already argued that there is no true meaning 
to the freedom of speech, if you have nothing to say. The question is what can be 
defined as "real substance" and who has the patronizing right to determine it.  
It is argued here that political rights cannot be defined merely as formal universal 
franchise. Therefore, certain knowledge about politics is not only a citizen duty, but also 
a citizenship right, exactly as literacy ceased to be a matter of luxury. If an information 
deficit prevents an individual from fully exercising his political power, then at least part 
of the responsibility departs from his own domain to the collective one. Marshall 
himself accepted that education "is a necessary prerequisite of civil freedom" (1950, pp. 
25-26), but, as noted earlier, the context often related to civil rights than to political 
ones. Obviously, the exact definition of political rights entails a strong ideological 
dimension, and is highly sensitive to nuances.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights ratified in 1966 exemplifies that. The UDHR stated, "the 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government" (Article 21), 
whereas the ICCPR proclaimed "every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity… 
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to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections… guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors" (Article 25). Remarkably, both documents 
referred specifically to the will of the electorate, though each does it differently, and 
none refers to the need to guarantee the will of the people is conveyed through 
democracy.  
Another intriguing perspective of rights and citizenship can be found in the individual 
interpretation of the concepts, which was found to be correlated to socio-economic 
disparities. By developing a "street terminology" of citizenship discourses, Dean aspired 
to assess the inclinations of ordinary citizens toward their citizenship rights (1999). 
Eventually, approximately a third of the sample attached no particular meaning to their 
citizenship and a quarter perceived it only as a certificate of their nationality. However, 
while respondents from "lower" occupation groups were more likely to have no concept 
of citizenship and embrace either nihilistic or nationalistic approaches to it, wealthier 
respondents tend to reflect solidaristic definitions of citizenship. Dean, seeking to 
explain why poor people act against their own interests in running away from the latter 
definitions, suggested that the rich are actually the frightened sector, as "they have the 
most to fear from the poor!" (p. 108). The underprivileged harm themselves again by 
adopting a citizenship discourse that only increases their isolation, as monitored by the 
"proxy" terminology developed to minimise biases.  
The way political rights, as an inherent part of citizenship, are conceived by individuals, 
scholars and policy makers is therefore of crucial importance. Jointly with the 
discourses of equality and exclusion, the perception of rights has a significant share in 
portraying the appropriate relationship between poor people and democracies. As of 
today, political rights are narrowly defined by most scholars, implicitly allowing the 
one-dimensional mechanistic definition of political participation. The findings regarding 
the unequal distribution of knowledge, and the political implications attached to it, 
reinforce the case for a broader perception of political rights. Those who already assume 
political rights cannot be exercised in void, should follow this logic also in the re-
definition of political deprivation and political exclusion.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
The integration of concepts from several academic disciplines was intended to provide a 
multi-disciplinary overview of the relationships between poor people and democracies. 
Functional relationships could empower the Triangle for Redistribution. Distorted ones 
are expected to disturb the delicate balance between the three forces constructing it. 
Several issues were explored in this chapter: economic voting, class voting, rationality, 
knowledge, equality, exclusion and rights. Elements shaping the political behaviour of 
the underprivileged are reflected in or derived from all of them. I reviewed these 
relationships and the limited way they have been monitored so far.  
As for the issues relating to political theory, the conflict between theories of class voting 
and economic voting is an ongoing one. While some assume that class affiliation is the 
dominant power behind voting, others prefer the more pragmatic explanation of selfish 
interests. Since this thesis takes the latter route, it explores several utilitarian 
considerations capable of influencing voters. The various dimensions of economic 
voting were integrated here into one coherent matrix, and the insights were used to 
refine the operational framework underlying my own research.  
The parallels drawn here between the political and commodity markets helped with the 
construction of a critical review of the current engagement of poor people with 
democracies. Theories of substantive rationality enabled the pursuit of systematic 
deviations from it and paved the way towards an assessment of individual decisions. 
The electoral consequences of political illiteracy were also addressed. While some 
scholars have doubted the potential of a fully informed electorate to shape election 
results, others have arrived at contradictory findings.  
As for the concepts relating to the social policy arena, significant inequalities were 
found in the layers of physical and informed voting, which had a cumulative impact on 
the ―public‘s choice‖. The explanations ranged from the replication of existing 
inequalities through institutional barriers and the absence of mobilising campaigns. The 
outcome incontrovertible, and it calls for a re-definition of political exclusion. 
Arguably, this concept aims higher than the narrow threshold of turnout.  
This chapter leads to the research itself. In many ways, the dependency of political 
rights on the social right of sound political education is reflected both in Britain and in 
Israel. The fieldwork and the secondary data analysis have sought to identify why and to 
what extent the underprivileged find themselves excluded from the democratic process. 
Whereas the State has a substantial role to play in this field, the responsibility of 
individuals, as discussed here at length, cannot be undervalued or ignored.  
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5. Research Design 
In the late nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century, the key 
objectives of social research included the empirical description of the living conditions 
of certain groups in society (Moser & Kalton 1971). Two papers published then met this 
objective: "Map Descriptive of London Poverty" drawn by Charles Booth (1889) and 
"A Study of Town Life" written by Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree (1902). Not only did 
these manuscripts became seminal works on the measurement of poverty, but they also 
helped to shape a new period in social research, in which the desire to enumerate social 
phenomena was made possible using concrete methods and practices.  
The tension between plain statistical figures and data derived from critical research was 
a matter of time. In 1935, Wells passionately argued that social survey "as a rule" must 
not be concerned with "evolving any comprehensive sociological theory", suggesting its 
sole goal was "the collection of facts relating to social problems and conditions in order 
to assist directly or indirectly the formulation of practical measures with reference to 
such problems" (p. 18).  
Some might argue that the desire to detach numbers from theories and ideologies has 
never ceased to exist. However, the aspirations of contemporary scholars go far beyond 
the philosophy of their predecessors. It is therefore necessary to define explicitly the 
ruling paradigm of this thesis, noting also that the choices "researchers make about 
paradigms shape the research strategies they think they should use" (Esterberg 2002, p. 
9). The literature points to a few dominant paradigms, beginning with the oldest one of 
positivism, which are briefly reviewed here. 
Scholars affiliated to the positivist school of thought assume, that "the social world is 
inherently knowable and that we can all agree on the nature of social reality" (Esterberg 
2002, p. 10). Their motivation is to predict human behaviour, which may enable them to 
control, modify or advance it. On the contrary, the post-positivists might acknowledge 
the existence of one reality, but they would be sceptical of their ability to capture it 
objectively. Biases and prejudices are thought to be inevitable, since the characteristics, 
thoughts and intentions of the researcher herself are believed to be inherently in her 
subjective interpretation of reality. Any reflection of reality is therefore, by definition, 
imperfect.  
While the positivists are divided on whether reality can be objectively sketched, they are 
probably all realists, as defined by Miles and Huberman. This definition of realism 
perceives social phenomena to exist not only "in the mind but also in the objective 
world" (1994, p. 4). The reverse view is held by the social constructionists, who argue 
social actors are those who create reality, and therefore, there is no reality apart from 
that constructed by those creating and depicting it. This assertion shifts attention to an 
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entirely different arena, sending scholars to study the interactions between actors and 
their subjective interpretation of reality.  
This perception correlates to the symbolic interactionism theory. Simplifying its 
complexities, three elementary assumptions are put forward: humans act towards things 
based on the meaning those things have for them; the meanings of things arise out of 
social interaction; meanings are created through a process of interpretation (Blumer 
1969, Denzil 1978). These assumptions had led Esterberg to argue constructionists 
"should begin by immersing themselves in the world inhabited by those they wish to 
study" (2002, p. 19), in order to understand how subjects construct and interpret their 
reality.  
This research strategy is also shared by the naturalists. Under the paradigm of realism, 
and with a close association with symbolic interactionism, this school of thought 
demands "the researcher actively enter the worlds of native people", to truly understand 
their world in relation to "behaviours, languages, definitions, attitudes and feelings" 
(Denzil 1978, p. 78). Evidently, if one acknowledges the vital importance of 
understanding human interactions, there is no other alternative to immersing oneself in 
the group under investigation.  
In addition to summarising the underlying tenets of positivism, post-positivism, realism, 
constructivism and naturalism, the approach of critical social research deserves special 
attention. Its supporters are motivated by a desire to challenge the premises of the 
current social order. They are loaded with motivation, which unlike others, turn them 
into "intrinsically critical" scholars (Harvey 1990, p. 3). A detailed list of premises held 
by a "criticalist", drafted by Kincheloe and McLaren, shows the rather radical side of 
this definition. It assumes, among other things, that all thoughts are fundamentally 
mediated by power relations, that certain groups in society are more privileged than 
others and that oppression is "more forcefully reproduced when subordinates accept 
their social status as natural, necessary, or inevitable" (1998, p. 263).  
As a line of defence, it should be noted that not all "criticalists" conform to this radical 
definition. Esterberg, for instance, preferred to focus on the scholars' motives rather than 
any radical preliminary belief. He wrote, "whereas the goal of positivist research… is to 
'predict and control' and the goal of interpretive research is to understand and interpret, 
the goal of critical social research is to work toward human emancipation" (2002, p. 17). 
This view softened the Marxist argument about a bourgeoisie dispossessing the masses, 
clearing the way for the modification of critiques striving to promote emancipation 
rather than study oppression.  
Having reviewed some of the principle approaches to research, a deterministic 
classification of this study would not do justice to its underlying intentions. It is critical 
in the sense that it focuses on the continuous political deprivation of those who have 
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not, aiming to empower them. However, these underlying motives were influential in 
determining the research questions but did not affect the professional tools employed to 
examine the derived hypotheses. The realistic tradition was followed in practice by 
assuming objective reality does exist, and could be described through systematic and 
multi-disciplinary research.  
The author is disinterested and unable to predict and control the behaviour of 
individuals, although he assumes political behaviour can be generalised in a way that 
would enable prediction. On the other hand, this thesis does acknowledge the merits of 
the post-positivist approach, by which the biases and prejudices of the researcher are 
inevitably influential. Precisely because of that, the strategy adopted here integrated 
various research methods capable of contributing towards the rigorousness of any 
theory and thereby reducing the effect of external interventions. However, if any 
theoretical model can do justice to this thesis, it is that of "critical realism".  
Having placed this thesis in a broader framework, this chapter will first link the theories 
discussed in the previous chapters with the broad rationale and the research strategy. 
The questions, hypotheses and methods employed will be explored subsequently, as 
well as the problems experienced and the methods of data analysis adopted. Further 
details concerning the methods adopted when the fieldwork was carried out in both 
countries can be found in Appendices ‎11.3 & ‎11.4 (Pages 338 & 354).  
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5.1 Rationale 
This thesis has navigated so far around the Triangle of poor people, democratic 
procedures and welfare provision, discussing separately each pair of elements. If one 
conclusion can be drawn, it is probably that in an ideal world, rational and selfish poor 
citizens should have employed their electoral capacity to advance their welfare interest.  
This conclusion is premised on three assumptions: 
(1) The utility function of poor people facing income deprivation is more 
predictable than that of others, as their dependency on benefits is greater.  
(2) Certain welfare regimes are capable of assisting the needy by direct income 
transfers or other in-kind provision.  
(3) The formation of welfare regimes is very dependent on democratic decisions 
taken by the electorate.  
However, when a considerable proportion of the underprivileged electorate abstains or 
votes contrarily, questions should be asked.  
The earlier chapters have shown the validity of the these assumptions. In "The Welfare 
State & The Poor", the effects of liberal welfare regimes on poverty and inequality was 
described, in addition to the politics behind different levels of redistribution, 
decommodification and stratification. The history of the British and Israeli welfare 
states shows that there is a social price to be paid when conservative governments are in 
power.  
This correlation however is not exceptional, as shown in the subsequent chapter, "The 
Welfare State & Democracy". Research shows that democracy, turnout and left-wing 
representation all correlate with the emergence and expansion of welfare provision. 
Evidently, voting matters, abstention counts, and democracy started to facilitate 
regressive redistribution at the end of the 1970‘s. On a different level, thinkers were no 
longer concerned with the desirability of democracy, but started to question the method 
and the capacity of the electorate to deliver.  
The previous chapter, "The Poor & Democracy", raised further questions. It showed 
that systematic deviations from rationality theories are intensively studied in economics, 
whereas there is almost no parallel research on reasoning in the political arena. 
Employing economic theories of voting, the problem of underprivileged abstention was 
found to be on the "benefit-side" of the utility function. Therefore, compulsory voting 
might improve superficially turnout figures, but will not remediate the uneven 
distribution of knowledge and the dissimilar patterns of reasoning.  
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Delving into the moral underpinnings of social exclusion would show at least one of 
these elements within the boundaries of political exclusion. Bearing in mind the 
discussion of citizenship rights, it is necessary to ask why the social right for education 
is widely perceived as a prerequisite for successful engagement in the private markets, 
but is usually neglected in the exercise of political rights.  
Whilst focusing on the economic aspects, political exclusion can be classified as a 
failure of collective action. However, contrary to the propositions made in Olson's 
theory (1965/71), personal self-interests in this case tend not to overcome group ones. 
Given a framework of substantive rationality and utilitarian materialistic behaviour, the 
interests of the underprivileged individual should overlap with the interests of their 
class, generating a pro-welfare vote. In reality, many of the British underprivileged 
electorate do not bother to vote at all, whereas within the Israeli underprivileged 
electorate, their voting is not necessarily in favour of greater welfare provision. In 
certain cases of abstention and counter-class voting, coherent reasoning and rational 
thinking (in one direction or another) can be identified, but in other cases, a disturbing 
vacuum is revealed.  
As shown earlier, this is not an isolated phenomenon. It can be placed within a broader 
framework and linked to several concepts within the discipline of social policy, political 
economy and governance. Thus, it seems odd that after a long battle for the expansion 
of the franchise, at a time when the masses have the right to vote, a more generous 
welfare provision is blocked either by abstention or by objection. It is also disturbing to 
note the high level of political illiteracy and detachment of those dependent on the state. 
In order to address these questions more accurately, a different approach towards 
political exclusion and political rights is needed. Enhancing the theoretical and practical 
distinctions between different types of political engagement is a first step. In line with 
this approach, the scope of political deprivation and social exclusion might be widened 
to address information or rationality deficits. Accordingly, the concept of political rights 
should also be enlarged, to incorporate additional layers of political rights, above the 
elementary level of equal suffrage.  
The issue of redistribution lies at the core of this thesis. As discussed at length in 
Chapter ‎3, the outcome of unbalanced political representation in modern democracies 
can hardly be detached, in theory and in practice, from the extent of income 
redistribution, as well as indirect social provision.  Distorted representation of interests 
can only hamper the utility of all welfare clients as a group and as individuals. In Filer's 
words, "government is a vehicle for income redistribution" and "elections are 
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reasonably assumed to be battlegrounds in the struggle over income redistribution" 
(Filer et al 1993, p. 64).  
Based on the existing literature, two major arguments constitute the rationale of this 









l Unlike other groups, the utility function of underprivileged citizens is more predictable, 
as their marginal utility from money is the highest. Substantively rational poor people 
are therefore expected to support a more generous welfare state to maximise their 
future utility. Any other decision should be accounted for, noting that it might reflect a 









l A systematically lower level of political engagement among underprivileged 
populations signals a serious imbalance and might lead to a distorted democratic 
outcome, given a higher level of engagement by wealthier people. When the extent of 
poor political behaviour crosses the level of randomness and becomes predictable, it 
might as well dilute redistribution and promote neo-liberalism more than would happen 
under different circumstances. 
Table ‎5.1.1: Major arguments  
Having put forward the major arguments, the operational framework of this thesis need 
to be described. It should first be noted that elections were conceived here as the 
primary channel for engagement. Therefore, many other channels such as party 
affiliation and conference participation were ignored. Concentrating on voting as a hub 
had led to the re-structuring of it into three hierarchical levels of engagement, defined 
here as the Pyramid of Political Engagement. This framework, which was briefly 
mentioned in Section ‎4.1 (Page 88) turned the empirical assessment of participation into 
a feasible task. Concrete arguments and definitions can be made in every layer.  
1. Physical voting is the basic level of engagement. Turnout of poor people are 
thought to be lower than  those of wealthier voters.  
2. Informed voting is an indicator of advanced engagement. It could be argued 
that an unequal balance of power exists in favour of the wealthier electorate.  
3. Rational voting is perceived as the highest mode of engagement. The 
applicability of substantive rationality theories is believed to vary in each group.   
Having noted the general framework, each of the concepts is to be explored here 
separately, based on the literature and arguments made so far.  
 
 









Figure ‎5.1.1: The Pyramid of Political Engagement 
Physical voting is conceived as the fundamental pillar. Without it, no "counted" 
contribution to democracy can be obtained. It is relatively simple to measure and 
interpret, as turnout figures are usually made public shortly after elections. Nonetheless, 
there is a need to deepen the understanding of abstention within different groups. 
Explanations for this phenomenon varied from a utilitarian calculation on one side 
depicting participation as a no-benefit or high-cost act, to sociological arguments 
emphasising social exclusion and political isolation on the other. It is clear that the logic 
leading to abstention can only be identified through data analysis and unmediated 
discussions with voters and abstainers from various socio-economic groups.  
The rationale underpinning informed voting is more sophisticated. Arguably, the 
participation of voters in elections does not necessarily mean that they hold the 
elementary knowledge needed to cast a rational vote. The premise that a certain level of 
knowledge is required for a conscious vote cannot be disputed. If one is to draw 
comparisons with the business realm, a decision to purchase a flat with no market 
orientation or awareness of the relevant regulations might result in a financial loss at 
best or the physical loss of the entire flat at worst. The same applies to voting, justifying 
the focus on levels of information. 
Three dimensions of knowledge are conceived here as essential for a rational political 
choice. As discussed on Section ‎4.3 (Page 100) and illustrated in Figure ‎5.1.2 (below), 
the first dimension is past-oriented knowledge, which is needed to assess politicians, 
parties and incumbent governments based on their functioning. The second is present-
oriented knowledge, referring to the subject's own circumstances, as self-awareness is a 
prerequisite to value the personal implications expected from the implementation of 
policies. The third dimension of knowledge is future-oriented. It includes the various 
platforms and policies advocated by each party. Integrating these three dimension 
should enable the voter to cast a deliberate rational vote, according to the dominant 




















Figure ‎5.1.2: Informed voting and rational voting in the Pyramid of Political Engagement 
Rational voting is the most complicated and controversial concept, as already shown in 
the literature review. The rationale underpinning the effort to concretise and monitor 
reasoning is premised on the different justifications people themselves put forward for 
their voting decision. Whereas some justifications are based on a level of logic, others 
scarcely show reason or coherent judgment. Thus, for instance, traditional voting as the 
sole explanation for a counter-class vote can hardly be justified from a rational 
perspective in comparison with a solid set of principles and beliefs as to what 
government should do to advance the State and its citizenry. It should be stressed that 
solidarity does occasionally converge with utility, intentionally or unintentionally, but 
an element of reasoning, stronger than general feelings, is needed for a rational vote.  
Integrating the voter's utility function and his/her political reasoning takes this logic 
one-step forward. As the marginal utility from money is the highest among those who 
have least, one would expect an underprivileged rational voter to place redistributive 
welfare regimes top on his/her list of considerations. Any systematic deviation by 
individuals away from what is perceived to be their utilitarian preferences merits further 
study. It might be found that rational reasoning is beyond them, or preferably, that there 
is an informed and reasoned account of their decision. 
The analytical framework of the Pyramid of Political Engagement, and specifically its 
top level of rational voting, is not trivial. However, a firm strategy that acknowledges 
the weaknesses but employs rigorous and diverse tools to examine these concepts is 
needed. The theoretical debate around rationality, information and abstention lasts 
decades and will not be solved here. However, this thesis does intend to put forward a 
coherent strategy of various methods capable of validating or refuting this research's 
hypotheses.   
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5.2 Questions & Hypotheses 
This research neither focuses deliberately on the environmental circumstances breeding 
political deprivation, nor on the consequences of such deprivation. These aspects had 
already been explored in several earlier studies, explored in the literature review. The 
questions defined below put the spotlight on voters themselves, seeking to monitor the 
mechanisms influencing individual behaviour. While the quantitative methods should 
generate a macro assessment of several positivist hypotheses, the qualitative research 
employs an interpretive approach expected to enable better understanding of individual 
thinking. The first question compares characteristics of poor and wealthier individuals, 
whereas the second is focused solely on people living in poverty casting a "counter-
class vote", as defined below . The independent variables in all questions are the voter's 
degree of wealth and his political affiliation, whereas the dependent indicators are from 
the realm of political engagement.  
 
1 
What are the differences in Britain and in Israel, in terms of political engagement, 
between people living in conditions of poverty ("Underprivileged") and people not living 
in such conditions ("Privileged")?. 
2 
What are the differences in Britain and in Israel, in terms of political engagement, 
between people facing poverty who support the major “welfarist party" and others who 
support the major “non-welfarist party"? Alternatively, what differentiates the "counter-
class" underprivileged voters? 
Table ‎5.2.1: Research questions 
 "Underprivileged", as opposed to "privileged", are either individuals sampled in 
the British/Israeli Election Surveys and categorised as members of the lowest class 
or individuals sampled/interviewed in poor areas, whose income group, when 
reported, is roughly below the poverty line.  
 "Welfarist Party" is the major political party competing in the general elections, 
whose official manifesto contains elements approximating to social-democratic 
welfare regime principles and whose leader articulates views that can be perceived 
as more egalitarian and beneficial to the less privileged, in relation to other 
candidates.  
 "Non-Welfarist Party" is the major political party competing in general elections, 
whose official manifesto contains elements approximating to liberal welfare regime 
principles and whose leader expresses views that can be perceived as more 
conservative and liberal, in relation to other candidates.  
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 "Counter-class voting" exists when a citizen defined as underprivileged votes for 
the non-welfarist party, given that classes are defined mainly by income and class 
voting promotes the collective economic interest of each group. 
As discussed in the previous section, the Pyramid of Political Engagement serves as the 
analytical framework to assess the differences in voters' engagement. Its three 
hierarchical levels, namely physical, informed and rational voting, serve as fields for 
comparison. Due to their key role in the research, concise definitions of the three levels 
are also desirable: 
 "Physical Participation" is exercised when an individual who is entitled to vote 
registers himself/herself and casts his/her vote in the general elections.   
 "Informed Participation" is achieved when a voter holds a reasonable level of 
knowledge as measured in three dimensions: past performance of politicians, parties 
and incumbent governments; present personal circumstances of himself/herself; and 
future policy platforms of the candidates. 
 "Rational Participation" is attained when a voter shapes his voting decision in 
accordance with principles of substantive rationality, i.e. he acts to maximise his/her 
expected utility in elections, based on the knowledge s/he holds and the political 
alternatives open to him/her.  
After defining the research questions and generating an analytical framework, the 
research hypotheses are to be explored. The matrix below resulted from the integration 
of the three degrees of political engagement with the two comparisons defined in the 
research questions.  
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 Research Question No. 1 
Privileged vs. Underprivileged 
voters 
Research Question No. 2 
"Counter-class" underprivileged voters 
vs. other underprivileged voters 
Physical Participation  
It is assumed that 
underprivileged citizens in both 
countries would be less likely to 
exercise physical, informed and 
rational voting in the general 
elections. Even though their 
utilitarian interest in exhibiting 
higher level of participation is 
higher than the average, they 
are expected to be lagging 
behind the wealthy voters in 
terms of turnout and knowledge, 
and have different pattern of 
reasoning.  
It is assumed by hypothesis that 
underprivileged voters who are in 
favour of non-welfarist regimes 
tend to vote in larger numbers than 
their equivalents who support the 
major welfarist party. In both 
countries, it is argued that the 
intrinsic forces leading poor voters 
to cast an counter-class vote are 
stronger than the drive of other 
voters to participate in the political 
process. Therefore, whereas the 
latter group is more likely to 
alienate itself from the political 
process, the former would reflect 
greater motivation to vote.  
Informed Participation  
It is assumed that voting 
preferences are very much 
dependent on the level of 
knowledge and type of reasoning 
voters develop. Countr-class voting 
is expected to correlate with 
information or rationality deficits, 
whereas welfarist underprivileged 
voters would probably have a 
better level of knowledge and 
elements of substantive rational 
reasoning.  
In Israel, there might be a similar 
correlation in terms of knowledge, 
though security concerns might 
rationally overtake financial 
considerations, prompting an 
counter-class vote.  
Rational Participation 
Table ‎5.2.2: Research hypotheses 
It should be noted that two of the three hypotheses defined here are identical in both 
countries, as generally, the mechanism of political marginalisation in this thesis is 
viewed as universal. The circumstances underlying the third hypothesis are different, 
due to the unique security threat that the Israeli electorate has faced for decades.  
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5.3 Strategy 
A few strategic decisions were taken at the outset of this project. It was decided to carry 
out the research in Britain and in Israel, two countries familiar to the author, from which 
intellectual comparisons could be drawn. It was also agreed that qualitative and 
quantitative research methods had to be integrated, in order to enrich the conclusions 
inferred from the data . This understanding required intensive fieldwork in both 
countries, contributing to the rigour of this study. Another strategic decision was to 
confront the issue of rational voting, even though the operationalisation of this concept 
would probably attract firm criticism. Income was taken as the lead indicator for 
poverty, after a few empirical tests.  
Research is based on trade-offs. As Denscombe wrote in The Good Research Guide, 
there is no "one right" direction to take, though there are "some strategies which are 
better suited than others for tackling specific research topics" (1998, p. 3). King, 
Keohane and Verba argued that the process of any social research is by definition 
"imperfect", whereas the substance is at best a "social enterprise" (1994, pp. 8-9). 
Considering the inevitable imperfections, an evaluation of the background leading to the 
adoption of these strategies is required.  
The focus on two case studies derived from the premise that political deprivation ought 
to be found globally, although each country would have its unique mechanisms and 
reflections. Aside from considerations of reliability, this decision also enabled an 
evaluation of two different societies, identifying their merits and shortcomings. The 
choice of Britain and Israel to be case studies was prompted by the author's relative 
familiarity with both states and languages. While each country has its own political 
history that was thoroughly reviewed in Chapter ‎0, a crucial element in any fieldwork is 
the ability to have unmediated contact with native citizens.  
After the two states had been selected, the next strategic decision was to combine 
various research methods to guarantee rigorous and reliable results. Noting the tension 
between qualitative and quantitative methods, this study opted to use both, making no 
assumptions as to the superiority of either. Personal inclinations had also contributed to 
this decision. The author thought that opting for one over the other would result in 
unnecessary imperfections. It is assumed that quantitative findings cannot replace fine, 
unmediated and qualitative insights, whereas qualitative methods are inherently 
imperfect without numerical supervision. The need to research in various channels 
increases in those instances where the arguments were not previously explored.  
These decisions are open to criticism of several kinds. Obviously, the preliminary 
selection of two states as case studies omitted many other democracies, which might be 
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found to be better field-studies. Paradoxically, precisely due to the author's personal 
familiarity with both States, the research might be unbalanced by the type of raw data 
collected. Additionally, the author's accented English might pose difficulties in the 
engagement with British native respondents. If this research was to be repeated, it might 
be advised to focus only on one country, double the number of subjects sampled and 
hire local staff to guarantee smooth and fluent communication.  
Yet, the major criticism is probably of the operationalization of political reasoning. 
While the empirical definition is still heuristic in nature, it might be the subject of 
prejudice and misperceptions. The reliance on the concept of substantive rationality, as 
developed by Arrow (1951) and employed by Downs (1956), turns the challenge of 
enumerating rational thinking into a feasible if controversial objective. This criticism 
would exist under any circumstances, as the existence of political reasoning is a 
fundamental tenet in this work.   
The reliance on income as a measurement of poverty directly or by other socio-
economic indicators, was also a tough decision taken. However, it was found to be the 
only practical indicator around which the various research methods could merge. Family 
income is still the most accurate indicator of poverty as it correlates with most other 
indicators of need. Factually, there is no other single indicator capable of "fencing" a 
multi-deprived population. It should be noted that lack of data forced a partial shift from 
individual to local indicators of poverty, as will be discussed in depth later.  
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5.4 Methods 
In light of the decision to integrate qualitative and quantitative elements in the research 
itself, three methods were chosen to monitor political engagement. Large-scale surveys 
were the first to be re-analysed, in order to generate a quantitative orientation of the 
general phenomenon. Consequently, an experimental exploratory survey assessing 
personal utilities of voters was distributed in designated areas, to track certain trends 
and inclinations. A series of in-depth interviews with citizens from the top and bottom 
of the social ladder was conducted in parallel, creating the required elements to increase 
understanding of various patterns of behaviour.  
As the research hangs on the concept of poverty, the definition of underprivileged 
citizens employed here (Page 140) deserves specific attention. Initially, this study 
intended to adopt a strict definition of income poverty to focus on the most deprived 
populations striving for money. However, an examination of the existing datasets 
revealed a serious shortage of data. Notably, each existing survey had different 
questions relating to family income, but also the sample of the bottom income group 
(when it was possible to calculate it) was often too small. The fieldwork, on the other 
hand, concentrated on certain locations, known to host underprivileged populations, 
although interrogation of family income of those willing to participate was believed to 
be inappropriate. Despite these issues, the income threshold defined generally matched 
the official poverty line in each country.  
What follows are specific references to each of the research methods employed, the 
rationale behind its selection and the various practicalities involved. The subsequent 
section will elaborate on some major aspects of data collection, including sampling and 
ethics. 
 
5.4.1 Exploratory Survey 
The exploratory "personal utility survey" was intended to apply Arrows' concept of 
substantive rationality with all the theoretical complexities involved. Its final aim was to 
assess future subjective utilities of voters from different policy arenas, based on 
standards and assessments given by the voters themselves. The survey was completed 
by 137 subjects, 70 from Britain and 57 from Israel. It preceded the in-depth interviews, 
and was conducted at the same locations, as detailed in Section ‎5.5.2 (Data Collection \ 
Locations, Page 156). Roughly speaking, approximately half of the subjects approached 
were willing to take part in the survey.  
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Initially, the survey was conducted on a laptop, as a computer-administered 
questionnaire (the slides and the hard copies are in Appendix ‎11.1, Page 303). After a 
short time, the laptop was replaced with hard copies of the questionnaires in both 
languages. Unfortunately, the technology was found to be unhelpful, instead of 
providing an element of entertainment for the participants and making the engagement 
more attractive and less intrusive. The underprivileged were found to be unfamiliar with 
such technology and were even scared of it. The privileged spent enough time in front 
of their own electronic equipment to feel utterly untouched. The catalyst for modifying 
the attitude was a frightening incident, involving a warning that the laptop would be 
stolen, made in an underprivileged neighbourhood.  
The survey first inquired about the voter's political preferences, before moving on to ask 
about his/her expected utilities. The ranking of the various policy arenas by their level 
of importance to the voter was conducted through an allocation of a dummy budget pie. 
This was believed to be an effective method of defining the "standards" for selection. 
Subsequently, specific inquiries about the expectation from each party in each policy 
field were made. After answers were entered, the computer (when it was used) 
compared the subject's actual voting with his calculated relative preferences from each 
party, showing whether the two were compatible. The entire process was generally 
successful.  
The sample was initially planned to be a non-representative one, due to the exploratory 
nature of the project and the limited resources available to manage it. Indeed, several 
locations were selected to target specific groups, though overall random selection was 
made only in these specific and unrepresentative locations. Purposive sampling has its 
own merits, as well as its own deficiencies. Under the general framework of this study it 
seems as its unique characters were well integrated.  
5.4.1.1 Rationale 
Arguably, if voters are utility maximisers, one can assume they vote in favour of a party 
that on average, is expected to perform better than others will, in the voters' eyes. 
Hence, by asking voters to rate the importance of different fields of policy by their own 
interest, and then comparing the subjective expected utilities from different parties in 
each field, one can indicate which party would maximise the voters' expected utility. 
Clearly, most of the voters had never made such a rational calculation to decide on their 
vote. However, precisely because of that, this experimental method might facilitate 
some intriguing findings about the systematic deviation of a certain group from its 
"substantively rational vote". 
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There are many other factors capable of influencing voting behaviour. These factors 
might have nothing to do with personal subjective utilities. However, if they influence 
only certain groups, this is a proof of the groups' "bounded" rationality, which can be 
generalised into a concrete theory applicable for certain populations. Interestingly, 
Marwell and Ames were among the few scholars who sought to classify groups 
vulnerable to such "systematic" deviations, as hinted in their seminal study's title - 
"Economists free ride, does anyone else?" (1981). The exploratory "personal utility 
survey" does aspire to apply this technique to non-economic markets as well, or more 
specifically, to the underprivileged electorate acting in political markets.  
5.4.1.2 Questionnaire 
The challenge of drafting survey questions was already labelled as a major cause for 
errors in the entire fieldwork (Sudman & Bradburn 1974). The literature is packed with 
advice as to how to construct each sentence. For instance, Hoinville and others stressed 
the need to generate a "clear, unambiguous and uniformly workable" questionnaire, 
which is capable of "engaging [subjects']… interest, encouraging their co-operation, and 
eliciting answers as close as possible to their truth" (1977, p. 27). Fowler suggested 
defining a concrete objective for each question so that the inquiry falls "only within the 
context of an analysis plan, a clear view of how the information will be used to meet a 
set of overall research objective (1998, p. 346).  
The final questionnaire, to be found on Appendix ‎11.2.2 (Page 326), incorporated three 
major blocks of questions. First, there were general questions about physical 
participation and voting preferences, on Election Day. There were, secondly, a series of 
inquiries assessing informed participation, through past performance, present status and 
future policies. The last section evolved around questions of rational participation, 
which included the allocation of a budget pie and the ranking of various parties in 
various policy fields. The final question was about the subject‘s personal income, 
asking him/her to circle one income group out of five.  
All questions were carefully formulated to avoid any preliminary leading, and some 
questions were taken from existing large-scale surveys. The integration of such 
questions contributes to the vigorousness of the questionnaire, as their validity and 
reliability were already verified in experiments and significant studies. Nonetheless, the 
methodological challenges of assessing information and rationality merit further study, 
as the empirical aspects of both were not found in existing literature or large-scale 
surveys.  
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As for specific blocks of questions, a study of the topic of informed voting would show 
that in Israel scholars blatantly ignored it to focus solely on views and positions. The 
state of affairs regarding the British Election Surveys was not dramatically better, but 
questions were still severely limited in their scope. In the American context, however, 
the seminal work of Delli-Carpini and Keefer advocated the use of a Five-Item 
Knowledge Index, which inquired about the positions of dominant figures, the name of 
the most conservative party and procedural or civic issues. Their goal was different 
though, as they intended to deal with the concept of political knowledge rather more 
then they sought to define types of knowledge needed to maximise the voters' expected 
utility.  
This paper maintains that familiarity with legal procedures or political figures does not 
necessarily breed a rational voting decision. It is therefore seeking to monitor the 
existence of a conscious understanding of what happened in the past, where the voter 
stands at the present and what the alternatives are for the future. As discussed 
extensively earlier, the questions selected represented this approach.  
To measure rationality, the individual's utility function from government activities was 
gauged, in order to assess the degree of utilitarianism. Since the entire topic is complex, 
a blunt question would probably fail to bring satisfactory results. Therefore, the 
technique developed depends on the subject's ability to allocate the national budget, 
based on his or her own personal utility. The sums given in each field were counted as 
the relative coefficients of the individual utility function, whereas a different set of 
questions would obtain the expected utility in each field from each party. This is how 
the overall weighted expected utility was calculated.  
This method is vulnerable to several shortcomings (e.g. not all types of utility are 
counted; utility itself is an abstract concept; voters might ignore their own benefits etc.). 
However, these shortcomings are common in relation to all parties and all interviewees, 
leaving a solid (though not perfect) basis for comparison.  This technique seems to be 
theoretically feasible as the only goal of this exploratory part is to compare expected 
utilities from all parties, rather than reach deterministic conclusions related only to one 
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5.4.2  In-depth Interviews 
No true understanding of political deprivation is possible without considering the roots 
of this phenomenon. In social research, the origin of most phenomena can only be 
touched upon during an unmediated contact with the key players, namely the involved 
human beings. Interviews in general are expected to examine the roles that "attitudes, 
values and beliefs play in leading people to behave as they do" (Hoinville et al 1977, p. 
11). Therefore, this method is particularly suitable for instances where the research is 
centred on "individual motivation" and when "the psychology and circumstances of 
respondents need to be interrelated" (p. 15). Having said so, interviews are often 
affected by the biases of the interviewer himself.   
These biases and prejudices are the most disturbing of all.  The influential sociologist 
Norbert Elias noted, "Scientists engaged in the study of nature are, to some extent, 
prompted in the pursuit of their task by personal wishes and wants… They may hope 
that the results of their inquiries will be in line with theories they have enunciated 
before" (1956, p. 228). It is inevitable, he continued, that the course of discovering "the 
inherent order of the social development of mankind" would not be diverted because of 
the "hopes and the fears, the enmities and beliefs resulting from their role as immediate 
participants in the struggles and conflicts of their own time" (p. 234-235). Without 
challenging these truths, some biases can and should be tackled in advance.  
In 1954, Hyman emphasised the damaging impact that the personal characteristics of 
the interviewer and his/her predefined expectations might have upon the interviewees 
(1954). In this instance, the researcher had consistently sought to sustain neutrality from 
the research hypotheses while interviewing. In addition, he also manipulated his 
appearance by wearing a suit, shaving and using an after-shave when looking for 
privileged interviewees and vice versa when seeking out underprivileged ones.  
More useful advice was also provided by Moser and Kalton. They maintained that a 
structured interview minimises the risk of biases (1971). While a fully structured 
interview could have inhibited some fine arguments, the interviews were eventually 
semi-structured.  This allowed communication to flow, enabling authentic conclusions 
to be made and reducing the risk of biases. An interview schedule, which included a list 
of topics to be covered and some standard answers, was carefully constructed and is 
provided in Appendix ‎11.2.4 (Page 336).  
Nonetheless, these steps have not completely eradicated biases. The awareness of their 
existence was however always to the fore, during the interviews themselves, during the 
analysis and during the writing-up phase. It is assumed that such awareness did lead to 
second thoughts, additional doubts and particular caution at all times.  
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5.4.2.1 Selection of Interviewees 
Certain districts were selected for locating and approaching fieldwork participants (See 
Section ‎5.5.2, Page 156). In these locations, contact with potential interviewees was 
made at random, given that their external appearance matched the general intentions. 
Thus, not all visitors to Starbucks were presumed to be wealthy, and not all clients at 
the Citizens' Advice Bureau were presumed to be needy. However, the weeks spent in 
both locations led to prudent identification of privileged (wearing costly suits, smart 
watches and polished shoes), and underprivileged interviewees (often wearing worn-out 
clothes). Eventually, after subjects had undertaken the exploratory survey, and based on 
their declared income, voting preferences and willingness to cooperate, some were 
approached for an in-depth interview. This created a diverse group of interviewees.  
Initially, interviews were scheduled to take place immediately after the exploratory 
surveys, either at the location itself or at a different venue at a different time.  This plan 
worked mainly for the underprivileged interviewees, who often expressed a strong 
desire to share their views. On the contrary, only a few of the privileged interviewees, 
consented immediately to participate in a longer session. The majority were reluctant to 
do so. As a result, half of the privileged interviewees were contacted directly, through 
personal contacts and not random selection. Nonetheless, the socio-economic gaps 
between the selected underprivileged and privileged interviewees were still significant, 
and the selection process was directed to guarantee a diverse cadre of interviewees.  
5.4.2.2 Approaching Subjects  
Being approached for an interview is not a common experience for most people. The 
difficulties faced in the field could be grouped into linguistic and non-linguistic ones. 
As to language aspects, some failed attempts to gain cooperation demonstrated that the 
very first words uttered greatly affected a potential interviewee. As a result of this, the 
introductory section was modified, so that privileged interviewees were told that the 
research was being conducted by "a PhD student from the LSE" studying political 
behaviour of individuals. Underprivileged interviewees were told of a "student" 
inquiring about voting. The latest form was less deterring, whereas the earliest was 
much more impressive.  
As to the non-linguistic aspects, appearance was certainly a key attribute attracting 
cooperation or prompting rejection. An elegant suit with a tie clearly contributed 
towards a smooth interaction with privileged interviewees, whilst jeans and t-shirt were 
essential in underprivileged locations. When these dress codes were not maintained, 
cooperation was dramatically lowest. It would not be an exaggeration to perceive the 
external outlook and the wording adjustments, accompanied by a different intonation 
and rhythm, as key decisions that advanced the entire fieldwork.   
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5.4.2.3 Conducting Interviews 
A few aspects, related to the way in which interviews were conducted, merit a 
reference. First was the venue for the interviews. Obviously, the respondent's 
willingness to talk freely about herself can evaporate in the presence of a familiar 
person. Therefore, the venue had to be isolated from external interventions, and be as 
intimate as possible. Under these terms of reference, the ultimate venue was the 
respondents' own home. However, when the question was presented to some of the 
underprivileged interviewees, most selected different places. In the case of privileged 
interviewees, dialogues were held at either private houses, offices, isolated tables in 
coffee shops, or in one exceptional case, an exclusive members' club in Central London. 
In the case of underprivileged interviewees, most discussions took place at the initial 
point of interaction, such as the Citizens' Advice Bureau or coffee shops in town 
squares.  
The interviews themselves were semi-structured, based on the interview schedule. Two 
major principles were maintained during the entire process. First, the questions were "as 
open-ended as possible to encourage respondents to talk spontaneously about their 
behaviour and opinions" (Hoinville et al 1977, pp. 11). Second, the questioning 
technique included some verbal and non-verbal probing, as well as indirect references 
about "others' behaviour". The latest tactic intended to encourage respondents to 
communicate honestly their genuine beliefs.  
5.4.2.4 Recording & Transcribing  
After the location of the interview had been set up, the interviewees were asked whether 
tape or video recording were acceptable. The intention was to film all interviews in 
order to capture authentically all interactions. Time showed that the presence of a DV 
camera was almost forgotten after a short while. Eventually, most interviewees agreed 
to be filmed after their confidentiality was guaranteed, and no exceptional events were 
noted. However, the management of Hackney's CAB was immensely concerned with 
the interviewees' privacy, and allowed only tape-recording to take place. In all 
interviews, subjects were told the recording was solely for academic purposes and the 
tapes would not be distributed or shown in public.  
Kowal and O'connel already stated that transcribing work, is not merely a technical 
procedure, as "the creation and use of transcripts are theory-loaded constructive 
processes" (2004, p. 249). Aside from being aware of the risk of biased interpretations, 
efforts were made to include full quotes within the thesis itself, in order to allow the 
reader to draw his/her own inferences. Notably, even though the analytical emphasis 
was on verbal statements rather than on paralinguistic communication, the non-verbal 
elements captured during the filming usually reinforced previous impressions. 
Therefore, the additional effort invested in videotaping the interviews was often 
unjustified.  
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5.4.3 Secondary Analysis 
Quantitative deductions about political behaviour cannot prevail in a statistical vacuum. 
Secondary analysis of large-scale datasets becomes a crucial element in reaching 
conclusions and crystallizing this research's findings. Obviously, the terminology and 
aims underlying the existing election surveys do not perfectly fit the core premises of 
this thesis, but nonetheless, insights and inferences relevant to this study can be deduced 
from the professional databases compiled by top scholars.  
There was a distinction between two types of quantitative data. The first type were 
official public choice statistics conducted at the national or local level, taken from 
government agencies and complemented with elementary socio-economic indicators. 
The second type was drawn from public opinion surveys conducted at the individual 
level by academic institutes and polling firms. Table ‎5.4.1 summarises some of the 
distinctive characteristics of each data source, reflecting implications in terms of data 
reliability and data perfection:   
 "Public Choice" Sources "Public Opinion" Sources 
Sampling  All registered voters  Probability Sample 
Locations All Polling Stations Random Homes 
Content 
Recorded voting patterns and 
socio-economic indicators  
Reported voting patterns, socio-
economic indicators and positions  
Level of Measurement Constituency/Town Individual 
Source of Data Official Records Respondents' Answers 
Table ‎5.4.1: Major characters of public choice & public opinion qualitative data  
Each type of data had advantages and disadvantages. However, precisely the integration 
of both types of data guaranteed reliability, as the aggregated figures of both types could 
be compared to each other.  
Technically, the statistical analysis was conducted using with SPSS software (version 
13.0). The graphs and the tables were produced using Excel (2003 edition). The various 
datasets relevant to the 1992 & 1997 General Elections in Britain and 1992 &1999 
General Elections in Israel were all analysed.  
The selection of these years took into account the political upheavals in both countries 
(1997 in Britain, 1992 & 1999 in Israel). In Britain the 1992 elections was perceived as 
an influential campaign before the upheaval, and in Israel the 1995 elections were 
exceptional, due to the murder of Prime Minister Rabin.  
 
 
The Poverty of Democracy 153 
 
5.4.3.1 Public Choice (Constituency Level) 
In both countries, election results divided by constituencies or towns were available free 
of charge, either as a hard copy or electronically as an Excel file. The challenge though 
was to create the statistical correlation between the division of votes and the socio-
economic indicators taken from a different data source. In Israel, the Central Bureau of 
Statistics officially classified all towns in accordance with their population's socio-
economic indicators. Methodologically, 14 key socio-economic variables from various 
fields and sources were reduced down to ten categories, which reflected the local 
standard of living. In Britain, Parliament initiated the breakdown of Census data into 
constituencies, illuminating the socio-economic composition of each locality. Among 
the various indicators, data on occupation and employment was taken as a leading 
indicator, alongside voting and turnout patterns.  
Below are the major datasets analysed as part of the "public choice" analysis. Further 
bibliographic details are provided in Section ‎0, Page 264.  
Year Source Dataset 
1992 Central Bureau of Statistics Results of Elections to the Thirteenth Knesset  
1999 Central Election Committee  Results of Elections to the Fifteenth Knesset by Cities 
2001 The Electoral Commission  Election 2001: The Official Results 
2004 Central Bureau of Statistics 
Characterization and Classification of Local Authorities by 
the Socio-Economic Level of the Population in 2001 
2004 House of Commons Library  
2001 Census of Population: Statistics for Parliamentary 
Constituencies 
Table ‎5.4.2: Major "public choice" datasets analysed  
5.4.3.2 Public Opinion (Individual Level) 
The British Election Surveys, conducted since 1964, and the Israeli equivalents carried 
out since 1969, were the major "public opinion" datasets analysed. Both took 
representative samples, although in Israel some minority groups (Settlers / Arabs / 
Kibbutzim residents) were occasionally omitted.  
Below are the major datasets analysed as part of the "public opinion" analysis: 
Year Source Dataset 
1992 Israel Social Science Data Centre Israeli Election Survey of 1992 
1993 UK Data Archive (SN: 2981) British General Election Study, 1992 
1999 UK Data Archive (SN: 3887) British General Election Study, 1997 
1999 Israel Social Science Data Centre Israeli Election Survey of 1999 
2001 UK Data Archive (SN: 4318) British Social Attitudes Survey, 1999 
Table ‎5.4.3: Major "public opinion" datasets analysed 
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5.4.3.3 Defining an Underprivileged Group in "Public Opinion"  Datasets 
When analyzing public opinion surveys, classifying respondents in accordance with 
their personal socio-economic status proved challenging. In both countries, it was clear 
that a single-variable was not appropriate. Poverty was far too complicated to be 
captured in one indicator and in many of the "public opinion" datasets the socio-
demographic questions did not feet with each other, and there was a need to overcome 
the inconsistencies. 
As a consequence, a multi-variable approach was used to create an underprivileged 
group. The process of selecting the new variables was based on three principles – their 
reliability in measuring poverty, their applicability in all datasets explored and the 
extent the entire algorithm is practical and can be implemented. However, due to the 
lack of repeating indicators, and the need to create a separate but homogenous 
underprivileged group in all datasets, data collected at the local level had to be carefully 
linked to that collected individually.  
Full explanations of the algorithms are provided in Appendices ‎11.3.3 (Page 340) and 
‎11.4.3 (Page 357). In Israel, five variables were used: the adjusted family income, as 
low income is still the major indicator of the presence of poverty; the socio-economic 
classification of the city, because when details of family income are absent, the official 
categorisation based on the local population characteristics is the most appropriate 
alternative; age, as it is unreliable to group perceptions of young voters with pensioners 
only because their incomes are temporarily similar; years of schooling, as normally 
higher education increases the probability of permanently high incomes and vice versa; 
and household size, as singles or couples are less likely to suffer from enduring poverty 
than large families.  
In Britain, four variables were eventually employed in the algorithm. The main source 
of household income distinguished between those living on benefits, residing on 
pensions or working to earn their living. The time passed since the last job separated out 
respondents experiencing long-term unemployment from those working until recently. 
The Standard Occupational Classification (SOC 1990), which was applicable for 
members of the labour force, indicated the quality of the respondents' occupation. The 
age range was fixed at 26-65.  
By examining the socio-demographic distributions of all underprivileged groups in both 
countries, the algorithms were found to be statistically rigorous. The characteristics of 
the groups created were generally comparable and workable, as shown in the 
Appendices. These manipulations had an empirical price. This was inevitable, as all 
datasets needed to be grounded for comparisons. 
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5.5 Data Collection 
After describing in details the various methods employed to gather qualitative and 
quantitative data, several "horizontal" topics of data collection deserve special attention. 
While the statistical analysis of large-scale datasets had almost no implications in terms 
of sampling, ethics or language barriers, the fieldwork conducted for a period of more 
than a year, did face methodological questions, which had to be addressed. 
 
5.5.1 Sampling 
The mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods allowed a certain level of flexibility 
in terms of sampling. While qualitative methods deepened the understanding of 
individual behaviour, quantitative tools looked at macro hypotheses using a 
representative sample, and thus strengthened the rigorousness of the entire research 
findings. The disadvantages of one method were balanced with the advantages of the 
other. Noting this equilibrium, and considering the financial and practical obstacles, the 
qualitative fieldwork was proclaimed as unrepresentative, even though its focus on 
certain locations created a "sampling frame" of individuals from certain backgrounds, 
which were then randomly selected.  
This technique of purposive sampling, in preliminary defined locations, was used 
mainly in the exploratory surveys. Half of the interviews took place after the survey, 
whereas the other half were set up separately through personal contacts (which might be 
defined as a "convenience sample" by Henry [1998, p. 105]). It should be emphasised 
however that the selection of locations generated group homogeneity, whereas the 
random selection within each location formed the needed heterogeneity within the 
sampling frame. Thus, not all Hackney citizens had an equal probability of asking for 
assistance from the Citizens' Advice Bureau, but the principle of randomness was 
generally applied to all those visiting the Bureau.  
A major task was to define the appropriate size of the sample. Hoinville and others 
argued it must be "broadly enough based to allow for comparisons not foreseen as 
important at the planning stage" (1977, p. 17). Henry noted, "the challenge of sampling 
lies in making trade-offs to reduce total error while keeping study goals and resources in 
mind" (1998, p. 125). The flexibility advocated by both scholars was fully implemented 
here. Whereas the initial plan was to hold 12 in-depth interviews and collect 120 filled 
surveys in both countries, there were 25 interviews and 137 surveys. The decision to 
extend the sample was taken spontaneously during the fieldwork, as there was an 
apparent need to broaden the scope of it. 
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5.5.2 Locations 
The question of locations where subjects would be approached was crucial, as wrong 
locations could divert the entire findings. After considering several alternatives, luxury 
and exclusive coffee shops were chosen to "capture" the privileged, whereas public 
places or specific locations in underprivileged neighbourhoods served for finding the 
needy. Table ‎5.5.1 summarises these places and gives the rationale underpinning their 
selection. Examination of other locations ended up with failure. Thus, Israeli hotels 
were toured for a few days but were abandoned, as most visitors were foreigners. 
Manchester's Moss Side neighbourhood was visited for two days, without success.  
Table ‎5.5.1: Locations and reasons for the selection 
Whereas the selection of sites was based on logic, the focus on cities and 
neighbourhoods was based largely on official statistics. In Israel, the national socio-
economic ranking placed the towns of Netivot, Ofakim and Sderot at the third and forth 
clusters, namely at the bottom of the pyramid of Jewish towns. Herzliya and Tel Aviv, 
on the other hand, were among the largest cities at the top ten clusters ladder (CBS 
2001). Eventually, practical considerations, such as the size of commercial areas and the 
public reputation of each city also influenced the selection process.  
In Britain the research was conducted only in London, where neighbourhoods of severe 
poverty coexist with areas of tremendous wealth. Statistically, whereas the Cities of 
London and Westminster were in the top ten constituencies for their proportion of 
workforce holding managerial and professional positions, Hackney North was in the top 
ten of constituencies whose inhabitants had never worked at all (HCL 2004). Notably, 
the reputations of Hackney and the City were a key factor as well, even if they cannot 
be backed up statistically.  






Starbucks Branches  
(City of London, 2005-2006)  
Luxury coffee shop chain that usually serves  wealthy customers 
spending their free time during the working day; the branches' locations 
guaranteed representation of businessmen, lawyers and accountants.  
JobCentres 
(Hendon & Hackney, 2005) 
Government agency where benefits are claimed and jobs are sought by 
the unemployed; the relatively underprivileged neighbourhood selected 
guaranteed a high representation of dependent customers.  
Citizens' Advice Bureau 
(Hackney, 2005-2006) 
NGO that assists ordinary citizens in contacting the authorities, often in 
order to claim welfare benefits; the nature of these services and the 






(Tel Aviv & Herzliya, 2005) 
Luxury coffee shop chain located usually in wealthy commercial areas; 
the high pricing and the carefully selected locations generated an 
exclusive group of customers, usually from the upper classes.  
Business Conference  
(Tel Aviv, 2005) 
The Annual Israeli Business Conference organized by Globes (equivalent 
to the British Financial Times); the entire conference is directed at senior 
business men who can afford the high fees.  
Town Squares 
(Netivot & Ofakim, 2005) 
Public areas in developing cities suffering from high proportion of poverty 
and unemployment;  presence in the city squares at  midday could be 
attributed to those with no permanent employment.  
JobCentres  
(Netivot & Sderot, 2005) 
Public service, though privately provided in Sderot, assisting unemployed 
and authorizing their benefit claims; due to the socio-economic 
characteristics in both towns, most visitors are living in poverty.  
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5.5.3 Language 
The language barrier had several implications for data collection, far beyond the 
anticipated difficulty of a foreigner communicating with English people. Surprisingly, 
communication was gruelling also with underprivileged Israelis, though at least 
ostensibly, both sides had spoken the same language. Too often, the underprivileged 
subjects did not understand the questions, the expressions, and the tasks presented, 
forcing the interviewer to simplify entire sentences. In London, the non-native accent 
certainly influenced the interactions, though the colloquial terminology of the poor 
often seemed to pose a greater challenge.  
The long days of surveys and interviews had taken the author back to Disraeli's 
observation of "Two Nations", with different discourses and distinctive levels of 
understanding. The inability of some underprivileged interviewees to complete a 
sentence, to understand a question and to make a structured argument was, to the author, 
astonishing. Nevertheless, the original meaning of the questions is believed to have 
been understood after a process of "phrasing down" the sentences.  
The British interviewees, privileged and underprivileged, have certainly noticed the 
interviewer‘s different accent. However, within the framework of London's multi-
cultural society, it seemed as this difference was not perceived as dominant. 
Paradoxically, there were some positive implications attached as well, especially when 
interviewees felt they had to explain themselves thoroughly in order for the non-native 
to understand, or when they felt their anonymity was guaranteed. The privileged 
interviewees probably recognised the different accent immediately, although it was only 
mentioned explicitly by one of them.  
5.5.4 Ethics 
The engagement with deprived populations, taking place precisely because of their 
deprivation, demanded  careful consideration of the ethical implications of each method. 
As Miles and Huberman put it, "qualitative data analysis is more than a technical 
matter… [therefore] we must also consider the rightness or wrongness of our actions… 
in relation to the people whose lives we are studying" (1994, p. 288). Unfortunately, 
existing works on ethics, such as the 12 ethical dilemmas included on the "Handbook on 
ethical issues in anthropology" (Cassell & Jacobs 1987), do not address the concrete 
difficulties of social researchers. 
Flinder set forward four major attitudes towards social surveying. Each has its own 
implications in relation to recruiting subjects, studying their behaviour and reporting the 
findings (quoted at Miles & Huberman 1994, p. 290). Whereas deontological scholars 
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would manage their fieldwork to avoid wrongdoing while seeking fairness in their 
report, utilitarian scholars are said to avoid concrete harm whilst focusing on 
confidentiality rather than fairness. This research, posing and addressing questions of 
utilitarianism, adopted a utilitarian approach to ethical dilemmas.  
There was however a unique problem. Aside from seeking the subject's informed 
consent and protecting his/her confidentiality, the quest for political reasoning could 
have left some interviewees disappointed. In Flinders' terminology, a utilitarian scholar 
would seek the "avoidance of harm" during the fieldwork, but that can hardly happen if 
an interviewee understands during an interview he was behaving irrationally. This harm 
can take the form of lower self-esteem, a blow to well-established beliefs or simply bad 
feeling. Such outcomes were unacceptable.   
Therefore, some safeguards were built into the fieldwork itself. The phrasing of the 
questions often referred to "others' behaviour", to enable respondents to express their 
thoughts without personalizing them. Several "evasion" avenues of understanding and 
sympathy were kept open by the interviewee throughout the interview, and arguments 
such as "I intended to vote differently anyway" or "I just can't trust him" were often 
made and noted. All replies were given legitimacy during and after the interview, 
prompting further inquiry as for the justified reasons leading to a specific voting 
decision. The exploratory surveys and the in-depth interviews never ended with a 
judgemental remark, and often the question of rationality was addressed in the midst of 
the discussion and not at the end of it. The intention was to facilitate the calmest and 
most relaxed atmosphere, which would leave the interviewee feeling satisfied and happy 
with his/her replies.  
All engagement began with a short declaration of intentions by the interviewer, in order 
to avoid any misunderstanding by the interviewee (the declaration is integrated in the 
questionnaire). Even though the interviewer did not elaborate the detailed objectives of 
the thesis, the introduction was honest and trustworthy.  Informed consent was asked for 
recording or taping the engagement, after confidentiality was guaranteed. The 
interviewer confirmed that the recording would not be shown in public and would be 
used solely for academic purposes. Eventually, all files were saved in one private 
computer and the raw data were deleted from the camera. If footage is to be used for 
academic purposes, as part of a short movie summarising the entire fieldwork, faces and 
voices of interviewees will be distorted to avoid their identification.  
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5.5.5 Problems in Data Collection 
The field work revealed the need to change certain practices for greater efficacy. Here 
are some suggestions for future research in this area:  
 All interactions with interviewees should start in ―meeting places‖, such as waiting 
rooms or coffee shops, where cooperation is more likely. The outcome of 
interactions initiated at other places was insignificant, especially since 
underprivileged voters often "have no time" for such dialogues to take place 
 Interviews were much more effective than exploratory surveys. It might be the case 
that surveys should be undertaken while the interview is in progress, rather than 
before it begins. Having said that, the direct confrontation with utility questions 
enriched the discussion and it should not be disposed of.  
 Voters tend to justify their voting behaviour. Even if a short interrogation revealed 
regrets, the automatic response to survey questions was to validate their choice. This 
instinct occasionally turned the ranking of expectations of the major parties into a 
useless tool, which replicated the voters' existing choices rather than their current 
feelings.  
 The survey expressions have to be simplified, in order to avoid any potential 
misunderstandings. The removal or replacement of some intellectually complicated 
features such as the budget pie should be considered. The unequal capabilities of 
different voters must be taken into consideration when constructing surveys.  
The Poverty of Democracy 160 
 
5.6 Data Analysis 
Three stages are usually outlined in the process of analyzing data: reducing it, 
presenting it, and drawing inferences from it. While one might argue these are 
chronological phases, they can also take place throughout the life of the entire project. 
Miles and Huberman had already noted that data reduction always occurs, as in each 
phase decisions are taken as to the issues to be examined (1994, p. 10). It is therefore 
argued that the reduction, as well as the presentation and the inferences-drawing, are all 
part of the daily work, and they are all needed to generate the final report.  
The process of quantitative analysis commenced with a comprehensive exploration of 
all potential correlations between the relevant variables. Aside from employing several 
descriptive statistic tools in SPSS 13.0, all relationships with the socio-economic 
indicators were carefully examined. Cross tabs and Pearson Coefficients were executed, 
as well as logistical and linear regressions when needed, in order to validate or refute 
the hypotheses. When consistent trends were identified, efforts were made to strengthen 
the rigorousness of the findings, by analyzing parallel questions in different datasets.  
All datasets included separate references to physical, informed and rational 
participation.   The findings were therefore eventually classified under one of the three 
categories. Subsequently, the figures were processed and presented in bar charts, pie 
charts or plain tables. In order to enable the smoothest reading possible, almost all the 
major findings were accompanied by graphic illustrations, from which inferences and 
deductions were typically possible. 
The analysis of qualitative data, and the crystallisation of qualitative inferences, was 
based on first and second level coding. All interviews were transcribed into a Word 
processor and were printed in turn as hard copies. Interesting citations were marked first 
by their general context, classified into physical, informed or rational participation, and 
subsequently, by the specific discourse they reflected. A quote could have been 
classified under two "primary" categories. However, the true challenge was to "read 
through the quotes" and look for trends and insightful inferences. The entire process 
was carried out manually.  
It should be noted that discourse analysis entailed a few methodological risks, which 
should be addressed in advance. Clearly, "discourses do not simply describe the social 
world, but categorise it, they bring phenomena into sight" (Parker 1992, p. 4). The 
danger though is in falling hostage to discourses and overlooking their reflection of 
existing power relations in society. The wide use of citations and quotes from the 
interviews should enable the reader to re-examine the conclusions.  
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5.7 Conclusion 
The previous chapter has reviewed the various methods employed in this project, and 
referred specifically to issues of data collection and data analysis. It also touched upon 
the difficulties in defining a homogenous underprivileged group in all datasets analysed. 
In addition to the general information provided here, specific and localized references to 
all of these topics are included in the Appendices section as well. They are not part of 
this thesis' general narrative, but they can certainly be of assistance if one is interested 
in exploring in details the way in which this research was carried out.  
The subsequent two chapters constitute the core part of this thesis, summarising the 
outcomes of the entire research. The closing chapter draws upon the various inferences, 
generating an comprehensive assessment of the relationship between poor people living 
in Israel and Britain and their democratic apparatus.  
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6. Britain 
This chapter deals with Britain. It asks why relatively few underprivileged electors vote 
in this country and it scrutinises their patterns of political engagement. The reviews of 
the relationship between the poor, the welfare state and democracy are preceded here by 
a systematic evaluation of individual political behaviour. The findings will be used later 
to illuminate new dynamics in the triangular relationship between the forces facilitating 
redistribution.  
During the 1990s, 40-45 per cent of the British underprivileged electorate did not 
support  the "pro-welfare party" as defined in Chapter 5. Most of them chose not to vote 
at all. There is no doubt that the question of abstention is salient in the British case and 
it will be addressed in this chapter first. The physical barrier however is accompanied 
with other phenomena such as political illiteracy, blurred class identity, low 
expectations and different priorities of voters, all of which will be explored in the 
second part of the chapter. After the findings from Israel are presented in Chapter 7, the 
insights from both countries will be synthesised and discussed in Chapter 8.  
Technically, the findings presented here rely on the empirical analysis of several large-
scale surveys and datasets, recorded engagements with dozens of electors and in-depth 
interviews with ten UK citizens from diverse backgrounds. The fieldwork itself was 
carried out between October 2005 and May 2006. This was a relatively stable period in 
Britain. It saw the election of David Cameron as leader of the Conservative Party in 
December 2005 and the Local Government Elections of May 2006. Former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair had won a third consecutive term of office in May 2005 with a 
significantly reduced majority in Parliament. Whereas the in-depth interviews and the 
exploratory surveys may have been affected by these developments, the secondary 
analysis relied on earlier large-scale studies carried out during 1992, 1997 and 1999. 
These surveys corresponded to the periods before, during and after the defeat of the 
Conservatives by "New Labour".  
A distinction has been made in this thesis between privileged and underprivileged 
voters. These terms have been adopted mainly due to their multi-dimensional nature, 
which better reflects the suboptimal method of categorising subjects. Rather than 
relying on the conventional poverty threshold, I had to rely on several socio-economic 
indicators because of data constraints. Unfortunately, several surveys omitted the 
questions required to calculate household equivalised income. As a consequence, the 
conceptual construction of the groups had to take into account factors such as the source 
of income, occupation and age. Whilst the algorithm could not perfectly match the 
income distribution, it succeeded in isolating most subjects at the bottom of it (61-75 
per cent of the ―underprivileged‖ had a household income of less than £8,000 a year). 
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These subjects were also among the key beneficiaries of a generous welfare state, as the 
algorithm intended to reflect mainly financial poverty. It should be stressed that subjects 
whose status could not be adequately verified were excluded from the analysis to 
guarantee reliability [see the Appendices for a detailed explanation].  
The analytical prism of this thesis is that of rational choice theory. It is consistent with 
the writings of Downs (1956), Arrow (1951/1963), Olson (1965/1971), Key (1942) and 
Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996), who sought formal rather than bounded rationality and 
applied market features to the political arena. According to their precepts, which can of 
course be challenged, physical voting can be measured by turnout; the concept of 
informed voting is determined by the knowledge needed for players to act rationally; 
and the tracking of reasoning engages with questions of consistency and transitivity. 
Some of these indicators were monitored quantitatively in the personal utility survey 
(Section ‎5.4.1, p. 145) and the secondary analysis of large-scale datasets (Section ‎5.4.3, 
p. 152). Others were also tracked qualitatively in the in-depth-interviews (Section ‎5.4.2, 
p. 149).  
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6.1 The Question of Abstention 
Turnout in Britain is often discussed as the key barrier to political inclusion. Survey 
figures suggest that 20-32 per cent of the underprivileged electorate in Britain chose not 
to vote during the nineties, whereas 11-21 per cent voted Tory. Whilst both decisions 
felt short of active support for greater redistribution, abstention was clearly more 
common among the underprivileged. The table below summarises these aggregated 
figures and shows that inter alia a similar proportion of respondents were classified as 
underprivileged (roughly 16-17 per cent), an indication of a well-functioning algorithm. 
The qualitative work in the field showed the depth of political alienation. Unlike the 
Israeli case, where turnout was relatively high, the engagements with British 
disadvantaged citizens found they were consistently insulating and detaching 
themselves from the very idea of politics. After presenting the evidence and its 
shortcomings, several theories and explanations will be explored here.    
BES 1992* BES 1997* BSA 1999* 
 Overall Sample 2,855  2,906  3,143  
 Privileged (%) 1,209 84% 1,233 84% 1,398 83% 
 Underprivileged (%) 223 16% 230 16% 286 17% 
 Unavailable 1,423  1,443  1,459  
     










       
Conservative Voters (%) 554 46% 312 25% 336 24% 
Labour Voters (%) 275 23% 433 35% 552 39% 
Liberal Democrat Voters (%) 211 17% 181 15% 149 11% 
Other / Refused / DK (%) 57 5% 68 6% 82 6% 
Didn't vote (%) 110 9% 240 19% 277 20% 














       
Conservative Voters (%) 47 21% 25 11% 43 15% 
Labour Voters (%) 86 39% 105 45% 128 45% 
Liberal Democrat Voters (%) 32 14% 15 6% 14 5% 
Other / Refused / DK (%) 13 6% 14 6% 14 5% 
Didn't vote (%) 45 20% 73 32% 87 30% 
       
* All datasets are weighted. Consequently, the number of respondents in each category might vary.  
Table ‎6.1.1: Selected statistical figures of the three datasets analysed in Britain  
I should start with a warning. Survey figures tend to underestimate underprivileged 
abstention. Therefore, two methodological constraints with a disproportionate effect on 
the underprivileged should be explicitly acknowledged. One is derived from the 
existence of an "invisible group" in British society and the other from the "over-reported 
voting" phenomenon. Whereas the latter has been studied extensively (see, for instance, 
Clausen 1968, Silver et al 1986 and Bernstein et al 2001), the former has rarely been 
researched.  A partial attempt was made by Swaddle and others 1989, though it did not 
The Poverty of Democracy 165 
 
refer to the socio-economic impact. Clearly, these phenomena have the potential to 
distort studies relying only on surveys.  
Two structural anomalies account for the existence of an "invisible group", whose 
proportion is systematically downgraded in surveys and official turnout figures. First, 
neither the Postcode Address File (PAF) nor the Electoral Register (ER) used in surveys 
represents all eligible voters (registered and unregistered). Second, due to 
multicollinearity, there seems to be an a-priori probability of an underprivileged 
member of society being eligible to vote but unregistered, un-cooperative in surveys and 
abstaining in elections. As both samples are not representative and the probabilities are 
not independent, underprivileged abstention is likely to be underestimated. A detailed 
explanation with a graphical illustration is provided in Appendix ‎11.4.4 (Page 369).  
The "over-reported voting" phenomenon also has an adverse socio-economic impact. 
It was repeatedly shown that voters tend to misreport their physical involvement in 
elections, increasing the risk of biased turnout figures. In the British context, this 
concern was partially addressed by the verification of subjects' answers with the official 
register whenever possible. Consequently, approximately 5 per cent of the total 
verifiable reports were refuted. In the BES of 1992, 4 per cent of the "voters" did not 
vote according to the records, whilst 10 per cent of the "abstainers" appeared to 
participate. Although these figures partially balance each other out, Silver and others 
have shown in the American context that privileged citizens, who are most likely to 
vote, are also more likely to over-report voting (1986). It might be that in Britain this 
phenomenon is also not equally common in all classes. 
Both the "invisible group" and the "over-reported voting" phenomena have increased 
the risk of measurement errors in turnout figures, specifically among the 
underprivileged electorate. By analysing the figures of authentic election results, as 
recorded by the Election Committee, it is possible to arrive at an indicative assessment 
of the level of error, noting that the ER data might be imperfect but it is a tolerable 
baseline. Table ‎6.1.2 shows that the "invisible group" generated greater deviation than 
the "over-reported voting" phenomenon. The consequence might be that significant 
analyses and multi-variables regressions would fail to recognise the variables affecting 
this group, in this study as well as in previous ones. 
If the three columns are compared – original sample turnout, verified sample turnout 
and recorded national turnout – the validation process reduced errors {(3)-(2)}, but it 
was still far from the official figure {(2)-(1)}. Significant gaps remained between 
column 1 (national turnout) and column 2 (the sample verified turnout), making it 
plausible that the "invisible group" was not adequately represented in the total number 
of survey respondents or that other errors had occurred. Evidently, when registered 
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abstainer citizens declined to undertake the questionnaire, they left the BES with a 
biased sample to start with. However, an abstaining voter can still "escape" from the 
Electoral Register by not registering, which is why the ER is also imperfect. Individuals 


















 England 78% 86.1% 88% 
Wales 79.7% 78.5% 82.6% 





 England 71.4% 80.7% 80.7% 
Wales 73.5% 78.4% 79.5% 
Scotland 71.3% 78.8% 83.1% 
  Average Gap 
(2) - (1) 
5.2% 
(3) - (2) 
3.0%  
* In the BES of 1997, turnout according to official records refers to subjects found on the registry and whose turnout was positively verified. The BES 
sample of 1992 was already drawn from the ER (i.e. turnout was already positively verified).  
** In the BES of 1997, turnout according to subjective reports represents subjects who revealed their turnout and stated a name that did appear on the 
ER, making it verifiable. As the BES sample of 1992 was already drawn from the ER, the figure refers solely to subjects who affirmed their 
participation.   
- It should be noted that not all subjects counted here were classified as privileged or underprivileged by the algorithm.  
Table ‎6.1.2: Comparison of official turnout figures (HCL 2001, p. 15), subjective reports of the 
BES' respondents and the official validation figures (BES 1992 & 1997) 
The measurement constraints require empirical evidence beyond what was gathered by 
individual testimonies. Official records of voting patterns at the constituency level are 
indeed missing eligible voters who have not registered, but the potential for error is still 
the lowest possible. Thus, these records were integrated with the census data, enabling 
the assessment of abstention in 2001 elections, as well as the social background and the 
circumstances surrounding it
24
. The new algorithm classified 110 constituencies as 
privileged and 103 as underprivileged, according to their concentration of wealth or 
poverty. Eventually, it was found that electoral participation was 53.8 per cent on 
average in underprivileged localities, compared to 61.6 per cent in privileged ones.  
The statistical correlation was strong and significant, with a Pearson coefficient of 
0.486. However, when the dichotomist classification was replaced with numerical 
representations of the proportion of wealthy and deprived populations, a parabolic 
correlation better described the relationship between class domination and abstention. 
As illustrated in Figure ‎6.1.1, a regression line with a cubic slope best fitted the data, 
accounting for 23-29 per cent of the unexplained variance in turnout.  
                                                 
24
  Technically, the distinction between constituencies rested on the eight-category scale NS-SEC (National Statistics 
Socio-Economic Classification, ONS 2005). Constituencies in which more than 17.8 per cent of the population were 
officially classified in the two lowest classes were defined here as underprivileged, whereas constituencies in which 
more than 33.4 per cent of the population were classified as members of the top two classes were marked here as 
privileged. These thresholds were calculated by adding one standard deviation to the mean score of each unified 
category (π + σ). This was necessary due to the ordinal nature of the NS-SEC.  









Figure ‎6.1.1: Scatter plot and regression line of turnout in the 2001 General Elections by the 
proportion of citizens in the bottom and top socio-economic classifications (HCL 2004 
& EC 2001) 
The right-hand figure, based on the concentration of underprivileged populations, 
contained only a few outliers from extremely poor constituencies. The left figure was 
premised on a more solid foundation. Even though the statistical correlation is relatively 
weak, it suggests there is a critical turning point where the proliferation of wealthy 
individuals did not contribute towards higher turnout and perhaps even reduced it. 
Overall, a statistical prediction would suggest turnout decreases or freezes above this 
threshold, which is roughly a proportion of 26 per cent of the top two classes. Put 
simply, when the concentration of the top two classes in the constituency is above 
average, the social fabric and the local environment are probably incapable of 
improving turnout rates any further. 
Two additional variables also support the existence of such a turning point. Figure ‎6.1.2 
portrays the relationship of turnout figures to educational attainment and long-term 
unemployment. In the context of educational qualifications, turnout has risen as more 
citizens gain high-level degrees, until a point where the more educated the local 
population was, the less likely it was to vote. Turnout decreased when long-term 
unemployment increased, until a certain degree of enduring unemployment was 
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Figure ‎6.1.2: Scatter plot of turnout figures in the 2001 General Elections by the proportion of citizens 
with the highest level of qualifications and the proportion of long-term unemployment of 
total unemployment in the constituency level (HCL 2004 & EC 2001) 
It is plausible, meriting further study, that constituencies at the edge of the socio-
economic distribution react differently from those in the middle of it with regard to 
turnout. This artificial turning point, in which a further rise in the independent indicators 
failed to deliver the expected change in turnout, was found in all the regressions above. 
One explanation might be that saturation breeds complacency among the rich, but 
despondency among the poor. However, the extent and the causes underpinning this 
phenomenon should be further explored.  
So far, I have brought empirical evidence based on large-scale surveys and voting 
records of constituencies. Even though the limited capabilities of face-to-face 
questionnaires to gauge abstention accurately have already been demonstrated, the 
findings indicate sizeable socio-economic disparities, which are probably larger than 
any methodological imprecision. These disparities were also verified in the largest 
series of polls conducted in Britain by MORI (2001). Turnout among the bottom social 
classes (DE) was found to be 53 per cent, compared to 68 per cent among those from 
the top (AB). Using an extraordinary sample of 18,657 individuals, a turnout gap of 10 
to 15 per cent remained stable, similar to that found in the independent secondary 
analysis of the BES and BSA datasets. 
In addition, several socio-economic indicators could be ranked by their level of impact 
on turnout, based on constituencies' voting records. The order copied into Figure ‎6.1.3 
reflects separate analyses for underprivileged, privileged and all constituencies together, 
based on the Beta coefficients. The indicator of population density is significant, and 
might stand for other economic indicators. Whereas the average age of the population 
was found to be insignificant, the proportion of children in each constituency had a 
positive impact. This possibility resonated with one of the interviews carried out with an 
underprivileged voter in Hackney, who justified her participation by mentioning her 
children's future.  
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Beta values: (***) > 0.5 ; (**) > 0.4 , (*) > 0.3 , (^) < 0.2 , (^^) < 0.1 ;  α < 0.05 
Figure ‎6.1.3: Regressions results for all / privileged / underprivileged constituencies by the 
explanatory variables' order of importance (HCL 2004 & EC 2001)  
The correlation of socio-economic deprivation and political abstention is therefore 
salient when examining both constituencies' aggregated records and public opinion 
surveys. This is the same historical correlation first explored in the US by Key 
(1942/1947, p. 594), verified in several other countries by Lijphart (1977) and proved 
persistent also in Britain by Swaddle and Heath (1989, p. 550) and Crewe and Payne 
(1971). The latter analysed the census to show turnout was higher in seats with more 
professional and managerial workers. This consistently unequal distribution of the vote 
distracts democracy from producing an accurate representation of the public's will. 
Having said that, I shall now focus on the different kinds of abstention and its 
underlying causes.  
The literature explored in previous chapters suggests two major lines of theory. One 
follows the economic approach of individual rationality (see Section ‎4.3, p. 100), while 
the other focuses on the sociological background (see Section ‎4.4.1, p. 112). Other 
schools of thought accounting for unequal turnout include theories of political efficacy, 
voter mobilisation, neighbourhood effects and registration requirements (see Denver 
2003, Ch. 2). What emerges in this study‘s fieldwork, and is reinforced by previous 
research, is the decisive role of civic commitment. All things being equal, a sense of 
duty and citizenship is often the difference between voting and abstaining. Before 
looking at my own findings, I shall summarise some of the key studies in this field in 
Britain, to establish a solid conceptual background.  
Two key works, based on the British Election Surveys, deserve elaboration. Pattie and 
Johnston compared several turnout theories by using both opinion surveys and 
aggregated constituency data. They found a weak correlation between turnout and social 
status or constituency marginality, defining the latter as a "fallacy" whose influence had 
constantly decreased since 1959 (1998, p. 277-8). Consequently, they questioned the 
validity of rational choice theories and concluded that "it was those who felt the greatest 
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sense of commitment to the result and to particular parties who were most likely to 
vote" (p. 279). Voting, according to their research, depends on the voters' degree of 
commitment and interest in politics. 
This "commitment factor" was also evident in the study of Clarke and his colleagues. 
The analysis of the 2005 BES brought them to conclude that "similar to 2001, a 
person‘s sense of civic duty was an especially important factor in the skein of forces 
affecting turnout" (2006, p.31). Their estimations showed that this commitment boosted 
the probability of voting by 47 per cent (Table 3). This work is based on Clarke's 2001 
publication, in which six models of turnout were developed and compared (perceived 
equity-fairness, social capital, civic voluntarism, cognitive mobilisation, minimal 
rational choice and general incentives models). He showed that, on aggregate, "turnout 
is basically about incentives and mobilisation" (p. 261), and alerted to the declining 
sense of civic duty among younger people. Remarkably, demographic variables – 
except age – had a very limited influence.  
The correlation of turnout with social background is therefore under dispute. The two 
key studies mentioned above focused mainly on duty and motivation. A third one even 
noted "voters and non-voters share very similar sociological characteristics" (Crewe et 
al, 1977, p. 52). Nevertheless, other British scholars did identify empirically socio-
economic disparities (Brody and Sniderman 1977, Swaddle and Heath 1989). 
Methodologically, my research is unique in basing its conclusions on dozens of non-
mediates engagements and interviews. Its fieldwork could not enrich the aggregated 
figures cited above, but it could clarify the decisive role of commitment in the 
articulation of citizens.  
This approach accommodates Amaratya Sen's critique on individual rationality theory. 
In his famous "rational fools" essay, Sen shows that individuals often do not follow 
egoistic assumptions set by economists, among others because commitment "drives a 
wedge between personal choice and personal welfare" (1977, p. 229). The same 
principle of non-egoistic behaviour was also explored by Titmuss in his investigation of 
the altruism of blood donors (1970/1999), and by Le-Grand who studied its magnitude 
within public services (2003). Assimilating commitment as a utility in the political 
arena, it can structure a bridge to account for voters' rationality and accommodate 
Ledyard's argument, according to which "if everyone is rational… then, presumably, no 
one will vote" (1984, p. 12).  
But where does this commitment come from? One possibility is the political campaigns 
and public atmosphere that might mobilise (or demobilise) the electorate. This was the 
conclusion of Butler & Kavanagh (1997, p. 300) and  Pattie and Johnston (2001a) in 
their analysis of the 1997 General Elections, and was also considered significant in the 
study of Clarke and others (2004). Funding and canvassing are key variables in this 
respect. Another is to look at the voters' themselves and their preliminary degree of 
inclusion. This individual approach requires a synthesis of ideas from the disciplines of 
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social policy and political science, as the question of exclusion is mostly absent from 
the current scholarship of electoral studies.  
The individual-level analysis better portrays the gaps between privileged and 
underprivileged individuals. This difference is meaningful, as most studies refer to 
poverty as a factor in turnout regressions without looking separately at the behavioural 
aspects of different socio-economic backgrounds. This research shows the nature of 
underprivileged abstention to be fundamentally different than that of others. It was 
fuelled by different motivations and could be characterised by different signs. Whereas 
underprivileged abstention was correlated with scepticism and isolation, privileged non-
attendance had more to do with technicalities or dissatisfaction – both being temporary 
triggers rather than permanent causes. The findings indicate that any classification of all 







Figure ‎6.1.4: Interest in the election results by turnout and wealth (BES 1992) 
As noted earlier, the focal principle, around which the figures and the in-depth 
interviews can be constructed, is that of civic commitment. It serves as a powerful 
indicator, capable of wedging two common narratives of abstainers. Whereas 
physically, both ended up outside the electorate, technical and temporary issues 
experienced by the one are fundamentally different from a voluntary segregation and 
lack of commitment experienced by the other. Thus, in 1992, 72 per cent of the 
underprivileged abstainers stated that they "did not care very much" which party won 
the elections. As demonstrated in Figure ‎6.1.4 above, this proportion was a 24 per cent 
lower among privileged abstainers, and 40 per cent lower compared to underprivileged 
voters. In 1997 and 1999, 57-66 per cent of the underprivileged abstainers asserted that 












Did you care a good deal which party won?
Cared a good deal Didn't care much
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The election surveys also show varying degrees of self-esteem, demonstrated in 
statements such as "people like me have no say in what the government does." 
Underprivileged abstainers were more vulnerable to feelings of irrelevancy and 
inadequacy, compared to privileged ones. Curiously, Labour underprivileged voters 
were found to be the most fragile of all. This variation, as mirrored in the three 
statements assembling Figure ‎6.1.5, raised another query: if among the underprivileged, 
the sense of worthlessness was at its peak among Labour voters, what differentiated 
them from the abstainers? Why did Labour voters succeed in channelling their emotions 








Figure ‎6.1.5: Responses to statements regarding political engagement and self esteem by wealth, 
voting and turnout (BES 1992) 
A definitive answer to this difference is still to be found, but clearly a commitment to 
democracy has a role to play. When individuals were asked in the BES of 1997 whether 
it is "everyone's duty to vote" or whether it is an issue only for those who "really care 
who wins", only 50 per cent of all abstainers thought it was a duty, compared to 85 per 
cent of all voters. Among voters, there was almost no distinction between privileged and 
underprivileged voters, implying this civic commitment is in the hearts of affluent and 
unfortunate alike. A dedication to democracy plays a key role in mobilising 
underprivileged voters to the ballot boxes, even when low esteem and low expectations 
prevail.  
The in-depth interviews allowed these trends to be examined independently on the 
ground. They exposed firsts and foremost the extent of perceived worthlessness 
prevailing in underprivileged localities. The negative sentiment of individuals 
channelled itself through many avenues, and often emerged as a firm declaration - "I 
don't vote." This dogmatic statement signalled a deadlock. It contained no time 
framework and no substantive argumentation. It renounced voting almost in principle, 
























Labour Conservatives Abstention Labour Conservatives Abstention
Underprivileged Privileged
Political Influence and Self Esteem
People like me have no say in w hat the government does
Councillors and MPs don't care much w hat people like me think
Politics seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really undertand it
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surveys. Most importantly, the interviews showed abstention had little to do with the 
costs attached to voting. It reflected mainly the lack of foreseeable benefits or sufficient 
trust in the apparatus. 
Prompting those who "don't vote" or "have no time" to elaborate their thoughts, quickly 
revealed a utilitarian calculation ending up with the selfish question "what would I get 
out of it?" This approach was shared mostly by underprivileged who refused to be 
interviewed at all, and perhaps were not part of the large-scale surveys analysed earlier. 
In many aspects, the way they reacted told the story better than their answers.  
In Manchester's Moss Side Job Centre, one unemployed man stated, "I don't vote, I 
don't benefit from that… they are all ***… people are dying because of them" 
(29/9/2005). Another subject who was asked whether his welfare benefits are not a state 
benevolence, answered, "Everyone coming to this country gets benefit; they don't give a 
*** for me;… I am in this job centre for a month and they have no job for me" 
(29/9/2005). In Hendon Job Centre, one subject replied, "I have no time to answer 
surveys as I am searching for a proper job", and immediately after asked, "will you pay 
me for these 5 minutes?" (3/10/2005).  
Similar replies and comparable tones, were found in Hackney Job Centre. One 
unemployed man stated he "does not believe in voting"; another maintained she does 
not vote "as they help the rich… [and] they have nothing to do for people like me" (4-
5/10/2005). When asked whether it had something to do with her abstention, this 
woman replied, "A lot of people do vote; do they get something?" These feelings were 
also supported with empirical evidence. In the BES of 1997, 62 per cent of the 
disadvantaged abstainers agreed that, "it does not really matter which party is in power, 
in the end things go on much the same." Among privileged abstainers and 
underprivileged voters, this statement was less acceptable.  
The fieldwork showed a very weak motivation of underprivileged to participate in the 
collective action of voting. This was theorised by Rosenstone, who maintained an 
individual fighting for her survival is likely to experience "a withdrawal from politics" 
(1982, p. 41). Yet, a different reality was portrayed by the secondary analysis of opinion 
surveys. The comments collected in the fieldwork did not repeat themselves. As 
demonstrated in Figure ‎6.1.6, the two dominant reasons for underprivileged abstention 
in 1997 were "other commitments" or "lack of time" (21 per cent). On the other hand, 
among the privileged, the predominant reason for abstention was "being away on 
Election Day" (29 per cent in 1992; 20 per cent in 1997). The statements "I never vote" 
and "my vote would not have affected who won" were rarely recorded by respondents. 
Only 10-18 per cent said they were not interested in voting.  







Figure ‎6.1.6: Reasons for abstention among privileged and underprivileged voters (BES 1997) 
The fact remains that civic commitment, salient in the fieldwork, was rarely mentioned 
by abstainers in the surveys. This could be explained by the study of Swaddle and Heat, 
according to which voting is "part of acceptable civic behaviour that most people are 
ashamed to admit not having done it without having some good cause" (1989 p. 544). 
Yet, the pretexts given as part of the BES were still different for privileged and 
underprivileged abstainers. The latter were less likely to abstain due to technical reasons 
(being away / work constraints). This brings us back to the question of civic 
commitment, and its correlation with poverty.  
The engagement with two British underprivileged interviewees cited below strengthens 
Rosenstone's theory about this link (1982). The two admitted their troubles were so 
acute that any abstract duty was irrelevant for them. The first was an old woman, who 
voted until several years ago, saying that after her dismissal "domestic things that 
caused a lot of grief", made her "not available to go and vote". The second example was 
given by a European immigrant who had lived in Britain for eight years and had never 
thought about registering to vote. Declaring that if he gets "the legal right to vote, I will 
vote, it is not a problem for me", he did nothing to acquire this right due to his hardship.  
"If anyone manages to find me when they come to my door and like 
me to get registered… If life could be a little easier, I maybe find time 
to concentrate on things like that… [now] I have enough problems to 
throw myself over the border or under a tree, so that takes priority." 
Quotation ‎6.1.1: Interviewee No. 22 (Underprivileged, 11/5/2006) 
"I don't know if I have the right to vote or not… I am not in politics, I 
know nothing about it. [Q] Why actually? [A] Well, you are working 
class, you do your job, and your head is distracted from this and 
from that… you just focus on the work and the job… there is no time 
for politicians or talking about politicians."  
Quotation ‎6.1.2: Interviewee No. 21 (Underprivileged, 11/5/2006) 









Other commitments/no time Technical reasons Couldn't be bothered/not interested
Away on election day Not effective / Never vote Work prevented me
Couldn t decide between parties Deliberately abstained Other reasons
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The Poverty of Democracy 175 
 
Remarkably, the fieldwork also showed that even when disadvantaged individuals 
eventually voted, civic duty was not always one of their motives. One voter said that his 
bank clerk had told him, "if you do not vote (or more likely register to vote – G.A.), you 
have no right to take any mortgage or any loan" (Interviewee No. 20, underprivileged, 
8/10/2005). Another voter, quoted in Quotation ‎6.1.3, initially thought she had to vote 
by law, but her argumentation quickly went on to describe future utilitarian 
expectations, noting on two separate occasions her role as a mother.  
"When I have got children, and they come and say they gonna help, 
and I am a mom, I think I have to go and vote… [Q] What [did voting 
change] for instance? [A] Schools and everything, parks and 
everything… I am a mom with two kids, you know? Maybe if you vote 
something will change, to help to have parks, new schools and 
everything."  
Quotation ‎6.1.3: Interviewee No. 24 (Underprivileged, 9/5/2006) 
The privileged voters, on the other hand, tended to explicitly reiterate their civic 
commitment, even if they held libertarian views. Nevertheless, under the moral auspices 
of collective commitment, there were at least two distinct narratives. The first was 
concerned with social justice whereas the second was largely preoccupied with social 
unrest. Thus, while one kind of articulation had almost ignored personal interests, the 
other did precisely the opposite. Interviewee no. 18, for instance, articulated a strong 
commitment to democracy as, "if you don't vote… you don't deserve to have a 
democracy", though after proclaiming that abstention leads to undesirable "extremism", 
some deeper reasons were revealed:  
"If I want to live well, and I reckon I live very well, I don't want to 
have people on my back attacking me because I am living well and 
they are living in extreme poverty. I would rather have a degree of 
levelling out… I want them to live well, and I want them to let me live 
well. If you have a huge diversity between rich and poor you will at 
some stage have civil disturbances, so to me it is very critical that 
people are happy… At the end of the day, it benefits me." 
Quotation ‎6.1.4: Interviewee No. 18 (Privileged, 9/5/2006)   
In fact, one could argue that what began with "the ability to live in freedom" and the 
duty each citizen had to democracy was soon turned into a utilitarian narrative. On the 
contrary, Interviewee No. 17, a veteran Labour supporter, seemed to be genuinely 
motivated by a pure pursuit of the "public good". Her "civic duty" discourse carried an 
altruistic message, demonstrated in Quotation ‎6.1.5. There might indeed be hidden 
motives, but several replies clarified her view of the importance of citizenship on its 
own merits, rather than from a desire to keep social unrest smouldering.    
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"Voting is like a massive big moving shoal of fish, isn't it? I would 
rather be more with that shoal out of millions than be the fish who is 
hiding or say this isn't happening… we are all stakeholders in this 
system that we have got… [and] I am a happier British person if I 
think the party I voted for is spending tax payers' money as closely 
as possible to what I would like to spend if I was in government." 
Quotation ‎6.1.5: Interviewee No. 17 (Privileged, 6/3/2006) 
The most remarkable reflection of civic commitment was made by a senior financial 
advisor, who "realised I have been insulating myself from government as much as I 
could… since I did not believe it can change something" (Interviewee No. 19, 
privileged, 10/5/2006). Nevertheless, while labelling his readiness to pay taxes as a 
"pact with the devil", he embraced voting as "one of the rules of the game", adding that 
"democracy can only be seen to be working if sufficient number of us actually vote." 
Thus, even though government was perceived as destructive, the advisor put his 
commitment to democracy above any egoistic utilitarian calculation and belief.  
These three examples show different kinds of civic commitment and different positions 
on the continuum between national and personal interests. The gulf between levelling 
out inequalities to prevent "social disturbances" and supporting redistribution to become 
a "happier British person" was evident among privileged voters, just as a strong sense of 
estrangement consistently dominated the underprivileged articulation. Most privileged 
voters referred to their "civic duty", though each had his own view of how best it could 
be delivered. On the other hand, such an approach was missing from almost all 
transcripts of the underprivileged interviewees. Their narrative was typically devoid of 
any reference to citizenship in general and civic commitment in particular.  
I shall return to the difference between the utilitarian and civic-duty discourses later on, 
with the analysis of Israeli interviews. By now, one can recall the theories explored in 
the literature with regard to abstention. What this study can contribute to the existing 
scholarship, is the rigorous linkage between economic deprivation and lack of civic 
commitment. This has apparently made the underprivileged the most utilitarian players 
in the political arena: given that the very satisfaction from performing a civic duty is 
absent in their set of considerations, their utility function fully accounts for and justifies 
their decision to abstain.  
Where should we look for solutions? Obviously, pure economic theory (like the one 
referred to by Ledyard in 1984) would not perceive abstention as abnormal at all – but 
the opposite. Unless one accepts Sen's argument (1977) and refers to commitment as a 
benefit, the anomaly is to be found among those who vote. However, a multi-
disciplinary approach, integrating economic theory, political science and social policy, 
would look for the "benefit" side of the utility equation, even though the causes given 
by the poor in surveys had more to do with the "costs". The pretexts of time and 
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technicalities seem to conceal the basic sentiment that often stands in between 
privileged and underprivileged.  
Several proposals aimed at increasing turnout in elections have been mentioned by 
scholars. Two of the most popular ones are probably postal voting and compulsory 
voting. It should be noted here that both policies affect the "costs" side of the equation, 
either by reducing the cost or by setting a price for abstention. These solutions might 
therefore be effective in changing a utilitarian voter, assuming that the "cost treatment" 
is needed to increase physical attendance. They by no means treat the lack of benefits, 
which can be identified as the key challenge of modern democracies, and ignore the 
spill over of economic disparities to higher levels of political engagement. The ideal 
solution would tackle the problem, not the symptom, by instilling a sense of belonging 
and commitment, which might lead to a cultural change.  
Which party benefits from preserving current reality? Clarke and others maintained 
there was no significant correlation between Labour support and abstention, but 
confirmed that "the most poorly motivated of non-voters are consistently and clearly 
pro-Labour" (1977, pp. 99). Based on the BES data, they also claimed that a more 
energetic Labour campaign might be counterproductive, as its major impact would be 
on "the more strongly motivated non-voters", who are probably Conservatives. Butler 
and Kavanagh, showed the linkage between Labour support and abstention in the 1997 
elections was much more influential. They concluded that "despite the rapid growth of 
Labour Party membership… the party still appears to have a significant problem in 
mobilising some of its traditional support into the polling station" (1997, p. 300). This 
issue was extensively researched, as summarised in Section 4.3 (see also Pacel and 
Radcliff 1995, Shaffer 1982, Fenton 1979 and Lutz 2003).  
The key insights presented in this section generally converge with the existing research 
even though its methodologies were different. Other studies relied heavily on empirical 
analysis to investigate turnout in one country (e.g. Crewe et al 1977, Pattie and Johnston 
1998 and Clarke et al 2004 & 2006) or in several (e.g. Lijphart 1977 and Franklin 
2004). This study benefitted significantly from a series of in-depth interviews and 
individual engagements. They have enabled new light to be shed on the issue of 
physical voting, both in terms of voters' narratives and their unique motivations. 
Eventually, the evidence suggests the phenomenon of abstention is beyond the basic 
question of attendance and has a solid socio-economic bias in favour of the wealthy. 
Underprivileged abstention is fuelled by emotions of worthlessness, detachment and 
even desperation. What differentiated privileged and underprivileged abstainers was 
usually their sense of civic commitment.  
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6.2 Dimensions of Political Engagement 
The analytical shift from turnout to other dimensions of political engagement enables a 
different understanding of voters‘ behaviour. During the research, new trends and 
inclinations were revealed, and the impact of several phenomena was better assessed. 
Their presentation here follows the original hierarchy of the Pyramid of Political 
Engagement, which referred to informed voting as a prerequisite for any rational 
engagement in politics. Hence, the key findings and inferences with regard to political 
illiteracy and identity are to precede the insights on voters‘ reasoning (including 
commitment, tradition, ideology and priorities). It should be noted that the order has 
nothing to do with relative importance: all dimensions explored here were found focal 
during the data-analysis.  
In Sections ‎5.1 and ‎4.3 (Pages 135 and 100), I developed a distinction between three 
dimensions of knowledge needed for a rational vote: past-oriented, which is required to 
assess politicians, parties and incumbent governments based on their previous 
functioning; present-oriented, projecting on the subject's own status in society assuming 
self-awareness is a prerequisite of any evaluation of personal implications of policies; 
and future-oriented, which includes the various platforms and policies advocated by 
each party. Integrating these three dimensions was supposed to construct a solid basis 
for casting a deliberate rational vote, according to rational choice theories.  
During the analysis of the results, this typology was modified to better reflect the key 
facets of voters‘ engagement. The past and future dimensions of political knowledge 
were referred to a single dynamic in the relationship of poor people and democracy, 
namely political illiteracy. It prevented certain voters from assessing their available 
alternatives when casting their votes. The present dimension of knowledge was 
correlated with a different mechanism, which shaped the way voters perceived 
themselves as a group. This question of identity – how people situated themselves as 
political actors – had a fundamentally different impact. Whereas political illiteracy 
could distort the assessment of concrete political alternatives, a blurred identity would 
affect the personal evaluation of each alternative. The latter also had a different impact 
on the underprivileged, as any mistaken assessment of economic interests projected 
directly and uniquely on those who need state assistance the most.  
I shall start with the question of class identity. Its importance derives from the critical 
role self-consciousness plays in enabling voters to assess their political alternatives. A 
contradictory assessment of interest would necessarily lead even the most wise and 
engaged voter to make a wrong choice. This was exemplified in the exploratory survey. 
Noting its limited scope, most British underprivileged voters (69 per cent) thought they 
would benefit from an income-tax reduction, although they paid no taxes at all. 
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Following this logic, they would probably welcome any pledge to cut taxes, even 
though economic rationality would expect them to do the exact opposite.  
The fate of class voting discussed here and in Section ‎4.2 (page 92) is nowadays the 
subject of fierce dispute. Professor Herbert Kitschelt was one of the leading scholars to 
argue that today, "the work and market experiences of blue collar workers and white 
collar workers are often not significantly different" (1994, p. 6). Sarlvik and Crewe, in 
their Decade of Dealignment, also noted the "gradual replacement of manual labour by 
machinery, and of manufacturing industry by the service sector" (1983, p. 88). Even the 
historical statistical dichotomies have evolved through the years, and classes are defined 
and monitored differently today (see, for instance, the NS-SEC in ONS 2005). 
However, the subjective assessment of class and its association with political affiliation 
is not necessarily related to objective definitions. Butler and Stokes' ground-breaking 
work referred to a "normative bond of class and party", absorbed by electors since 
childhood, which resulted in the acceptability of party allegiance as a "natural element" 
of class culture (1969, p. 91). Pulzer's statement, according to which "class is the basis 
of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail" (1967/1978, p. 102) cannot 
be promptly dismissed. However, as long as the correlation between class and economic 
interests remained stable, both on the side of the electorate and that of the major parties, 
these sociological accounts coincided with rational-choice theory
25
.  
Class dealignment reshuffled these old alliances. What was identified by Butler and 
Stokes as the weakening of Labour's identification with distinctly working class goals 
(p. 121-2) ended up in large swings of "manual workers" to the Tories during the 1970s. 
Sarlvik and Crewe found that the class basis of the vote remained, "but clearly it is not 
as important as it once was" (1983, p. 86). Franklin maintained the British electorate is 
now "more open to rational argument" and no longer constrained "by characteristics 
largely established during childhood" (1985, p. 152). Later, in a comparative study, he 
and his colleagues confirmed a global decline of political cleavage voting and a parallel 
rise in issue voting (1992, p. 399). Yet, the debate on whether "social classes are dying" 
had shaken British academia for several years (Clark and Lipset 1991, Clark and others 
1993, Manze, Hout and Brooks 1995, Bartle 1998, Evans 1999, Andersen & Heath 
2002). What is widely agreed is that the ideological notions of left vs. right intersected 
with other dimensions of identity, including attitudes to authority (Inglehart 1977, 
Kitschelt 1994).  
                                                 
25
  Remarkably, even then, Conservatives drew more than half of their total support from the working class (Butler and 
Stokes 1969, p. 105). 
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The relevancy of these debates to this research lies in voters' ability to identify their 
interests in an era of ―issue voting‖. These interests are no longer solely connected to 
occupation, whose meaning was blurred by sociological and demographic processes. 
Consequently, voter's income becomes the key indicator defining today whether a voter 
would benefit or lose from certain welfare policies. As long as the "lower" class 
classification converges with this dichotomy, voting by class or voting by economic 
interests would make no difference. However, if there is a gap between the two, 
economic theory would look for the indicator of income as the sole predictor of 
financial gains and losses from any future policy imposed by government
26
. 
Based on the distinction between privileged and underprivileged voters, a comparison 
could be made between objective financial deprivation, subjective class identity and 
partisanship. It was found, for instance, that Labour voters generally classified 
themselves as "working class" and Tory supporters, even if classified as 
underprivileged, tended to opt for a "middle class" label. A contradictory identity was 
often correlated with a "counter-class" vote. Also in the BES of 1997, 74 per cent of 
Labour underprivileged supporters classified themselves as "working class", compared 
to only 50 per cent among those voting Conservative. Since both groups had a similar 
socio-economic composition, it seems as the subjective definition of class identity 








Figure ‎6.2.1: Class identity of voters by wealth and political affiliation (BES 1997) 
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  This was the key difference between the "underprivileged group" as constructed here by an algorithm (see Appendix 
‎11.4.3, p. 372) and the commonly used "working class" typology based on occupation. As elaborated in the 
appendix, the algorithm, validated in a trial and error process, tended to reflect mainly financial poverty. Household 
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Significant deviations also exist in the particular point at which individual voters locate 
themselves on the social scale. The nine Conservative disadvantaged voters sampled in 
the ISSP of 1999 tended to overestimate their income group, and a majority of them 
located themselves in the top half of the scale. On the contrary, as Figure ‎6.2.2 shows, 
most Labour underprivileged placed themselves in the bottom groups. The Labour 
voters also argued that they earned less than they deserved (58 per cent), whilst 
Conservative underprivileged voters showed less resentment, with only 30 per cent 








Figure ‎6.2.2: Self-rated social group of voters by wealth and political affiliation (BSA 1999) 
These misconceptions were first identified forty years ago. Butler and Stokes have 
shown that lower class voters who conceive of themselves as middle class were far less 
likely to vote Labour (1969, p. 78). Assuming that a "working class" identification is 
synonymous with a lower position in the socio-economic ladder, a significant 
proportion of underprivileged (among them the recipients of benefits) do not perceive 
themselves as such. In light of the mounting evidence for stronger class dealignment, 
the negative impact of blurred identity on the assessment of individual interests is 
significant in itself.  
While the interviews could not project on national trends, they did reflect the different 
capacities needed today in order to make a sound political choice. Quotation ‎6.2.1 
exemplifies the intuitive way choice was made in the past. However, as issue voting 
replaces old class alliances and the parties‘ manifestos are changing, an informed voting 
entails a different kind of effort. The comfortable reliance on class is problematic, and 
issues of social policy, being crucial for those dependent on welfare, have gradually 
become one of many.  
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"I don't really know the ins and outs of what Labour wants to do.… I 
suppose… they are more like the working class government… the 
traders in a way… and a kind of the human government; where I 
suppose the Conservatives are kind of… I don't know if I am right. 
The idea of the Conservatives is more I suppose for middle England 
middle class, British people who are working or can work." 
Quotation ‎6.2.1:  Interviewee No. 25 (Underprivileged, 11/5/2006) 
This apparent trend is further exemplified in Quotation ‎6.2.2 and Quotation ‎6.2.3. Both 
show that class affiliation still matters but that its impact has declined and the 
"automatic reliance" is no longer trivial. Thus, the second quote was made by an 
underprivileged voter who subsequently added she "no longer felt that Labour was for 
low-income people".  
"I don't think that's necessarily a very wrong thing… I think in this 
country we have got such a… Actually we haven't anymore, I was 
going to say in this country we have got such a Labour-Conservative 
thing. Of course we haven't really now, but if you are from a place 
where I am from, which is an industrial place, people gravitate to 
Labour. That's the way it is, and being Northern equates for me with 
being a Labour person." 
Quotation ‎6.2.2: Interviewee No. 17 (Privileged, 6/3/2006) 
"I think I voted Labour, partly because I was very young, very new 
voter, family tradition etc… I was brought up in a northern working-
class background and in a northern working-class background back in 
the seventies and eighties you voted Labour by and large.… My family 
voted Labour. They were the working-class vote."  
Quotation ‎6.2.3: Interviewee No. 23 (Underprivileged, 9/5/2006) 
The loosening of these historical frameworks, as acknowledged by the voters cited 
above, requires the underprivileged electorate to contemplate alternatives. The new 
capacities required for any such process of deliberation, as well as the blurred identity 
of voters discussed earlier, further weaken the stand of left-wing parties seeking to 
attract votes from their natural basis of support. As Downs anticipated (1956), and 
Butler and Stokes (1969) have already argued, the parties themselves were not passive 
in their actions and their manifestos also reflected this new reality. Under these 
circumstances, the question of identity becomes crucial. Any misreading of personal 
economic interests, when choice is required and old alliances are not a "lighthouse" 
anymore, might result in adverse selection. 
After elaborating on the role of voters' identity, it is time to focus on the past and future 
dimensions of political knowledge. Economic theories of decision-making perceive 
political illiteracy, or information a-symmetries, as a cause for non-optimum behaviour 
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of markets. Yet there was a debate, mainly in the US, around two questions - the ability 
of heuristics to help voters to make the "right" choice and the aggregated impact of 
illiteracy on election results. As explored in Section ‎4.3 (p. 100), there is no unanimous 
agreement on the second question (Miller 1986, Wittman 1989, Converse 1990, Bartels 
1996). As for the first question, the debate on the level of knowledge needed for a 
rational vote and the place of heuristics is ongoing (Kramer 1971, McKeley & 
Ordershook 1984 & 1985, Page & Shapiro 1992, Sniderman et al 1992). In the British 
context, Sanders showed that the voters' "general perceptions about unemployment and 
inflation correspond, with a considerable degree of accuracy, to actual variations..." 
(2000, p. 275 & 290). He argued that the "overall sense" of economic improvement or 
decline enabled voters to make well-informed political judgments. Yet, his study used 
only aggregated data and did not analyse deprived electorates separately. 
Attention should be paid to the various methodologies used to monitor knowledge, as 
the literature has mostly ignored the socio-economic dimension. Sanders integrated 
figures of inflation and unemployment with Gallup monthly surveys tracking the 
economy (2000). By comparing the two, he showed that British voters "are remarkably 
astute" in recognising objective economic trends (p. 290). Frazer and Macdonald 
classified knowledgeable voters differently, relying on the "political knowledge 
quizzes" of the BES, which focus mainly on leaders' names and constitutional rules 
(2003). However, they severely criticised the poor level of data available, arguing that 
the BES is restricted in scope and asks "no questions about really important aspects of 
'political knowledge'" (p. 68).  
A third technique to operationalise political knowledge was used by Heath and Tilley to 
examine "how well people can place parties on key policy dimensions" (2003, p. 2). 
Their research also drew on the BES, though it analysed a different section of it. By 
identifying those who correctly noted the difference between the three parties in 
nationalisation/privatisation and taxation/spending dilemmas, they showed how "low-
knowledgeable voters are simply more reluctant to change their vote" (p. 13). This 
method of operationalising knowledge followed the methods of mainstream American 
literature (see Delli Carpini and Keefer 1989). 
A forth method was used by Pattie and Johnston who distinguished between different 
groups of voters, in line with the strategy of this research (2001b). They noted that 
"conventional models of electoral choice more often than not try to account for the 
behaviour of all voters at the same time", arguing that the impact is not homogenous (p. 
374). Later on, they unravelled evidence to show that "abstract ideological thinking was 
more prevalent among the most highly educated" and that "the perceived gaps between 
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the parties were greatest for those with post-school qualifications and smallest for those 
with no qualifications" (p. 378, 384).  
My study examines the political literacy of voters both with regard to their awareness of 
future parties' policies and of government's past performance. It assumes that these two 
types of knowledge, monitored by different sets of questions, equip voters with essential 
information for assessing political alternatives. Two findings were eventually identified: 
the chronic insecurity of underprivileged voters when facing issues of national policies 
and significant information gaps. These gaps were occasionally linked to poor socio-
economic conditions. For instance, 55 per cent of underprivileged Conservatives 
claimed the Tories would redistribute income, double the proportion among their 
privileged fellows. However, most other misunderstandings were better explained with 
partisanship. Not surprisingly, supporters of each party tend to colour government 
performance differently, depending on their political loyalty.  
As for the past performance of the British government, partisanship was the 
predominant variable differentiating between voters' assessments of economic progress. 
This trend was verified in relation to two sets of indicators: quantitative ones like 
inflation, taxation and unemployment and qualitative ones such as satisfaction and 







Figure ‎6.2.3: Subjective assessments of the change in level of prices, taxes and unemployment 
since last election by wealth and political affiliation (BES 1992 & BES 1997)   
With the subjective evaluation of quantitative indicators, it was found that: 
 Underprivileged citizens in general and underprivileged Labour supporters in 
particular, were more likely to emphasise the extent of inflation between 1988 
and 1992. 79-87 per cent of them maintained that prices had increased "a lot", 
compared to 53 per cent of Conservative underprivileged supporters. Prices did 
increase, but different groups perceived differently the severity of this change.  
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 In 1992, when voters were asked about changes in taxation since the last 
General Election, Labour disadvantaged voters were twice as likely (66 per cent) 
to argue that taxes had increased compared to their Conservative counterparts 
(32 per cent). The burden of taxation in Britain as a whole had fallen during this 
period (HCL 2003, pp. 30-31), although the composition of progressive income 
taxes vs. regressive expenditure taxes had changed as well.  
 When asked in 1997 about the change in unemployment, Labour underprivileged 
voters were three times more likely (69 per cent) to claim a rise compared to 
Conservative disadvantaged voters (22 per cent). The reality, however, is in line 
with the Conservative electors. The 1993 recession drove unemployment to a 
peak of more than 12 percent, before it gradually decreased, reaching 8 per cent 
in 1997 (ONS 2006, pp. 30-31).  
Overall, these measurable indicators show partisanship was better correlated with 
voters' perceptions than financial deprivation. The findings were similar when 
qualitative indicators were monitored. When considering satisfaction with the National 
Health Service (NHS), Conservative voters, and in particular the underprivileged 
Conservative supporters, were categorically happier with the progress made. 38-48 per 
cent of them thought NHS standards had improved since 1987, compared to 6-9 per cent 
among Labour supporters. 62 per cent of Labour supporters reported a deterioration in 
their standard of living between 1987 and 1992. Those holding this belief amongst the 
Tory electorate were in a glaring minority of only 35 per cent. In addition, there was a 






Figure ‎6.2.4: Assessments of Conservative and Labour underprivileged voters of the change in 
personal and general standards of living since the last General Election (BES 1992 
& BES 1997) 
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  The right graph referring to the 1997 questionnaire revealed an interesting dissonance. The proportion of Conservative 
underprivileged who praised the British economy was double that of those satisfied with their personal conditions. In the 
eyes of these voters, their personal stalemate (or deterioration) occurred while the State flourished. 
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The future dimension of political knowledge is concerned with the voters' assessment of 
their political alternatives. The questions used to assess knowledge are similar to the 
ones used by Heath and Tilley, who asked "how well people can place parties on key 
policy dimensions" (2003, p. 2). Yet the challenge is to overcome the inherent and 
almost natural interest of political parties to blur their intentions in order to gain 
support. Arguably, parties can hardly hide the solid convictions and ruling ideologies 
underpinning their very existence. Therefore, this section will look at the voters' 










Figure ‎6.2.5: Voters' assessment of the positions held by the major political parties in three 
controversial domains, by political affiliation and wealth of voters (BES 1992) 
The assessment of voters' awareness of the political parties' platforms is based on the 
BES "eleven-point scale". Generally, each end of the scale represented an extreme 
position taken on a controversial topic, and voters were asked to indicate their position 
and that held by the major political parties. Figure ‎6.2.5 shows the average score 
recorded in 1992 regarding taxation, privatisation and redistribution. While Labour's 
positions were found to be generally clear and understandable, discrepancies were 
identified with the Conservative stance on taxation and redistribution.  
Tory underprivileged voters misconstrued their party's position in comparison with their 
underprivileged opponents and even their privileged associates. In 1992, most of them 
(60 per cent) denied that their party was in favour of "cutting taxes and spending less". 
Half (52 per cent) ascribed to the Tories a commitment to guarantee "every person has a 
job and a good standard of living". Third (30 per cent) argued that it was committed to 
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make "greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal". In 1992, not even the neo-
liberal manifesto accommodated all these pledges.  
The domain of redistribution is particularly interesting and deserves elaboration, due to 
its importance for any personal utility calculation. The belief held by most Tory 
underprivileged voters, according to which their party is in favour of income 
redistribution, was found to be consistent and repeated itself in 1997. A majority of 
them (55 per cent) maintained that the Tories would make "greater efforts to make 
people's income more equal", double the proportion among their privileged fellows. 
Figure ‎6.2.6 illuminates another key insight: there were almost no doubts as to Labour's 
intention to redistribute income. Nevertheless, this understanding did not suffice to 








Figure ‎6.2.6: Voters' perception of the conservative and labour manifestos in the domain of 
redistribution and equality of income by wealth and political affiliation (BES 1997)  
My in-depth interviews and variety of interactions during the fieldwork could not 
contribute to the empirical assessment of these trends, but they did reflect several 
behavioural patterns found mostly among underprivileged subjects. First, whereas 
privileged interviewees were far more concerned with macro implications of future 
policies, disadvantaged voters were more often than not focused on micro issues and 
tangible changes in adjacent fields. Starting with the privileged electorate, this was 
blatantly demonstrated in Quotation ‎6.2.4, made by an interviewee who earlier 
described an unpleasant encounter with the police, but quickly pursued a conclusion 
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"There is no point in paying for something simply because the 
country has been paying for it mechanically since 1830… Why spend 
the money? Because it keeps policemen in employment? Well, I 
suppose it stops some of them of becoming crooks… but couldn't we 
call that social security? They are an underprivileged group actually. 
They really are in need of remedial help, and they don't get that.  All 
they get is salaries." 
Quotation ‎6.2.4: Interviewee No. 19 (Privileged, 10/5/2006) 
Privileged voters tended to employ personal stories to support macro assertions. 
Interviewee no. 18 recalled that he established a firm advising on legal tax avoidance 
schemes in the 1970s, before placing this experience into a broader context, arguing that 
lower taxes brought "more taxes" so "entrepreneurs stayed in this country" (privileged, 
9/5/2006). Interviewee no. 17 admitted that she "didn't have a wealthy upbringing", but 
precisely because she had studied at local state schools, she was a staunch supporter of 
macro investment in education, since "to think that children are not being given an 
opportunity is a horrible thought" (privileged, 6/3/2006).  
However, this smooth shift from personal encounters to policy inferences rarely 
repeated itself among the underprivileged electorate. The British have-nots relied 
heavily on their personal experiences, hardly transcending beyond these concrete 
interactions. This can be exemplified in Quotation ‎6.2.5 made by a disadvantaged voter 
who highlighted the changes he observed in his locality as reasons to support the 
incumbent. Quotation ‎6.2.6 was made by a disadvantaged abstainer who backed the 
Tories because of their pledge to fight smoking in the street. This interviewee, who had 
just lost his job, admitted he was unaware of the Conservatives' economic policies, but 
vowed to support David Cameron as he "tries to promote the future of this country".  
"I think personally for me, like a person, I like Tony Blair more: 
intelligent man, gentleman, and what he says – he is doing. He said 
about the police in the street, and there is more police in the street. 
He said about the NHS hospitals, and it is cleaner now. I mean, it 
changes from last year to this year; there is so much changing." 
Quotation ‎6.2.5: Interviewee No. 20 (Underprivileged, 6/10/2005) 
"I would like to vote for Cameron, for the Conservatives… [A] I think 
he looks good personally… He tries to improve the environment so 
people won’t smoke in the streets. If you smoke, you should put your 
cigarette on the bin. [Q] What about welfare? [A] Well the welfare 
and the benefits are not… I have not heard him saying anything 
about it."  
Quotation ‎6.2.6: Interviewee No. 21 (Underprivileged, 11/5/2006).  
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Analysing these citations, it seems as in every case when underprivileged interviewees 
were invited to step into the arena of national policy, elements of chronic insecurity 
were revealed in their behaviour. Their dependence on feelings, accidental interactions 
or intermediate agents was clearly higher than others. Unlike privileged voters, who 
integrated these insights into a broader argument, the underprivileged seemed to walk 
blind in the darkness when facing questions of welfare policy. This disability might be 
linked to their a-priori lower level of education or to the impact of the media, which can 
also account for the political illiteracy of voters. 
I shall discuss the role of the media in the relationship between the poor, democracy and 
the welfare state in Chapter 8. In the context of this chapter, the seminal work of 
Lazarsfeld et al (1948) might explain the difficulties underprivileged voters encounter 
when they venture into the macro arena. The study found the media first affects 
―opinion leaders‖, who then filter the knowledge to the less active sections of the 
population. Without coming to any firm conclusions, the fieldwork has found very few 
―opinion leaders‖ among the underprivileged electorate. This has emphasised the role of 
canvassing in persuading underprivileged voters, which was found to be highly 
influential in one of the interviews (Interviewee No. 24, 9/5/2006).  
The fieldwork has also shown that voters of all socio-economic backgrounds 
automatically rejected official information published by rival parties. Thus, an 
underprivileged voter referring to one manifesto said, "I haven't read anything about it, 
so I am not saying this is what they say; I am just presuming" (Interviewee No. 25, 
11/5/2006). Another voter, from an affluent background, admitted selective 
consumption and noted, "if there was a newspaper article saying this is what the 
Conservatives want, I probably would not read it, and if Conservatives are on TV… I 
assume that whatever they want is not going to be what I want" (Interviewee No. 17, 
6/3/2006). 
Overall, the focus on voters’ knowledge identified two key barriers hindering a rational 
vote, namely blurred identity and political illiteracy. Both inhibit voters from properly 
assessing their future utilities, either due to deficiencies in evaluating alternatives or 
because of misjudgements in predicting their effects. Both seem to be overrepresented 
among underprivileged Tories. Pattie and Johnston's study, linking educational 
qualification to voters‘ capacity for ideological thinking, might explain these findings 
with existing socio-economic deprivations (2001b). The fact remains that voters, often 
Tory underprivileged, cast their ballots when they were not fully informed about the 
available policy alternatives and the potential impact on their individual future utility.  
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If all votes knowledgably, democracy more accurately represents the people's will. 
Nevertheless, it is argued here that in order for the ―right‖ individual choice to be made, 
it is not enough to vote and to be informed. As these two prerequisites have been 
explored earlier, I shall now leave them aside and focus on the question of reasoning. 
Having reviewed (in Section 4.3) theories of rationality, my focus will be on the 
different patterns of logic and the distinct types of influences affecting privileged and 
underprivileged electors. In this context, the concepts of consistency and transitivity are 
the only ones that can allow judgments to be made. Thus, if an underprivileged elector 
acts rationally and deliberately supports the "pro-welfare" party as defined in Chapter 5, 
at least three preconditions should be fulfilled:  
{A}  S/he should acknowledge that the welfare state guarantees future returns, which 
will benefit his/her own future utility.   
{B}  S/he should associate the "pro-welfare" party as the one that will pursue the 
welfare state model s/he desires in {A}.  
{C}  S/he should prioritise the question of welfare above other policy domains, to the 
extent needed to offset all competing utilities.  
The evidence of voters' political illiteracy explored earlier showed precondition {B} 
was only partially fulfilled. However, both the {A} and {C} assumptions are fragile as 
well, especially among the Tory underprivileged electorate. Those at the bottom of the 
income distribution might be heavily dependent on the welfare state, but some of them 
do not prioritise it in their set of considerations. Their commitment to welfare policy is 
tremendously weak and ethics of self-reliance have permeated their political perception. 
In Feldman's words, "instead of asking why personal economic grievances appear to 
have no political consequences, the question now is why so few people hold the 
government responsible for their economic well-being (1982, p. 455). In addition, 
underprivileged voters were found to be more vulnerable to traditions and emotions, and 
their agenda reflects other priorities. The cumulative picture provides a rigorous and 
consistent explanation of support for neo-liberal parties.  
I will start with the evidence collected with regard to precondition {A}, which required 
voters to expect at least some future gains from government through the welfare state. 
The findings of this research suggest not only that underprivileged voters are often 
devoid of such expectations, but also that their personal commitment to the welfare 
state, to the virtues of equality and to the mechanism of redistribution is glaringly weak. 
This might stem from two correlated causes. The interviews found underprivileged 
voters have almost no expectations that government will deliver for them. The 
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secondary analysis showed the Tory underprivileged often hold ideological positions 
opposed to the very idea of progressive redistribution. 
As for their perceptions of government, the underprivileged interviewees expressed no 
faith in the ability of government social policies to change things and affect their lives. 
One underprivileged abstainer declared "I just don't believe anyone can change" 
(9/10/2005) and another said, "what I know about politics is that they promise things but 
nothing happens" (8/3/2006). Interviewee no. 21 in Quotation ‎6.2.7 showed how deep 
(and often unjustified) this disconnect between government and welfare can become.  
"[Q] Have you ever seen any link between politics and your personal 
welfare? [A] … Well I don't know. This is nothing to do with the 
government really. This is something to do with the job centres, not 
with the politicians or the government. This is the people working 
there (at the Job Centre – G.A.) and they have to decide." 
Quotation ‎6.2.7: Interviewee No. 21 (Underprivileged, 11/5/2006) 
The interviews were insightful not only because of what the voters said, but also 
because of what they did not say. Apart from one underprivileged interviewee, none 
used welfare terminology or advocated greater redistribution. The answers were 
extremely self-centred and the outlook was mostly limited to the interviewees' own day-
to-day concerns. Thus, interviewee no. 21 was asked about macro policies and 
channelled his anger towards people smoking in the streets (11/5/2006). Interviewee no. 
25 urged government to provide "what people really need", without elaborating further 
(11/5/2006). In fact, in almost all interactions with underprivileged voters, the word 
"inequality" was not mentioned. Even though ―welfare‖ ideals could have been be 
communicated in diverse ways (Dean 1999), they were noticeably absent from the 
underprivileged articulation. There is a vast difference between the extent to which 
these issues are taught and debated and the void found among those who should be the 
most interested in promoting them.  
The empirical analysis of voters' expectations from government revealed the gulf 
between Labour and Conservative voters. In the BES of 1992, a majority of Labour 
underprivileged voters (81 per cent) maintained that "it is the government's 
responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants it." Approval rates among 
Conservative equivalents were almost half (45 per cent). When voters were asked to 
indicate who was responsible for the change in their household income over the last 10 
years, 77 per cent of Labour underprivileged voters stated the government, compared to 
only 30 per cent of Tories experiencing similar hardship. In 1997, too, a majority of 
Labour underprivileged voters held the government responsible for the change in their 
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living standards since the previous elections (62 per cent), unlike Tory voters who 
projected it on others (33 per cent).  
Figure ‎6.2.7 and Figure ‎6.2.8 integrate data on government performance in various 
domains and the professed degree of government responsibility in each. Tory 
underprivileged voters virtually absolved government of responsibility for what they 
defined as the most acute problems, i.e. rising crime rates and escalating prices. Even 
though most voters did expect the state to act on health, Labour underprivileged voters 
tended to have constantly greater expectations. On average, 68 per cent of them 
attributed performance in all fields to government action, compared to 60 per cent of 
their Tory equivalents. One of the salient differences was the assessment of government 
responsibility for one‘s own standard of living (―yours‖). Labour voters were twice as 









Figure ‎6.2.7:  Proportion of Conservative underprivileged voters holding government policies 






Figure ‎6.2.8:  Proportion of Labour underprivileged voters holding government policies 
responsible for changes vs. proportion of voters claiming deterioration (BES 1997) 
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What do these findings tell us about the voters? Generally, that some of them disengage 
from government. The work of Feldman, who investigated the relationship between 
self-interest and political behaviour, can offer some insight here. Like this analysis, he 
presumed that "in order for personal economic welfare to affect political behaviour, 
people must perceive that political events and decisions have some impact on their 
financial well being" (1982, p. 448). Subsequently, Feldman argues that the rise of 
economic individualism and ethics of self-reliance, especially in the American context, 
might have reversed this connection. He therefore identified the core barrier for 
economic voting not as behavioural, but as the disinclination of citizens to hold their 
government accountable. In a later publication, he looked for the environmental 
conditions that allowed such a process to happen (1984).  
In the context of this study, the lower the expectations Conservatives have of 
government the lower their expectation that a particular vote would be personally 
beneficial for them. Intuitively, when such expectations exist, they fuel voters' 
commitment: if an underprivileged voter does not expect the welfare state (or the 
government) to deliver for him, why should he commit himself to it politically? Having 
said that, privileged voters were also sceptical of government's ability to deliver, but 
still endeavoured to pursue their agenda through it despite these constraints.  
Privileged voters were still willing to give government a chance (and were utterly 
against giving it up). Thus, for instance, Interviewee no. 19 was enormously upset about 
the "incompetent" government, which he admitted he had tried all his life to "insulate" 
himself against (privileged, 10/5/2006). Nonetheless he perceived voting and politics as 
a "necessary evil" and felt committed to participate. Another Tory voter sought to bring 
about a healthier society that would enable him "to live in freedom" and not suffer 
"significant restrictions in civil liberties" (Interviewee no. 18, 9/5/2006). The 
interviewees reflected scepticism, but also a strong sense of commitment – to the state 
or to certain virtues and ideals.  
Voters' commitment to the welfare state cannot be separated from the ideological 
question of what governments should or should not do. Putterman developed three 
potential explanations for why the electorate should "forget radical distribution of 
property": the opposition of the majority on grounds of self-interest, an ideology that 
justifies inequality and the disproportionate political influence of the wealthier (1997, p. 
359). Neo-liberal ideas automatically lower expectations from the welfare state and 
justify less dependence on its assistance. This might cause voters to perceive any 
enlargement of social budgets as damaging, thus rationally opposing any "pro-welfare" 
party. In that case, broken relationship will emerge between the welfare state and those 
who are assumed to benefit the most from it, despite their economic grievances. 
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Figure ‎6.2.9 demonstrates how different voters perceive government intervention. Only 
half of Tory underprivileged supporters thought in 1997 that "government should 
definitely spend more to eradicate poverty", whereas Labour voters, regardless of their 
economic background, were strongly in favour. In the 1992 BES, nine out of ten Labour 
underprivileged voters thought "there should be far greater equality" in Britain, 
compared to six out of ten of their Conservative counterparts. The likelihood of Labour 
underprivileged voters urging government to "make much greater efforts to make 







Figure ‎6.2.9: Voters' perceptions as to the need of government action in various fields by wealth 
and political affiliation (BES 1997)  
These perceptions explain the support for particular policy tools. Tory disadvantaged 
voters, who played down the problem of poverty, were correspondingly less keen on 
solutions. In the 1999 BSA study, 63 per cent of them maintained that "the welfare state 
makes people nowadays less willing to look after themselves", in comparison to 27 per 
cent of Labour underprivileged voters. The probability of the latter supporting higher 
taxes and greater spending on health and social services was more than double (83 per 
cent compared to 35 per cent). Only 48 per cent of Tory underprivileged voters were in 
favour of establishing a National Minimum Wage in 1997 (compared to 71 per cent 
among Labour supporters). The 39 per cent who opposed it argued that "a minimum 
wage set by law would cost too many low paid workers their jobs."  
These figures, found also by Heath and others (1985, p. 17), show underprivileged 
Conservatives to be consistent and ideologically convinced. Roemer mentioned in his 
Why the poor do not expropriate the rich that taxes would hurt the children of the poor, 
worsen the economy and that they are unethical (1998). Putternman also sought 
justification for this unexpected approach and emphasised the challenge of enforcing 
redistribution and its impact on savings (1997). Even though none of these were 
mentioned by the underprivileged in my own study, it is clear that if equality and 
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poverty are not perceived as immediate challenges, any opposition by underprivileged 
voters to a generous welfare state can be justified and rationalised.  
Remarkably, the affluent Conservatives were disturbed by social concerns more than the 
underprivileged interviewees. Yet, their articulation reflected varying motives, from a 
personal need for social order to a belief in social justice. Interviewee no. 18, for 
instance, referred directly to his fear of "civil disturbances" and noted that "it can 
happen… they might attack me". His grasp of equality posited on achieving social order 
and was essentially utilitarian. In contrast, interviewee no. 17 communicated completely 
different motives, conveying her willingness to "pay for facilities I want for everybody". 
Her rhetoric was altruistic, deriving from a desire to foster equality and promote the 
greater good of social justice.   
Up to now, I have shown that underprivileged voters rarely consider or commit 
themselves to issues of welfare and equality, and many Tory voters are ideologically 
opposed to policies of redistribution. The third precondition for the underprivileged to 
support pro-welfare parties has to do with priorities. An underprivileged voter should 
prioritise the question of welfare above other policy domains, to the extent needed to 
offset all competing utilities. This was clearly not the case with the Conservative 
underprivileged voters. At the top of their agenda in 1992, with 79 per cent defining it 
as significant for their voting, was unity with the European Community (EC). In 
contrast, 89 per cent of the Labour underprivileged electorate prioritised government 
efforts to equalise income. This figure can be linked to the Tories' lack of welfare 
expectations, or alternatively, to the growing number of issues affecting voters 
nowadays.  
This, however, is evidence of consistency and transitivity in Tory voters‘ behaviour. To 
verify their existence, a clear and structured utility function is required. The attempt to 
construct one, and impose these elements on political behaviour, is not trivial. However, 
if one is seeking to draw equivalents, two questions need to be answered: the weight of 
the dominant fields in the decision process of voters and the utilities derived from each 
of the available alternatives. Whereas the integration of both elements will be effected 
at a later stage, the identity and subjective importance of the various fields are presented 
below. They are based on the BES of 1992, which asked subjects to rank several policy 
dilemmas by their impact on their own voting. 
As illustrated in the figure below, income equality was the least influential policy field 
among Tory underprivileged voters. In 1992, barely 30 per cent of underprivileged 
Tories said government efforts to equalise income were a serious consideration for 
them. A solid majority said income redistribution was "not very important" (50 per cent) 
or "not at all important" (20 per cent). On the other hand, 79 per cent of them defined 
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unity with the European Community (EC) as significant in their deliberative process. 
Notably, the importance underprivileged Tories attached to national sovereignty within 
Europe was greater even than that of their privileged comrades. Paradoxically, the rich 















Figure ‎6.2.10: Level of importance given to various policy dilemmas in a voting decision by 
Labour and Conservative underprivileged voters (BES 1992) 
In this context, the impact of new issues dominating the political debate on certain 
dimensions of political engagement should be stressed. The shift from class voting to 
issue voting, as observed by Sarlvik and Crewe (1983), modified the way choice is 
made, and required new capacities from the electorate. The diversity of issues at stake 
muted the historically almost-single question of class and redistribution. Inglehart's 
forecast in the seventies that "class politics may decline in favour of status or cultural or 
'ideal' politics" (1977, p. 12-13) was complemented by Kitschelt's observations in the 
nineties of a new libertarianism-authoritarianism axis of identity (1994, p. 30-31). 
Roemer gave examples of how these new dimensions of concern can change politics 
and divert parties' agendas (1998, p. 417). This discussion is very much linked to the 
question of identity addressed earlier, as each new domain of concern requires voters to 
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But who are the voters who vote for issues? Apparently, not all of them perceive 
elections as a competition between ideologies, and not all of them vote for the best 
party. Tradition has a role to play here, especially among the Labour electorate 
(privileged and underprivileged). Tories, on the other hand, were statistically less likely 
to rely on tradition. As Figure ‎6.2.11 demonstrates, more Tory underprivileged voters 
said in 1992 that their party should adhere to its principles even if votes are lost, while 
Labour disadvantaged voters were most likely to state they "always vote that way" (42 
per cent compared to 25 per cent among Conservative underprivileged electors). 
Judging by these figures, Conservatives communicated greater faith, ideological 






Figure ‎6.2.11: Voters' perception as to the appropriate aim of their party and their major reason 
for supporting it by wealth and political affiliation (BES 1992) 
Taking paternal voting as an indicator, the proportion of Labour underprivileged voters 
who replicated their fathers' voting was the highest. In 1997, this figure was 82 percent, 
having peaked at 93 per cent in 1992. In fact, the percentage of Labour underprivileged 
voters whose parents voted Tory was no greater than ten. Conversely, half of all the 
Conservative voters swapped sides. Such a decision can derive from either conviction or 
confusion. However, the consistent support for neo-liberal beliefs by underprivileged 
Tories, as noted earlier, strongly suggests the former. 
My own in-depth interviews with Labour traditional voters opened a window on their 
perceptions of affiliation. One poor respondent stated, "I voted Labour because 
everyone voted Labour. I do not think my vote is going to count if I vote against the 
flow" (9/5/2006). Another, quoted in Quotation ‎6.2.8 linked the phenomenon of 
traditional voting with that of class voting. The accuracy of these past paradigms hardly 
matters to this analysis, but the voters' conscious decision to give tradition precedence at 
the expense of utilitarian assessments of gains and losses certainly does.  
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"I was brought up in a northern working-class background, and in a 
northern working-class background back in the 1970s/1980s, you 
voted Labour by and large… My family voted Labour. They were the 
working-class vote, and I was working-class and that is what I was 
identified with. It is quite a simplistic sort of way."  
Quotation ‎6.2.8: Interviewee No. 23 (Underprivileged, 9/5/2006) 
The association of Labour with traditional voting in Britain provides additional 
evidence of the motivations characterising underprivileged Tories. Even though the 
premises on which their decision is based might be mistaken, one can hardly argue that 
these voters act out of impulse or tradition or that they show signs of irrationality. Their 
critique against the foundations of the welfare state, their conscious decision to 
prioritise future relationships with the EC and their solid ideological statements – all 
identified in opinion surveys – construct a set of utilitarian considerations.  
Like tradition, emotions also distract voters from economic rationality and might divert 
their focus from substantive issues. Their impact was clearly identified during the 
fieldwork, mostly with regard to political leaders. Thus, Interviewee no 19 noted, 
"Gordon Brown is a danger… I believe Brown actually has an agenda which goes 
beyond helping people. It is actually a punishment agenda." The specific role of 
emotions has been extensively researched (see, for instance, Stewart & Clarke 1992). 
Yet the interviews exemplified how such non-utilitarian factors determined the fate of 
the utilitarian ones. While the cumulative effect of emotions and traditions was not 
modelled in this study, their existence is undeniable.  
It is now time to examine the potential cumulative impact of the various topics explored 
here, by comparing voters' actual behaviour with their self-defined utilities. In order to 
construct this formula, data on the professed importance of various policy fields had to 
be integrated with the gains or losses expected from each political alternative. This was 
done in the BES of 1992, which asked voters first to prioritise several policy 
controversies (as explored earlier, in relation to voters' priorities), and then presented 
them with a series of questions based on the "eleven point scale". The respondents' task 
was to locate themselves and position the major parties on a continuum of well-defined 
debates. Voters' expectations from each party in relation to their own personal 
preferences were calculated by the distance between their own position on the scale and 
the place they located each party.  
For instance, if a voter indicated that he was strongly against taxation by putting himself 
on point "K" (11) and assumed the Labour party took the opposite view by placing it on 
point "A" (1), the distance was the broadest possible (10). For convenience, this scale 
was inverted so that the expected utility from the Labour party in the above example 
was zero (0). These expectations were then integrated with each field's level of 
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importance as determined by the voters, yielding mathematical expressions of the 
expected political utility from each party. The BES referred to five policy fields, with 
each one having two competing policy propositions
28
: inflation/employment, 
taxes/spending, nationalisation/privatisation, income equalisation and EC unity.  
Voters' priorities (see Figure ‎6.2.10) were integrated here in one formula with their 
mean answers as to their own ideological stances and the major parties positions, as 
demonstrated in the figure below. The results show that Tory underprivileged voters are 
more right wing in their economic thinking than their Labour counterparts, but slightly 
more left wing when compared with their privileged comrades. They believed that their 
party held more moderate positions than their privileged counterparts did. The latter 
ascribed to their party a greater determination to get people back to work, to prevent 
government from tackling inequality and to cut off public spending. In general, 
Conservatives were more likely to adopt "halfway" positions in the debate on taxation 
versus spending. It should also be noted that Labour voters ascribed far more radical 











Figure ‎6.2.12:  Assessed positions of the major parties and respondents themselves in socio-
economic policy controversies, by wealth and political affiliation (BES 1992)  
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  In retrospect, it would have been preferable to examine a greater number of policy areas, probably using a more 
comprehensive methodology. Nonetheless, it is beyond doubt that the most acute controversies of that time were 
included in the 1992 questionnaire. While every methodology has its shortcomings, it seemed in this case that the 
gains in basing the British analysis on this large-scale professional dataset would be greater. 
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Whereas the above referred solely to socio-economic controversies, one set of questions 
directly tackled the dispute about the European Commission. As demonstrated in Figure 
‎6.2.13, the wedge was no longer linked to political affiliation but rather to socio-
economic classification. Underprivileged from all parties were strongly opposed to 
unity, whereas the privileged electorate (especially Labour voters) was relatively 
supportive of it. Remarkably, although the underprivileged thought the Conservative 
party was more hostile to European unity than Labour, both parties were signalled as 
relatively  moderate in relation to the voters' own militant positions. In terms of 
expected utility, neither party offered significant returns, although the Tories were better 








Figure ‎6.2.13: Assessed positions of the major parties and respondents themselves in socio-
economic policy controversies, by wealth and political affiliation (BES 1992)  
Even though previous findings reflected a conviction of the underprivileged Tories in 
their choice, a closer look at the aggregate figures suggests a profound crisis of 
confidence. Thus, the expectations of Labour underprivileged voters of their party, 
measured with the "eleven point scale", were greater at 87 per cent compared to their 
expectations of the Conservative party. However, among Conservative disadvantaged 
voters the difference, measured by the same weighted scale points, was only 26 per 
cent. Apparently, the key inducement to vote Tory did not always stem from the socio-
economic domain where support was relatively fragile and the impact on voting was 
generally low. The mobilising force might lie in a different sphere: it could be unity 
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Figure ‎6.2.14 summarises this entire examination by shifting from an aggregate 
analysis of groups to an individual assessment of voters. It gauges the utility from each 
party, clarifies the "utilitarian choice" each voter ought to make and verifies it with the 
"actual choice" made in the ballot box. The numbers of "dissidents" in each group, 
whose utilitarian preference was different from their actual vote, can now be accurately 
assessed and scrutinised.  
The results show that not one single Labour underprivileged voter ranked the Tories 
above his own party. In contrast, a quarter of Tory underprivileged voters thought the 
rival faction offered them better policies. Among the privileged Conservative electorate, 
the proportion of "non-utilitarian" voting was relatively low, but it was still greater than 
Labour. These numbers strengthened the view that there are other motivations driving 







Figure ‎6.2.14: Voters' actual vote compared to voters' utilitarian preference by wealth and 
political affiliation (BES 1992) 
This method can be quickly converted into an efficient tool of prediction, in line with 
the work of Heath & Tilley (2003). Thus, logistic regressions were calculated in order 
to predict the actual decisions of voters based on their 1992 utilitarian preferences. 
These regressions took prediction rates up from 66 per cent to 85 per cent among 
privileged voters, and from 68 to 89 per cent among underprivileged ones (Nagelkerke 
R Square of 0.586 and 0.676 respectively). Such figures show statistical rigour but also 
focus attention on the unexplained variance that is probably related to non-utilitarian 
factors. The utilitarian methodology, as with any academic theory, was unable to 
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6.3 Summary and Conclusion 
Factually, 40-45 per cent of the British underprivileged electorate did not actively 
support the pro-welfare party in two election campaigns. Ignoring the measurement 
deviations, a significant portion of this electorate either abstained or voted Tory. While 
investigating the three layers of voting ("The Pyramid of Political Engagement"), this 
chapter has in fact illuminated new facets of the relationships between the poor, 
democracy and the welfare state ("The Triangle for Redistribution"). Through this 
prism, the crisis  of commitment is revealed: by abstaining, voters seemed to reflect 
their lack of commitment to democracy; by voting Tory, they seemed to reflect their 
lack of commitment towards the welfare state.  
The general lack of expectations from government was found to pose a tremendous 
challenge. It triggered the disengagement of one point of the Triangle (the poor) from 
the other two (democracy and the welfare state). Consequently, the poor inhibited 
themselves from using their political power to achieve greater redistribution. These 
impediments were often countered by the electoral power of the better-off. However, 
the fieldwork showed that whereas privileged electors were willing to support a 
generous welfare state, they had conflicting opinions on what social policy is supposed 
to achieve (social order vs. social justice).   
As for those underprivileged who actually voted, their identity as a group was fragile. 
Even though similar economic and class interests bind this group together, 
underprivileged Conservatives consistently upgraded their status and affiliated 
themselves with the middle class (46 per cent compared to 22 per cent among their 
Labour equivalents). New axes of identity blurred the old dichotomy of classes, leaving 
some of the poor ill-prepared to assess the impact of various policies on their own 
future. Misconceptions of the kind that brought 69 per cent of deprived underprivileged 
to praise tax cuts, increase the likelihood of suboptimal individual choice and flawed 
reflections of interests in democratic elections. 
Poor people in general did not feel sufficiently secure to enter discussions on national 
policy. They were more influenced by self-experienced interactions and faced 
difficulties in transcending these experiences. The problem of political illiteracy was 
found to be related more to politics than want. The figures suggest partisanship (and not 
needs) defined how voters would calculate or miscalculate their government's 
performance. Labour disadvantaged voters, for instance, were twice as likely as their 
Tory fellows to argue that taxes has increased under Thatcher (66 per cent vs. 32 per 
cent). Having said that, underprivileged Tories tended to soften their party‘s neo-liberal 
positions. The discussion therefore shifts to the relationship between modern democracy 
and the welfare state, where knowledge is manipulated to serve political ends.  
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The analysis of underprivileged voters' reasoning concluded with some convincing 
justifications for voting Tory. This can be linked to the weakening commitment of poor 
voters to the welfare state and the emergence of new issues driving the welfare state to 
the margins of the public agenda, as reflected in the interviews. The findings, supported 
by preceding research, suggest that fewer voters today hold government accountable for 
their personal well being. Not only do they expect less from government, some of them 
– mainly Conservatives – are ideologically convinced less should be given.  These Tory 
voters are more likely to prioritise other issues, such as the relationship with the 
European Commission. Under these circumstances, no particular benefits are expected 
from a larger welfare state, which in turn rationalises the decision of some 
underprivileged to cast a Tory vote.  
Having said that, two points deserve particular attention. First, there seem to be 
powerful underlying forces that marginalise the question of equality among 
Conservative underprivileged voters. 70 per cent of them said equivalising incomes is 
"not very important" or "not at all important". This figure is striking, especially since it 
derives from those dependent on welfare assistance. It should raise tough questions 
among those who provide this assistance as to the acknowledgment of their 
contribution. A second point has to do with their aggregated utility. Remarkably, even 
after calculating the significant impact Europe had on the considerations of Tory 
underprivileged voters, one quarter of them still expected greater utilities from the 
Labour party.  
This chapter has shown how in Britain, almost half of the underprivileged electorate 
systematically abstain or lack the necessary setting required for supporting the welfare 
state. Whilst abstention was mostly attributed to the absence of civic commitment, a 
mixture of factors created a distinctive pattern of political engagement among certain 
voters. The cumulative impact of blurred identity, political illiteracy, absent welfare 
commitment and new issues dominating the agenda eventually led to a vote against 
"formal rationality". However, we are still left with 25 per cent of underprivileged 
Tories, who realised their vote conflicts with their financial interests. Their behavior 
needs to be further explored.  
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7. Israel 
Israel was chosen to be the second case study to which to apply the operational 
framework. The figures suggest that in Israel, too, 36-42 per cent of the underprivileged 
electorate did not support the social-democrat party. However, unlike in Britain where 
abstention rates were high, the Israeli underprivileged did vote and consistently opted 
for the Likud. A fundamental question dividing the electorate had to do with prioritising 
security and welfare. Underprivileged right wing voters were not only dubious as to the 
welfare state‘s ability to assist them, but were also greatly influenced by the ongoing 
security threats. The question of priorities in voters‘ reasoning is to be addressed here 
first, before undertaking a review of other dimensions of political engagement.  
The fieldwork in Israel, begun in August 2005, unexpectedly coincided with a general 
election campaign marked by a series of dramatic events. By Election Day, 27 March 
2006, when the fieldwork was almost completed, the domestic political arena had been 
radically transformed: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was comatose in hospital; the 
Labour party‘s acclaimed chairman had been overthrown; the ruling Likud party lost 
two thirds of its seats; and the newly established "Kadima" movement ("Forward" in 












Figure ‎6.3.1: Sequence of events in Israel between August 2005 and March 2006  
August September November December January February March 
Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip 
and parts of the West Bank 
(10/11) Upheaval in the Labour Party; 
Amir Peretz beats Shimon Peres 
(18/12) PM Sharon is hospitalised after 
suffering a mild stroke 
(4/1) Prime Minister Sharon is 
incapacitated after a severe stroke 
(28/3) "Kadima" wins a majority of 
votes in the Israeli Elections 
(21/11) PM Sharon founds "Kadima" 
and quits Likud 
(30/11) Shimon Peres, the defeated 
Labour leader, joins "Kadima" 
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The unexpected sequence of events summarised in Figure ‎6.3.1 began in November 
2005 with a surprising coup in the Labour party. Against all odds and polls, Amir 
Peretz, an immigrant from Morocco who had been Chairman of the ―Histadrut‖, became 
the first Sephardic Jew to lead the party. On the opposing side, Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon faced growing rebellion in his Likud party following the implementation of the 
Gaza Disengagement Plan.  
Sharon abandoned the Likud in November and established the new centrist "Kadima" 
party. Days later, the defeated Labour leader, Shimon Peres (who was later elected 
President of Israel) joined the new party. However, a month after the "big bang" 
reshuffle in Israeli politics, its architect, Prime Minister Sharon, suffered a mild stroke. 
Two weeks later another more severe stroke left him in a coma. Eventually, three 
political party leaders contested the premiership in the March 2006 elections: Peretz on 
behalf of the Labour party, seeking to assume the mantle of a social-democratic leader; 
Benjamin Netanyahu on behalf of the Likud after making swingeing cutbacks in welfare 
expenditure, and Ehud Olmert, acting Prime Minister, Sharon's close ally and 
designated successor, on behalf of "Kadima".  
The exploratory surveys and in-depth interviews were conducted between August 2005 
and March 2006. Since academic studies of this kind are meant to focus on authentic 
events, the research proceeded as planned. Fourteen citizens were interviewed and 
dozens were questioned. Almost paradoxically, the difficulties created by the events 
proved advantageous. The interviewees were willing to clarify their fundamental 
assumptions, motives and guidelines rather than simply profess support for a particular 
party. In addition, in 2006 the ideological differences between Labour and Likud socio-
economic manifestos were salient. The secondary analysis of election surveys was 
based on three large-scale surveys conducted in 1992 and 1999.  
As in Britain, missing data prevented equivalised household income being computed for 
some datasets. A trial and error process had ended with an algorithm constructing the 
―underprivileged group‖ based on municipalities‘ socio-economic ranking, the subject‘s 
years of schooling, his/her household size and age. This multi-variable method 
guaranteed far better prediction of financial poverty than other existing indicators, such 
as the subject‘s assessment of his/her relative family expenditure. No statistical 
verification of income could be made, but the distributions of ethnic origin and level of 
religiosity showed similarities between the ―underprivileged‖ (as verified by the 
algorithm) and ―poor‖ (as verified by median income). Further methodological 
explanations are in the Appendices.  
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The strategy of two different case studies made it possible to explore the electoral 
behaviour of the underprivileged in different cultural and political backgrounds. 
However, any intention to conduct a comparative study would necessitate first 
overcoming several shortcomings and methodological hazards (see, for instance, 
Mabbett & Bolderson 1999). However, three differences in the way this research 
progressed in Israel are worth mentioning. First, a greater focus was on voters' 
knowledge and reasoning, as abstention was found to be rather marginal. Second, there 
was an enormous emphasis on questions of existential security, especially among the 
underprivileged. Third, there was a dearth of research into welfare ideologies and public 
attitudes. These differences required different sensitivities and emphases during the 
fieldwork and the analysis of the findings.  
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7.1 The Question of Priorities 
Defence and welfare policy are the two most contentious domains in the Israeli public 
debate. The way voters prioritise between them was found to be central in the analysis 
of their voting patterns. The conscious decision of an underprivileged voter to 
undervalue social policy might rationalise his Likud vote, but its underlying motives 
need to be examined. Among them are voters' low expectations from the welfare state, 
their greater vulnerability to emotions of fear, their support for neo-liberal beliefs and 
their risk-aversion strategy. The a-priori lower visibility of social benefits might be a  
structural explanation for the pre-eminence of security in voters' priorities. However, 
these factors were found to have different effects on different voters. After reviewing 
electoral statistics, this section asks how voters‘ priorities are set.  
IES 1992 IES 1999 ISSP 1999 
 Overall Jewish Sample 1192  1075  1057  
 Privileged (%) 643 78% 622 88% 553 81% 
 Underprivileged (%) 179 22% 83 12% 128 19% 
 Unavailable 370  370  376  
     












       
Likud Voters (%) 121 19% 154 25% 138 26% 
Labour Voters (%) 235 37% 194 32% 157 30% 
Others (%) 208 32% 174 28% 208 40% 
Haven't decided (%) 62 10% 84 14% NA NA 
Didn't vote / Won't vote 17 3% 7 1% 21 4% 














       
Likud Voters (%) 74 41% 29 35% 38 31% 
Labour Voters (%) 35 20% 20 24% 21 17% 
Others (%) 51 28% 26 32% 56 46% 
Haven't decided (%) 15 8% 6 7% NA NA 
Didn't vote / Won't vote 4 2% 1 1% 6 5% 
       
* For details about the classification of privileged/underprivileged, the variables used to facilitate it and the algorithm developed see Section ‎5.4.3.3, p. 
154 and Appendix ‎11.3.3, p. 340.  
Table ‎7.1.1:  Selected statistical figures of the three datasets analysed in Israel 
The figures summarised in Table ‎7.1.1 show that underprivileged voters consistently 
preferred Likud to Labour. This preference was also confirmed by aggregated data at 
the municipality level (based on a socio-economic categorisation) and by political 
scientists scrutinising the Israeli Election Surveys since 1969 (Shamir & Arian 1999b; 
Yuchtman-Ya'ar & Peres 2000, pp. 47-80; Arian 1990, pp. 239-249; Arian 1975). 
Notably, in 1999, a significant proportion voted for "other" parties, probably due to a 




. It is also worth mentioning that professed turnout was 
remarkably high. Apparently, the Israeli electorate feels committed to voicing its 
priorities.   
When looking for the reason underlying the support of underprivileged voters for Likud, 
the wedge between defence and welfare is exposed. Right-wing voters are far more 
likely to prioritise the field of defence and vice versa. Both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence suggest this is a key predictor for partisanship among the have-nots. There are 
two ways to examine that empirically. The first explores questions which directly invite 
voters to label the level of influence that various policy fields have on their voting 
decision. This method was successfully used in the British case study. The second is 
indirect in nature as it bases its inferences on the budget priorities of voters and asks 
them to allocate the budget from scratch. This was done in the exploratory survey in the 
fields of defence, welfare, benefits, home affairs, foreign affairs and environment.  
Direct questioning of the influence each policy field has on voting decisions, as 
appeared in IES 1999, uncovered an interesting phenomenon. Apart from a few 
exceptions, most fields were graded similarly, implying that all exerted a similar degree 
of influence. There was in fact no request to prioritise between them. Yet, closer 
examination of the figures revealed slight differences of intensity. Social policy, for 
instance, attracted one of the lowest means (representing importance) among the Likud 
underprivileged voters. As illustrated in Figure ‎7.1.1, the average underprivileged Likud 
voter (Yellow) cared most about defence policies, and most of the time he reacted in a 
similar way to his privileged colleague (Blue). The Labour underprivileged voters 
(Green) were mostly interested in the future of peace and the territories, although social 
policy was also ranked near the top of their list. Those who prioritised welfare the most, 






                                                 
29
  Following new legislation, the election procedures were reformed in 1996, so that citizens voted in two separate 
ballots for the premiership and the parliament. The new method may account for the sharp decline in the power of 
all major parties and the rise of "other" parties, as voters felt less committed to support both the party and its 
premiership candidate (Arian & Shamir 1996, Shamir & Arian 1999a). The difference between the IES and the ISSP 
in the support of "other" parties is probably due to the time factor: the ISSP questionnaire was undertaken a few 
months after the elections, whereas the IES was conducted before the elections.  












Figure ‎7.1.1 Influence of each field of policy on voting behaviour by wealth and political 
affiliation (IES 1999) 
An indirect inquiry into voters' order of priorities was achieved through the mechanism 
of budget allocation, either from scratch or in relation to the current budget. The IES of 
1992 and 1999 asked whether subjects would be interested in increasing and decreasing 
certain budget sections, but with no trade-offs or priorities in between. The questions 
referring to each field separately showed that, compared to their Labour counterparts, 
the Likud underprivileged voters were more enthusiastic about spending on settlements 
and less interested in cutting budgets for religious institutions and increasing 
unemployment benefits. They were also less keen on investing in education and the 
environment. Figure ‎7.1.2 illustrates the different replies of the average voter in four out 





Figure ‎7.1.2: Underprivileged preferences for modifications in the national 
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  Do the following fields influence your voting decision? 
 1992  1999 
 
Def nce Poli  
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It was found that in 1999, only 64 per cent of the Likud underprivileged electorate 
supported higher spending on education, compared to 83-94 per cent among all other 
groups. The Likud underprivileged voters were also the least likely to support higher aid 
for the unemployed, with 33 per cent asserting benefits should be slashed. These results 
provide a general outline of the priorities of Likud underprivileged voters, especially 
regarding the balance of security versus welfare expenditure. However, they could 
hardly form a utility function to assess the available political alternatives.  
A logistic regression seeking to identify the budget preferences influencing the 
underprivileged voting preferences succeeded in predicting 82 per cent of the voting 
decisions, compared to 60 per cent without the budget allocation figures (Nagelkerke R 
Square = 0.560). Of ten spending sections asked about in the IES of 1999, three were 
found to be significant. Supporting settlements and religious institutions, as well as 
opposing aid for the unemployed, boosted the likelihood of underprivileged voters 
supporting Likud and vice versa. Social spending characterised mainly Labour voters 
from all groups. Within the limited sample of the latter group, Labour supporters' 
inclination to assist the unemployed was found to be statistically significant.  
The dominance of defence policy in voters' priority sets is strongly supported by 
previous research. Shamir and Arian defined the territorial debate as ―clearly dominant‖ 
in recent decades, as well as the ―overriding dimension‖ ordering the party system since 
1984 (1999b, p. 270). In their analysis of the 2001 General Elections, Arian and Shamir 
also showed that ―79 per cent of the Jewish population… mentioned issues of 
security/peace/terror as the major issue the government should take care of‖ (2001, pp. 
14-15). The results were similar in 1969, 1988, 1996 and 2001, whereas in 1981, 1984 
and 1999, the focus was on domestic policy. Nonetheless, it should be stressed again 
that the analysis referred to the entire electorate, with no specific reference to the 
underprivileged.  
The preferences found in the small-scale exploratory survey are therefore not surprising. 
The Labour voters‘ placement of social investment above defence spending was 
replicated and vice versa. However, unlike the measurement of incremental preferences, 
the allocation of budget from scratch identified absolute priorities, and could be better 
integrated into a utility function. This method asked the voters to allocate limited 
resources, and required them to gauge ―by how much‖ one field was more important 
than the other. These figures were required to assess the consistency between the voters‘ 
―actual choice‖ and their ―utilitarian choice‖, as will be elaborated later.  
The voters‘ order of importance clearly shows defence was more dominant in the case 
of Likud underprivileged voters. Two thirds (65 per cent) of those voters who 
participated in the small-scale exploratory survey argued that security was an imperative 
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and must be at the top of national priorities. However, the few labour underprivileged 
unanimously proposed an opposite allocation of budgets in which welfare was the first 






Figure ‎7.1.3: The relative place of security and welfare in the national budget (Author's 
Exploratory Survey 2006) 
On average, the Likud underprivileged voters allocated 30 per cent of their budgets to 
defence spending, whereas the few Labour counterparts distributed only 18 per cent. 
The cumulative share of welfare and benefits expenditure amounted to 62 per cent 
among the Labour underprivileged, compared to 48 per cent among their Likud 
equivalents. As shown in Figure ‎7.1.4, it seems that the underprivileged offset their 
welfare preferences with lower spending on environmental affairs, home affairs and 
foreign affairs. Defence spending was similar in both samples. It should be stressed, 
however, that the Labour underprivileged sample consisted of only three subjects, hence 











Figure ‎7.1.4:  Pie chart of voters’ spending by wealth and political 
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It should be noted that assessing priorities by budget allocation had some shortcomings. 
One is related to the subjects' will to "fix" the existing allocation rather than reflect their 
own priorities. Another derives from a possible will of voters to reduce budgets, and 
thus make an opposite correlation between spending and utilities. However, at least 
within the independently supervised exploratory survey, the vast majority of the 
respondents were explicitly advised to echo their priorities in their budget pie. 
Having shown the strong correlation between priorities and partisanship in Israel, I shall 
now explore several phenomena that were found relevant to the overriding importance 
of defence policy to underprivileged voters. Among them, the presence and impact of 
fear, the low expectations of and commitment to the welfare state and the structural 
barriers of media visibility and risk aversion. The next section will explore several other 
dimensions of voters‘ political engagement and the summary will restate the various 
insights and reflect their implications on the relationship between the poor, democracy 
and the welfare state. 
Emotions of fear seemed to govern the behaviour of most underprivileged who 
sanctified security expenditure. This was noticeable both in the interviews and the 
election surveys, and characterised mainly those voters at the bottom of the income 
distribution. From an early stage of this fieldwork, it became clear that the way social 
groups acknowledge and act upon threats is crucial, and that different voters assess 
threats differently. An emotional approach often dictated a complete subordination of all 
other considerations for the sake of ‗the threat‘. A more moderate approach perceived 
defence as a key issue but avoided turning it into the only one.  
[Q] What you have just told me is quite simple: I know the Labour 
party will promote my welfare, but I will not vote for them. [A] 
…Because of security… I prefer eating the sheet… They will give up 
everything and will take us back to ‘67 borders. [Q] Will that harm 
you? [A] Of course! Soldiers will die and people will have to live in 
shelters… [Q] What do you actually mean by "eating the sheet"? [A] 
The current benefit cutback...I will cope with it. We will not eat meat 
twice a week as before, but only at weekends… What can you do? I 
just do not want to live here with rockets flying over me."  
Quotation ‎7.1.1: Interviewee No. 6 (Underprivileged, 2/11/2005) 
The above quotation demonstrates a radical and emotional approach to threat 
management, at least in relation to other engagements with Israeli voters. The apparent 
willingness of the interviewee to tolerate a reduction of 20 per cent in his state benefits 
as long as Qassam rockets do not fall on his peripheral town, might be hard to 
understand. As the interviewee noted that his benefits had already been reduced by 300 
Shekels, this dilemma was very real for him. However, he vowed to continue voting 
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Likud "because of the security", but also since "nobody will help" him financially 
anyway. This suggests we are facing two separate reasons for prioritising defence that 
often complement each other.  
A radical reaction to threats and fears was not rare and was found in other episodes. 
Interviewee No. 7 admitted that he had made "a big mistake" by voting Likud since 
Netanyahu "is a crook… [who] cut families' income in half." Nevertheless, he declared 
his willingness not to eat meat and "give what is needed for security… they [the security 
forces – g.a.] must not lack for anything, not even a match". Interviewee No. 2 said that 
security "stands beyond everything else", and "this is one of the elementary things 
permitting our existence. If we did not have it – we would not be here." Despite his 
clear financial disadvantage, the disengagement from Gaza was the factor persuading 
him to abandon Likud as now "we have no security left".  
But fear and the reaction to fear were not similar among all groups in an Israel that has 
faced existential threats since its establishment. The responses of the privileged voters 
showed a moderate and multi-dimensional approach. Interviewee No. 11, for instance, 
still perceived security as the most important issue, but his priorities were not enslaved 
to it. Doubts were also raised about the Defence Ministry's level of efficiency. These 
reservations have created a more balanced account, not derived from the fear of an 
imminent danger, but from a sophisticated account of gains and losses.  
[Q] When you allocated the budget, you invested more in welfare 
than security…  [A] This is true. [Q] Why did you do it? [A] Because I 
have the feeling… that the Defence Ministry can manage with 
significantly lower budgets… I simply do not think our personal 
security will be reduced if the budget is cut; all they need is to 
reorganise themselves… If I am convinced such a reform would 
significantly damage my personal security, then I will change my 
mind." 
Quotation ‎7.1.2: Interviewee No. 11 (Privileged, 8/12/2005) 
These trends are strongly supported with empirical evidence from opinion surveys. In 
the IES of 1999, on the eve of the Camp David peace talks with the Palestinians, nine 
out of every ten Likud underprivileged voters asserted that the ultimate goal of the 
Arabs is to annihilate Israel (90 per cent). None of the Labour underprivileged agreed (0 
per cent). In the IES of 1992, a fifth of the Likud underprivileged voters assessing the 
chances for an imminent war as high (19 per cent) was three times higher than their 
Labour equivalents (6 per cent). As demonstrated in Error! Reference source not 
found., three fifths of the Likud underprivileged voters were "very concerned" for their 
personal and or family safety (60 per cent), more than any other group.  
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Figure ‎7.1.5: Levels of existential fear by wealth and voting patterns (IES 1992) 
The qualitative and quantitative evidence therefore suggests that the underprivileged, 
mostly Likud supporters, were far more likely to exaggerate threats than others and to 
address them with a determined political action. As questions of security and territory 
have been extremely prominent on the Israeli political agenda (Arian 1992, Shamir & 
Arian 1999b, Yuchtman-Ya'ar & Peres 2000), this tendency had a vital impact on their 
electoral behaviour. In this context, Gordin and Arian have already noted that "when 
people feel threatened – the decision-making process about policy is dominated by 
emotion… [whereas] under conditions of low threat, both emotions and logic have a 
role in the process" (2001, p. 196).  
It should be emphasised, however, that emotions are experienced in common and are 
not necessarily destructive. In certain cases, they can even be integrated into the 
framework of "rational choice" theory. One can argue, for instance, that a minor risk 
taken with existential security can result in a catastrophe, whilst the potential damage 
from a failure of welfare policy is insignificant. This would make any decision to 
prioritise defence spending completely rational, even if it is emotionally driven. 
However, when one group systematically exaggerates threats in a way that moulds 
electoral behaviour, the entire relationship between democracy, the poor and the welfare 
state is affected.  
History shows this phenomena can determine election outcomes. McCann, for instance, 
linked social threats to the election of "strong" presidents, defining threats as "stressors 
or crises of a social, economic or political nature faced by the populace… that might be 
interpreted as endangering the established American order and way of life" (1997, p. 
161, see also Fromm 1941, Sales 1973 and Doty et al 1991). In Israel, emotions of fear 
were found by Arian and Shamir to be central in the surprise victory of Benjamin 
Netanyahu over Shimon Peres in the 1996 elections. Clearly, an emotional reaction to 









































There are high chances for a
forthcoming Israeli-Arab war
The ultimate aspiration of the Arabs is
to annihilate Israel
I am very concerned that me or my
family would get hurt by Arabs
Existence of an Existential Fear
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After elaborating on the role of fears and emotions in Israeli politics, voters‘ 
commitment to the welfare state and their expectations from welfare policies will now 
be scrutinised. As in Britain, these expectations are found to be feeble and certainly not 
powerful enough to motivate underprivileged voters to prioritise welfare over defence. 
Voters hardly calculate the contribution of the welfare state to their living and tend to 
focus their attention on other policy arenas. There are some structural inhibitors, such as 
the a-priori low visibility of welfare in the media and the risk averse nature of 
individuals. These will be also discussed, as they all affect the balance of priorities 
between welfare and defence.  
During the fieldwork, the sense of hopelessness when discussing personal welfare was 
striking. The way voters articulated their pessimism paved the way towards a wish ―to 
punish‖ government by non-participation, as will be shown later. Interviewee No. 3 said 
that when he needed help to find employment after years of political activity "they did 
not even look" at his face, hence voting "does not help at all". His colleague who took 
the exploratory survey noted, ―Nobody bothers with us... I am not passive, but 
desperate. We are all desperate here." Interviewees No. 1 and 2  reflected the same 
phenomenon of detachment between politics and welfare.  
―[Q] Have you ever linked welfare and your vote? [A] Nope. There 
was never a connection between these things for me. If I was not 
waking up and taking care of myself every morning and every year – 
nobody would have been taking care of me… I hardly think that they 
are capable of helping me in anything."  
Quotation ‎7.1.3: Interviewee No. 1 (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005) 
"[Q] Shouldn’t politics be something that will promote your interests 
in the future? [A] Nothing. They just do not help. In this country, only 
the rich benefit. All others, the people at the bottom… how did you 
say earlier… One to ten? So all people below five are being trampled 
on, especially in these times."  
Quotation ‎7.1.4:  Interviewee No. 2 (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005) 
This collection of quotes exemplifies the fragility of underprivileged political 
engagement in the field of welfare. This group did not go to the polls to shape social 
policy at all; it apparently had no hope for personal economic progress. The evidence, 
gathered mainly in the fieldwork, shows these voters did not appear to see any 
correlation between their vote and their wellbeing. Such a lack of expectations was 
found in several others studies that monitored voters‘ feelings of being incapable of 
affecting their government (Vigoda & Yuval 2002, Arian 1990). 
Yet, it seems that not all policy fields are alike. The arguable incompetence of 
government to deliver on welfare could not be compared to its reputation in delivering 
defence. Underprivileged voters often perceived their government as extremely 
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effective and capable in relation to matters of peace and war. Some of these voters 
seemed to attribute to government almost mythical powers to shape reality. These 
expectations might have induced turnout, as they gave individuals a sense of duty. 
Nevertheless, it also made some voters' political decisions rather limited in scope, 
turning the welfare state into almost a non-issue.  
As an example, Interviewee No. 6 felt no resentment about getting lower benefits and 
eating less to finance the army. He was absolutely confident that tougher action would 
improve his suffering, as he did not "want to live here with rockets above me" 
(Underprivileged, 2/11/2005). Quotation ‎7.1.5 demonstrates a similar trade-off but also 
illuminates the will of voters to be part of a collective pursuing the greater good. 
Apparently, voting for welfare benefits was perceived as less patriotic than funding the 
security establishment, as the Nation ―is more important than me":  
"I vote for Likud because of security, as if we are not secure, nothing 
else will materialise here. The Labour party is socially better, but in 
Israel, security is more important. [Q] Why is it? [A] If there is no 
security, there will be no peace, no social provision and no anything 
else… Yes, they did reduce my benefits, but what can I do? … We 
should first be safe. Israel is more important than me, isn't it?" 
Quotation ‎7.1.5: Participant in a new active employment scheme (Sderot Jobcentre, 21/3/2006) 
As was the case in Britain, it is not that privileged voters were firmly convinced that 
government can deliver on welfare, but that their approach was more moderate and 
balanced. They made welfare an essential consideration in their voting patterns, though 
they were still sceptical. The issue of equality was always on their agenda, even though 
a little probing showed privileged voters often had their own narrow interests in 
welfare. Thus, for instance, Quotation ‎7.1.6 and Quotation ‎7.1.7 reflected a declared 
interest to avoid riots and neutralise a social "time bomb".   
"You cannot ignore the needs of the lower classes… as I believe that 
if the gaps get larger, we will all suffer. [Q] Why? [A] Because these 
gaps cannot widen endlessly… An explosion will occur eventually. [Q] 
Do you mean violent explosion? [A] Among other things… I think that 
if these gaps increase, we will have riots here." 
Quotation ‎7.1.6: Interviewee No. 9 (Privileged, 6/12/2005) 
"I am in favour of a free economy… but you still have here substantial 
rates of inequality that must be taken care of… It is a time bomb… In 
every state, a high number of unemployed leads to violence and 
other troubles. Overall, it will hurt everyone; these large gaps can 
blow up in our faces… We face here a situation of two peoples."  
Quotation ‎7.1.7: Interviewee No. 12 (Privileged, 13/12/2005) 
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In addition to underprivileged voters' lower commitment to and expectations from the 
welfare state, some of them also seemed to espouse a neo-liberal view of inequality and 
government intervention. These findings are quantitative, based on the ISSP Social 
Inequality 1999 module. They suggest that Likud underprivileged voters not only have 
fewer hopes for an equal society, but they also tend to justify an unequal one on the 
basis of its contribution towards prosperity. As demonstrated in Figure ‎7.1.6, two fifths 
of them agreed that large income differences were necessary for economic growth (39 
per cent). The proportion of those who "strongly agreed" was three times higher among 








Figure ‎7.1.6: Perceived relationship between a high level of inequality and economic prosperity, 
by wealth and voting patterns (ISSP 1999)  
This phenomena repeated itself in at least two other analyses. An ISSP-based study 
entitled "Legitimating Inequality" showed that Israelis still support actions to reduce 
poverty, but a third of them, and especially the poorly-educated, supposed inequalities 
to be essential (Oren & Levin-Epstein 2000). A separate analysis conducted by a think 
tank found low-income respondents were slightly more likely to assume that there was a 
contradiction between prosperity and equality, and prosperity should be preferred (Taub 
Centre 2006, p. 291). When levels of education were taken as the independent variable, 
the significance of these gaps increased (42 per cent vs. 15 per cent, p. 291).  
My own analysis of the ISSP 1999 survey suggested that Likud underprivileged voters 
were less critical of inequalities than others. 62 per cent of the underprivileged Labour 
voters "strongly agreed" that income differences were too high, compared to 53 per cent 
of their Likud equivalents. The mean score of the responses from the Labour 
underprivileged voters showed that they were the most anxious about socio-economic 
gaps. As can be seen in Figure ‎7.1.7, none of them denied their severity, compared to 
one in ten Likud underprivileged voters, who were indifferent to inequalities or fully 
legitimised them.  
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Figure ‎7.1.7: Judgement of the extent of income inequalities in Israel by 
wealth and voting patterns (ISSP 1999) 
The cumulative effect of issues discussed up to this point can comfortably account for 
the current priorities of Likud underprivileged voters. However, there are two structural 
anomalies worth mentioning that might also contribute to the submersion of welfare by 
most Israeli underprivileged voters, namely media visibility and risk aversion. Their 
impact on political behaviour might not be direct and explicit, but both can enrich the 
analysis of voters' reasoning. 
As for media visibility, it seems that in Israel, poverty, social services and cash benefits 
will always have less exposure in the media than army operations. The media has today 
an almost absolute power to set the public agenda (Cohen 1963, McCombs & Shaw 
1972). Several Israeli studies have noted that the media "discovers" poverty for short 
periods, usually when new figures are published (IDI 2006, Arbel 2005, Yeshuvi 2002). 
Journalists often argue that the topics featured depend today also on the images 
available. This partial dependency was only reinforced by the technological revolution 
the communication industry has undergone. This might help explain why a military 
attack is likely to attract continuous coverage and a reform in income support would 
rarely lead the news in Israel.  
The Israeli studies cited above mentioned among others the "poverty festival", as it is 
called, which takes place when inequality statistics are being published. However, the 
analyses showed that even then, stories of misery rather than the policy debate are what 
dominate the press. When the "festival" ends, these issues are neglected again until 
further sensational figures are published. As Bernard Cohen famously wrote, the press 
"may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (1963, p. 13). This is 
directly linked to the question of priorities.  
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A second potential influence on voters‘ priorities has to do with risk aversion. 
Kahneman and Tversky's Nobel Prize-winning prospect theory, proved mathematically 
that ―losses loom larger than gains", as "the aggravation that one experiences in losing a 
sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same 
amount‖ (1979, p. 279). These inferences can apply equally to commodities markets 
and to political ones. In politics, it might be that security was portrayed by some voters 
as a minefield where leaders could make painful mistakes, whereas higher spending on 
welfare could only guarantee gains. If welfare is a ―gaining field‖ and security is a 
―losing field‖, then a crucial predisposition diverts voters' priorities and pushes them to 
highlight security.  
Having explored several dynamics and influences that affect voters‘ priorities, a word 
should be said about their permanence. The fear factor, low expectations from and 
commitment to the welfare state, neo-liberal postures, a-priori low visibility and risk 
management – are all here to stay. They cannot be changed overnight. Most of them are 
ingrained in culture, contributing to the continuous subordination of welfare policy by 
the Israeli underprivileged electorate. It was shown here that when fears are not 
exaggerated, social policy is perceived differently; when voters follow a redistributive 
ideology – they are more likely to support the ―pro-welfare‖ party.  
These trends can be re-framed in the Triangle of the poor, democracy and the welfare 
state. In fact, they inhibit these three powerful forces from sustaining each other to 
facilitate greater redistribution. One example is the lack of commitment of welfare 
beneficiaries to the redistributive mechanism that assists them. Put it differently, the 
poor are disassociating themselves from the welfare state, and by sabotaging this 
linkage they are less willing to support it politically. This section describes a few 
additional examples for barriers that impede the effectiveness of the Triangle. As none 
of them is temporary in its nature, these dynamics make it quite difficult to envisage 
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7.2 Dimensions of Political Engagement 
The previous section focused on voters‘ reasoning and the issues that affect their 
priorities. A few additional dimensions of  political engagement require attention in the 
context of this thesis, among them turnout, civic commitment, identity and political 
illiteracy. In terms of the operational framework of this thesis, these dimensions derive 
mostly from the first two layers of the Pyramid of Political Engagement, namely the 
layers of physical and informed voting. All of them affect the Triangle of relationships 
between the poor, democracy and the welfare state. Having explored in depth the 
question of reasoning and prioritising, I will elaborate on some key figures and insights 
with regard to turnout and knowledge.   
Turnout in Israel has generally declined over the years. Official data of the Central 
Election Committee (CEC) shows that 86.9 per cent of eligible voters took part in the 
first Israeli elections held on 1949, whereas since 1973, turnout has not exceeded 80 per 
cent. The 2006 elections broke a record, with only 63.5 per cent voting. Socio-economic 
bias in the vote exists, but it is significantly weaker than in Britain. In 1992, for 
instance, the turnout of those living in underprivileged municipalities was 76.5 per cent, 
compared to 77.9 per cent in wealthier localities. In 1999, these figures were 73.4 and 
74.8 respectively. The Pearson correlation of turnouts with the municipality's socio-
economic status was found to be strong and significant (Pearson R of 0.319 in 1992 and 
0.342 in 1999). 
Opinion surveys were found to be less accurate in gauging turnout. Whereas the Central 
Election Committee figures revealed that approximately 25 per cent of eligible voters 
did not vote in the 1999 elections, secondary analysis of the ISSP dataset showed that 
only 5 per cent reported abstention. Since ID cards are obligatory in Israel, the CEC 
database is the most reliable and accurate source of information. The opinion surveys 
might therefore be vulnerable to "over reported voting" or the presence of an "invisible 
group", which concealed three-quarters of the abstainers in surveys (see Section ‎6.1, p. 
164 & Appendix ‎11.4.4, p. 369). This makes any reliance on abstention figures taken 
from the opinion surveys questionable.  
The socio-economic bias in turnout was confirmed, to varying degrees, in several 
studies. Avner found higher levels of abstention among poorly educated and Asian-
African citizens, as well as among the young and the elderly (1975). Arian and Shamir 
showed that in 2001, when the Israeli electorate was required to vote only for the 
premiership, "the legitimacy given to abstention… encouraged the abstention of those 
less involved politically and less included socially" (2001a, p. 49). In the 2003 elections, 
when turnout fell to 67.8 per cent, Shamir and Arian linked youth, low socio-economic 
background and low sense of political influence with a decision not to vote (2004, pp. 
The Poverty of Democracy 221 
 
17-20). Afriat and Dahan have shown that turnout biases intensified during 1996-2006, 
stressing its negative impact on representative democracy (2009).  
My fieldwork showed that the problem of turnout is linked to the question of duty. 
Whereas the figures portrayed a mild problem of underprivileged abstention, civic 
commitment was found to be worryingly low among some welfare recipients. This 
deduction is qualitative and therefore its aggregated impact could not be measured. 
Also, it does not rely on previous research. Shamir and Arian, for instance, explained 
the high abstention in the 2003 elections with temporary dissatisfaction, arguing "it does 
not reflect any overwhelming feeling of estrangement from the establishment or its 
governing principles" (2004, p. 20). Nonetheless, in the microcosms of Sderot and 
Ofakim things looked differently. 
In the chapter on Britain, interviewees with a sense of civic duty were easily identified 
and were usually found to be affiliated with the privileged electorate. Some of them 
showed interest in social order and others were preoccupied more with social justice. In 
Israel, two distinct narratives were observed among those whose commitment to 
democracy was the lowest. The first approached elections from a utilitarian perspective, 
looking for benefits in exchange for voting. The second was seeking to punish the 
government. Narratives of the first type were preoccupied largely with the subject‘s 
personal gains whilst narratives of the second type were premised on a rather childish 





Figure ‎7.2.1: Four narratives of abstention 
The figure above summarises the four types of narratives found during the fieldwork in 
both countries. Two of them characterised voters with low commitment to the 
democratic establishment, so that an alternative motivation for voting or abstaining was 
required. The two others reflected two different interpretations of the same 
commitment. Clearly, underprivileged interviewees were more likely to hold the "low 
commitment" narratives and vice versa. The Israeli fieldwork could better exemplify the 
difference between utilitarian and punishment narratives, among others reasons because 
underprivileged subjects – even when abstaining – were still involved and engaged 
politically. Their articulation reflected the two different narratives.  
High Civic Commitment 
Social Order Social Justice  Utilitarianism Punishment 
Low Civic Commitment 
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The utilitarian narrative derived from an absence of hope for a better future, from a 
perceived lack of difference between parties or from an absolute distrust of all 
politicians. It accommodated the rationale of several "rational-choice" theories explored 
in Section 4.3. The following two quotes may demonstrate its origins: 
"Elections are like visiting a supermarket and thinking of which 
supermarket to visit. Do you understand? It is like a game… Everyone 
looks after his own seat and they are all scared to act… Trust me, it 
does not matter who will be elected, because it will all be the same." 
Quotation ‎7.2.1: Interviewee No. 8 (Underprivileged, 2/11/2005) 
"I voted for change… to provide opportunity, to bring something to 
this country, to get things moving, to help these poor people who 
need the welfare services, the education system..." 
Quotation ‎7.2.2: Interviewee No. 4 (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005) 
These types of comments were also found among the privileged interviewees in Israel. 
One of them clearly stated that his intention was to defend the equal representation of 
all groups in parliament. In his words, "the middle class always gets screwed" due to its 
lower representation compared to other sectors "such as the ultra-orthodox and the 
Arabs‖ who vote en bloc (Interviewee No. 13, Privileged, 17/3/2005). These were 
utilitarian comments, which might compensate for the absence of civic commitment. 
A narrative of punishment held voting to be part of a contract between voters and their 
representatives rather than with the democratic regime as a whole. This premise 
motivated citizens to abstain in order to punish the political system for its "sins". 
Individuals asked why they abstained immediately recalled previous suffering caused 
by politicians, reflecting radical disappointment with the entire apparatus.  
"I will vote for none of them. Netanyahu is rubbish. Why should we 
work and study here? What kind of law is this? I want no one…  They 
all sit in their offices and forget the people here. They should transfer 
these centres to a place where there are no Qassam rockets." 
Quotation ‎7.2.3: Participant in a new \ctive employment scheme (Underprivileged, 21/3/2006) 
"I am a member of the Labour party, but I do not want to vote, as 
my vote is better floating. Nobody bothers with us. We are here, and 
none of the candidates cares… what will make me vote is if somebody 
takes me at the last minute to the ballot box... [Q] You are passive. 
[A] I am not passive, but desperate. We are all desperate here." 
Quotation ‎7.2.4: Participant in a new active employment scheme (Underprivileged, 21/3/2006) 
It should be emphasised that the remarks above were made by citizens whose income 
support benefits were recently made conditional on their attendance at 30 hours of 
weekly courses. However, their frustration did not induce them to swap parties and 
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support a different policy. Instead of re-considering their voting behaviour, their 
immediate reaction was to abstain completely, so that their vote will benefit no one.  
This rationale was not found among privileged citizens at all, rather the opposite was 
the case. Not only did they reflect stronger civic commitment, but when one interviewee 
was determined to protest, he did so in the ballot box by putting in a blank voting slip. 
In his interview he explained that it was his own "private protest against an international 
phenomenon – the diminishing of leaders and the rule of politicians…" (Interviewee 
No. 9, Privileged, 6/12/2005).  
Generally speaking, voters with a resilient commitment to democracy articulated their 
intentions in a very similar way to British voters. Political participation was perceived 
by them as an obligation imposed by virtue of citizenship. As Interviewee No. 11 noted, 
"when I vote, I make a sort of statement… I gain the moral right to be disappointed or 
angry because of my vote… I am in the game" (Privileged, 8/12/2005). Two additional 
quotes deserve mentioning:  
"I think it has to do with my belonging… the feeling of abstaining 
leads to being completely detached from what is happening here. I 
am not a political activist; I do not demonstrate and do not sign 
petitions even though I have my own opinions… [voting] connects 
me… [this is why] I have never abstained." 
Quotation ‎7.2.5: Interviewee No. 12 (Privileged, Herzliya Arcade, 13/12/2005) 
 "…I think it is the duty of every citizen to influence. I am not 
prepared to abstain even when it is uncomfortable for me to take a 
stand… How can I complain sitting here in my salon or argue against 
something if I have not voted? …You are a citizen in this country and 
you have to accept your rights and duties." 
Quotation ‎7.2.6: Interviewee No. 10 (Privileged, Personal Contacts, 27/11/2005) 
The relatively high turnout in Israel might explain why abstention has been only 
sporadically and quantitatively researched. Whereas the question of ethnicity and 
partisanship has been extensively studied (see Yuchtman-Ya'ar & Peres 2000 and 
Shalom Chetrit 2004), there has been no qualitative attempt to explore non-participation 
of the underprivileged. A recent study which uniquely scrutinised socio-economic 
biases in turnout, adopted statistical tools to show that the gaps have indeed been 
escalating in recent years (Afriat & Dahan 2009). Another study found evidence of 
underprivileged estrangement from state institutions, as indicated by dimensions of 
The Poverty of Democracy 224 
 
patriotism (Arad & Alon 2006). However, the academic field of socio-economic 
abstention is largely unexplored
30
.  
The socio-economic turnout bias is not the only domain of political engagement in 
which the underprivileged are losing ground. Underprivileged Likud voters were also 
more likely to deny and soften the neo-liberal agenda of their party. Whereas several 
indicators reflected political illiteracy, it was also found that the underprivileged 
electorate was systematically less interested in discussing questions of national welfare 
policy. This was not a question of knowledge, but a question of interest. The integration 
of these inclinations led Likud underprivileged supporters to passionately defend the 
Thatcherite policies promoted by their leader, Benjamin Netanyahu.  
As with turnout, the question of political illiteracy has rarely been referred to by Israeli 
political scientists. It is widely agreed that Israelis are avid consumers of news (see, for 
instance, Arian 1990, pp. 396-402). In fact, 90 per cent of the underprivileged electorate 
reportedly read at least three daily newspapers every week – even more than the 
privileged electorate (ISSP 1999). However, political knowledge was neither theorised 
nor integrated into mainstream research on electoral behaviour in Israel. Alternatively, 
studies usually explored the voters' economic ideology and its influence on voting (e.g. 
Yuchtman-Ya'ar & Peres 2000, Arian 1990, Arian & Shamir 1996, Arian & Shamir 
2001). This void limited the contribution from the existing opinion surveys and 
increased reliance on my own fieldwork.  
The analysis of future knowledge is based on voters' awareness of the most 
fundamental rifts between the competing parties. The liberal economic reforms 
implemented by the Israeli Finance Minister Netanyahu made these ideological 
disparities salient and undisputable. Netanyahu's commitment to reducing taxes and 
public expenditure was a pivotal issue in the 2006 elections. In contrast, the former 
"Histadrut" chairman was firmly advocating income equality, a sharp increase in the 
National Minimum Wage and new legislation to ensure a retirement pension for every 
worker. The dominance of social-policy issues made the exploratory survey a 
tremendously valuable (albeit not representative) method of assessing voters' levels of 
knowledge.  
The limited survey revealed the extent to which underprivileged voters, and specifically 
Likud supporters, were ill-informed (or some would say politically-manipulated) about 
Netanyahu's neo-liberal agenda. Whilst the social agenda of the Labour party was not in 
                                                 
30
  An exception is the case of the Arab minority, where abstention was ideologically motivated (Arian 1990, p. 239). 
Jamal has even defined it as "instrumental abstention" in relation to a specific campaign, aimed at rationally 
achieving concrete political goals (2001). 
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dispute, 77 per cent of Likud underprivileged said that their party was seeking to 
increase spending on social services. It might be that a majority among the few dozens 
of underprivileged answering the exploratory survey did not even consider Netanyahu 






* Notably, very few Labour underprivileged voters completed the exploratory survey. 
Figure ‎7.2.2: Voters’ perceptions of the fundamental socio-economic pledges of the two major 
parties (Author's Exploratory Survey 2006) 
The in-depth interviews strengthened the perception that the Likud underprivileged 
were less knowledgeable of the parties' policy platforms. Whereas a frequently repeated 
theme was, "I do not know what they are saying… they hide everything" (Survey No. 
51), Quotation ‎7.2.7 and Quotation ‎7.2.8 reflects different levels of political literacy. 
The first interviewee, who had voted for Likud since he arrived in Israel at the age of 
14, had not noticed that benefits for the elderly had been reduced recently and kept 
arguing passionately that Netanyahu's policies were aimed at "taking from the rich and 
giving to the poor".  
"Prove me that. How can you prove that?... I have not read in any 
newspaper that he reduced tax rates for the wealthiest… I cannot 
believe this… The fact is that Bibi had no alternative other than to 
approve the budget. Consequently, he decided to resign and prevent 
the approval of a Labour budget. [Q] What did the Labour party ask 
for that prompted his resignation? [A] It wanted more budgets for 
itself... For the party!" 
Quotation ‎7.2.7: Interviewee No. 5 (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005) 
"All the time the Labour was in power, it was easier to make a living 
here. The moment Likud took office, we had a catastrophe here [Q] 
Why? [A] It was because of their taxes. They imposed draconian 
taxes. All income you earned disappeared because of their high tax 
rates… They oppressed the entire labour market and made the 
purchasing power of each citizen smaller." 










What is the Likud's socio-economic manifesto?










What is the Labour's socio-economic manifesto?
Greater efforts for equality Less efforts for equality
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The picture is not however one-sided. Personal experiences of benefits withdrawn did 
play a significant role among other interviewees. Several citizens, adversely affected by 
Netanyahu's welfare reforms, expressed strong sentiments and desperation, as seen in 
the quotation below. However, these interviewees concentrated on their own suffering 
and were concerned less with national policy.  
"The economy of Likud is crap. They are all thieves and crooks… He 
reduced our benefits, halved our stipends, harmed all the weak 
classes and took another 250 Shekels of my income… It is hard for 
me… Beforehand I did not have to think about selling drugs; I did not 
have to think about many things I am doing today and cannot talk 
about. I used to pay for electricity with money, and sir, today I live 
without electricity."     
Quotation ‎7.2.9: Interviewee No. 7 (Underprivileged, 2/11/2005) 
The above quote also reflects the different role played by personal experience among 
the privileged and the underprivileged electorate. Apparently, living in an environment 
of unemployment and harbouring economic grievances has led subjects to think it was 
mounting. Even though the sample is too small for generalisations, 17 of 22 
underprivileged Likud voters thought unemployment had increased in 2006, whilst 8 of 
11 privileged Likud supporters argued the reverse. The facts bear out the views of the 
privileged: unemployment had dramatically fallen, from 10.9 per cent in December 
2003 to 9.5 per cent in December 2004, and down to 8.7 per cent in December 2005 
(CBS 2006). Even if jobs had been created in other sectors of the economy, those at the 
bottom of the pyramid were almost unaware of this fact.  
The Israeli privileged voters, as their British equivalents, knew how to integrate their 
personal experiences into a broader argument. Consequently, they showed a more 
measured and less emotional approach towards policies. Their suffering from a benefit-
cut was obviously different, and yet, their socio-economic outlook was rarely driven by 
personal deprivation. It had to do with their economic knowledge and the need to 
reconsider their positions as investors, producers or employees. On that solid basis, they 
could link national policy back to their own experiences, as exemplified below.  
"If I want to promote free markets, I screw myself up as my 
advantage as a local producer will diminish. [Q] So what is your 
position? [A] The benefit of the state comes first… I am in favour of 
restricting imports. But in the modern world, limiting imports will 
generate problems in other spheres."  
Quotation ‎7.2.10: Interviewee No. 9 (Privileged, 6/12/2005) 
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"I had a lot of criticism of the policies implemented recently, but 
overall, I find it tempting that today more opportunities exist in the 
markets… If you take me as a private, self-employed citizen, there 
were times when the Histadrut controlled the markets and I had no 
chance of closing a deal with a large concern."  
Quotation ‎7.2.11: Interviewee No. 12 (Privileged, 13/12/2005) 
The impact of partisanship in forming perceptions is prominent with regard to 
knowledge of the past. As in Britain, the retrospective assessment of the State's 
economic performance was strongly correlated with the respondent's political 
affiliation. Figure ‎7.2.3 shows that three years of a Likud government led the party's 
supporters to believe that the general standard of living had improved, whereas the 








Figure ‎7.2.3: Subjective perception of the change in the general standard of living over the last 
three years (IES 1999) 
Following Pattie and Johnston's methodology (2001b), the perceived differences 
between the parties‘ positions in various areas were taken as an imperfect indicator of 
voters' awareness of the various platforms. As shown in Figure ‎7.2.4, when security was 
at stake, Likud voters from all financial backgrounds acknowledged a radical difference 
in the parties' manifestos. However, when questions referred to economic and social 
policies, the underprivileged, especially the Likud voters, noticed much smaller 
disparities. Their knowledge in this regard was rather limited, though it should be noted 
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Figure ‎7.2.4: Perceived differences in parties' policies in various fields, by wealth and voting 
patterns (IES 1999) 
Another indicator of the low awareness of socio-economic issues was found in the IES 
of 1992. Economic and social policy were high on the agenda in these particular 
elections (Doron 1996, Arian & Shamir 2003), and yet 84 per cent of the Likud 
underprivileged voters, who described themselves as socialists, stated that the Likud 
comes "closer" to their socio-economic preferences. On the other hand, 79 per cent of 
the Labour underprivileged electorate, who described themselves as capitalists, thought 
Labour comes "closer" to their views. Judging by these results, it is probable that many 
voters – from all socio-economic backgrounds - turned their party into what they 
wanted it to be, regardless of its founding ideological principles.  
Having explored issues of civic commitment and political literacy, I will now address 
the question of votes’ identity. As in Britain, the disadvantaged interviewees have 
shown a very tenuous awareness of their financial poverty. This might be related to the 
multiple identities and schisms in Israeli society. Section‎2.3 (Page 45) summarised 
some demographic figures to show the high level of fragmentation and ethnic division 
within Israel. However, these cleavages are aligned neither with social class (as 
measured by occupation) nor with financial poverty (as measured by income).  







Average (1 No Difference 4 Extreme Difference)
Privileged (Lab) Undrpriv (Lab) Privileged (Lik) Undrpriv (Lik)
Perceived Differences in Parties' Policies 
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Sephardic, Russian and ultra-orthodox groups are all more likely to be members of the 
working class and earn lower salaries. Nevertheless, this correlation tells us little about 
the economic interests of these groups. As an example, ultra-orthodox voters are 
interested in child benefits targeted exclusively at large families. The Russian 
immigrants, many of them elderly, would benefit significantly from higher state 
pensions and unemployment benefits. Each group has different economic interests, 
related to its unique problems and demographic characteristics, which can hardly be 
grouped only by income. Having said that, one can clearly identify groups that are 
greatly dependent on state assistance and that would benefit the most from a generous 
welfare state.  
The work of Shamir and Arian on Collective Identity and Electoral Competition in 
Israel explores in detail the political implications of these unique attributes (1999). 
Their analysis of longitudinal data showed a solid and continuous impact of social 
cleavages on the vote between 1969 and 1996. In this context, the impact of cleavages 
converged with the global rise of "issue voting". As occupation was rarely a key 
indicator of voters' identity in Israel, the multi-axes identities have been dominant in 
Israeli politics for decades. Each group has its own sectorial agenda and virtues, which 
related not only to class and income.  
Thus, since the establishment of Israel in 1948, ethnicity and demography have had a 
significant influence in creating social cleavages and individual identities (see also 
Yuchtman-Ya'ar & Peres 2000). The association between these cleavages and political 
alliances has become more structured with the years, as more and more parties 
deliberately targeted specific sectors. Back in 1999, "religious, Sephardim, the less-
educated and lower-status workers voted for the right-wing Likud and religious parties, 
whereas the Left (Labor and Meretz) has had a disproportionate share of secular, upper-
class Ashkenazi Jews voters" (Shamir and Arian 1999, p. 266). The Russian immigrants 
and the Arab minority also have their own sectorial parties.  
It should be noted that the multifaceted identities are interconnected. The chances of a 
religious voter being of Sephardic origin, living in the periphery and being at the lower 
end of the income distribution are a-priori higher. Of all the socio-demographic 
identities he has, one is likely to play the dominant role in his identity and political 
behaviour. Against this background, the sociologist Prof. Yohanan Peres maintained 
that diversity in Israeli society diminishes the prospects of collective class action 
(2006). Days before the elections, Peres suggested "class warfare" in Israel is in fact 
thwarted by the clash of identities, which does not allow the proletariat to acknowledge 
its common economic interests.   
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After a brief sociological review, I will now return to the "rational-choice" framework 
and focus on personal utilitarian interests. An economic approach incisively 
distinguishes between individuals who have a tangible and present benefit from the 
welfare state and those whose current contributions exceed the gains they make. Ultra-
orthodox and Israeli-Arabs were taken out of these analysis to make the welfare 
interests of the privileged and underprivileged samples as homogenous as possible. 
Notably, these groups had their own distinctive agenda and identity, which was not 
related to their socio-economic status. My focus on voters' identity relied heavily on the 
question of income. This information was the key for an informed and rational choice 








Figure ‎7.2.5: Subjective place of subjects in society by wealth and voting patterns (ISSP 1999) 
The ISSP questionnaire addressed this topic directly (1999). When subjects were asked 
to locate themselves in society on a scale of 1 to 10, distinguishing between those 
"tending to be towards the top" and those "tending to be toward the bottom", a normal 
distribution was found in almost all groups. However, as illustrated in Figure ‎7.2.5, the 
underprivileged, especially the Labour supporters, were more likely to put themselves in 
the bottom three categories, whereas no more than a third of the Likud underprivileged 
did so. The majority of the underprivileged respondents, like the majority of their 
privileged counterparts, perceived their standard of living to be average or above 
average. Evidently, there seems to be only a light correlation between the authentic 
position of an underprivileged person in society and his subjective estimation of it, 
especially if s/he supports Likud. The exploratory survey, despite its limited scope, also 
showed that a majority of Likud underprivileged placed themselves in the fourth decile 
or above 
This flawed awareness is remarkable considering the real gaps between privileged and 
underprivileged. Factually, the upper monthly income limit of families from the lowest 
two deciles in Israel was 5,401 Shekels gross (CBS 2001, Table 5.32). The ISSP 1999 
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family income data showed that all underprivileged families were located deep within 
the bottom two categories, with a gross adjusted income of no more than 3,500 Shekels. 
Yet, less than a fifth of these subjects realised that their deprivation is severe enough to 
place them in the bottom fifth of society. These figures also call into question the more 
accurate assessments of the Labour underprivileged electorate.  
Likud underprivileged voters erroneously upgraded themselves on the socio-economic 
ladder in the in-depth interviews as well. A common answer is in Quotation ‎7.2.12 and 
maintains that if an individual can satisfy her/his basic needs and does not require 
external assistance, s/he becomes a member of the middle-class, which is far above the 
base of the income pyramid. Even though this phenomenon has rarely been explored in 
Israel, it resonates with findings from other countries, reviewed in previous chapters.  
"[Q] You put yourself in the fifth decile in the survey you filled a short 
while ago. [A] Yes. [Q] Why? [A] It depends on the way you examine 
it. I am not poor, begging for money and I am not waiting for 
someone to bring me bread. I can feed myself. Therefore, I put 
myself in number five. Put it simply, I am living my life."  
Quotation ‎7.2.12: Interviewee No. 2 (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005)  
Having confirmed the existence of contradictory identity, Quotation ‎7.2.13 exemplifies 
its implications. It was made by a pensioner whose benefits were recently reduced 
following Netanyahu's reforms. Yet, it seemed as the interviewee did not fully realise he 
was among those who was paying the price of these reforms. 
"He wanted to implement his reforms like it happened in America… 
We cannot understand today the reasoning behind his thoughts… It is 
possible that Bibi believed he would torture them for a month or two, 
and subsequently everyone will be equal in their salary – taking from 
the rich and giving to the poor." 
Quotation ‎7.2.13: Interviewee No. 5 (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005)  
The empirical evidence illustrated in the figure below shows that the impact of 
unawareness was stronger among Likud underprivileged voters. 36 per cent of them 
were certain that they would be better off if income tax rates were reduced, even though 
they are exempted from paying it. These figures are better than those found in Britain, 
but the fact remains that a third of the Likud underprivileged electorate perceived 
Netanyahu's liberal tax reforms as beneficial. These reforms have literally reduced the 
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Figure ‎7.2.6: Subjects' estimations as to the change in their personal status following a reduction 
in income taxes (Author's Exploratory Survey 2006) 
Before moving on to explore tradition and coherency in the vote, a few summarising 
remarks on the three dimensions of informed voting are required. I have tried to show 
that illiteracy with regard to welfare policy exists among broad populations, but also 
that underprivileged Likud voters are more likely to hold erroneous beliefs of their 
party's future intentions. This specific group was also more likely to upgrade its socio-
economic status and wrongly assume that tax cuts would be directly to its benefit. The 
analysis showed two trends collide with each other: the difficulties in engaging in policy 
debates about welfare (which were common to the entire underprivileged sample) and 
the inaccuracies in assessing economic progress and parties‘ platforms (which were 
heavily influenced by partisanship). The combination of both prevents the Likud 
underprivileged electorate from pursuing its economic interests.  
The differences in attitudes towards defence and welfare were striking. The discomfort 
of the underprivileged when talking about social policy was in stark contrast with their 
extreme confidence expressing views on issues of national security. Underprivileged 
voters were also well aware of the different approaches to the latter. Having discussed 
the issue of priorities, it is unclear whether the underperformance of the poor in the 
debate on welfare derives from ignorance of the socio-economic manifestos, a process 
of retrospective rationalisation, or, rather, the smokescreens and manoeuvres of election 
campaigns. None of these possibilities could be fully rebuffed or accepted with the 
available data. Unfortunately, the absence of any comprehensive research focusing on 
political knowledge also limited the ability to rely on existing studies in the pursuit of 
firm conclusions.  
When looking at voters‘ reasoning, the impact of traditional voting cannot be 
overstated. When examining whether voters care about their party‘s policies, it was 
found that not all were actively seeking to pursue ideological goals. In fact, some of the 
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manifestoes. Their vote was largely determined by what was defined in the IES of 1999 
as "solidarity with the party". The Hebrew translation of the questionnaire links 
solidarity with old loyalties and traditions, and the figures show Likud underprivileged 
voters were the most likely to vote for such reasons (62 per cent). In contrast, privileged 
voters were twice as likely as underprivileged to perceive their voting to be based on te 








Figure ‎7.2.7: Major motivation behind party affiliation by wealth and affiliation (IES 1999) 
Voting records also call attention to the Likud underprivileged electorate. According to 
the IES of 1999, 93 per cent of them replicated their previous vote, compared to 80 per 
cent among Labour underprivileged voters. This is not to say their voting had no 
ideological underpinnings, but rather that the chances of them holding fixed political 
positions over time is higher. Notably, earlier studies reached similar conclusions (see, 
for instance, Arian 1975, p. 154 and Arian 1990, p. 250), even though over time the 
reliance on historical alliances was found to be reducing (Arian & Shamir 2005, p. 46).  
The quantitative findings are supported by qualitative observations of the fieldwork. 
Interviewee No. 2, who was deeply frustrated and seriously damaged by the cutbacks in 
state benefits, would probably keep voting Likud as "it‘s better to keep ploughing with 
your own cart rather than search for a new one" (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005).  
Interviewee No. 3, when asked whether he had any regrets about voting Likud, replied 
that Likud is "in my blood and my roots". He despised Labour, declaring that the "most 
important thing is to prevent Labour from winning" (Underprivileged, 21/9/2005). 
Together with Quotation ‎7.2.14, these comments reflect the spiritual and even 
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"I went once to the polls to vote for Labour. I swear to God… that the 
ballot was just stuck in my hands and I could not lift it from the table. 
It just could not be lifted, until I picked the ballot of the Likud party 
or the one for the Religious Party. The most important thing is to 
resist the Maarach (the previous name of the Labour party – G.A.)… 
But today I know that not loving the Maarach was the greatest 
mistake I made in my entire life." 
Quotation ‎7.2.14: Interviewee No. 7 (Underprivileged, 2/11/2005) 
In contrast to the underprivileged voters, the privileged ones played the political game 
without surrendering their independent judgment to past commitments. Interviewee No. 
9, who joined the "Herut" movement (the antecedent of Likud) when he was 18, had 
voted once for a religious party, although he dubbed his decision "a betrayal of values‖ 
(Privileged, 6/12/2005). Interviewee No 10, who voted for Shinui, a secular left-wing 
party, admitted that it had not kept its promises, which "frustrated" her personally and 
led her to swap parties (Privileged, 27/11/2005). Interviewee No. 11 explained how his 
voting decision was taken, maintaining he ascertained his "positions in the political and 
social arenas before searching for the candidate who has a similar platform" (Privileged, 
8/12/2005). 
The stronger adherence of underprivileged voters to traditions can be explained in 
various ways. Statistically, it is correlated with the difficulties these voters experience 
when discussing national welfare policy. This research however has restricted itself to 
monitoring the characteristics (and not the root causes) of the underprivileged vote, 
which have the potential to divert choice from the course of rational thinking. Tradition 
is certainly one of these attributes. The linkage between "public choice" and "public 
interest" can hardly be maintained when voters, rather than considering their 
alternatives, set aside their perceived interests, the parties' pledges and the candidates' 
capacity to deliver. Traditional voting is the antithesis to Downs‘ (1956) and Key‘s 
(1966) ideal voters. Yet those in need are more likely to follow this route.  
The various dynamics and influences discussed so far could account for the scant 
importance underprivileged voters attached to welfare provision. The evidence suggests 
that Likud underprivileged voters were generally uncommitted to the welfare state, 
faced difficulties in grasping welfare policy, softened (or even denied) the socio-
economic agenda of the neo-liberal party and were vulnerable to higher levels of fear 
and a stronger adherence to tradition. Yet, having said all that, a plain questionnaire 
found many of the Likud underprivileged voted against their own pre-defined utility. In 
fact, for 43 per cent of them, a better utilitarian choice could have been made.  
This figure relies on the structure of the voters‘ utility function, as explored earlier in 
this chapter, and their expectations of each party in each field, as reported in my own 
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exploratory survey. The datasets of the IES or the ISSP did not contain enough data to 
permit a systematic comparison of political alternatives and trade-offs. Nevertheless, the 
IES of 1992 did show that voters had relatively low expectations of the rival party in 
almost all fields. It seemed that voters‘ political affiliation obviated any potential critical 
approach, clearing the way for an almost unreserved conformity with the chosen party. 
This conclusion resonates with an early study of Arian which doubted there was any 
significant degree of "critical voting" in Israel (1975).  
The analysis of the 2006 exploratory survey indicated different trends than the IES of 
1992. It showed diminishing expectations of the Likud in the field of welfare, even 
among the party's traditional bases of support. Only a third of these voters stated that the 
Likud party would advance their welfare interests (33 per cent among the privileged, 27 
per cent among the underprivileged), whereas half of the Likud voters, privileged and 
underprivileged, believed that the Labour party would deliver on these issues (50 per 
cent). The contradictory expectations demonstrated in Figure ‎7.2.8 might be correlated 






Figure ‎7.2.8: Expected utilities of the entire sample from Likud and Labour in the field of 
welfare by wealth (Author's Exploratory Survey 2006) 
The independent fieldwork of this study therefore found Likud underprivileged voters, 
while acknowledging the Labour party would probably advance their utility through the 
welfare state, still hold onto their own cart. Several explanations for this phenomenon 
were discussed already, though the extent of sympathy with Labour was above 
expectations. Figure ‎7.2.9 complements the operationalisation of the independent 
variable by presenting the scores each party received, which are the average difference 
between the voters' expected utility from both parties in each field. The indicator 
received the value of four when the respondent replied that one party would "definitely 
promote" his/her interests and the other would "definitely damage" them.  
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* Note that the Underprivileged (Labour) group includes only three individuals out of 57 respondents.  
Figure ‎7.2.9: Parties' relative advantage over their major rival in selected policy fields by wealth 
and political affiliation (Author's Exploratory Survey 2006)  
The integration of the level of importance and the parties‘ relative advantage in each 
field yielded the expected utility from each party. The conflict of expectations between 
social and defence policies resulted in 43 per cent of Likud disadvantaged supporters 
voting against their calculated "utilitarian preference", revealing a potential 
inconsistency in their reasoning. The results summarised in Figure ‎7.2.10 below reflect 
the difference between Likud and Labour supporters. Within the Labour sample, there 
were almost no discrepancies, as the vast majority of Labour voters have shown their 







Figure ‎7.2.10: Voters' actual vote compared to voters' utilitarian preference by wealth and 
political affiliation (Author's Exploratory Survey 2006) 
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The behaviour of Likud underprivileged voters cannot be accounted for with the small-
scale and short survey presented above. However, some plausible theories can be 
deduced from the in-depth interviews and the various indications found in the empirical 
data. With regard to the utility calculus, there is a need to assess the cumulative impact 
of other factors that were not taken into account here. It might also be that the need for 
security and the disappointment with state welfare played a greater role for these voters 
than they would be willing to admit. What we can learn is that in 2006, underprivileged 
Likud voters admitted a dissonance with their political choice.  
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7.3 Summary and Conclusion 
Projecting the insights deduced from the Israeli analysis of the relationships of the poor, 
the welfare state and democracy, the weakness of the welfare state is a key concern. The 
results are unmistakable. In numbers, 41 per cent of the underprivileged voted Likud in 
1992, double the support for Labour. The research shows that the perceived need for 
security brushed aside questions of redistribution. Crudely speaking, welfare was almost 
a non-issue for the underprivileged electorate, who rarely considered it when making its 
political choice. It was the weakest link in the Triangle.   
The poor certainly benefited from social and political rights, but did not perceive 
themselves as a collective and were more concerned with their existential security. This 
would be understandable, if the balancing of underprivileged Likud voters between the 
different threats were not so distinctive. It was fuelled by emotions of fears (security) 
and lack of hope (in welfare). The fears could be described as obsessive, especially in 
relation to other voters, and they were effectively addressed by the right-wing party. 
The hopes were dashed by government's perceived incompetence to affect their well 
being, leaving them unwilling to commit themselves politically to the left-wing party.  
There was also a sharp difference in voters' expectations from government. The state 
was perceived as incompetent in providing better welfare but exceptionally capable of 
guaranteeing security. As the expectations of voters from a tough defence policy 
increased, so too did their political commitment to support it. Voters went through the 
opposite process with regard to welfare provision. In fact, the unmediated engagements 
in disadvantaged localities showed many of the poor acting as if they were in a different 
triangle. In their view, the question of redistribution is marginal and the safety of all 
Israel is not only central but also rests exclusively upon their lean shoulders.  
All the reasons and explanations for the underprivileged to vote for the Likud exist. 
However, there were a few anomalies and disparities. The Likud voters were factually 
less knowledgeable as to their party's socio-economic agenda, the depth of their socio-
economic deprivation and the implications of these indicators on their future utilities 
from different policies. They were engaged in collective action, but on a different 
frontier and with a different congregation. They were also more likely than others to 
follow old traditions of political support and justify inequalities on the grounds of 
economic prosperity. All these inclinations could be seen as excluding mechanisms that 
contributed to the already-established priorities of the underprivileged.  
These findings cannot explain why the welfare state occupies today a relatively 
marginal place in the Israeli agenda. A historical perspective might suggest that Israel 
was established after the democratic struggles for redistribution had ended. Others 
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might note that the lack of visibility in welfare provision prevents such issues from 
becoming prominent in a public arena that is almost addicted to news. One way or 
another, it seems that the welfare state is not supported by the very mechanism of 
democracy, where "the poor have more sovereign power than the rich" (Aristotle 1992, 
p. 362). When social policy plays such an insignificant role in election campaigns and 
political rhetoric, this side of the Triangle is locked out.  
As previous studies have emphasised, the security issue was – and probably remains – 
the key to understanding why Israeli voters make the choices they do. Crude utility 
calculation indeed failed to account for 43-50 per cent of the Likud voters. Even though 
the method employed in the exploratory survey was limited in scope and statistical 
rigour, the findings raise questions as to additional motives underpinning a Likud vote. 
Yet, as Gordon and Arian have argued, it seems that "when people feel very threatened 
– the decision-making process about policy is dominated by emotion – not by logic or 
rational considerations" (2001, p. 196). The welfare state and the Triangle for 
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8. Discussion and Synthesis of Findings 
The changing relationships between poor people, democracies and welfare states have 
been systematically evaluated in this thesis. The previous chapters have explored in 
detail the findings in the two case studies of Britain and Israel. Their structure was a 
derivative of the operational framework consisting of three hierarchical layers of 
political engagement, as explored in Chapter 5. This chapter will synthesise these 
results into the theoretical framework, around which Chapters 2-4 were constructed, 
reflecting upon the existing literature. The key insights will therefore be discussed in the 
context of the relationships between the three forces that facilitate redistribution, namely 
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Figure ‎7.3.1: The Triangle for Redistribution and the Pyramid of Political Engagement 
This discussion requires a clearer definition of the Triangle for Redistribution's corners, 
as they form the boundaries of this thesis, situate its findings within the wider social 
milieu and define its analytical prism. The meaning of each factor has been subjected to 
long-running debates and scientific disagreements. It might also vary across states and 
regimes. The following clarifications are intended merely to define a solid and 
acceptable baseline upon which the various conclusions can reside.  
"Democracy" in the thesis refers to the Greek definition of demos (people) and krator 
(rule), and its modern implementation through equal suffrage and an elected 
government that is sovereign (see Pericles in Thucydides 1972, p. 145). "The welfare 
state" is the set of institutions that secures "some basic modicum of welfare for its 
citizens" (Esping Andersen 1990, pp. 19), and a set of policies that can be seen to be 
"beneficent, redistributive and concerned with economic as well as non-economic 
objectives" (Titmuss 1974, p. 30). "The poor" are citizens who are "deprived of the 
conditions of life which ordinarily define membership of society" (Townsend 1979, p. 
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Having defined the boundaries of the discussion, I shall first examine the principal 
findings regarding the poor as a key force in the Triangle and the focal point of this 
thesis. Issues of identity and turnout, as well as the absence of commitment, will be 
recapped in light of the poor's engagement with the other two corners of the Triangle. 
The appropriate role of the welfare state will also be questioned, following its lack of 
support from those it benefits the most. Subsequently, the emphasis will shift to the 
relationship between democracy and the welfare state and the function they currently 
play in the context of voters' knowledge and reasoning. After shedding light on some 
negative (but probably unavoidable) implications for democracy today, the concluding 
chapter will refer to several challenges and future directions of research.   
 
The Poor 
Forty years have passed since Pulzer famously stated 
that "class is the basis of British party politics; all 
else is embellishment and detail" (1967/1978, p. 
102). Over the years, American scholarship on 
electoral behaviour shifted from psychological-based 
theories (Lazarsfeld et al 1948) to sociological-based 
ones (Campbell et al 1960). In Britain, Butler and 
Stokes' classic study highlighted the major impact 
class culture had on party allegiance (1969). Even though new trends have been 
identified (even by Pulzer himself, in 1978), the prefatory question of class identity has 
resonated since and remained central to voting theories.  
Sections 6.2 and 7.2 explored the various definitions of class and their practical 
implications in both countries. Whereas the historical definition of class in Britain relied 
on occupation, the common definition in Israel referred to low income families. The 
original intention of this thesis was to focus on individuals living in relative poverty 
("the poor"), noting that they might be entitled to state benefits and gain personally from 
a generous welfare regime.  However, missing data in election surveys required the 
construction of an "underprivileged group" through a multi-variable algorithm. It 
comprised of subjects living at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, as captured by 
several indicators. Within this group, a subjective identity of a "working class" 
increased the likelihood of a Labour vote. This scenario, of class affiliation correlated 
with partisanship, is widely defined as "class voting" (see Section 4.2 for further 
discussion).   
Generally speaking, class voting requires the least effort in making political choice. By 
following old class loyalties, no particular attention need be paid to past records of 
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The Poor 
The Poverty of Democracy 242 
 
performance, future policies and political alternatives. As one interviewee said, "In a 
northern working class background back in the seventies and eighties you voted Labour 
by and large." Incidentally, in contrast with Israel, the class-based choice in Britain 
coincides with the economic interest of the underprivileged electorate in having a 
generous welfare state. Even though not all underprivileged voters identified themselves 
with the working class (and vice versa), it turned an almost-blind choice into a rational 
one.  
The trends of class dealignment bring this hegemony into question. Inglehart was the 
first to observe the change in values that led to realigned bases of political support and 
the declining importance of occupation (1977). Subsequent studies showed not only a 
shift in individuals' axes of identity but also a corresponding swing in the agendas 
pursued by political parties (Sarlvik & Crewe 1983, Franklin 1985, Bartle 1998, Evans 
1999). The ideological axis of socialism vs. capitalism had been complemented by 
something far more complex that accommodated both libertarianism and 
authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1994, pp. 30-31). In Britain, a major academic controversy 
emerged around the fate of class voting in light of these changes (see Sections ‎4.2 & 6.2 
and Denver 2003, Chapters 3&4). In Israel, these ethnic and ideological realignments 
could be traced back to the early years of the establishment of the State (see Section 7.2 
and Yuchyman-Ya'ar & Peres 2000).  
This study observes the apparent impact of these new identities on grass-roots 
underprivileged voters. Its findings show how the blurred class identity of the 
underprivileged both in Britain and in Israel appears to translate itself into a "counter-
class" vote. The literature repeatedly shows that class, albeit weakening, is still strongly 
correlated with partisanship (Butler & Stokes 1969, p. 78; Heath et al. 2001, p. 6; 
Andersen and Heath 2002, p. 129; Denver 2003, p. 70; Clarke et al. 2004, p. 12). A 
contradictory self-identification with the middle class does affect voters. Unlike 
privileged citizens, whose dependency on the welfare state is minimal, such 
contradictions have brought some of the most deprived voters to support a policy that 
might be to their detriment.  
Secondary analysis of large-scale Israeli and British surveys demonstrated that 
underprivileged Conservative voters were more likely to artificially upgrade their socio-
economic status. In Britain, 46 per cent of them identified themselves as members of the 
middle class compared to 22 per cent of Labour voters. In Israel, only 33 per cent of 
Likud underprivileged located themselves in the bottom four deciles of society, in 
comparison to 50 per cent of their Labour equivalents. Roemer (1998) interpreted this 
as a potential long-term investment of the poor in national prosperity. Nonetheless, the 
expected loss of foreseeable benefits in the short term does raise a question.  
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My in-depth interviews showed that class is often subordinate when multiple identities 
are formed. The citizens of Sderot, for example, were not only likely to be poor but also 
those most likely to face the unique threat of rockets, be labelled as "Sephardic" and be 
strictly observant of the Jewish religion. This ties in with Peres' conclusion, which 
perceives as unlikely the prospect of collective class action in Israel because of multiple 
identities (2006). In Britain, EU integration was found in the BES of 1992 to be the 
issue most mentioned by underprivileged Tories as affecting their vote. Even though it 
was not salient in my 2006 interviews, its blurring potential on class identity as shown 
in the secondary analysis cannot be neglected.  
These new axes of identity unrelated to class interests contribute to the inaccurate 
positioning of voters' own status in society, especially in Israel. A Sephardic might think 
of a new immigrant as poor and requiring state assistance, even though both have 
similar incomes. When religious, ethnic and socio-economic identities substitute for 
each other, they might impede a "rational vote" by the underprivileged, as this blurred 
identity distorts any assessment of interests. This was exemplified in the exploratory 
small-scale survey conducted as part of the fieldwork, which showed that one third of 
Israeli Likud underprivileged voters and two thirds of their British Conservative 
counterparts believed that an income tax break would benefit them personally, even 
though they were below the tax threshold. Clearly, knowledge about identity plays a 
crucial role in individual choice. Mistaken assessments inform ostensibly perverse 
judgments.  
In this respect, the shift from class voting to issue voting (Sarlvik & Crewe 1983, see 
also Section 4.2) requires different capacities from voters that they might not always 
possess. Following a tradition is easier than prioritising issues and forming positions 
based on individual interests. The interviews have shown that not all voters are equally 
adept at the latter. This shortcoming is analogous to the market failure of information 
asymmetries. Its role in decision-making has been extensively discussed in economic 
scholarship (see, for instance, Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz Nobel Prize Lectures in 
2001) and has also been mentioned in the analysis of political choice (see, for instance, 
Fiorina 1990 and Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997). However, the precise types of 
knowledge needed for making a reasoned political decision are rarely defined and 
researched.  
Having discussed class identity in relation to "the poor" as a collective forming one 
'point' of the Triangle, it is time to reassess this group's relationships with democracy 
and the welfare state. The theoretical chapters have explored the varying contribution of 
different welfare regimes to the underprivileged (Chapter 2) and the diverse theories and 
frameworks within which the political performance of poor people can be examined 
(Chapter 4). What this thesis can contribute to the debate is the parallels between two 
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types of possible commitments to the state, one of which is to the democratic 
establishment and which has been extensively studied, and the other is to the welfare 
apparatus and which was seldom identified in the literature. The absence of these 
commitments was found to be a key characteristic of the underprivileged who did not 
vote for greater redistribution (either by abstention or by "counter-class" voting).  
These concepts were developed during the analysis itself, and they require clarification. 
When I use the term "civic commitment", I am referring to the commitment of citizens 
to the democratic establishment. It is commonly described in economic literature as the 
"civic duty" to account for abstention from voting (see Section ‎4.3), and was one of the 
key observations of this thesis' fieldwork. In this respect, the privileged and 
underprivileged cannot be assigned to the same group of abstainers, simply because 
their motives and discourses of abstention are fundamentally different. The term 
"welfare commitment" implies the same type of commitment but towards the welfare 
apparatus, which guarantees the poor their social rights in the same way that democracy 
guarantees their political rights. However, an overview of the welfare state, its past 
achievements, present impact and future capacities, results in individuals being 
unwilling to support it politically. In both instances, we are faced with an absence of 
commitment that affects the Triangle as a whole.   
The "civic commitment", in the context of turnout, is often offered as the solution to a 
paradox in political behaviour. As explored in Section 4.3, the insignificant chance of 
casting the decisive vote in elections led theorists to suggest that "if everyone is 
rational… then, presumably, no one will vote" (Ledyard 1984, p. 12). Whereas the 
partisan distribution of abstention is disputed (Pacel and Radcliff 1995, Shaffer 1982 
and Lijphart 1997), its correlation with low socio-economic status is generally 
acknowledged (Key 1942/1947 and Lijphart 1997). Rosenstone maintained that when 
an individual fights for his/her economic survival, a "withdrawal from politics" is likely 
and even expected (1982, p. 41). Generally, the studies into the causes of abstention 
followed three avenues of analysis – rational choice, sociological effects and political 
efficacy (Denver 2003, Ch. 2). 
Pattie and Johnston uniquely integrated individual data from the BES and voting 
records of constituencies to compare all three explanations. They eventually concluded 
that "those who felt the greatest sense of commitment to the result and to particular 
parties… were most likely to vote" (1998, p. 279). Riker and Ordeshhook reached a 
similar conclusion in the U.S. context, highlighting the intrinsic satisfaction from civic 
participation (1968). Both studies have in fact shown that if civic duty is taken as a 
utility, cost-benefit equations can also apply to voting decisions. The interviews 
conducted for this thesis and the secondary analysis of databases strongly suggests that 
lack of commitment is the key cause of abstention by the underprivileged.  
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Both surveys and turnout records showed that abstention was more common among the 
underprivileged, especially in Britain, where a turnout gap of 10-15 per cent was 
repeatedly found. In Israel, the gap was smaller, but nonetheless existed. When British 
abstainers accounted for their nonparticipation in election surveys, the reasons given by 
the privileged were mainly technical, whereas the underprivileged tended to express 
them in terms of apathy and disinterest. The interviews conducted for this thesis 
reiterated this difference, demonstrating that the chief barrier to turnout was the 
underprivileged's scepticism about democracy's ability to deliver. The transcripts of my 
interviews with underprivileged respondents provide a basis upon which to question 
other theories discussed in the literature that link abstention to registration requirements 
(Brians & Grofman 2001, Highton 1997) or the cost of voting (Aldrich 1993, Niemi 
1976).  
The series of interviews with underprivileged potential electors ended with the 
identification of three major discourses: a utility-based discourse, which expected 
material gains from voting; a duty-based discourse, which reflected a strong sense of 
civic belonging; and a punishment-based discourse, which intended to "penalise" the 
political apparatus for the abstainer's distress. In both countries, the privileged and 
underprivileged often shared a common view of their government's incompetence. 
However, whereas the wealthier still voted and reflected a discourse of duty (either for 
solidaristic or contractarian reasons), the underprivileged abstainers were more likely to 
adopt the other narratives. They looked for something in return for their effort and 
ignored any collective framework of commitment, precisely as one would expect from 
rational players.  
These results correspond with the seminal argument made by Amartya Sen about 
rationality theories. Sen's notion of "rational fools" was premised on the role of 
commitment in human behaviour (1977). Arguably, the poor's lower degree of 
commitment makes abstention perfectly rational for them, unlike privileged voters, 
whose commitment accounts for the irrational act of voting. Orthodox economists might 
ascribe the role of commitment to Simon's notion of bounded rationality (1955). 
Nevertheless, as elections are by far the most resounding example of the failure of 
formal rationality (see the discussion on the Paradox of Voter Turnout in Section ‎4.3), 
the acknowledgment of civic duty as a utility offers a solution for the contradiction. If 
we follow this avenue, the absence of commitment, mainly in underprivileged 
strongholds, leads to convergent economic and sociological accounts of poverty and 
low turnouts.  
We are therefore observing different narratives of abstention in which civic 
commitment makes the difference between voting and abstaining. Under these 
circumstances, classifying all abstainers in one category seems rather simplistic, as the 
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fieldwork clearly shows that socio-economic background is correlated with the different 
narratives.  The interviews have demonstrated the behavioural gulf between an elector 
who was temporarily absent on Election Day and another who declared permanent 
abstention or was intent on punishing the government by staying at home. Following the 
theoretical discussion in Section ‎4.4, these findings underline the need to re-examine the 
operational definition of political exclusion, which today does not make this 
differentiation in turnout (Burchardt et al. 1999, Gordon et al. 2000).  
Two reservations should be made. First, there is a wide range of factors affecting 
turnout that this study has not dealt with, such as the impact of a seat's marginality and 
the neighbourhood effect (see, for instance, Andersen & Heath 2002, Denver & Hands 
1985 and MacAllister et al 2001). It should be said, however, that these factors did not 
emerge from the interviews. In addition, in both countries, no deliberate attempt was 
made to overcome the "over-reported voting" phenomena (Silver et al 1986) and the 
less-explored "invisible group" (see Sections 6.1 & 7.1). Both negatively affected the 
accuracy of survey figures, though the overall trends were generally verified. 
Having discussed some key findings with regard to "civic commitment", I will now 
focus on the "welfare commitment" concept. Notably, whereas the former is part of the 
dynamic between the poor and their democratic representatives, the latter is part of their 
dynamic with the welfare state. Consequently, questions of turnout and identity are to 
be replaced here with questions of knowledge and reasoning. In short, the findings 
suggest a crisis of trust between the welfare apparatus and its principal beneficiaries. 
The evidence gathered portrays a one-sided relationship, in which a significant 
proportion of the underprivileged receive state assistance but rarely acknowledge it, 
articulate its importance or show willingness to commit themselves to it politically. The 
historic triumph of collective welfare, as explored in Section 3.3 and Chapter 2, is 
neither familiar nor embraced by the disadvantaged of our time. 
The ethics of self-reliance have been mentioned in the literature as a possible 
explanation for the alienation of individuals from national policy (see Section 4.4). By 
relieving the state of responsibility for individuals, the ethics of self-reliance make it 
difficult to theorise about utilitarian voting, as no collective responsibility for personal 
welfare remains. This was best described by Feldman in the U.S. context, who noted 
that "instead of asking why personal economic grievances appear to have no political 
consequences, the question now is why so few people hold the government responsible 
for their economic well-being" (1982, p. 455, see also Sniderman & Brody 1977, 
Scholzman & Verba 1979 and McClosky & Zaller 1984). The fieldwork for this thesis 
contributes similar insights to this debate, both in Israel and in Britain.  
The interviews showed the extent of the underprivileged electorate's scepticism about 
the ability of politicians to deliver for them. In Britain, an underprivileged interviewee 
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said his personal welfare had "nothing to do with the government really" as "this is 
something to do with the job centres… [and] the people working there… they have to 
decide." In Israel, an underprivileged voter stated that "there was never a connection" 
between the elected government and his welfare, because if "he was not waking up and 
taking care [of himself]… nobody would have been taking care of [him]." Most 
underprivileged voters perceived pledges of social reform as impracticable, denying any 
impact of state policies on their daily life. A strikingly different attitude was found in 
the Israeli fieldwork when defence policies were at stake. Suddenly, almost mythical 
powers were accredited to the same incompetent government.  
The secondary analysis of election surveys reinforced these qualitative observations. In 
Britain, the BES of 1997 revealed that only one third of underprivileged Tory voters 
(compared to 60 per cent of underprivileged Labour voters) perceived the government 
as being accountable for their personal standard of living. In Israel, the figures reflected 
the priority the mainly right-leaning underprivileged interviewees attached to issues of 
security and foreign affairs at the expense of welfare and redistributive policies. In both 
countries, a positive correlation was found between voting Conservative and support for 
neo-liberal ideals. In that respect, the interviews have shown that a social-democratic 
language, welfare terminology or redistributive concepts were mostly absent in the 
articulation and mindset of underprivileged individuals. 
The lack of a welfare language should not be underestimated. Almost all 
underprivileged interviewees, although prompted to do so, did not chose to actively 
advocate greater redistribution, generous benefits or greater social expenditure. Both 
ideologically and terminologically, some of the interviews gave the impression of being 
a muted electorate focused on the observable with no spark of a vision for a 
fundamental change. Social Policy might be taught in leading universities, but the 
language of social change has apparently never crossed the line to the poor. The 
underprivileged interviewed for this thesis, regardless of their political affiliation, 
exemplified the gulf between their outspoken agenda and any notion of a broader social 
ideology of the type intuited by Converse (1964) or Feldman (1988). 
In one of his first publications, Basil Bernstein defined language as "the most important 
means of initiating, synthesising, and reinforcing ways of thinking, feeling and 
behaviour which are functionally related to the social group" (1959, p. 312, italics are in 
the origin). His classic distinctions between public and formal language, and elaborated 
and restricted language "codes", were entirely correlated with structures of social 
relations (1958, 1959, 1960 and 1964). Even though linguistics is not within the scope 
of this research, Bernstein's citation suggests that the language of the underprivileged 
affects their way of thinking. Their restricted code associated with limited vocabulary 
equates with the absence of underpinning ideals of welfare.  
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These ideas could have been communicated by all language codes. One does not need to 
use the language of redistribution and equality to urge for higher social spending and 
greater taxation on the rich. Dean's work on moral repertories and their manifestation by 
different groups showed how these ideas can be communicated in different languages 
(1999). What is striking in this fieldwork is the rarity of redistributive issues in the 
political context, especially among Israeli underprivileged Conservatives. The 
informality of the fieldwork interviews was conducive to first-hand familiarity with the 
issues disturbing the interviewees with regard to politics. Redistribution and welfare 
policy were simply not among them, neither in substance nor in vocabulary, even 
though the interviewees might have expressed support if asked.  
The secondary analysis of election surveys provides a more systematic view of the 
salience of neo-liberal ideas, mainly among underprivileged Conservatives. In Britain, 
for instance, Conservative underprivileged voters were twice as likely as their Labour 
counterparts to claim that the Welfare State makes people "less willing to look after 
themselves" (63 per cent vs. 27 per cent in the BES of 1992).  Only one-fifth of 
disadvantaged Tories expect their government to "make people's income more equal", 
compared to three-fifths of their Labour equivalents. The latter were also twice as likely 
to support higher taxation and greater social spending. In Israel, a fifth of the Likud 
disadvantaged voters "strongly agreed" that inequalities are needed for prosperity - three 
times more than others. Although the interviews exposed the emptiness of language, the 
quantitative findings showed that a neo-liberal narrative affected the perceptions of the 
underprivileged in both societies and specifically those casting a "counter-class" vote.  
The reasons for underprivileged voters to hold such a narrative are unclear. As Chapters 
2 and 4 have shown, various welfare regimes treat the underprivileged differently. A 
social-democratic regime benefits the poor more than others, at least in the short term. 
Nonetheless, a significant proportion of the underprivileged – around two-fifths in both 
countries – either abstain or vote for the non-welfarist party (as defined in Section 5.2). 
Moreover, the language of those who formally support greater redistribution rarely 
contains any social-democratic ideas of collective change. The modern welfare state 
was relatively successful in redistributing wealth, fighting Beveridge's "five-giants" and 
satisfying the basic needs of the poor. However, it failed to instil basic notions of 
equality and rights in the consciousness of the underprivileged electorate. As the 
welfare state is not a self-sustaining mechanism and since its fate is determined by the 
people themselves, these one-sided relationships, to say the least, pose grave challenges 
for its future. 
A different strategy might have made welfare less taken for granted by the poor. It 
might have disseminated a proper terminology to allow the underprivileged to have at 
least a basic understanding of its role and history. This might have allowed the welfare 
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state to become more relevant for the poor. Either way, as long as the debate on 
redistribution and equality is confined to academia, other issues will continue to shape 
the agenda (and the language) of the poor electorate. While the question of legitimation 
deficit in welfare provision has already been explored (Taylor-Gooby 1983 & 1985, pp. 
21-52), the vocabulary and knowledge of those in need lags behind, and there is a need 
to understand better why and how this happens. The welfare state is capable of 
revitalising its image among that audience whose attention and commitment it might 
have captured.. 
Having discussed poor people's identity, their lack of commitment and their limited 
welfare language, another insight into the mechanisms of reasoning of the 
underprivileged electorate should be noted. Over and again, the fieldwork has shown the 
chronic insecurity of underprivileged citizens when venturing into the domain of 
national welfare policy. This is not necessarily attributable to their relative lack of 
knowledge but to the overall circumstances of their life, which probably limit their 
capacity to engage in such a debate. As a consequence, personal experiences and 
accidental interactions were found to have a higher impact and therefore exercise 
greater influence over underprivileged voters‘ perceptions. This echoes the findings of 
the "Columbia" school (Lazarsfeld et al 1948), as the dependency of the underprivileged 
electorate on their close environment is probably greater than others.  
In this respect, the fieldwork showed a significant difference between privileged and 
underprivileged voters. Whereas both have often integrated local observations in their 
political articulation, only privileged voters constructed from these observations some 
policy conclusions for the future. The underprivileged rarely transcended self-
experienced observations in their replies. Thus, for instance, if a privileged voter's fury 
over police neglect of a crime in his neighbourhood culminated in a complaint against 
its human resources management, an underprivileged voter stated that Blair "spoke 
about the police in the street, and there are more police in the street… he spoke about 
the NHS hospitals, and it is cleaner now." Both accumulated self-experienced 
observations, but the relatively poor rarely used them to form an abstract argument 
relevant for the work of government. The poor were far more likely to rationalise their 
previous voting by using micro and self-experienced observations rather than 
considering future directions and raising questions of national policies. The latter 
discourse put them on unsteady ground.  
Another key difference shaping the mechanism of reasoning of the underprivileged 
electorate concerns emotions and fears. Secondary analysis and in-depth interviews 
have shown that the underprivileged, especially Likud voters in Israel, reacted to 
uncertainties by exaggerating them. In 1999, for instance, on the eve of the historic 
Camp David peace talks with the Palestinians, nine out of ten Likud underprivileged 
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voters claimed in a survey that the ultimate goal of the Arabs was to annihilate Israel, by 
far the highest proportion among all groups. The interviews conducted in the course of 
this study have shown how the fear of terror overwhelmed the fear of poverty. As a 
consequence, welfare policy became subordinate to questions of defence and security. 
This was a key distinction between Labour and Likud underprivileged voters: whereas 
all the former exclusively prioritised welfare in the exploratory survey, only one-third of 
the latter did so.  
These trends can be explained with Kahneman and Tversky's Nobel Prize-winning 
theory of decisions under risk (1979). Their prospect theory proved mathematically that 
―losses loom larger than gains", as "the aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum 
of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same 
amount‖ (p. 279). Whereas the argument applied originally to financial behaviour, it can 
also be applied to politics. Thus, voters might have perceived welfare expansion to be 
something that can increase their future utility, unlike security, which was portrayed as 
a minefield where leaders could make painful mistakes. If welfare is a ―gaining field‖ 
and security is a ―losing field‖, then a crucial predisposition diverts voters' priorities. 
The fact that most Israeli Likud voters acknowledged in the exploratory survey Labour's 
advantage in welfare highlights the question of priorities and their formation.  
If the most urgent and emotionally charged issue for Israeli Likud underprivileged 
voters was defense, its British equivalent – according to the British Election Survey – 
was probably European integration. Any comparison between the two should be made 
with caution, as the linkage might be contestable and tenuous, but the fact remains that 
79 per cent of Tory underprivileged voters defined Europe as a cardinal issue affecting 
their vote in 1992. The least pressing issue that year for underprivileged Tories was that 
of equalising incomes. This conforms to Roemer's conclusion according to which "new 
dimensions of citizen concern" changed old issues allegiances (1998, p. 417). 
According to the findings of this research, both Israeli and British Conservative 
underprivileged voters faced such new dimensions that fuelled emotions and pushed 
questions of redistribution off their political agenda.  
Traditional voting is in fact an illustration of emotions. It was particularly common 
among the underprivileged electorate in both countries, even though the main 
beneficiaries were different. In Israeli surveys, 62 per cent of the Likud underprivileged 
voters explained their vote in terms of party loyalty. In 1999, 93 per cent of them 
replicated their previous voting, compared to 80 per cent among Labour underprivileged 
and 75 per cent among the privileged sample. In-depth interviews reflected a long-
lasting, emotional and often unquestioning allegiance to the right-wing party. In Britain, 
42 per cent of Labour underprivileged voters said in the BES that they always voted that 
way, double the percentage of their Tory counterparts. The interviews have shown that 
the privileged who replicated their voting were usually more critical about it. 
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Up to this point, the observations have focused mostly on the poor, elaborating on their 
identity and their different patterns of engagement with politics in general and the two 
other points of the Triangle in particular. Several issues explored in the theoretical 
chapters have been revisited, among them class and economic voting, reasoning and 
knowledge, welfare emergence and its reliance on left-wing parties and questions of 
social inequalities and political exclusion. Significant variations between voters have 
been noted, all of which address the research questions defined at the outset; the first 
relating to the contrast between privileged and underprivileged citizens and the second 
to the uniqueness of "counter-class" voting among the underprivileged. At the risk of 
oversimplification, I shall try to address the first question with the following conclusion:  
Privileged citizens were found in this thesis to be more likely to physically vote. Their 
knowledge was generally more accurate and their reasoning less influenced by emotions 
and tradition. Their awareness of their personal interest was greater, and so they were 
more likely to pursue their own agenda through democracy. On the other hand, 
underprivileged voters differ in at least two ways; they vote less frequently and they 
tend to reason differently. In addition, their class identity is blurred and most of them 
lack a basic commitment to and the terminology of "welfarism" and "democracy", 
which affects their political decisions. 
Within the issue of reasoning, the question of rationality should be assessed separately. 
Generally speaking, there has been no evidence so far of systematic irrationality of 
underprivileged individuals. With regard to participation in elections, the utilitarian 
theory would clearly justify abstention, especially when civic commitment is so rare 
(see the Paradox of Voter Turnout in Section ‎4.3). With regard to non-welfarist 
preferences of parties, the theories of Downs (1956) and Arrow (1951) virtually 
collapse when state impact is denied and class identity is blurred. The cause for counter-
class voting might therefore be in the domain of past, present and future knowledge, 
required for any kind of rational voting.  
Nevertheless, this thesis has also shown that Conservative voters are less likely to 
follow their self-defined "utilitarian choice". This was based on voters' own assessment 
of parties and preferences in several policy domains, as recorded in the British Election 
Study and the Israeli exploratory survey. The algorithm successfully predicted most of 
Labour voters' behaviour, but failed to account for half of Israeli Likud underprivileged 
voters and a quarter of their British Tory equivalents. Significant inconsistencies were 
also found among the Conservative privileged electorate in both countries. This 
indicates a unique phenomenon among non-welfarist supporters, which calls for greater 
efforts to find new indicators capable of minimising the unexplained variance. I will 
return to this issue later, as it goes beyond the underprivileged electorate. 
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 Democracy and the Welfare State  
Up until to now, this chapter has concentrated on the 
poor and their relationships with the democratic 
apparatus and the welfare state. This generated a few 
insights about the differences between privileged 
and underprivileged voters. However, when 
discussing the uniqueness of underprivileged 
"counter-class" voting, the dynamics of the third pair of elements, namely the 
democratic establishment and the welfare state, becomes highly relevant. The changes 
and challenges undergone by both institutions have generated certain dynamics that 
resonate in the public debate. The historical endorsement of the welfare state by 
democracy and the reversal during the seventies, as explored in Chapter 3, have resulted 
in a new balance of power. Whereas struggles around equal suffrage and unified realms 
of rights were once predominant, my fieldwork questions the way issues of 
redistribution and welfare are portrayed in the public realm. Doubts about the capacity 
of democracy to deliver requires a renewed focus not only on its electoral source of 
power but also on the institutional transitions that have occurred.  
Both democracy and the welfare state have been subjected to strong criticism over the 
years; democracy, for its inability to facilitate collective action and accurately represent 
the people's interests (Michels 1915/1959, Schumpeter 1942/1976 and Offe 1987); and 
the welfare state, among others, for the difficulties of its delivery strategy to attract 
wider support and acknowledgement (Harris and Seldon 1979, Alt 1979, pp. 249-262, 
Taylor-Gooby 1983). Both institutions have undergone change; whereas advanced 
democracies have sought inclusive policies to regain legitimacy (Young 2000, OECD 
2001, OECD 2008), welfare states have adapted themselves to the growing demand for 
choice and competition (Powell 1999, Le Grand 2007). Another key element, which 
was not scrutinised in this research, is the mass media, whose ability to set the agenda 
(Cohen 1963, McCombs & Shaw 1972) has been challenged by new forms of 
communication and challenges, all of which have transformed the way politics is 
conducted (see also Denver 2003, Ch. 6). We are therefore in a period of transition in 
both "points" of the Triangle.  
Although the key role of democratic procedures in shaping welfare policies has 
remained, the challenges mentioned above have had an impact on the dynamics between 
the institutions. As for the persistent importance of these relationships, studies have 
recently shown the state's incessant impact on levels of inequalities (Hills 2004) and the 
abiding power of the electorate to determine such policies (Brooks and Manza 2007). 
As for the new dynamics between these institutions, the literature and the engagement 
Democracy The Welfare State 
The Poor 
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with voters discerned two: the first being the subordination of welfare policy in the 
public debate and the second the superficial manner in which these debates are currently 
being conducted (see, for instance, IDI 2006, Arbel 2005, Yeshuvi 2002). Both had an 
impact on underprivileged voters, and consequently, on the Triangle as a whole.  
As a preliminary note, it should be said that this thesis ought not to have had to deal 
with the media. However, it encountered evidence of its probable impact that could 
hardly be ignored. The power of the press has been acknowledged since the seminal 
work of Butler and Stokes, who argued that "readers are absorbing more than their 
editor's bias" (1969, p. 244). Yet, the underprivileged are generally more dependent on 
the press than others, as their access to independent and academic resources is a-priori 
lower. It leaves them more vulnerable to knowledge manipulation and other media 
biases. For instance, when newspapers take a political stand that affects coverage 
(Denver 2003, pp. 138-143) or when political correspondents adopt a "horse race" 
approach to cover elections (Merritt 1998, Goidel 2000) - the market of ideas and the 
quality of knowledge become necessarily limited.  
The visibility of welfare policy is also limited, which might contribute to its 
subordination and superficial coverage. Crudely speaking, images of rolling tanks are 
more attractive to the media than a report on a moderate increase in welfare benefits 
(which has no visual appeal). For underprivileged members of society, who face 
difficulties in grasping these figures, the war on want is vaguer and more distant than 
the war on terror. Visibility is therefore a new contributory factor in the changing 
climate of relationships between democracy and the welfare state. The Israeli media, for 
instance, faces criticism for "discovering" poverty only when new figures are published, 
and even then, it is argued that the so-called "poverty festival" focuses heavily on 
stories of misery rather than on the policies that allowed them to happen (IDI 2006, 
Arbel 2005, Yeshuvi 2002). This, and the other issues mentioned above, might also 
account for the cardinal importance that the Israeli poor attach to issues of security.  
The impact of these new dynamics on voters is mainly in the arena of knowledge and 
reasoning. These will be addressed here separately.  
The effect on knowledge is two-fold. It can be found in voters' consistently inaccurate 
assessment of economic records and also in their creative interpretation of the parties' 
manifestos. In the case of the former, it was found that voters (not necessarily 
underprivileged) tend to fit figures to ideologies. In the BES, Labour underprivileged 
voters were twice as likely as their Conservative counterparts to mistakenly argue that 
taxes had increased until 1992. They were three times more likely to claim that 
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unemployment rose until 1997. Clearly, political affiliation shaped British voters' 
assessment both of measurable indicators and immeasurable ones (like NHS 
performance). In Israel, on the other hand, underprivileged voters from both parties 
wrongly claimed that unemployment was increasing. However, these contradictory axes 
of influence only exemplify the frequency and the simplicity by which information is 
distorted. 
It should be noted that the role information plays in shaping partisanship is debatable. 
Delli Carpini and Keefer, authors of the most comprehensive study of political 
knowledge so far, indeed found that knowledge "appears to facilitate a closer linkage 
between group interests and political attitudes" and that it plays a key role in enabling 
issue voting (1996, p. 242, 258).  Nonetheless, several scholars have shown that the 
average voter might manage perfectly well with information cues and heuristics 
(Kramer 1971, McKeley & Ordershook 1984/5, Sniderman et al 1992). Their 
conclusions were refuted by Pattie and Johnston, who criticised "conventional models 
of electoral choice" for their attempt "to account for the behaviour of all voters at the 
same time" (2001b, p. 374). They maintained that some voters, mostly educated ones, 
"might be more likely to use the economic vote heuristic than others" (p. 375). This is to 
say, knowledge is essential and its unequal distribution does inhibit voters of very 
specific groups from exercising a rational vote (see also Section 4.3).  
Having addressed knowledge gaps of the first type, I will now focus on misconceptions 
of parties' future plans and their fundamental platforms. This type of information deficit 
can hardly be moderated by cues and heuristics. It might even be deliberately projected 
by parties, as suggested in Downs' "median voter" theory (1956). The figures 
demonstrate a reality of misconceptions about the elementary issues that divide parties. 
In 2006, for instance, 77 per cent of Israeli Conservative underprivileged voters claimed 
in my exploratory survey that their party would increase social spending – after it had 
dramatically reduced it in previous years. In large-scale election surveys, Likud voters 
saw only minor differences between the parties' economic and social manifestos. In 
Britain, 60 per cent of underprivileged Tories denied in 1992 that their party was in 
favour of "cutting taxes and spending less". 52 per cent claimed that the Conservatives 
were committed to ensuring that "every person has a job".  
Notably, similar but more moderate trends were also found among the privileged 
electorate. Thus, in the BES of 1992 one out of four Conservative privileged voters 
thought their party would redistribute income. On aggregate, contrary to Labour 
supporters, privileged Conservatives did not agree that their party's policy was to cut 
spending. This challenges one of the findings of Pattie and Johnston who suggested that 
education correlates with the perceived gaps between parties (2001b, p. 384). However, 
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the in-depth interviews did show that the privileged were generally more reflective and 
willing to admit to disagreements with their party. They were also more sophisticated in 
answering questions, which might explain non-trivial responses. The underprivileged on 
the other hand often denied inconsistencies and rejected the possibility that their party 
might harm their interests.  
The misconceptions of the underprivileged Conservative voters probably inhibited them 
from making a fully rational choice, as explained in Section 4.3. Notably, even if an 
illiterate voter makes a choice in accordance with his/her interests, this does not 
constitute deliberate behaviour requiring an informed assessment of the various 
alternatives. Logically, when the future and past dimensions of political knowledge are 
absent, a crucial brick is removed from the Pyramid of Political Engagement. That 
raises questions as to the possibility of a higher level of political engagement. Blurred 
identity does not contribute much to this conundrum.  
A systematic review of the findings explored so far suggests a new pattern of 
relationship between the democratic system and the welfare state. If, historically, 
democracy was the battlefield for redistribution of wealth (as elaborated in Chapter 3), 
the interviews have shown that a large proportion of the electorate today is little or not 
at all concerned and informed about the welfare alternatives they have. These findings 
correlate with the shift identified in the literature, from debating the redistributive 
implications of democracy to questioning its very capability to reflect the public will. 
Thus, while the democratic apparatus seeks to regain legitimacy, the media is focused 
on sound-bites and the welfare state reconstructs its delivery mechanisms – questions of 
redistribution are put aside by many voters.  
The last observation has to do with reasoning, and it reflects the aggregated impact of 
insights explored earlier. Interestingly, according to the British Election Survey and the 
Israeli exploratory survey, it was mainly the Conservatives from both countries, 
regardless of their economic status, who voted against their self-defined "utilitarian 
choice". Their political choice was more likely to differ from their parties' expected 
utilities, calculated on the basis of policy priorities. The scientific rigorousness of this 
algorithm is indeed limited, and not all policy fields were included in it. Yet, the same 
method successfully predicted the vote of most Labour supporters. In Britain, it has 
taken prediction rates up from 66/68 per cent to 85/89 among 
privileged/underprivileged voters, respectively.  
The Conservatives were the exception. The algorithm failed to account for the 
behaviour of half of the Israeli Likud underprivileged and a quarter of their British Tory 
counterparts. These voters consciously voted for policies that on aggregate were not 
beneficial for them, whereas Labour supporters were utterly convinced of their choice. 
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A closer look reveals some key insights. The analysis of the small Israeli sample 
showed that Likud underprivileged voters did acknowledge Labour's advantage in the 
fields of welfare and benefits in 2006, but for most of them, this field was simply less 
important than defence. In the British Election Survey of 1992, Tory underprivileged 
voters generally ascribed to their party softer neo-liberal positions than any other group, 
thus mitigating its socio-economic agenda. 
These results can be approached from two directions. They show that not all voting 
decisions are unpredictable and chaotic, but they also stress the need to better 
understand the causes for a "non-utilitarian" choice, which in the case of the 
underprivileged converges with "counter-class" voting. It is probable that factors 
unrelated to policies had a greater impact on the Conservative electorate. It is also 
possible that knowledge gaps interfered with the voters' assessment of parties. However, 
eventually, welfare issues seemed to be impenetrable to certain voters. One out of two 
Israeli underprivileged Conservatives subordinates these domain to what he/she 
perceives, according to the fieldwork, as the greater good of existential security. 
These new dynamics between the democratic establishment and the welfare state are 
well reflected in voters' knowledge and reasoning. Rather than occupying the central 
ground in voters' articulation, with a fresh and captivating image of change, questions of 
benefits and redistribution compete with other, more visible and often more emotional 
debates. At least in Israel, studies have shown that the media, usually making the 
advocacy of sophisticated ideas, actively contributes to the subordination of welfare 
policy in the public debate.  
Having explored all points of the Triangle, the research question relating to the 
underprivileged electorate's "counter-class" voting can now be better addressed. 
Evidence from both case studies shows welfare was often subordinate in a Conservative 
agenda. Underprivileged Likud voters in Israel were more influenced by national 
solidarity, personal fears and old traditions, whereas underprivileged Tories in Britain 
prioritised their opposition to EU integration. Both groups took little account of the 
redistributive consequences of their political choice. In addition to that, the 
underprivileged electorate's "counter-class" vote often correlates with knowledge gaps – 
concerning past government records, present socio-economic interests, and parties' 
platforms for the future. These gaps, together with different priorities, made poor voters 
perfectly capable of rationalising their Likud/Tory vote. 
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9. Conclusion 
Democracy is justly credited with having assisted the creation and expansion of modern 
mechanisms of redistribution. Yet, in recent decades it appears to have become more of 
an inhibitor than a catalyst in the creation of an equitable society. Paradoxically, those 
treated most unequally include many who fail to exercise their full political power.  
Electoral figures show that roughly two fifths of underprivileged Israelis supported a 
neo-liberal candidate (in 1992 and 1999) whereas two fifths of British underprivileged 
abstained or voted Conservative (in 1992 and 1997). Over the years, ideals of equality 
and social rights have been subjected to intensive reappraisal or continuous 
marginalisation in both countries, supported by the electorate. By examining 
psychological, sociological, political and economic theories that explain individual 
behaviour and social change, this thesis has sought to readdress the question of 
redistribution. It has done so by focusing on three potentially powerful forces that have 
played a cardinal role in its facilitation: poor people, the democratic apparatus and the 
welfare state. 
An examination of the relationships between the three shows that the underprivileged 
sections of the electorate are unlikely to push for greater redistribution without a major 
shift in the current dynamics. Unless such a shift occurs, the principal beneficiaries of 
welfare seem incapable of mobilising democracy to expand the benefits and services 
they receive. This draws attention to the political power of the middle class and raises 
questions as to the root causes of the current stalemate. As for the last issue, this study 
indicates that each of the three forces that facilitated redistribution has changed over the 
years, resulting in the evolution of different patterns of relationships within the various 
pairings. These relationships, situated within their wider social milieu, may be 
diagrammatically represented in the form of a triangle. It is this triangle that has 
provided both the boundaries and the focus of this thesis. However, on the basis of 
current realities, it would appear no longer to be the engine to mitigate market 
inequalities, at least in the immediate future.  
The relationship between the poor, democracy and the welfare state is therefore at a 
crossroads. What are our conclusions? They can be summed up as  (a) fewer of the 
poor, confronted by a shift towards class dealignment, are able and willing to identify 
themselves as a collective with economic interests and consequentially political clout, 
(b) democratic processes and the manner of our public debate obstructs voters from 
reflecting their interests, especially when complicated policies and a disadvantaged 
electorate are at stake, and (c) the welfare state is neither perceived nor portrayed as 
capable of relieving poverty, but as a fading set of institutions managed by non-
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advocates with objectives that are seldom adequately explained in public. Whereas the 
first two conclusions reflect structural changes, the third echoes a change in perceptions 
that might be more easily reversed.  
The above three findings – one for each corner of the Triangle – arise from an 
exploration of the relationship and dynamics between each pair of concepts. On that 
basis, the conceptual framework introduced in the theoretical chapters can be revisited, 
using the new evidence summarised here. In short, this study lends weight to the 
following arguments:    
 The welfare state certainly contributes many benefits to the poor, but the 
relationship is one-sided; poor people often fail to acknowledge this contribution 
and rarely make any connection between public policies and their own welfare. 
The history of collective struggle to build favourable elements of the welfare state 
is not familiar to the disadvantaged of each succeeding generation. 
 The relationships between poor people and the democratic apparatus, especially 
in Britain, reflect a profound crisis of civic commitment. There is also a 
consistent difficulty with poor people's ability to apply the lessons of their own 
experience to the arena of national welfare policy. These in turn negatively 
affect the utility they expect from voting in elections.  
 As for the third pair, the democratic apparatus and welfare state, it seems that our 
political culture impacts on voters' knowledge and understanding. The 
presentation of facts is moulded for political purposes and the objectives of social 
policy are often unknown to the electorate. Both sets of institutions have changed. 
Access to voting is one thing, manipulation of knowledge is another 
A systematic review of the dynamics of these important pairs of relationships suggests 
that two basic commitments poor people could have had – one to democracy as a 
method of governing that secures their political rights and one to the welfare state as the 
mechanism that guarantees their social rights – are fragile, if they exist at all. Integrated 
into Sen's "Rational Fools" theory (1977), these commitments could perfectly well 
account for the ostensibly irrational act of voting. Yet, this study has found civic and 
welfare commitments prevalent mainly among the privileged electorate. This has left a 
large proportion of the poor with less motivation to exercise their political power and 
support the welfare state. Many of them are passive in their defence of the welfare state 
rather than active in support of its extension. Consequently, on aggregate, elections 
today are only a partial reflection of the electorate's economic interests. They have 
become a pale fulfilment of the collective dreams (no less than fears) of one hundred 
and two hundred years ago, as explored in Chapter 3.  
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These conclusions are supported by evidence gathered from 137 engagements with 
privileged and underprivileged voters, 25 semi-structured in-depth interviews and a 
secondary analysis of 5 large-scale opinion surveys. The empirical analysis suggests 
that two thirds of the underprivileged electorate, both in Britain and Israel, did not 
support the "pro-welfare" party during the 1990s, either by voting against it or by 
abstaining. Of the key evidence reviewed in the previous chapters, some should be 
briefly re-emphasised here: 
 In interviews, underprivileged voters rarely acknowledged the assistance they 
receive from the welfare state, showing no willingness to commit themselves to it 
politically. Comments such as "I hardly think they are capable of helping" (Israel) 
and "I just don't believe anyone can change" (Britain) were frequently made. 
Scepticism and ethics of self-reliance distracted from a commitment to the 
welfare state. Only 30 per cent of British underprivileged Tory voters held 
government accountable for their personal well-being. The fieldwork showed 
welfare policy might be impenetrable to citizens in hardship.  
 In both countries, welfare was often subordinate in the political priorities of poor 
"counter-class" voters. Secondary analysis showed 79 per cent of British 
underprivileged Tories defined the prospect of European integration as a cardinal 
issue affecting their vote, leaving income equalisation at the bottom of this list. 
The fieldwork in Israel found poor Likud voters unanimously prioritising defence 
spending. Some Sderot residents tolerated their benefit cut, as it was more 
important to stop the "rockets flying over". Uncertainties and fears were often 
exaggerated: 60 per cent of Likud poor voters were "very concerned" about Arabs 
hurting their families. 
 Demographic and sociological transformations have contributed to voters' 
blurred class identity, which is attributable to a contradictory assessment of 
economic interests. Underprivileged Conservatives in both countries were more 
likely to artificially upgrade their socio-economic status, many of them 
miscalculating the implications of neo-liberal policies on their finances. The 
exploratory survey showed 69 per cent of all British underprivileged and 36 per 
cent of Israeli Likud underprivileged voters thought they would be better off if 
income tax was reduced. Blurred identity thwarted class solidarity and action.  
 Whilst the underprivileged were more likely to abstain (turnout gaps in Britain 
reached 10-15 per cent), the interviews showed that lack of commitment to 
democracy was the key underlying cause. Most disadvantaged abstainers were 
sceptical as to government's ability to deliver and looked for tangible benefits in 
return for their efforts. Opinion surveys showed a record of 82 per cent of them 
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"didn't care much" which party won. Yet other electors, privileged and 
underprivileged, were no less sceptical, but voted out of civic duty. One of them 
explained, "If you don't vote... you don't deserve to have a democracy."   
 In both countries, political illiteracy distorted voters' assessment of political 
alternatives. Surveys showed voters overvalued their party's performance in 
government and vice versa. Conservative underprivileged voters tended to soften 
their parties' manifesto on welfare. In Britain, 55 per cent of them claimed that the 
Tories would redistribute income. In Israel, 77 per cent claimed the Likud would 
increase social spending. In interviews, some Israelis seemed to be in a state of 
denial as to Likud's recent benefit cut-offs. Information deficits were not exclusive 
to the underprivileged, but had the most impact on them.  
An integrative assessment of the various dynamics affecting voters provides some 
plausible explanations for underprivileged abstention or for a "counter-class" vote. In 
the political context, class identity of the underprivileged was found to be dealigned and 
blurred, their commitment to democracy and the welfare state was weak, they rarely 
ventured into the domain of national policy, and ethics of self-reliance were highly 
dominant. Personal experiences and incidental happenings had greater influence on their 
perceptions, and they rarely conceived of elections as an opportunity for change.  
As for right wing voters, they were likely to soften the neo-liberal stance of their party 
(although they were generally supportive of it), preferred to distance themselves from a 
"working class" classification, paid greater attention to non-welfare issues and reacted 
differently to uncertainties and fears. Across the electorate, knowledge of governments' 
past performance and parties' core policies was found to be fluid and vulnerable to 
manipulation. Eventually, more findings revealed new forms of exclusion that justified 
a hesitant support for the welfare state, than findings labelling voters as irrational. 
Conservative support among the underprivileged may contradict some financial 
interests, but there seem to be a rationale for it. There is still a need to better theorise the 
non-utilitarian motives behind a "counter-class" vote, but the fieldwork and the 
empirical analyses indicate that new trends are affecting the grassroots of politics. The 
findings summarised above explain to some extent the lack of unequivocal support for 
the "welfarist" party by those who need it the most. Clearly, these new patterns of 
relationships show that the potential for the underprivileged electorate's political support 
for redistribution is far from being fulfilled. If all underprivileged voters were 
sufficiently knowledgeable and committed, one would expect a different representation 
of their financial interests. 
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Britain and Israel differ significantly in several key dimensions, such as demography, 
class structure and electoral system. Nevertheless, one can find a leitmotiv in the 
underprivileged electorate's route to political poverty. The appearance and scope of 
certain dynamics may vary between the countries, but similarities can be found in the 
fundamentals of identity, commitment, knowledge and reasoning. As for identity, in 
both countries the underprivileged do not necessarily identify themselves as such. In 
both countries they lack commitment, either to democracy, the welfare state or to both. 
In both countries the ethics of self-reliance sabotage the link between political choice 
and personal welfare. In effect, the similarities between the two case studies were much 
greater than originally expected. 
These conclusions should be regarded with caution. This research is limited in scope 
and has not explored, for instance, the impact of campaigns and candidates in re-
mobilising the poor. The fieldwork could not construct a representative sample of the 
electorate due to restricted resources. The secondary analysis confined itself to existing 
questionnaires. Nonetheless, the accumulation of findings, which draw on a number of 
other studies, reveals the extent to which the poor are alienated – both from democratic 
representation and action and from the welfare state. New forms of investigation and 
analysis are required to better identify the policies that might guarantee a more 
representative form of democracy and a renewed framework for monitoring and 
accounting for the political exclusion of the underprivileged. 
One can argue that nothing has changed since Robert Trussell's absorbing novel 
"Ragged Trousered Philanthropists" (1914), or since Marx urged the proletariat to "use 
its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie" 
(1848/1959). That would be a misrepresentation of history. Over the last sixty years, 
humanity effected one of its greatest collective achievements – the formation in 
industrialised capitalist economies of the welfare state as a mechanism for the 
redistribution of wealth. In meeting some of the basic needs of the poor, it achieved 
social stability and an uneasy, but peaceable, reconciliation of rich and poor. While its 
magnitude can be debated, the birth of social rights side by side with the enlargement of 
the franchise is undisputable. What we are experiencing today, at the individual level, is 
the unwillingness or incapacity of roughly two fifths of the poor to support welfare 
policy on Election Day. In view of its national implications, this phenomenon is the key 
challenge this thesis has sought to address. 
* * * 
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The findings of this thesis are relevant to at least two major debates in the fields of 
social policy and government that deserve to be mentioned. The first concerns the 
operational definition and measurement of political exclusion. The second concerns the 
policies required to make democracy more egalitarian and inclusive. In both arenas, the 
contribution of this study is limited: it cannot advocate a definitive solution, but it can 
certainly draw on the findings to highlight new facets of the various alternatives.  
As for the definition of exclusion, the different narratives attached to abstention make 
turnout a questionable indicator of political deprivation. The current working definition 
of political exclusion (Burchardt et al 2002, Gordon et al. 2000) might unintentionally 
apply similar conclusions to fundamentally different types of abstainers. Turnout might 
be the most accessible and convenient indicator to monitor, but it cannot differentiate 
between committed voters inhibited from voting for practical reasons and those whose 
abstention reflects their alienation from the democratic process and their exclusion from 
this aspect of social life. Furthermore, the social context and political implications of 
knowledge gaps show that physical attendance is the lowest threshold possible to define 
inclusion. Can we consider an utterly illiterate and non-engaged voter to be socially 
included only because s/he cast a vote? Recalling the theoretical definitions of social 
exclusion and political rights in Section 4.2, inclusion would seem to entail more than a 
physical action. 
The second debate revolves around the policies capable of producing a more egalitarian 
democracy, affirming its legitimacy and making it more inclusive than it is at present. A 
call for compulsory voting (Lijphart 1997) might cure the symptom of abstention but 
probably not the root causes of exclusion. This study has shown turnout cannot 
substitute for knowledge and reason when making political choices. Thus, the findings 
demonstrate the need for "benefits-side" reforms to reinforce the gains the 
underprivileged electorate identify with their political efforts. This can be achieved 
either through a "primary" shift between discourses, from a utilitarian-based to a civic-
commitment-based narrative, or through a "secondary" shift in the material prospects of 
underprivileged electors. Any attempt to reduce the costs of voting (e.g. postal voting) 
might be counterproductive in addressing the exclusion challenge and boost inequality 
by affecting predominantly the privileged. A change in the electoral system is also not 
advocated from this study's evidence, as in both countries, the dynamics of the 
processes by which poor people were alienated were unrelated to election procedures. 
* * * 
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This study commenced a few months before George W. Bush was re-elected as 
President in 2004 and its concluding remarks were drafted the day after Barack Obama's 
2008 landslide. Obama's campaign symbolised for many the dawn of a new era of 
collective action. He was even denounced as a "redistributor" (Krugman, 7 November 
2008, see also Schiller 2008). His "blueprint for change" and his victory speech 
succeeded in mobilising millions all over the world (2008a, 2008b). As Thomas 
Friedman of the New York Times wrote the following day, it was a rebellion of voters 
against the perception that "pursuit of the common good was all about pursuit of 
individual self-interest" (5 November 2008).  
The conclusions of this thesis cannot be applied to other countries, but might point to 
some global trends. Clearly, in Britain and Israel, the poor could have played a much 
greater role in facilitating redistribution in the last decade. However, the current 
dynamics make it unlikely that they will do so. It does not mean they are not a 
significant source of support for the welfare state or that they bear any responsibility for 
its retrenchment. It does mean that the sponsorship of welfare expansion is today in the 
hands of others. In America, according to press reports, the young voters, the blacks and 
the middle classes were those who fuelled the Obama campaign. An alternative route to 
welfare expansion requires new dynamics within the Triangle to change underprivileged 
political behaviour in the future, making it more prominent politically.  
Three questions bring this dissertation to an end. The first is whether these findings are 
in any way correlated with structural changes in welfare provision over time and across 
countries. If two fifths of the underprivileged electorate can hardly be mobilised to 
support welfare, state policies could have been politically adjusted to secure the support 
of those who can. If indeed welfare provision benefits the middle class today more than 
in the past (Le Grand 1982, Hill 2004), can it be the result of a middle class vote?  
A second question relates to the welfare state itself. In democracy, redistribution is not a 
self-sustaining mechanism. The evidence for one-sided relationships between the 
welfare state and the poor require a new approach that would make redistributive state 
welfare less taken for granted. The question is not how to prevent a legitimation deficit, 
but how to make the underprivileged feel that the welfare state is truly working for 
them. It might require an "active welfare state", not only in terms of policies, but also in 
the field of advocacy. 
The last question concerns the strategy required to create new dynamics in the 
relationships between the poor and democracy. The current detachment cannot be 
maintained for long, as the need for an "inclusive democracy" (Young 2000) is today 
stronger than ever. A recovery is needed not only to guarantee equality and promote 
redistribution. It is vital to affirm the legitimacy of democracy and its ability to reflect 
the people's will.  
After all, this is what its progenitors envisaged and hoped for so many years. 
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11. Appendices 
11.1 From Bismarck to Beveridge* 
A crude account of the emergence of the welfare state would inevitably identify at least 
three eminent figures, who had a substantial share in the transference of social 
responsibilities from the voluntary sector to the state
31
. First, was Prince Otto Von 
Bismarck (1815-1898), who founded the first compulsory National Social Insurance 
system, as he believed that "by making the individual more dependent upon the State… 
he could make him more loyal to it" (Ashley 1912, p. 57). Second was David Lloyd 
George (1863-1945), who was among those who changed the British perception of 
welfare provision and laid the foundations for the abolition of the Poor Laws (Hay 
1975). Third was William Henry Beveridge (1879-1963), who reshuffled the social 
administration by facilitating the needed transformation toward the establishment of the 
first universal, comprehensive welfare state (Abel-Smith 1992).  
These figures were selected as they all symbolise major turning points in the creation of 
the modern welfare state. Their personal characters, as well as certain exogenous 
circumstances, put Bismarck, Lloyd-George and Beveridge eventually under the 
history's spotlight and allowed them to lead revolutions rather than evolutions of 
welfare regimes. The external pressures were indeed crucial: Evidently, inclusive 
democracy or the preservation of its absence had a significant role in the emergence of 
the early Social Security schemes (Rimlinger 1968, Ashford 1986, Hicks et al 1995). 
However, this chapter aims to map the personal perceptions of these three leaders using 






                                                 
* This chapter was an essential part in the thinking prior to the final writing up of this thesis, and some interesting 
conclusions are arrived at. It could have been included in Chapter 2 “The Welfare State & the Poor”, but was 
eventually integrated in the Appendices. Despite its intellectual merits, it does not contribute to the core argument 
pursued in this thesis. Its reading is at the discretion of the examiners.  
31
  Remarkably, while historically responsibilities were transferred from the voluntary sector to the state, some suggests 
today that the private sector must also by liable by law to participate directly in providing welfare for the community 
(Giddens 2004).  







Figure ‎11.1.1:  Typology of attitudes toward economic and personal freedoms 





Figure ‎11.1.2:  Typology of attitudes to citizenship rights and redistribution 
(Dean 2002 & 2005) 
The first was developed by John Blundell and Brian Gosschalk (1997) and served 
Anthony Giddens in his The Third Way (1998, p. 20-23). Based on a series of surveys 
conducted in Britain, they reclassified the attitudes of contemporary Britain toward 
individual politics, distinguishing between approaches to personal and economic 
freedoms and thus generating four quadrants (Figure ‎11.1.1). Conservatives ("New 
Right") are in favour of market freedom, but like the authoritarians, want to restrict 
individuals' personal freedoms on issues such as family, drugs and abortion. Socialists 
("Old Labour") are supporters of less-restricted personal freedoms but opponents of free 
markets, while liberals ("New Labour") are market-fundamentalists resisting restrictions 
on freedom of any kind.  
Dean put forward the second typology seeking to classify logics and ideologies rather 
than contemporary political attitudes. The horizontal axis in Figure ‎11.1.2  represents 
the continuum between solidaristic-republican and contractian-individualist notions of 
citizenship. While the former supports in principle any collective action, the latter 
fanatically seeks to defend personal rights, most often the civil ones (2002, p. 189-193). 























The Poverty of Democracy 305 
 
a distinction between egalitarians supporting ideals of formal or substantive equality 
and conservatives seeking to preserve the current order (2005)
32
. A closer look of both 
typologies will reveal compelling similarities: Ideological beliefs toward citizenship are 
often correlated with attitudes toward economic freedoms, formal egalitarianism
33
 is 
usually accompanied with a desire for high personal freedoms and conservatism in 
essence leads to the opposite direction. 
Assessing Bismarck's tendencies in accordance with these typologies is a tricky task. It 
is generally assumed that the first Chancellor of the German Empire promoted his three 
Insurance Acts during the 1880s primarily to escape democracy and avoid civil unrest 
(Rimlinger 1968, Ashford 1986, Baldwin 1990). However, an extensive examination of 
his life reveals a keen solidaristic belief in the responsibility of a state to its citizens, 
even when the implementation of this duty restricts economic freedoms.  
Dawson‘s argument, according to which Bismark‘s personal social ideology was at least 
as important as the economic, political and social circumstances prevailing when he 
held office was certainly not made in a vacuum (1891). The German Empire might have 
had a deliberate strategy of catering "a little to everyone… [to please] all up to a point" 
(Waller 1997, p. 61), but in 1847, he was apparently in favour of nationalizing the 
railways. In 1865, he even persuaded Kaiser Wilhelm I to lend money for a co-operative 
factory (Ashley 1912, p. 39-40). On an other occasion, he explicitly referred to the 
"legitimate cause of Socialism" (Dawson 1912, p. 14).  
The guiding strategy of the Chancellor was to strengthen the republic (and his personal 
status) through improving the welfare of its citizens and not the reverse. This can 
explain his words to Dawson, that his aim was "to bribe the working classes, or, if you 
like, to win them" (1912, p. 11). Rimlinger quoted him saying, "I will consider it a great 
advantage when we have 700,000 small pensioners drawing their annuities from the 
state, especially if they belong to those classes who otherwise do not have much to lose 
by an upheaval and erroneously believe they can actually gain much by it" (1968, p. 
414). These words speak for themselves. 
However, assigning Bismarck to one of the fixed ideological groups might be reckless. 
Officially, he was a "State Socialist" who believed state action was necessary for social 
                                                 
32
  Originally, the vertical axe in this typology stood for two inherently different assumptions of possessing rights. A 
systemic assumption held the establishment as responsible for providing basic rights while an agential assumption 
implied more responsibility on the individual who is required to claim his privileges. For the purpose of this chapter, 
this allocation is less relevant than the one eventually used.  
33
  The distinction between formal and substantive egalitarianism in this thesis adheres to that in Dean’s work, in which 
formal egalitarianism was compatible with economic individualism and the perceptions of equal opportunity, 
whereas substantive egalitarianism resided largely on the discourse of moral-universalism (Dean 1998) 
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progress, which was a prerequisite for a strong state. Two extracts strengthen these 
premises. Dawson cited Bismarck as saying, "it is the duty of the State to give heed, 
above all, to the welfare of its weaker members" (1891, p. vii). Ashley cited him 
rejecting the Conservative party's "policy of drag", insisting on delivering his reforms 
(1912, p. 42).  
By mixing elements from different schools, Bismarck and his supporters believed they 
found the way between liberalism aimed at dismantling any state intervention, 
conservatism hampering any change and socialism pledged to do the opposite of both. 
They generated a model of "radical centre", founded upon Adolf Wagner's concepts of 
benevolent social reforms at the service of a powerful state and a strong industry 
(Ashford 1986, p. 39-40). Wagner, who seemingly played the same role for Bismarck as 
Giddens performs for Tony Blair, advocated nationalisation and denied any absolute 
right in possession of land. His colleague Schomoller discussed the principles of "State 
Socialism" in terms similar to modern manifestos (Dawson 1891, p. 3): 
[It purposes] the re-establishment of a friendly relationship between 
social classes, the removal or modification of injustice, a nearer 
approach to the principle of distributive justice, with the introduction 
of a social legislation which promotes progress and guarantees the 
moral and material elevation of the lower and middle class. 
After the establishment of the Socialist Workers' Party in 1875, Bismarck's personal 
ideological affiliation had lost its significance, as he was for the first time outflanked by 
the left. His fear that "revolutions can easily… go way beyond the intentions of their 
originators" (Waller 1997, p. 69) induced two major strategies – putting forward social 
legislation to appease the proletariat and outlawing the Socialist party to eradicate any 
revolutionary seeds.  
Two interesting comments were made by the Chancellor himself regarding these 
strategies. He once wrote that his policies addressed "those Socialist demands which 
seem justified and which can be realised within the present order of society" (quoted in 
Zollner 1982, p. 13). On the other hand, in a letter to the Kaiser he asserted, "with mere 
policy measures the problem cannot be solved" (quoted in Rimlinger 1968, p. 412). It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that a combination of internal beliefs and external 
political pressures embarked on process which its "supreme end", according to Brooks, 
was "to strengthen the weak" (1892, pp. 303-304).  
Before elaborating on the new legislation, further discussion of the economic and 
political conditions in Germany at that time is necessary. Unlike its European 
neighbours, the industrialization process in Germany began from a lower base with 
stronger vestiges of the feudal order (Rimlinger 1968). However, from the 1850s 
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onwards, industrial production steadily increased. The 1860s saw the rate of growth 
accelerating rapidly.  
The euphoria ended in 1872, two years after the end of the Franco-Prussian war. There 
was a sudden but destructive recession, which highlighted the inequalities within the 
German society (Waller 1997, Rosenhaft 1994). The developing class-consciousness 
under the existing authoritarian system eventually brought the dawn of the social 
parties. This process advanced at the same time as the preservation of old aristocratic 
traditions. The tension between classes then broadened and consequently, the regional 
Socialist movements turned into a united Socialist Workers' Party (Lidtke 1966, Roth 
1963).  
Four years after Bismarck became the first Chancellor of unified Germany in 1871, he 
became politically trapped between the Liberals and the Socialists. His belief in the 
importance of the church, his will to impose tariffs, his desire to avoid a "policy of 
drag" and his personal ambitions brought him into a fragile position. The ideas of "State 
Socialism" were incompatible with these two major political forces, which were 
gradually gaining popularity while collaborating to boost democratic reforms (Dawson 
1891, Lidtke 1966, p. 57).  
Two attempts to assassinate Kaiser Wilhelm in May and June 1878 provided an 
appropriate excuse and the required atmosphere for Bismarck to blame the Socialists 
and outlaw any socialist activity in Germany. Even though on the first attempt, "the 
shots went so far astray that not even the Kaiser noticed that he was the target", 
Bismarck telegraphed his intentions to take measures against the Socialists on the same 
day, prior to a preliminary investigation (Lidtke 1966, p. 70). It is quite clear that this 
legislation was far from being an authentic reaction to national security considerations 
(Roth 1963, pp. 71-84). However, the "Socialist Law" successfully passed the Reichstag 
on the second attempt, on 19 October 1878.  
The new legislation empowered the state and local governments to abolish societies 
with Social Democratic, Socialist or Communist attributes, to dissolve meetings where 
such characters were evident and to prohibit the publication and distribution of Social 
Democratic newspapers, periodicals and books (Lidtke 1966, pp. 339-345). If some had 
doubts regarding the extent of enforcement, the local policy clarified its intentions 
within days by shutting down the three most important newspapers of the party, 
resulting in the dismissal of hundreds of party members (pp. 78-82).  
Nevertheless, the dismantling of a popular movement could not guarantee on its own 
renewed support for the Chancellor, who was decisive in fully implementing his "carrot 
and stick" strategy. Whilst the socialists were smashed and served twelve years in the 
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political wilderness, a time they later dubbed as the "heroic epoch", Bismarck trapped 
the Liberals. By putting forward his social legislation, the Liberal party's determined 
resistance had led to its public isolation, to the benefit of the Chancellor (Waller 1997). 
The ending of this strategic move was the very beginning of the Social Security era. The 
speech of Kaiser Wilhelm in the Reichstag on 17 November 1881 virtually inaugurated 
the modern albeit immature concept of a welfare state (cited at Dawson 1912, pp. 16-
17).  
The cure of social ills must be sought not exclusively in the repression 
of Social Democratic excesses, but simultaneously in the positive 
advancement of the welfare of the working classes… In order to 
realise these views a Bill for the insurance of workmen against 
industrial accidents will first be laid before you… To find the proper 
ways and means for making such provision is a difficult task, yet is 
one of the highest obligations of every community based on the 
ethical foundation of a Christian national life.  
Two years afterwards, in 1883, the Act for insurance against sickness was passed. In 
1884, a scheme for insurance against accidents was approved. Finally, in 1888 the 
insurance for pensioners for old age and invalidity was legalized.  
Even though the principle of mutual insurance was not novel, the compulsory state 
insurance was a breakthrough at that time. This action alone awarded Bismarck an 
honourable share in the emergence of the welfare state. Nonetheless, it should be noted 
that voluntary associations or friendly societies had been very popular in many parts of 
Germany and Europe for hundreds of years (Ashley 1912, Collier & Messic 1975, Beck 
1992). In addition, various rulers already carried with them a notion of social 
responsibility (Tample 1981). Frederick the Great, for instance, was quoted as saying, 
"it is the business of a Sovereign, great or small, to alleviate human misery" (Dawson 
1912, p. 2).  
However, Bismarck's policy was incomparable to all previous insurance schemes. 
Unprecedentedly, the State insured approximately 13 million people (Brooks 1892) 
whereas in contrast to the friendly societies, it was not possible to opt out and bear the 
risk personally. Having said that, the three milestones of the entire scheme, namely 
compulsion, contribution and universalism merit further elaboration.  
The courageous element of Compulsion was imposed by Bismarck to guarantee the 
financial success of his scheme and to indicate his seriousness in reforming the state of 
affairs present at the time. Since the previous century, it had been clear that voluntary 
systems could not succeed as "the workers in the most dangerous or unhealthy trades, 
who needed the insurance most of all, would be unlikely to be helped" (Ashley 1912, p. 
The Poverty of Democracy 309 
 
54). Furthermore, the state could not allow itself to compete against friendly societies in 
providing insurance and by thus risking the financial success of the whole scheme. 
Eventually, compulsion did allow the masses to be less dependent on the voluntary 
sector, although many felt the benefits paid "were deliberately set at the minimum 
necessary to keep them off the poor relief rolls" (Rosenhaft 1994, p. 29).  
Another novel principle found in Bismarck's social legislation was its universality. Even 
though some of the laws were not applied to all employees, the original intention was to 
double the size of the insured group (Brooks 1892, p. 304; Dawson 1912, pp. 1-21). As 
Ashley noted, "it was a case for general legislation, not for picking out a few small 
classes of people" (1912, p. 55). The notion of unity and solidarity achieved by 
imposing one scheme indeed contributed to the easing of social tensions.  
The third principle was the contributory principle, which naturally was not popular 
especially when imposed in coordination with the other two principles. In sickness and 
accidental insurance, for instance, the employees were required to bear most of the 
burden: the employers deducted between 1 to 3 per cent of their payroll and added 
approximately half of it at their own expense.  The first thirteen weeks of absence 
entitled the insured employee to sick pay of between half and three quarters of the 
average wage while any further non-attendance fell under the provision of the accident 
insurance act (Ashley 1912, pp. 59-71).  
While one can challenge the motives behind Bismarck's social legislation, his 
contribution to the development of social policies cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, 
some of Bismarck's critics were very decisive in their criticisms. Tample proclaimed 
that Bismarck's social legislation "has been greatly overrated" as its impact was very 
limited (1981, p. 71). She argued that benefits were so low that they could hardly 
provide any welfare to recipients. Baldwin described Bismarck's policies as "commonly 
considered reactionary, Bonapartist and unsolidaristic" (1990, pp. 59-60). He stated 
three chief subjective shortcomings: It was limited to workers; benefits were income-
related; and there was no element of redistribution  
Two other lines of criticism focused less on Bismarck's policies and more on their 
method of implementation. One challenged the honesty of the insured population and 
warned against fraud; the other took on the excessive administration required to manage 
the new apparatus. Brooks passionately dismissed both arguments and defended the 
policies in a paper published in 1892. However, ignoring the anticipated criticism, the 
German Social Insurance scheme evidently paved the way toward the future 
implementation of moderate socialist ideas. Bismarck's main goal was to maintain the 
superiority of the state by enhancing the loyalty of its citizens. His strategy was to link 
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their welfare to the strength of the nation without allowing social mobility. These "stick 
and carrot" tactics probably achieved their original aim.  
Waller's description of Bismarck seems to be the most precise one, "the emperor, 
aristocrats, middle classes and workers all benefited to a certain extent from Bismarck's 
approach to politics. He had had given each of them something; but they all wanted 
more" (1997, p. 113). Dawson stated that by this tactic, the ideas of State Socialism 
virtually took the ground from under the feet of the German Liberals and spread despair 
among German Socialists (1891).  
In ideological terms, Bismarck was categorically against any radical change in the 
social order. Nevertheless, his collectivist attitudes stood for a solidaristic notion of 
citizenship – as long as it did not generate redistribution. This implies relatively low 
economic freedom, but not as low as radical ideas like massive redistribution can 
potentially possess. Regarding personal freedoms, Bismarck's aristocratic and 
nationalist conservatism ruled out any liberal attitudes, at least as interpreted by 
Giddens (1998)
34







Figure ‎11.1.3: Otto Von Bismarck's assessed attitudes based on the two typologies 
Eventually, Bismarck left office in 1890 following a series of clashes with the new 
Kaiser, caused to some extent by the desire of Kaiser Wilhelm II for more radical social 
policies. Apparently, the resignation also had to do with the impressive gains achieved 
by the Catholics and the Socialist Workers' Party in the General Elections, after their 
activities were legalized. Interestingly, although few regretted Bismarck's departure at 
the time, his popularity increased to record levels, possibly due to the failure of his 
successors to fill the leadership gap (Waller 1997, pp. 109-121).  The disappointment 
mainly benefited the Socialists. After their legalisation in 1890, the party had steadily 
                                                 
34
  The typology referred to personal freedoms in the sense of "state control over issues such as the family, drugs and 
absorption" (Giddens 1998, p. 21). The indicative categorisation presented here is in relation to the two other figures 
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strengthened its grip and by 1912, the renamed Social Democratic Party was the 
strongest in the Reichstag (Rosenhaft 1994).  
By that time, Britain was in the midst of its Liberal Reforms, led chiefly by Lloyd 
George as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1908-1915) and then later as Prime Minister 
(1916-1922). The common perception ascribed the legislation to motives and methods 
at variance to the German precedent. However, in the core of these dissimilarities lay a 
profound institutional difference. While absolutist regimes require power brokerage in 
order to please powerful players, constitutionalist regimes rest upon strategies of 
persuasion often entailing more space for manoeuvre.  
These differences were broadly discussed in the literature. Rimlinger noted that whereas 
Bismarck operated with no powerful democracy, Britain could not resist social 
legislation as "the old Poor Laws and working-class ballots had become incompatible" 
(1968, p. 410). Gilbert indicated it turned out that "the defence against socialism was 
social legislation" (1966, p. 19). Baldwin provided an economic explanations, noting, 
"while Bismarck sought to appease the urban labour elite, in Britain… the goal of social 
insurance was to reduce the scope of poor relief and to aid the most impoverished" 
(1990, p. 100). Similar questions of absolutism vs. constitutionalism would be further 
discussed under the next chapter, "Democracy & The Welfare State".  
Historically, the Liberals inherited a Victorian legislation premised on the rationale that 
market forces are the best method to allocate goods and services as well as to match 
labour to jobs. Unlike other regimes, the Victorians used state intervention only as a last 
resort, which must be preceded by help from philanthropists, families or charities 
(Peden 1991, pp. 1-14; Fraser 1984, pp. 124-132).  
The process of reconsidering the Poor Laws began early in 1885 with attempts to 
reform the provision for the elderly. Until 1903, however, no fewer than six different 
commissions and committees discussed pensions, reversing the instinct to blame 
individuals for their poverty but reforming practically nothing (Lewis & Condie 1950). 
Noteworthy, during the 1880s time street riots erupted on social ground and poor had 
finally "the weapon of manhood franchise" which fuelled the fears of revolution 
(Gilbert 1966, p. 21-37) 
Hay (1975) defined three major factors, which eventually overturned the Poor Laws and 
gave birth to the Liberal Reforms. First, the existence of political pressures from the 
working class encouraged politicians to present social reforms either to gain popularity 
or to prevent workers turning to radical alternatives. As Thane noted, conditions of life 
had deteriorated, unemployment was high and membership of trade unions flourished 
(1982, p. 51). Under these circumstances, social reforms were "the inevitable result of 
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working class pressure, through the ballot box, or by direct action or the threat of it" (p. 
29).  
Influential institutional bodies and organised civil servants constituted another 
significant force underpinning the reforms. Most remarkable were the "staunchly anti-
socialist" Friendly Societies who favoured strictly deterrent poor law and opposed any 
state intervention that could risk their sole, devoted management of working-class 
savings (Gilbert 1966, p. 159-180). Eventually, Lloyd George partially won their 
support by appointing them as "Approved Societies" serving as agents for the 
implementation of the plan (Thomson 1949, p. 200).  
A third explanation suggested by Hay referred to the changing attitudes toward welfare 
provision within British society. Three different developments were identified as part of 
this complex process. First was the emerging of a "national efficiency" school of 
thinking, which sought to solve Britain's low economic performance by challenging 
common conceptions (Searle 1971). Second was the use of new research methods in 
academic surveys, which increased public awareness of the real extent of poverty 
(Booth 1892, Rowntree 1902, Rose 1972, Fraser 1984). Third was the rise of two 
ideological hybrids that can be defined as "moderate collectivism" and "social 
liberalism". While the former allowed devoted socialists to ease their radicalism 
regarding collective actions, the latter moderated the "Natural Right" Libertarians and 
enabled the Liberals to recover from their electoral defeat of 1886.  
These two ideological hybrids, which can be seen as gradual evolutionary compromises, 
were strongly related to new forms of socialism, which emerged within the liberal 
thinking during the late 1880s and the 1890s.  The term itself had continuously suffered 
from a devastating image (Tressell 1914/1949). However, for specific groups the 
concept and the values it stood for gained popularity rapidly. This transformation 
confused many Liberals searching for ideological identity as illustrated by the column 
"Are We All Socialist Now?" published in The Speaker, a leading liberal weekly,  
(1893, p. 534-535): 
(Today) any man who manifests an active interest in the working 
classes is classified by some intelligences as in some way amongst 
the Socialists… If it be Socialism to have generous and hopeful 
sentiments with regard to the lot of those who work, let us repeat we 
are all socialists in that sense… The Socialism talked at English 
Labour meetings… [is] the Socialism of ends and not the Socialism of 
means. We therefore contend that there are no real Socialists in 
England.  
New concepts of "old" and "new" Socialism were essential to clarify the differences. 
Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, one of the eminent liberal thinkers of that era and the first 
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Professor of Sociology at a British university, distinguished between "Mechanical 
Socialism" and "Official Socialism" (1911/1934). The former could spring up only after 
a class war and eventually would create an equal society in terms of resources, 
eradicating all financial incentives. The latter conceived humankind as "a helpless and 
feeble race" and grasped its duty to treat the masses kindly by organizing an individual's 
life through unions and committees. 
Both of these concepts referred to the old Socialism. In some aspects, they were similar 
to a distinction made by Bellow between "Idealist" and "Statistical" Socialists. The first 
would like to confiscate owners' property for the benefit of the non-owners while the 
second would be interested chiefly in running and organizing the life of the poor. Both, 
argued Belloc, were leading toward a "Servile State" and eventually would not be able 
to preserve their ideal collectivism (1912/1927, pp. 121-130). However, there was a 
third type of "new" Socialism, dubbed by Hobhouse as Liberal Socialism. Such a 
moderate interpretation of the concept abandoned almost all of its historical 
characteristics, deliberately ignoring commitments for full equality and shared 
ownership of resources, replacing them with realistic pledges for adequate provision for 
the poor.  
The differences between "old" and "new" Socialism were depicted by two other 
contradicting concepts, the moderate "Practical Socialism" and the traditional 
"Theoretical Socialism". Freeden asserted that Practical Socialism leaned upon two 
major elements, feasibility and gradualism, both eminent in the liberal thinking of that 
time (1978, p. 38). Barnett reinforced this thinking by arguing, "a change which does 
not fit into and grow out of things that already exist is not a practicable change" (1895, 
p. 243). Hobhouse wrote that any social regime must formulate his plans by letting "the 




Among the examples of implementations of practical socialism, one unusual model, 
namely "Municipal Socialism" is interesting. The rationale behind the idea, first 
introduced by Joseph Chamberlain when Mayor of Birmingham, was to put greater 
powers and resources in the hands of local authorities so they could strengthen the 
community and improve provision for their citizens (Thane 1996, p. 44; Fraser 1973, p. 
                                                 
35
  The existence of negative perceptions about Practical Socialism should also be noted. Hobson, for instance, wrote 
that the ultimate goal of Practicable Socialism is "to supply all workers at cost price with all the economic 
conditions", therefore there is "no economic or moral finality in such proposals… [as] they would not bring a heaven 
upon earth". Hobson concluded by arguing that "equality will not be won without fighting for it… we can only cure 
poverty by an attack upon the sources of riches" (1909, pp 172-175). Another critic of Practical Socialism was 
Belloc. He was a great supporter of redistributive policies, but was emphatically against collectivist ideas.  Practical 
Socialism, he argued, was leaning toward the latter by putting power in the hands of the few rather than 
implementing redistributive policies that would allocate property to the benefit of the many (1912/1927).  
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130). It was one of the first policies derived from but also generated by a new liberal 
notion of community. Chamberlain described it as a revolution, resulting from "a wise 
cooperation by which the community as a whole… has faced its obligations and done 
much to lessen the sum of human misery and to make the lives of all its citizens 
somewhat better, somewhat nobler, and somewhat happier" (1891, p. 538).  
It should be noted that Liberal Socialism was taken up by various groups. One such 
group consisted of "Christian Socialists" and its texts were appealing not only for 
historical analysis but also to contemporary politics. Frederic Marshall, for instance, 
rejected the common wisdom asserting, "there always have been rich and poor, and 
there always will be", and argued that only "foolish or careless people" still believe in it 
as "any sensible man who reads the passage will see how idiotic such an interpretation 
is" (1892, p. 5). He identified "symptoms not of health but of disease" in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, but stated clearly that "all cannot be equally rich [as] if 
they were, the machinery of the world would cease to work" (p. 6).  
Broadly speaking, Christian Socialism advocated democratic, gradual, constitutional 
and peaceful solutions to reduce financial inequalities and maintain income levels. It 
was strongly criticised by Molesworth (1913) and Sanday (1912), who argued the 
foundations upon which the idea rested were exaggerated and distorted while its 
believers were "ignorant or oblivious of the past" as the outcome "would be hell". It is 
remarkable though that both in Britain and in Germany the term "Socialism" was used, 
some would say exploited, to describe utterly different approaches to social problems 
than that presented by Classical Socialism. The vision of Mill described in his Chapters 
on Socialism (1879/1989) is significantly different to Marx's ideas as portrayed in his 
writings during the 1840s (McLellan 2000). On the other hand, Mill's ideas like those of 
Marx do not sanction competition and exclusive property rights.  
When describing price reductions resulting from increased competition, Mill wrote it is 
"the hammer with which the rich among the producers crush their poorer rivals… the 
trap into which the daring speculators entice the hard workers… the sentence of death to 
the producers on a small scale" (pp. 236-237). He explicitly ruled out communists or in 
his words, "revolutionary socialists", but he did express sympathy for the ideas of 
distributive justice, "Flourierism", which "admits inequalities of distribution and 
individual ownership of capital, but not the arbitrary disposal of it" (p. 272). Eventually, 
Mill stated that "society is fully entitled to abrogate or alter any particular right of 
property which on sufficient consideration it judges to stand in the way of the public 
good" (p. 279).  
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Hobhouse also made a substantial contribution to modifying old conceptions by 
progressively changing the balance between individual rights and social welfare. In his 
Liberalism, he noted that a collective action does not always lead to coercion. 
Generally, he stated, "an individual right… cannot conflict with the common good, nor 
could any right exist apart from the common good… [as] the common good to which 
each man's rights are subordinate is a good in which each man has a share" (1911/1934, 
p. 127-128).  
Having described changing ideological perceptions, it is time to discuss Lloyd George 
specifically. Freeden cynically wrote that from the 1880s onwards any "public 
awareness of and desire to confront the social question was socialism" (1978, p. 26). 
However, any search for a vestige of pride in socialism within Lloyd George's speeches 
will produce no results. As clearly exemplified at a Liberal conference on 30
th
 January 
1925, for Lloyd George there was no "New Socialism", but only a "pervasive tyranny" 
(quoted in Thomson 1949, pp. 397-398): 
Socialism has no interest in liberty. Socialism is the very negation of 
liberty. Socialism means the community in bonds… It is like the sand 
of the desert. It gets into your food, your clothes, your machinery, 
the very air you breathe… That is what socialism means.  
However, a question of ideologies remains. As his official biographer arguably stated, 
whatever the National Insurance scheme was, "it certainly was not Liberalism" which 
theoretically revered laissez faire and sanctioned free enterprise (Thompson 1949, p. 
200). Although it was surely more liberal than progressive taxation, Thompson's 
remarks demonstrated Lloyd George's elusiveness was criticised a long time ago. 
Shrewder Conservatives realized as well that his adherence to liberal principles was 
"more lip service than the result of conviction" (Searle 1971, p. 175). His remarkable 
success in manipulating the entire British political system to form a coalition speaks for 
itself (Independent Liberal 1918, pp. 99-120), as well as his outstanding capability of 
smoothly shifting between an image of radical to one of pragmatist, depends on the 
audience (Grigg 1978, pp. 94-131). In fact, his talent combined with a great sense of 
humour enabled him "making the best of both worlds" (p. 98).  
Indeed, Lloyd Gorge's image is highly criticised. However, "while avoiding 
exaggeration of Lloyd George's contribution to social reform, one must equally guard 
against the tendency of some contemporaries to disparage his role" (Pugh 1988, p. 39). 
Exploring the original texts of his speeches, their substance generally followed the ideas 
of Liberal Socialism. Though acknowledging the rules of the markets, they consistently 
spoke of a deep sense of responsibility for relieving poverty as well as achieving fairer 
distribution of resources.  




 September 1906, for instance, Lloyd George elaborated upon what he defined as 
"unmerited poverty", defiantly calling "shame upon rich Britain that she should tolerate 
so much poverty among her people." He concluded his speech in Penrhyndeudrath by 
saying, "there is plenty of wealth in this country to provide for all and to spare. What is 
wanted is a fairer distribution" (quoted in Grigg 1978, p. 153). Two years later, in 
Reading, he admitted that the Insurance Acts could not deal with the "worst part" of the 
"unmerited destitution". He then declared, "these problems of the sick, of the infirm, of 
the men who cannot find means of earning a livelihood… are problems with which it is 
the business of the state to deal; they are problems which the state has neglected too 
long" (p. 160).  
One of Lloyd George's most famous remarks was made at a public meeting of the 
Liberal Christian League on 17
th
 October 1910. During what was promptly defined as 
"immortal speech, a speech that will be quoted ages hence", the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer struck the "idle rich". He denounced a reality in which the poor were 
required to work even when they are 70 to earn a "wretched pittance, which just saves 
them from starvation but never lifted them above privation." In this outstanding 
account, Lloyd George stood for those "earning 6s. and 7s. a week by needlework on 
the garments of those who in an idle hour will spend more on frivolity than these poor 
people would earn in three years of toil." He also hinted at his stance regarding the 
fairness of redistribution by making public his observations after monitoring death 
duties (quoted in The Times, 18.10.1910, p. 7):  
I find that out of 420,000 adults that die in the course of a year five 
sixths own no property… Out of £300,000,000 that passes annually at 
death about half belongs to something under 2,000 persons. Had the 
350,000 who died in poverty had lived of indolence and thriftlessness 
and extravagance? And had the 2,000 who owned between them 
nearly £150,000,000, had they pursued a career of industry, toil, and 
frugality? Everybody knows that that is not the case.  
Even though the words were charming and the rhetoric was admirable, one can hardly 
argue Lloyd George eradicated the evils he referred to. He was aware that "the remedy 
must be a 'bold' one" (The Times, 18.10.1910), but his proposals were far from being 
radical. Some would possibly perceive it as a proof for his "chameleon" inclination, 
recalling his utter lack of interest in economic ideas or in liberal ideology (Pugh 1988, 
pp. 39-57). A remarkable description of his manners was provided by the Edwardian 
journalist A.G. Gardiner: "There is no past: only the living present; no teachers: only the 
living facts… he picks up a subject as he runs, through the living voice, never through 
books. He does not learn: he absorbs, and by a sort of instantaneous chemistry his mind 
condenses the gases to the concrete" (1914, pp. 134-135). Nevertheless, while his 
manners were contested, his social instincts were evident.  
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Before discussing the reforms Lloyd George introduced, it should be noted that social 
issues were not prominent during the General Election campaign that led the Liberals to 
their overwhelming victory in 1906. It was therefore argued that pressure from the 
backbenches and a strong rival Labour party were major motives behind the political 
transformation (Peden 1985, p. 16; Thane 1996, p. 69). Thus, with minor publicity, the 
Liberals led by Lloyd George embarked on a collectivist reform program in essence, 
expanding the role of the state by introducing new provisions for children, pensioners, 
unemployed and the sick. 
The 1910 "People's Budget" shifted the chief source of revenue from indirect to direct 
taxation. Pugh maintained it inaugurated a limited redistribution of income and by thus 
"changed the whole basis of British public finance from the Victorian pattern to the 
system that has lasted throughout the twentieth century" (1988, p. 47). Other renowned 
legislation included the Education Act of 1906, which "permitted" local authorities to 
provide school meals for needy children before it became compulsory in 1914. The Old 
Age Pensions Act of 1908 introduced the right for non-contributory, means tested 
pensions, although recipients under the Poor Law were excluded until 1911. The 
National Insurance Act of 1911 comprised of unemployment, health and sickness 
insurance provided on a contributory basis. Another landmark piece of legislation was 
the Trade Board Act of 1909 that established a board representing both employers and 
workers, intended to set a National Minimum Wage (Laybourn 1995, pp. 160-178; 
Thane 1982, pp. 64-98; Peden 1991, pp. 15-33; Gilbert 1966).   
Although the reforms were the first significant move away from the Poor Laws, a major 
achievement in itself, they still attracted much criticism. While some identified and 
praised the fundamental change in attitude (Marsh 1970), others asserted that the 
reforms were relatively insignificant and lacked proper coverage. Thane wrote, "it was a 
pension for the very poor, the very respectable and the very old" (1982, p. 83). 
Referring to unemployment insurance, Sir William Beveridge noted, "it was avowedly 
experimental, with a low scale of benefits and a scope limited to manual workers" 
(1927, p. 229). Peden even argued that the reforms "can best be understood through the 
concept of social control", arguing that the party adopted social reforms "as a means of 
pre-empting the Labour [party]" in a Bismarckian tactic of "kill socialism with 
kindness" (1991, p. 18-21).  
A pivotal critique came from Bentley Gilbert. After Reviewing in detail the new 
provisions, he concluded by stating, "Great Britain was diverted from a socialist 
solution to the problem of poverty and was turned instead to the establishment of the 
institution of social insurance. The profit system, with its vagaries and caprices, was left 
intact" (1966, p. 451). Indeed, with a few exceptions, the Liberal reforms did not 
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contain any significant radical elements of redistribution as implied in pre-election 
speeches.  
To conclude, Lloyd George did not deliver a radical formal or substantive egalitarian 
reform. Nevertheless, his policies did eventually reflect his social instincts, which were 
in favour of equality. Lloyd George supported suffrage for women, promoted formal 
egalitarianism and vowed for higher personal freedoms. However, although his 
egalitarian rhetoric was prominent, he fluctuated between different perceptions of 
citizenship and accordingly, different perceptions on economic freedom. On the one 
hand, his collectivist reforms demanded sacrifices of economic freedoms more than its 
German predecessors did. On the other hand, his social insurance schemes did follow 
liberal principles of individual contributions and national contract. As he attempted to 
play on both fields, his approach is a classical case for the "middle point" with regard to 






Figure ‎11.1.4: David Lloyd George's assessed attitudes based on the two typologies 
In a sense, the way forward to William Beveridge's revolution started before the two 
destructive World Wars. A notion of the need for reconstruction rather than a simple 
reaction to social necessities can be traced back to 1909 when the Royal Commission 
for the Poor Laws published its findings. There were two separate reports published as 
four of the committee's members found themselves "unable to agree with the report of 
the majority" (HMSO 1909, p. 2).  
The two documents were often similar, with both groups moving away from the 
principles of the Poor Laws.  However, the minority report drafted by Beatrice and 
Sidney Webb was slightly more radical. It depicted moral lapses as the consequence 
rather than the source of poverty, recommending the "break up" of the Poor Law and 
advocated a national minimum standard of living (Lewis & Condie 1950, p. 326; Thane 
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Lloyd George preferred not to grasp this opportunity from his own political and 
ideological reasons.  
Historically, the First World War (1914-1918) brought temporary prosperity followed 
by a catastrophic recession in its aftermath, making change inevitable. The 48 per cent 
reduction in British exports between 1920 and 1921 was economically dreadful, leading 
to escalation in unemployment that rose from 6 per cent in December 1920 to 17.8 per 
cent in June 1921 (Mowat 1956, p. 125-126).  
Nevertheless, the inter-war period was largely a time of stagnation for Social Policy, 
with the exception of The Housing and Town Planning Act of 1919. A few other 
remedies were introduced to ease the misery of the poor but they were relatively 
insignificant. In 1921, the Unemployment Insurance Act was expanded to allow the 
unemployed an "un-covenanted" period of benefits. The Unemployment Workers' 
Dependant Act (Temporary Provisions) was approved, providing a little assistance for 
wives and dependent children of the unemployed. In addition, new criteria made 
benefits payable only to those "genuinely seeking" work, benefits levels were amended 
slightly and the scope of provision was expanded (Thane 1996, Barr 1998, Lewis & 
Condie 1950). Notably, throughout this period, the humiliating Poor Laws were 
enforced, providing support for 224,000 individuals in March 1921, 831,000 in 
November 1921 and 1,065,000 in June 1922 (Mowat 1956, p. 129).   
Toward the end of the 1920s, unemployment dropped substantially.  It then soared again 
after the Great Depression of 1929 and trapped major industrial cities in Britain into a 
deep recession (Mowat 1956).  Trade Union leaders like Ernest Bevin captured the 
Labour party after the disastrous 1931 General Elections, promoting union interests and 
marginalizing old-socialist leaders (Ashford 1986, p. 194).  
By the end of the Second World War (1939-1945), almost every family had experienced 
poverty, directly or indirectly. Sadly, Beatrice Webb's worst fears materialised. In the 
Minority Report for the Royal Commission on the Poor Law she wrote, "The first step 
is to make the whole community realise that the evil exists. At present, it is not too 
much to say that the average citizen of the middle / upper class takes for granted the 
constantly recurring destitution… as no more to be combated than the east wind" 
(HMSO 1909, p. 684).  
When "the evil" came to existence, all sought to protect themselves against it. 
Eventually, the route Lloyd George rejected was once again on the public agenda. 
Although some argued the war in itself changed nothing in the development of Social 
Policy (Peden 1985), others asserted it created a historic, momentous change in attitudes 
as for the first time the British people realized destruction knows no social borders. 
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Richard Titmuss, for instance, explained that new hazards generated a more generous 
society, committed to universal provision as the only just alternative in the face of a 
universal  risk (1950/1976, p. 506):  
No longer did concern rest on the belief that… it was proper to 
intervene only to assist the poor and those who were unable to pay 
for services of one kind and another. Instead, it was increasingly 
regarded as a proper function or even obligation of Government to 
ward off distress and strain among not only the poor but almost all 
classes of society.  
Titmuss stated that during the war, unplanned reforms occurred in various fields:  
Improved pensions were provided for old people as a right and not as a concession, a 
national milk scheme was introduced, the provision of school meals was increased 
dramatically and higher standards for social services were set. William Beveridge 
asserted that there had not been the same interest in post war problems during the First 
Wold War. He pointed out "the deep and vivid interest of the people of Britain in the 
kind of Britain which is to emerge when the floods of war subside" (1943, p. 107-108):  
 [This interest] implies no slackening of war efforts… it represents 
simply a refusal to take victory in war as an end in itself; it must be 
read as a determination to understand and to approve the end 
beyond victory for which sacrifices are being required and the 
purposes for which victory will be used.  
A third remarkable observation was made by The Times in a well-quoted leader entitled 
"The New Europe". Aiming at defining the "common values of which we stand", the 
editor captured the prospect of a whole nation under the devastating threat of Nazism 
(1.7.1940): 
If we speak of democracy, we do not mean a democracy which 
maintains the right to vote but forgets the right to work and the right 
to live. If we speak of freedom, we do not mean a rugged 
individualism which excludes social organisation and economic 
planning. If we speak of equality, we do not mean a political equality 
nullified by social and economic privilege. If we speak of economic 
reconstruction, we think less of maximum production (though this too 
will be required) than of equitable distribution.  
Beveridge was the one to enter the political arena, filling the vacuum of innovators in 
social policy. The liberal thinker, former director of the London School of Economics, 
was regarded as an expert in unemployment. He had his own reservations about the 
previous welfare reforms as evidently, his ideas had already matured much before he 
began to draft his famous report.   
Back in 1907 following a visit to Germany, Beveridge became convinced of the 
necessity of a contributory insurance mechanism (J. Beveridge 1954, p. 55-56). Later, 
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he expressed his desire for a universal scheme. He was uncomfortable with Lloyd 
George's Unemployment Act, saying in 1911, "no one outside the Board of Trade knew 
enough to criticize it in detail" (quoted in Gilbert 1966, p. 284). Referring to latter 
amendments, Beveridge blamed Parliament for surrendering to the "vigorous and 
successful resistance" of the trade unions, missing an opportunity to deliver a universal 
reform (1927, p. 232-233). In 1941, he reluctantly agreed to lead a civil-service 
committee to review the national insurance policies (Abel-Smith 1992). 
It should be noted that historically, the "Interdepartmental Committee on Social 
Insurance and Allied Services" was a compromise between the Government and the 
Trade Unions, who during the War demanded a major adjustment in the level of 
benefits. The Treasury preferred to nominate a "safe" chairman to lead a bunch of 
conservative civil servants that were expected to produce a "harmless as possible" 
report. For Beveridge's minister, Arthur Greenwood, it was an opportunity to free his 
―arrogant‖ employee, without anticipating his eventual contribution to the creation of 
the first welfare state (Timmins 1995, Abel-Smith 1992, Silburn 1994).  
In his final report, Beveridge defined "five giants" that need to be tackled for 
reconstruction: want, disease, squalor, ignorance and idleness. Although remedies were 
proposed for all giants, Beveridge was passionate about the giant of want.  He 
recommended the establishment of a universal, unified, contributory, comprehensive 
and centrally administered National Insurance System. Notably, his plan was not 
designed from the outset to include elements of redistribution, as it was first and 
foremost, "a plan of insurance" – of giving in return for contributions benefits up to 
subsistence level, as of right and without means test, so that individuals may build 
freely upon it (HMSO 1942, p. 7). The report defined flat rate of subsistence benefits 
and flat rate of contributions, which should have guaranteed freedom of want "so long 
as the need lasts" (p. 11).  
The government was largely embarrassed by this report written at its behest. It quickly 
recognised the consequences of its mistake.  Beveridge had gone far beyond his terms 
of reference. Not only did many ministers not share his views, but the last thing anyone 
expected "was that Beveridge's investigation would produce not just a technical report 
on social insurance, but a new declaration of human rights" (Bullock 1967, p. 225). The 
government ultimately stopped endorsing the report and downgraded its importance, 
prior to its publication (J. Beveridge 1954, pp. 101-117; Peden 1985, pp. 128-135).  
After the publication in December 1942, public pressure was so great that no reasonable 
leader could postpone the reform any further (Lewis & Condie 1950, Ashford 1986). A 
survey published by the British Institute of Public Opinion reported that 95 per cent of 
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the adult population knew something about the report and an overwhelming majority 
said it "should be put into effect" (BIPO 1942). The support made impossible retreat by 
politicians. The Conservative Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, withdrew his refusal 
to meet Beveridge and overturned his order to forbid any government department to 
"allow him inside its doors" (Bullock 1967, p. 226). Eventually, the Coalition 
Government of 1944 was forced to adopt the Report's principles and publish two white 
papers introducing new schemes for social insurance, retirement pensions, family 
allowances, sickness and unemployment benefits (HMSO 1944a, HMSO 1944b).  
These White Papers defined the first duty of government as the duty to "protect the 
country from external aggression". The second goal was to "secure the general 
prosperity and happiness of the citizen". The boundaries were narrow as the government 
restricted the scope of provision to "those hazards of personal fortune over which 
individuals have little or no control" (HMSO 1944a, p. 5).  Nevertheless, in July 1948, 
the modern welfare state was formally inaugurated with three pillars - National 
Insurance, National Assistance and National Health Service.  
Although the core principles of the report were put into action, the initial level of 
benefits was insufficient. When the full plan came into force in 1948, inflation had 
eroded a third of the proposed benefits in real terms (Feinstein 1972, Table 65). The 
Prime Minister Clement Attlee, admitted benefits would sustain only a "very modest 
standard of life" (Peden 1991, p. 146). In retrospect, the report made history by unifying 
and defining the corner stones for the British post-war welfare regime. However, it was 
argued that the report was "a skilful blend of measures and proposals that were in 
themselves tried and tested, and for that reason relatively uncontested, enriched by one 
or two somewhat more radical ideas" (Silburn 1994, p. 57). 
Ideologically, Beveridge was a liberal economist, influenced and connected to various 
scholars ranging, from Sidney and Beatrice Webb to John Maynard Keynes. Harris 
noted that Beveridge strongly believed rational, economic considerations motivated 
men and therefore "poverty traps", a term coined by Prof. David Piachaud in the 1970s, 
must not exist (1994). Social welfare, accordingly, is bound up with citizenship, but 
good citizenship consists of economic independence and self-discipline. Harris also 
argued that Beveridge was less interested in the relief of poverty for its own sake than in 
reconstructing the labour market in a way that would ultimately make relief of poverty 
unnecessary. Beveridge himself stated in the Report his conviction that social security 
must be achieved through cooperation between the state and the individual and no party 
to this equation can release itself or from the responsibility (HMSO 1942). 
 








Figure ‎11.1.5: William Beveridge's assessed attitudes based on the two typologies 
Assessment of Beveridge‘s attitudes is provided in Figure ‎11.1.5. Overall, while his 
writing was less enthusiastic about redistribution than Lloyd George's speeches, his 
concept of national minimum is in essence far more egalitarian than the liberal model of 
national insurance. It could also ensure higher personal freedoms and better social 
mobility. Regarding the horizontal axis, apparently, Beveridge conceived Liberalism 
with a stronger solidaristic inclination, being influenced by the post-war unity 
atmosphere. However, his outstanding capability of combining solidarity with economic 
freedoms cannot ascribe him to either of the sides. Indeed, if any figure deserves to hold 
the "middle point" not because of fluctuation and manipulation but due to compromises 
and conciliation, it is William Beveridge. While his proposals rested upon the notion of 
rational, economic man, his ultimate goal was to reinforce the labour market by liberal 
social provision and by thus provide prosperity for all.  
As Beveridge's premises shaped the recommendations, a major barrier eventually made 
the report impossible to implement fully. Three prior assumptions were essential to the 
success of the plan, as "Beveridge in effect was saying that any sensible Government 
would first of all grant family allowances, create a comprehensive health service and 
maintain full employment" (Fraser 1973, p. 199). The third prerequisite was found to be 
impracticable during the 1970s and consequently undermined the whole theory of 
demand management. The fine fiscal balance concealed in Beveridge's flat rate policy 
was broken (Peden 1985), and after the costs of unemployment and pensions benefits 
soared to heights, the burden forced the Labour government to reconsider its policy. 
After reviewing the ideological perceptions held by three influential figures, several 
conclusions were made. It was suggested that Bismarck presented the purest solidaristic 
notion of citizenship, allowing relatively low economic freedoms for the benefit of the 
state and the Chancellor. On the vertical dimension, the German monarch was in favour 
of the "old order", especially when he had to rule it. His fear from substantive 
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resistance to high personal freedoms. While the political analysis of Blundell & 
Gosschalk would put him under the contemporary definition of a Conservative (or a 











Figure ‎11.1.6: Personal ideological perceptions of Bismarck, Lloyd George and Beveridge 
according to Blundell & Gosschalk (1997) and Dean's (2002 & 2005) typologies 
Lloyd George played in a different, democratic field and the differences between his 
discourse and his policies were significant. Manoeuvring his electorate and his allies, he 
still introduced several social reforms, promoted progressive taxation and introduced 
social insurance schemes. Though these were neither formal nor substantive radical 
egalitarian reforms, they certainly pursued certain level of redistribution. Further more, 
his positive attitudes toward personal freedom were also reflected in his decision to 
back proposals for women suffrage. Therefore, in terms of economic freedom and 
perceptions of citizenship, Lloyd George's manoeuvres had put him in the middle 
ground, fluctuating between contradicting discourses and implementing policies of both 
types. 
In this aspect, Beveridge occupied the middle ground as well but apparently, not due to 
manoeuvring but because of compromises made between liberalism and socialism in the 
light of the Second World War. Unlike Bismarck and Lloyd George, his policies were 
significantly more egalitarian, achieving in fact and not in theory higher pace of 
redistribution. His national minimum framework as well as his plans for universal 
provision had certainly sought to guarantee higher equality of opportunities 
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11.2 Research Materials 
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11.2.4 Interview Schedule 
After the questionnaire has been completed, 12 of the interviewees will be asked 
whether, where and when a detailed conversation with them can take place. The 
selection of the interviewees from the preliminary sample will be done on the basis of 
their income and voting preferences, in order to generate a diverse sample. The 
following are the topics and some anchor questions to be discussed during the meetings.  
1. The subject's view of the political process, its purposes and its dynamics. Why do 
you vote? Do you think politics and voting are effective? Have you ever linked your 
own welfare and your voting patterns? Do you have interests in voting?  Was it 
always like that or has it changed during the last few years? Who has the power to 
influence your own conditions of living?  
2. The subject's current voting decision and the reasons behind it (if elections were to 
be held today). In the survey, you said you would vote for the ___ party. What are 
the reasons behind that choice? Do you always vote like that? What has changed? 
Are you a consistent voter? Would you vote the same way whatever happens in your 
life or whatever the other party says? What would make you vote for another party? 
3. The compatibility of existing reasoning with rationality theories. You said welfare is 
the most important subject that might help you in the future, and you also answered 
that the Conservatives will not help you in that aspect. Some people would say you 
actually voted against the welfare state. What do you think about it? Although you 
did not define yourself as a rich person, you said the government's investment in 
benefits and welfare is not a first priority for you. Do you think the government 
should help in this matter? Some scholars suggest you should work for your own 
interests in every voting decision you make. Do you think you did so in your current 
vote? Do you think benefits are within your interest? 
4. Retrospective assessment of the subject's voting decisions. What do you think about 
extremely poor voters who support cutbacks in their own benefits? Eventually, if 
you summarise all your preferences and your expectations, it seems you assume the 
Labour Party will promote your interests more than other parties… some would 
wonder whether you also voted against your own interests. Retrospectively, would 
you say there are other significant benefits you derive from governments, which 
were not included in the survey? After discussing these issues, do you think you 
should have voted differently? Do you think you are a rational voter? Voting from 
the head and not from your heart? Do you believe voting should be a rational act at 
all or people should vote from their hearts?  
After the questions of rationality, a few minutes will be devoted to the issue of turnout 
and information, in order to ease the pressures and finish the interview on a positive 
note. This will be achieved by making the interviewee feel s/he did her/his best and 
fulfilled her/his civilian duties. The goal, however, is to distance the argument of 
rationality and to distract the voter with other, less stressful topics.  
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Possible Scenarios and Answers 
"No, I am not poor, and therefore I have no reason to vote for the welfare state." 
Poverty is a controversial term, everyone defines it differently. How do you define it? If 
based on income – have you ever checked what the official welfare threshold is? Even 
though you are above the threshold, I am interested to know how, in your opinion, poor 
people should vote. 
"Both parties will do the same things in terms of the welfare state, there is no 
difference." What is it that they will do? Is it because they have the same ideology or 
because of other reasons? And are you satisfied with the current state of affairs? Do you 
see any hope for change?  
"Politics is a deceit – you can never trust what politicians say." You are not the only 
one who says that, but if you really believe it, why do you vote at all? Do you see any 
personal interest in casting your vote? What do you think about voter abstention? Is it 
worth the effort?  
"I don't think any of them can help me personally." Many people say so, but can you tell 
me what it is that you want from your government? Can you really manage without a 
government at all? Do you think governments can help poor people to get out of 
poverty? Can it help you in any way? 
"Maybe there is a problem with my vote, but I couldn't vote for any other party." It is 
not the first time I heard that, but let me ask you this: if party X promises you to add one 
hundred pounds to your net salary, would you still vote as you did?  
"If I had thought only of myself, I would have voted for the Labour Party, but I think it 
is bad for the country." Do people from your neighbourhood think the same way? Some 
people would wonder why you hold this belief while others have a completely different 
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11.3 Supplement on Methods (Israel) 
11.3.1 Exploratory Survey 
In the period from August 2005 to March 2006, approximately 200 Israelis citizens 
were invited to answer a few questions about their voting behaviour. Of these, 57 
secular or traditional Jews who reported voting for one of the two major parties agreed 
to do so. They were asked to participate in the exploratory survey either electronically 
or by filling in a hard copy of the questionnaire. From the very beginning, it became 
clear that a quantitative analysis might not expose all possible significant insights. 
Therefore, many interviewer observations and subjects‘ comments were added to the 
questionnaires until, in certain cases, the questionnaires turned into short, structured 
interviews. In order to achieve a diverse sample, these interviews were held in several 
locations, some wealthy and prosperous and others associated with poverty and 
deprivation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the sample for the exploratory survey 
was not meant to be representative of the whole population.  
The privileged members of the sample (31 subjects) were drawn from three areas: 
visitors to the exclusive Arcafe coffee shops in Herzliya and Tel Aviv, participants of 
the annual Israeli Business Conference organized by Globes, and wealthy individuals 
known personally to the author. The underprivileged members of the sample (26 
subjects) included visitors to job centres in the peripheral towns of Sderot, Ofakim and 
Netivot, as well as local residents spending their middays in the central squares of these 
locations. As noted, the computer-administered survey was limited to those who voted 
for the two major parties so other political parties are minimally represented. 
Reportedly, 57 per cent of the privileged subjects voted for the Labour party, whereas 
among the underprivileged, Likud enjoyed overwhelming popularity with 88 per cent of 
the votes.   
It should be emphasised that it was the location where the interview took place, rather 
than the reported income of the interviewee, that served as the indicator of the subject's 
socio-economic classification. However, the income distribution in both groups was 
almost always in line with the initial expectations. 69 per cent of the respondents 
interviewed in underprivileged locations reported an income lower than 4,000 Shekels a 
month, whereas 72 per cent of those interviewed in privileged areas reported a monthly 
income higher than 14,000 Shekels. Statistically, both groups suffered from a gender 
bias, as 71 per cent among the privileged sample and 65 per cent among the 
underprivileged sample were males. This deviation can be partly explained with the 
dominance of males in qualified jobs in Israel, as well as the environmental pressures on 
females to care for their homes and children rather than search for income or laze 
around in the town square. 
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11.3.2 In-Depth Interviews 
15 semi-structured in-depth interviews were carried out in Israel at the same time as the 
exploratory study. Short dialogues with subjects undertaking the questionnaires were 
not included in this count, even though several of the collected comments and 
observations were transcribed and analysed as well. There was a considerable difference 
between the data collected from privileged and underprivileged interviewees, which 
justifies individual reference to each of the two groups.  
The in-depth interviews with underprivileged individuals took place after the subjects 
consented to participation in the exploratory survey. As the entire engagement was in 
town squares or jobcentres, the discussion moved smoothly and respondents readily 
elaborated on their thoughts. Occasionally, it seemed, the interviewees were as anxious 
to share their thoughts as the interviewer was to listen to them. There was one 
exception, though: most visitors to the newly established Sderot jobcentre refused to be 
recorded by any device. Notably, this specific jobcentre was run by a private company - 
a fresh outcome of a controversial reform introduced by the former Finance Minister 
Netanyahu. As part of the "Welfare to Work" campaign, jobseekers were required to 
participate in classes and tutorials in order to preserve their income support or 
unemployment benefits. What was defined by governmental sources as a local version 
of the "Wisconsin Plan" was criticised in the press that published personal stories of 
humiliated benefits recipients. It is possible, therefore, that the jobseekers who refused 
to be recorded feared retribution. 
In contrast, difficulties arose when interviewing privileged individuals. For various 
practical reasons, it was impossible to hold interviews with wealthy respondents 
immediately after they completed the survey. However, all attempts to set up meetings 
with randomly selected subjects failed. Consequently, personal contacts were employed 
to set up in-depth interviews with wealthy individuals, who could be categorised as 
belonging to the upper classes. To guarantee diversity, special attention was given to the 
interviewees' backgrounds and fields of occupation. Hence, even though the selection 
was not random in the classical sense, the sample was far from being homogenous. In 
addition, the interviewer‘s previous acquaintance with the interviewees was found to be 
an advantage in certain respects, primarily their greater willingness to discuss their 
thoughts freely and openly with almost no time limitations.  
Technically, all in-depth interviews were recorded, either on audio tape or using a video 
camera, before being transcribed and translated into English. Short interviews, made 
mostly in Sderot Jobcentre, were written on the questionnaires and later transcribed 
electronically. The texts were coded using two levels of categories, to enable the 
identification of repeated discourses. Notes and insights written on many of the 
transcripts were similarly classified. This process later enabled the crystallization of a 
coherent and integrative narrative, which, accompanied with quantitative findings, 
facilitated the drawing of tangible conclusions.  
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11.3.3 Secondary Analysis  
11.3.3.1 Datasets Availability 
Whereas the in-depth interviews and the exploratory survey yielded primary data, the 
secondary analysis drew upon several datasets. Some of them were used to deduce 
inferences at the individual level, whereas others were analysed at the local level to 
correlate between aggregated voting and turnout data and socio-economic 
classifications.  As explained in the methods' chapter, the public's behaviour as 
monitored in large-scale surveys cannot always replace the official records of voting as 
summarised for each locality.  
Therefore, the quest after insights at the village level involved the integration of official 
voting figures at the village level (CBS 1992 & CEC 1999) and their socio-economic 
correlation (CBS 2004). In this method, the actual "public choice" was authentically 
reflected, using the official records from the ballot boxes records and a sophisticated 
socio-economic classification, as explained later.  
As for the personal level, two datasets of the Israeli Election Study (IES 1992 & 1999) 
and one dataset of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP 1999) were carefully 
explored to track positions on various issues. These indicators of "public opinion" were 
usually gathered through face-to-face interviews, as detailed in the technical references 
of each datset:  
 The IES of 1992 was conducted in one wave, during June, days before the General 
Elections in which the Labour candidate, the late Yitzhak Rabin, defeated the 
incumbent Likud government. The sample consisted of 1,192 adult Jewish citizens, 
excluding settlers living beyond the Green Line and residents of the Kibbutzim. The 
questionnaire was prepared by Prof. Asher Arian and Prof. Michal Shamir.   
 The IES of 1999 consisted of two waves. The pre-election questionnaire was 
presented to interviewees during April-May, approximately a month before the 
elections took place. Eventually, after three years of a Likud regime, the Labour 
candidate Ehud Barak brought about a political upheaval. Face-to-face interviews 
took place with 1,225 eligible voters, including 150 Arabs. The questionnaire was 
prepared by Prof. Asher Arian and Prof. Michal Shamir.  
 The ISSP Social Inequality III module of 1999 was run in Israel during November, a 
few months after the General Elections. Notably, major sections of the questionnaire 
were identical in all countries participating in this project. The representative 
sample, built on an area probability basis, consisted of 1,208 adult citizens, 
including 151 Arabs. The principle investigators were Prof. Noah Lewin-Epstein 
and Prof. Ephraim Ya'ar. 
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Most of the academic papers studying political behaviour in Israel separate the Arab 
population from the Jewish one, as the differences are too fundamental to be 
accommodated by statistical tools. Even though the Arabs formally possess full and 
equal civil rights, their political attitudes are highly influenced by extrinsic motivations, 
stemming primarily from the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Until 
the last decade, the turnout of Israeli Arabs was significantly lower then average, as 
voting for the Israeli Parliament was perceived by some as an acknowledgment of 
Israel's existence, hence a betrayal of Palestinian interests. Since then, the necessity of 
adequate political representation has been recognised.  However, it is widely assumed 
and occasionally publicly declared by Israeli-Arabs‘ leader that Arab political behaviour 
in Israel has to do with the national conflict, no less than the social tensions. 
Acknowledging that the Arab national minority is among the least privileged groups in 
Israel, it seems as this thesis' scope is too focused and its resources are too limited to 
address this issue sufficiently. A similar decision was accepted with regard to the ultra-
orthodox sector, which follows rabbinical commandments and vote for parties by their 
ultra-orthodox affiliation. Comparing these groups to the majority of the electorate is 
empirically unjustified, and therefore they were excluded from this analysis.  
11.3.3.2 A Single-Variable Method  
A fundamental methodological challenge was revealed when the first socio-
demographic distributions were produced.  It had to do with the need to define an 
underprivileged group in all three datasets, in a way that would enable comparisons 
between the datasets, to track the way underprivileged voters responded to questions. 
This mission faced several obstacles. Whereas adjusted family income was originally 
perceived as the most powerful distinguishing factor between subjects in the middle or 
the upper classes and those living in poverty, only one dataset included the information 
required to calculate it. Eventually, after a process that included exploring the available 
socio-demographic questions in all three datasets, studying their contextual 
connotations and reviewing their statistical correlations, it looked as if a single-variable 
method to define the underprivileged group was inapplicable. Two major reasons led to 
that conclusion. 
Each study project had asked different socio-demographic questions and due to validity 
failures, they could not be compared to each other. The major difficulty was found in 
the income/expenditure question. The IES did not include a direct inquiry of the 
subject's level of income but rather an indirect question quoting the "average 
expenditure figure of a four members' family" and asking the respondent to rank his 
own family expenditure on a ladder of five relative categories. The ISSP scholars 
preferred to stick to the traditional income question, which was adjusted according to 
the household size and composition. These two different questions of income and of 
expenditure generated two groups that were heterogeneous in terms of their internal 
composition.  






Figure ‎11.3.1: A comparison of voting patterns by estimated family expenditure (IES 1999) and 
adjusted family income (ISSP 1999) 
When looking at the political affiliation of subjects classified at the bottom of society 
through different indicators (Figure ‎11.3.1), considerable deviations are visible. 
Whereas the income question pointed to higher levels of support for the Likud party 
among families with low earnings and higher levels of support for the Labour party 
among families with high earnings, there was no consistency at all when subjects were 
classified by their estimated family expenditure. Figure ‎11.3.2 reveals one of the 
potential reasons for these contradictory results, derived from what seems to be a key 





Figure ‎11.3.2:  A comparison of household sizes by estimated family expenditure (IES 1992) and 
adjusted family income (ISSP 1999) 
The left figure produced from IES 1992 data, shows clearly that small households of no 
more than two individuals are more likely to report their expenditure is "much below 
the average", whereas the "average", as quoted in the question, refers explicitly to a 
"four members' family". The ISSP 1999 figure on the right proves this conclusion is 
hollow, i.e. small households are not financially disadvantaged, but rather their 
members are less capable of adjusting their expenditure in relation to bigger 
households. The difficulties of standardising the expenditure figure led to a 
contradiction. According to the ISSP figures, 56 per cent of the poorest households 
accommodate at least five people, whereas the IES figures claim these families are in 
fact at the top, constituting 45 per cent of the "wealthiest" households who spend "much 
above the average". The statistical complexities involved in any income equivalence 
process can easily account for the failure of ordinary people to standardise it correctly.  
0 20 40 60 80 100
Much abov e the av erage
Somewhat abov e the av erage
The av erage
Somewhat below the av erage
Much below the av erage
Expected Voting in 1999 by Family Expenditures
Labour Likud Other Party Haven't decided Won't vote







Voting in 1999 by Family Income
Likud Labour Other Party Did not vote
Actual Voting in 1999 b  Fa ily Income Expected Voting in 1999 by Fa ily Expenditures 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Much abov e the av erage
Somewhat abov e the av erage
The av erage
Somewhat below the av erage
Much below the av erage
People in Household by Family Expenditures
1 2 3 4 5 More than 6







People in Household by Family Income
1 2 3 4 5 6 or more
Househ ld Size y Family Income Household Size by Family Expenditures 







Figure ‎11.3.3:  A comparison of ethnic affiliation (2nd generation) by estimated family expenditure 
(IES 1992) and adjusted family income (ISSP 1999) 
Because of the initial deviation, categorisation of subjects by the expenditure variable 
might undermine sample representativeness as illustrated in Figure ‎11.3.3. Factually, 
the socio-economic level of the Israeli Sephardic community (a second generation of 
immigrants from Asia and Africa) is lower than that of the Ashkenazi one (Arian 1997, 
Cohen 1998, Yuchtman-Ya'ar & Peres 2000). However, this reality is apparently not 
reflected in the dataset: when the ethnic affiliation of the respondents is examined by the 
estimated level of expenditure (IES 1992) and by the adjusted family income (ISSP 
1999), two entirely different conclusions are found. In fact, the first comparison shows 
almost no divergence in the composition of the groups, suggesting erroneously that the 
Sephardic community has been equally integrated in society. Whereas the Pearson 
Coefficient of the right figure (ISSP 1999) was significant on a level of 0.124, the left 
figure (IES 1992) has shown no such incline. These results are an additional indicator of 
the validity failure of the expenditure question.  
A second reason for concern is the reliability and validity of the income question when 
it is examined independently. Apart from the inconsistencies discussed above, the 
peculiar conditions prevalent in Israeli society might influence respondents' answers in a 
tricky way. In Israel, old traditions stemming from anachronistic legislation might have 
induced the concealment of legal and illegal funds. This predisposition, probably 
strengthened by fear of the tax authorities, might result in inaccurate or incomplete 
income reports. Ironically, it was precisely these concerns, which question the reliability 
of the ISSP income question, that led Israeli scholars to omit the formulation and 
substitute it with the even knottier one of family expenditure. Regardless of the deficits 
of the second formulation, wealthy citizens might locate themselves at a lower place in 
the income pyramid, putting the reliability of this question at risk.  
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Figure ‎11.3.4: Age Groups by Adjusted Family Income (ISSP 1999) 
The income formulation also suffers from a validity deficit. Apparently, one deficit lies 
in the domain of reliability, as one would expect the process of family income 
equalisation to generate a socio-economic homogenous group, but this has never 
materialised. The distribution of adjusted family incomes by age, as illustrated in Figure 
‎11.3.4, shows that 58 per cent of the "poorest" households (whose monthly income is 
less than 2,000 Shekels) were in fact led by people in their twenties. These young adults 
might be students living in their own flats or even new couples embarking on a new 
chapter in life. Whereas factually, their income is lower than the threshold, one can 
hardly argue that they are living in poverty, or assume that their location on the income 
ladder is permanent. Considering these deficits, the widely used figure of adjusted 
family income cannot serve as a sole indicator for the presence of poverty. Arguably, 
instead of creating a homogenous group, it singled out subjects that are different in 
almost any socio-economic indicator, with the exception of their formal income as 
reported in a short and limited period in their lives 
11.3.3.3 A Multi-Variable Method  
Due to the inconsistencies of the questions asked, as well as the limited validity and 
reliability of the prominent available indicators, a new method to identify an 
underprivileged group is required. While income still constitutes the most essential 
indicator of poverty, it certainly cannot be considered as the sole one. It might help 
identify the poor, but it can hardly stop others from slipping into this group as well. The 
path towards a more homogenous underprivileged sample takes a multi-variable 
approach, in which the chances that poor people will meet the various criteria are the 
highest, as are the chances that non-poor will be disqualified. It employs a few 
additional indicators, which are powerful in isolating those earning low incomes and 
suffering from enduring poverty, and capable of mediating the various socio-
demographic questions asked. Three principles guided the process of selecting these 
indicators and defining their required range. 
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 Reliability: The defined thresholds should maximise the proportion of subjects 
living in enduring poverty and minimise the proportion of others. 
 Applicability: The chosen socio-economic variables should appear in most 
questionnaires and the available categories should match each other as much as 
possible.  
 Practicability: The goal is to succeed in creating a homogenous group of people 
having similar, but not identical, socio-demographic attributes.  
In light of these principles, five variables were chosen: The adjusted family income, as 
low income is still the major indicator of the presence of poverty; the socio-economic 
classification of the city, because when details of family income are absent, the official 
categorisation based on the local population characteristics is the best feasible 
alternative; age, as it is unreliable to bond perceptions of young voters with pensioners 
only because their incomes are temporarily similar; years of schooling, as normally 
higher education increases the probability of permanently high incomes and vice versa; 
household size, as singles or couples are less likely to suffer from enduring poverty than 
large families are. 
Table ‎11.3.1 provides the list of indicators and selected thresholds defined for analyzing 
the Israeli datasets, followed by a technical reference to each figure. Figure ‎11.3.5 
provides a graphical illustration of the algorithm (Page 349), which was programmed 
into the SPSS software.  
 
No. Indicator Threshold 
1 
Socio-economic categorisation of city 
or 
Standardized family income 
Bottom half according to official statistics 
or 
Less than 3,500 Shekels a month 
2 Age Between 27 and 65 (including) 
3 Years of Schooling 14 years or less 
4 Size of Household 3 people or more 
Table ‎11.3.1: Indicators and thresholds defining the Israeli underprivileged group 
1. The socio-economic categorisation was based on the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics' methodology which identified 14 key socio-economic indicators from 
various fields and sources and out of them composed three factors and five indexes, 
by which the local residents were classified (CBS 2004). Based on an analysis of 
2001 data, all Israeli cities were eventually ranked into ten categories according to 
the characteristics of their populations (for previous studies of this kind, see Ben 
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were defined as underprivileged. Residents of Jerusalem were excluded from the 
analysis, as their city's categorisation was highly influenced by the high proportion 
of Palestinians holding an Israeli ID and living in the east side of the city. Notably, 
the vast majority of cities located in the bottom two categories were inhabited by 
Israeli-Arabs, and were not part of this research study (a table of the cities included 
in the studies analysed is provided in Appendix ‎11.4.4).  
2. The adjustment of family income was based largely on the McClements 
Equivalence Scales (DWP 2001). However, the surveys analysed had only 
distinguished between adult and non-adult members of the household, whereas the 
McClements scales weights children according to their exact age. Eventually, the 
adjustment was based on the average weight of each child, i.e. 0.23 units, rather than 
on his or her exact age. When the number of children was missing from the dataset, 
the number of adults reported was deduced from the overall number of residents. As 
only the ISSP 1999 dataset collected income figures, the threshold was based on the 
official poverty line defined by the National Insurance Institute for a standard two 
member family in 1999—2,543 Shekels (NII 2000). The threshold defined in this 
thesis was higher, as it took into account net/gross income differences as well as 
other non work-related earnings excluded from the original question. It also 
intended to generate an adequate group to work with.  
3. Unlike other western cultures, Israeli youth usually accomplish their military service 
by the age of 21, before proceeding to at least three years of academic education and 
a possible "gap year". At the other end, the official age for retirement was 65 in 
1999. The aging threshold was set in the light of these actualities, in order to 
exclude exceptional incidents at both ends of the distribution. 
4. Factually, more than half of the ISSP 1999's sample reportedly had 12 years of 
schooling or less (54 per cent). However, as technical education or job training 
might be counted by some respondents as additional years of schooling, the 
threshold was set at 14 years. It should be emphasised that respondents with an 
academic degree must have at least 15 years of schooling.  
5. Small households of one or two persons are less likely to suffer from enduring 
poverty in Israel, as they are usually occupied by young couples who have just 
started their joint life. Unlike the British case, the phenomenon of lone families 
rarely exists in Israel. Therefore, the household size was taken as an indicator, 
supplemented with the subjects' years of schooling is order to guarantee the 
identification of exceptional cases. 
Reviewing the algorithm, several clarifications are needed. The first condition 
incorporates an area-based indicator of poverty (city categorisation) with a respondent-
based one (family income). This imperfect combination cannot be justified merely by 
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practical considerations related to the lack of any income question or another powerful 
indicator of poverty in the IES datasets. It is also derived from the high correlation 
between individual poverty and local poverty in Israel. Unlike Britain, where most of 
the underprivileged live outside poor localities, in Israel, poverty is concentrated almost 
entirely in disadvantaged cities, mostly in the periphery. The Central Bureau of 
Statistics, which composed and yielded the city category based on 14 indicators, found 
that the average income of the local population explained 96 per cent of the categories' 
variance (2004, p. 28). As individual income had the highest correlation with local 
poverty, the comparison of both variables is not desirable, but becomes feasible in the 
circumstances. 
Another domestic difference between Israel and Britain refers to the household size. In 
Israel, large families, often from disadvantaged backgrounds, is as prominent as the 
phenomenon of lone parents suffering from subsistence poverty. The CBS found the 
proportion of large families (more than four members) to be the second important 
indicator in its algorithm, explaining 94 per cent of the total variance. It should also be 
noted that due to practical considerations, the thresholds defined for each variant were 
less rigorous than they would have been in a single-variable categorisation method. This 
compromise was necessary to identify a relatively large and homogenous group of 
underprivileged people, without ending up with a rather small and insignificant sample.  
The multi-variable method was conceived to overcome methodological deficits already 
existing in the original datasets. As such, it does not seek to redefine poverty 
theoretically or statistically. However, it did aspire to create an algorithm that would 
employ pragmatic tools to elaborate the empirical criteria for membership in the 
underprivileged group. If there is a correlation between enduring poverty and political 
deprivation, the quality of the method in which the underprivileged are singled out is 
crucial. As in any empirical research, an error in defining the independent variable can 
easily ruin the project and interfere with its findings.   
It should also be noted that socio-demography is not an accurate science. Hence, the 
composition of the underprivileged samples defined by the multi-variable methods is 
not expected to be identical in all datasets. However, in comparison to the single-
variable method, it seems that the groups' homogeneity, as well as the study's validity 
and reliability, has been significantly improved.   
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11.3.3.4 The Algorithm's Structure 
Technically, the differentiation between subjects started with verifying the existence of 
the two "essential conditions", as defined in Table ‎11.3.1, which cover financial 
strength and maturity {Conditions 1 & 2}. The verification of both conditions is needed 
in order to attribute a subject to the underprivileged group, whereas not meeting the first 
condition would lead a subject directly into the privileged group, regardless of his age. 
When information about the adjusted family income was absent due to the different 
questionnaires analysed, the substitute indicator was the socio economic categorisation 
of the city, according to its local population. This combination generated a 
methodological challenge, which will be discussed later. However, membership of the 
underprivileged group required the fulfilment of at least one of the "optional 
conditions", referring to education level and household density {Conditions 3 & 4}. In 
this way, highly educated subjects who lived in small households were moved to the 
privileged group, regardless of their city's socio-economic cluster or their reported 
family income. The rationale underpinning this rule is related to the inherent 
generalization derived from taking the subject's place of living as a point of reference. It 
should be noted that when missing data prevented the accomplishment of this process, 
the subject was excluded from both groups, in order to minimise statistical deviations as 
much as possible. The entire process is demonstrated graphically in Figure ‎11.3.5. 
A major concern is related to the equation of an area-based indicator for poverty (city 
socio-economic categorisation) with an respondent-based one (adjusted household 
income). In ideal research, this analogy would not be made, given that other indicators 
can be employed for defining a homogenous underprivileged group. However, this 
method was the only practical alternative and the most reliable one to mediate the 
differences between the three datasets analysed. If one were to decide to focus solely on 
income figures, one would have to scrap the two IES datasets covering political 
positions with no income questions. If one were to decide to focus solely on the city 
categorisation, one would have to ignore the ISSP dataset covering attitudes towards 
inequality with no reference to localities. Aside from the lack of other powerful 
questions that could solve the problem, this alternative was eventually selected after the 
CBS itself found a strong correlation between individual income and the cities' 
categories (R
2
=0.96), and because the socio-demographic characters of the new 
underprivileged groups were found to be similar, indicating high reliability of the 
algorithm. Nevertheless, as a precaution, each dataset was analysed and presented 
separately to avoid direct comparisons.  
 
 

















Figure ‎11.3.5: The tree of questions employed to differentiate between the underprivileged and 
the privileged respondents 
 
11.3.3.5 Assessment of Outcome 
After describing the multi-variable method and the components of the algorithm, its 
reliability will be subjected to scrutiny. The original socio-demographic characters of 
the three datasets analysed served as a starting point for the formation of the new 
algorithm, seeking to generate a higher level of homogeneity among the underprivileged 
groups. After a long process of trial and error in selecting the variables and defining 
their internal correlation, the socio-economic characters of the underprivileged in each 
dataset became significantly more homogenous, and they are presented below. It should 
be noted though that in some of the graphs, the dependent variables were part of the 
algorithm that yielded the independent variable (the subject's categorisation as 
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Figure ‎11.3.6 demonstrates that members of the IES 1992 underprivileged sample were 
more likely to be Sephardic (67 per cent compared to 39 per cent among the privileged 
sample) and observe religious commandments to a high extent (41 per cent compared to 
14 per cent). The average wealthy household consists of 3.7 people and its adult 
members had studied for 12.8 years on average, in comparison to a household size of 
4.8 members and an average schooling period of 11.8 years among the underprivileged. 
Interestingly, after taking into account several socio-economic variables there is still no 
difference in the distribution of the reported family expenditure. The privileged and the 
underprivileged group had given similar answers, although they are clearly different in 
their financial status.  
Figure ‎11.3.7 illustrates some attributes of the IES 1999's underprivileged group, 
pointing at interesting dissimilarities compared to the IES 1992 dataset. As to the 
ethnicity question, it is only natural that with time more subjects would be defined as 
Israelis, based on their father's birthplace. However, the domination of Sephardic Jews 
in the underprivileged group remained stable (57 per cent), as did the distribution of the 
religiosity variable. As to the Years of Schooling, surprisingly, a higher proportion of 
the underprivileged (23 per cent) had more than 15 years of schooling, whereas a 
similar proportion stated elsewhere that they held an academic degree. This might be 
explained by the presence of highly educated Russian immigrants, who found 
themselves unemployed with no language skills. As most of these households were 
small, the relatively high proportion of three member households in the underprivileged 
sample (40 per cent) was reasonable.  
Figure ‎11.3.8 confirms the ISSP 1999 follows the same internal correlations as its 
antecedents. The underprivileged are more likely to be Sephardic, religious and live in 
large households. A few comments still merit attention. The underprivileged household 
size sampled in the ISSP was higher on average than that of the IES (4.7 members 
compared to 3.92), as was the average years of schooling in the entire ISSP (13.2 
compared to 12.6). In addition, the ISSP utilised a different scale to measure levels of 
religiosity, although the internal correlation prevailed—the underprivileged expressed 
stronger attachment to religion (34 per cent defined themselves as religious or ultra-
orthodox compared to 17 per cent in the privileged group). 


























Figure ‎11.3.6: Socio-demographic attributes of the members of the underprivileged and the 
privileged group, based on the multi-variable method (IES 1992) 
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Figure ‎11.3.7: Socio-demographic attributes of members of the underprivileged and the 
privileged group, based on the multi-variable method (IES 1999) 
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Figure ‎11.3.8  Socio-demographic attributes of members of the underprivileged and the 
privileged groups, based on the multi-variable method (ISSP 1999) 
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11.4 Supplement on Methods (Britain)  
11.4.1 Exploratory Survey 
Approximately 300 British adults were invited to take part in this research, with 70 of 
them agreeing to participate. Participants had initially been asked to complete a 
computer-administered survey. After an alarming visit to the Mosside Lane 
neighbourhood in Manchester, the expensive laptop was replaced with hard-copy 
questionnaires. The visit also confirmed that an unmediated appeal for participation 
rarely persuaded underprivileged individuals to cooperate.  
The continuous failure to attract cooperation from underprivileged individuals in several 
sporadically selected Job Centres prompted a reconsideration of the fieldwork strategy. 
Consequently, all fieldwork within underprivileged locations was focussed on Hackney 
Citizens' Advice Bureau (CAB), in the light of the management's willingness to assist 
with the project. Access to clients was given in the relaxed atmosphere of the CAB's 
waiting room
36
. Research among privileged members of the electorate was carried out, 
as planned, in branches of Starbucks Coffee shops within the City of London.  
During the fieldwork in Britain, the first few seconds of each interaction with 
interviewees were found to be crucial in determining the outcome of each engagement. 
Uttering the words "PhD" and "London School of Economics" was immensely efficient 
in convincing privileged respondents to cooperate, in contrast to disadvantaged 
individuals, whose fears and hesitations were reduced by the modest title of "student". 
A suit also improved the chances for collaboration with privileged interviewees, whilst 
casual attire prompted a more friendly and pleasant response from the underprivileged 
respondents. The opening line and the dress code were adjusted after a process of trial 
and error. Both played a central role in persuading the British respondents to complete 
the survey. In general, significant amounts of time were still needed to convince 
interviewees to participate - in direct contrast to Israel.  
The privileged sample (44 subjects) was composed mostly of executives, lawyers and 
other high-earning professionals spending time in the luxury coffee chain of Starbucks. 
In the weeks when the fieldwork was carried out, all branches around Fleet Street and 
Liverpool Station were visited, and individuals whose appearance communicated wealth 
were approached, if they were sitting alone. Many of the privileged respondents asked 
                                                 
36
  The confidentiality procedures presented in the methods chapter applied to Hackney CAB as well. However, 
following a request of the Bureau's director, only audio interviews were carried out with willing clients, and several 
ads clarifying the purpose and the process of the fieldwork were put in the waiting room.  
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how much time the survey would take before making up their mind whether to take 
part. The answer of 7 minutes usually allayed their concerns. The entire interaction 
often exceeded this time limit, due to the serious way in which the questions were 
addressed.  
The underprivileged sample (26 subjects) consisted primarily of visitors to Hackney 
Citizen's Advice Bureau (19), but also of unemployed visitors to Jobcentres in Hackney 
(4) and Hendon (3). Obtaining the co-operation of these visitors proved very difficult, as 
in all locations except the CAB, the majority of people approached refused to 
participate. One of the most commonly cited excuses was lack of time from the 
unemployed, while others were incredibly hostile to politics in general and questions 
about politics in particular.  
Those visitors to the Centres who abstained from participating were usually not asked 
directly for an interview. Their remarks were however recorded, transcribed and 
analysed qualitatively. In some locations, including Manchester‘s Moss Side Jobcentre, 
the extent of abstention was so extensive that no completed questionnaires were 
collected at all. The emphasis then shifted to observations of the general atmosphere in 
such areas, and the notes taken were later integrated into the qualitative analysis.   
The selection of sites proved to be highly accurate in predicting the subjects' income. 77 
per cent of the respondents in underprivileged locations reported that their gross income 
was less than £200 a week. 11.5 per cent refused to answer and 11.5 per cent earned 
more than this. 74 per cent of the respondents in privileged locations earned a weekly 
salary greater than £650. In terms of political support, only two underprivileged voters 
supported the Tories, in contrast to a solid majority of Labour support. Within the 
privileged sample, support for both major political parties was equal. Males were 
dramatically overrepresented in the privileged locations (83 per cent), whereas females 
had a slight domination in the underprivileged sites (58 per cent). It should be stated in 
this context, that the survey was carried out merely for exploratory purposes, with no 
claims to be representative of any kind.  
.  
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11.4.2 In-Depth Interviews 
The sporadic notes taken regarding individuals undertaking the exploratory survey only 
heightened the need for comprehensive discussions with voters honestly sharing their 
thoughts. Overall, 10 in-depth interviews took place in Britain, 6 with underprivileged 
adults and 4 with privileged ones. Most interviewees consented to take part, having 
undertaken the exploratory survey.  It should be noted that two of the privileged 
interviewees were identified and approached separately, through personal contacts. 
Comments and dialogues emerging during the undertaking of the questionnaire were not 
counted as interviews, although they were transcribed and analysed as well.  
Whilst the attempts to persuade ordinary people to devote time to an academic survey 
often failed, attracting interviewees for a relatively long and recorded discussion proved 
even more difficult. Among the dozens of privileged individuals willing to complete the 
initial questionnaire, only two gave their consent for an interview. Whereas the pleasant 
atmosphere of a waiting room should have eased the complexity of interviewing 
underprivileged respondents, their abstention posed a serious obstacle, as their 
contribution was limited. If initially only voters had been considered for in-depth 
interviews, the need to understand the logic behind political abstention overcame the 
initial intention to focus primarily on political reasoning.  
Particular consideration was given to the question of appropriate locations for doing in-
depth interviewing in England, as unlike in Israel, public areas would not be seen as 
appropriate for this purpose. Thus, underprivileged voters approached at the Hackney 
CAB were interviewed inside the office, in a designated room that was kindly lent for 
this purpose by the management. One individual found in Hackney Jobcentre, was 
interviewed in his own home, after giving permission for that. Two of the privileged 
subjects were interviewed at home, another at her luxurious club and the final one in a 
coffee shop. Video recording of the interviews was done with the consent of the subject 
in all instances except those completed on the premises of the Hackney Citizens Advice 
Bureau, where only audio recording was allowed by the management.  
The series of ten interviews enabled a comprehensive picture to be drawn of different 
types of individuals, coming from different backgrounds and experiencing different 
difficulties. Nevertheless, financial position drove a wedge between the groups: all 
privileged interviewees, especially the two whose consent was obtained through 
personal contacts, were wealthy while all underprivileged interviewees could barely 
make ends meet. Technically, all interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded using 
two levels of categories. A bound copy of the transcripts was read repeatedly, to 
generate qualitative observations and insights  
The Poverty of Democracy 357 
 
11.4.3 Secondary Analysis  
11.4.3.1 Datasets Availability  
The guiding objects behind the statistical analysis of the British case were twofold. 
First, it intended to correlate turnout and political party support with various socio-
demographic variables at the constituency level. Second, it sought to explore reasoning 
and knowledge on an individual basis. The fulfilment of the first object required a 
sophisticated integration of data gathered from the Electoral Commission (EC), the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the House of Commons' Library (HCL). The 
second goal was fulfilled by completing a broad analysis of the British Election Study 
series (BES) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) integrated into the 
British Social Attitudes survey (BSA).  
The deduction of quantitative inferences base on the actual public choice at the 
constituency level required the integration of socio-economic figures taken from the 
2001 Census of Population with voting distribution results from the 2001 General 
Election. The Census was carried out on 29 April 2001 by the ONS, and its raw data 
was later re-structured by HCL to refer exclusively to all 659 parliamentary 
constituencies (2004). The General Election took place on 7 June 2001. The official 
statistics were summarised and published by the EC in July 2001. They include the size 
of the turnout, the share of votes cast for each political party, and the size of the 
electorate in each constituency (2001).  
The integration of both datasets presented considerable technical difficulties. Each 
dataset had a different structure, with many constituencies named differently in the files 
e.g. North Hackney and Hackney North. After these complexities were resolved, a 
unified database enabled a statistical comparison of socio-demographic figures with 
turnout and voting distributions, as measured in each constituency during 2001.  
Quantitative analysis based on public opinion surveys at the individual level was 
based on the British Election Study (BES 1992 & BES 1997) and the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP 1999) integrated into the British Social Attitudes survey 
(BSA 1999). As these datasets were pivotal in scrutinizing voters' attitudes, it is 
important to describe each of them specifically. 
 The BES of 1992-1997 (hereinafter BES 1992) was a panel survey comprising eight 
waves. It was conducted by carrying out face-to-face interviews with the assistance 
of self-completion forms, telephone interviews and postal questionnaires. The 
sample of 3,534 respondents in the first wave dropped to 1,694 in the last one, and 
had to be weighted to accommodate a Scottish boost. It comprised of randomly 
selected individuals, on the electoral register who were eligible to vote in the 
General Election of 1992. The interviews were conducted by the Social and 
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Community Planning Research (SCPR) in collaboration with Nuffield College. 
Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice headed the cross sectional study.  
 The BES of 1997-2001 (hereinafter BES 1997) also consisted of eight waves. All 
rested on a novel sampling method, which revealed a vital shift in attitude. For the 
first time in election surveys, the initial sample of 3,615 adults was drawn from the 
Postcode Address File (PAF) and not from the Electoral Register. Another 
innovation was a symbolic financial incentive of £3, given to participants in the 
second wave.  
 Response rates were considerably higher, and the smallest sample consisted of 2,333 
subjects. A Scottish boost required the data to be weighted again, whereas the raw 
data itself was collected through computer-assisted face-to-face surveys, telephone 
interviews and postal questionnaires. The Centre for Research into Elections and 
Social Trends (CREST)
37
 ran the project, headed by the same team who organised 
the 1992 BES.  
 The ISSP Social Inequality III module was integrated into the BSA of 1999 
(hereinafter BSA 1999).  The principal questionnaire was presented to respondents 
during face-to-face engagement. The ISSP supplement was distributed separately as 
a self-completion form. The principal survey sample was 3,143 British adults living 
in private accommodation.  1,804 members of the cohort received the ISSP forms 
but only 804 returned them.  
 In this project, both questionnaires were analysed. The sample was created as a 
stratified random probability one, drawn from the PAF. The data had to be 
weighted. Principal investigators were Roger Jowell, Alison Park, Katarina 
Thomson, Lindsey Jarvis, Catherine Bromley and Nina Stratford, who worked under 
the auspices of the National Centre for Social Research (NCSR)
38
. 
The methods these samples were pooled had peculiar implications on this research. 
Whereas the BES of 1992 relied upon the Electoral Register, all other surveys were 
extracted from the PAF, enhancing their representativeness as non-registered Britons 
could be approached as well. However, the probability of an underprivileged voter 
giving his consent for an academic interview is probably a-priori lower, generating an 
intrinsic statistical deviation. Employing the PAF for pooling could therefore reduce the 
initial range of error. Nonetheless, as will be discussed later, even this enhanced 
sampling method lacked sufficient statistical rigor to account accurately for the extent of 
electoral non-participation.  
  
                                                 
37
 CREST is an ESRC Research Centre, which linked the National Centre for Social Research (NCSR), formerly known 
as the Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR), and Nuffield College the Department of Sociology, 
University of Oxford.  
38
 NCSR was formerly known as the Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR).  
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11.4.3.2 Defining the Underprivileged Group 
Serious consideration was given to the formation of an underprivileged group in the 
three large-scale surveys. This could have been trivial if a key question in the BES of 
1992 had not been omitted. No information about children living in households was 
collected so calculation of equivalent household income proved impossible. This 
obstacle created the need for a new method to discriminate privileged voters from 
underprivileged voters. A prerequisite for any method was horizontal applicability, 
underlining the need for indicators available in all datasets. Social class based on 
occupation was one of these indicators, although as Figure ‎11.4.1 illustrates, it did not 
correlate precisely with household income. It seemed probable that a set of criteria 
could have enhanced the selection process even further, putting aside the rather 








Figure ‎11.4.1: R.G. social class based on occupation by equivalent household income groups of 
respondents between the age of 26 to 65 years old (BES 1997) 
The first step towards the construction of an effective algorithm was the summary of all 
available socio-demographic indicators. Based on Table ‎11.4.1, a trial and error process 
sought to define the optimal mixture of indicators, generating a localised multi-
variable method aimed at defining an underprivileged group of electors. As the 
distinction between privileged and underprivileged voters was intended to reflect 
financial poverty, household income figures were used to validate the rigor of the 
results though they could not be part of their formation. 







R.G. Social Class by Household Income
I II III (non-manual) III (manual) IV V Skp,never had job









Household Income (before tax)    
Household Structure (adults / children)    
Main Source of Income  
(employment / pensions / benefits / grants / interest) 
   
Main Economic Activity  
(education / employment / unemployment / retired / seek) 
   
Time since Last Job 
(working / waiting for a job / less than 1 year / more than 1 year) 
   
Level of Qualification  
(Degree / A level / O level / CSE / Foreign / No qualification) 
   
R.G. Social Class (I-V)  (Both partners)     
SOC 1990 (100-1000)     (Both partners)    
Housing Ownership    
Private Health Insurance    
Ethnicity / Religion / Gender / Age    
Table ‎11.4.1: Available socio-demographic indicators and their major categories as included in 
the questionnaires analysed (BES 1992, BES 1997, BSA 1999) 
Four variables were eventually chosen. The main source of household income 
distinguished between those living on benefits, residing on pensions or working to earn 
their living. Information on the time passed since the last job facilitated a division 
between respondents experiencing long-term unemployment and those working until 
recently. The Standard Occupational Classification (SOC 1990) was applicable for 
members of the labour force, indicating the quality of the respondents' occupation. 
Finally, the age range was fixed at 26-65 including filtered subjects who were outside 
the scope of this research. It should be noted that the entire process took into 
consideration both partners' classification rather than that of the respondent alone. The 
structure of the algorithm is provided in Section ‎11.4.3.4. A summary of its 
underpinning indicators and thresholds is shown in Table ‎11.4.2. 
No. Indicator Threshold 
1 Main Source of Household Income 
Benefits, earning from employment, other 
sources that are not pensions 
2 Age Between 26 and 65 (including) 
3 
Standard Occupational Classification 
1990 (Respondent & Partner) 
Major group 9 for both partners (other 
elementary occupations & never worked) 
4 
Time since the Last Job  
(Respondent & Partner) 
More than a year for both partners 
Table ‎11.4.2: Indicators and thresholds defining the British underprivileged group  
Empirically, the algorithm succeeded in selecting out an underprivileged group, keeping 
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household income was one of a few objective indicators capable of validating the 
process, the results demonstrated in Figure ‎11.4.2 are satisfactory. Whereas in the BES 
of 1992 equivalised household income was inaccessible, prediction rates within the 
underprivileged groups ranged between 61 per cent in the BSA of 1999 and 75 per cent 
in the BES of 1997
39
.  
Prediction rates within the privileged populations were even higher, reaching on average 
90 per cent in both datasets. The remarkably high proportion of low-income households 
in the underprivileged group was shown in Figure ‎11.4.3 as well, illustrating the 
composition of each income group by privileged and underprivileged classification, 
confirming that the proportion of underprivileged voters diminished when income rose. 
Overall, the underprivileged group had the maximum proportion of low-income 






Figure ‎11.4.2: Distribution of equivalised household income for privileged and underprivileged 






Figure ‎11.4.3:  Internal composition of privileged and underprivileged respondents by equivalised 
household income (BES 1997 & BSA 1999)   
 
                                                 
39
  Underprivileged prediction rate represents the proportion of subjects classified as underprivileged by the algorithm, 
whose equivalised household income was lower than 60 per cent of the median calculated income in the entire 
sample. Privileged prediction rate represents the proportion of subjects classified as privileged by the algorithm, 
whose equivalised household income was higher than 60 per cent of the median. It should be emphasised that 
these thresholds were roughly in line with the national median income for the relevant years. 
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Privileged Underprivileged







Wealth Classificiation by Household Income (97)
Privileged Underprivileged
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11.4.3.3 Selected Indicators 
As with the Israeli case, the multi-variable approach aims at generating through an 
algorithm an underprivileged group that would be as homogenous as possible in its 
socio-economic composition. Whereas in Israel there was a need to overcome local and 
individual measures of poverty, in Britain all indicators are at the individual level, 
though missing data prevented the sole reliance on equivalised household income. Table 
‎11.4.2 shows the list of indicators and defined thresholds, followed by a technical 
reference to each indicator. It should be noted that each criteria stands alone in its own 
domain, and therefore even if a respondent was defined as "underprivileged" in one 
threshold, he might still be classified differently in the other. The sequence of the 
algorithm is illustrated in Figure ‎11.4.4 (Page 365).  
No. Indicator Threshold 
1 Main Source of Household Income 
Benefits (income support / jobseeker / 
family credits), earning from employment, 
other sources excluding pensions 
2 Age Between 26 and 65 (including) 
3 
Time since the Last Job  
(Respondent & Partner) 
More than a year for both partners 
4 
Standard Occupational Classification 
1990 (Respondent & Partner) 
Major group 9 for both partners (other 
elementary occupations & never worked) 
Table ‎11.4.3: Indicators and thresholds defining the British underprivileged group 
1. The main source of household income was a powerful indicator, appearing in all 
three questionnaires (BES 1992, BES 1997, BSA 1999). It enabled three types of 
households to be distinguished: those dependent on benefits due to their financial 
deprivation; those living off state or occupational pensions; and those in 
employment and or in receipt of other non-state and non-pension sources of income. 
Notably, the question referred to the entire household, rather than a single 
respondent, in a way that made it more relevant for the sake of this research. Within 
the algorithm, households receiving certain state benefits as their major source of 
income were automatically classified as underprivileged; households living off 
pensions were taken out of the sample as their overall socio-economic classification 
could not be assessed accurately; and household surviving on regular wages from 
employment or other sources of income were subjected to additional examination.  
2. The age threshold was set up to catch as many respondents capable of contributing 
towards the labour market and earning their living. The upper threshold was set at 
65 being the official retirement age in Britain. The lower threshold was set at 26 as a 
reasonable age at which most citizens start their professional life.  
3. A closer look into the data revealed that some respondents of the relevant ages 
replied that their major source of income was neither benefits nor pensions, and they 
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questions referring to employment status, and more specifically to the time passed 
since their last job, solved this difficulty by signalling out the long-term 
unemployed from those who had been employed within the year prior to the survey. 
As all questionnaires introduced identical questions to examine both partners in a 
household, the replies were combined, so that underprivileged subjects were defined 
as those where the couple, or the respondent alone if necessary, were unemployed 
for more than a year. Privileged were defined as those unemployed for less than a 
year, or currently in employment.  
4. Among the several socio-economic and socio-demographic classifications available, 
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC90) was found to achieve the 
highest correlation levels with the equivalised household income. In addition, unlike 
other classifications that were calculated only for the respondent, SOC90 was 
available for all partners in all datasets. Generally, the classification integrated nine 
major groups of occupations, following older but often similar methods of allocation 
(ONS 1990). It preceded, and was generally correlated with, additional methods 
such as the Registrar General Social Class, National Statistics Socio Economic 
Classification (ONS 2005) and the Standard Occupational Classification of 2000 
(ONS 2000). For the sake of this thesis, households in which both partners, or only 
one if necessary, were classified at the bottom SOC90 scale (i.e. as working in 
elementary occupations, unit group codes of 900-990) were defined as 
underprivileged. Households where both partners, or only one if necessary, were 
classified at the top seven categories (i.e. ranging from managers and administrators 
until sales occupations) were defined as privileged. 
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11.4.3.4 The Algorithm's Structure 
The first criteria imposed in all datasets referred to the respondents' age, and their major 
source of income. Both were "essential conditions", as defined in Table ‎11.4.3 
(Conditions 1 & 2). Subjects who fell within the age thresholds, and reported their 
households' major income source was state benefits (income support / jobseeker / family 
credits) were automatically classified as underprivileged. Subjects who reported their 
household's major income source was state or occupational pensions were omitted from 
the sample, as the available data was insufficient to define their financial wealth in a 
reasonable way. Similar decision was taken with regard to those who lived on 
invalidity, sickness or disabled pensions. However, a majority of the subjects, who 
reportedly worked or earned money through other sources (such as grants or 
investments) were subjected to the "optional conditions", covered mainly the respondent 
and his/her partner's status within the labour market (Conditions 3 & 4). 
Condition 3 was the first to be applied, showing whether both partners, or the 
respondent alone if there was no partner or the partner's classification was missing, were 
unemployed for more than a year. Even though theoretically such households should 
have reported benefits as their major source of income, in reality many did not do so. 
Most of these people have managed to live on extremely low incomes, and would 
probably be defined as poor by any definition. For all other respondents, who were 
employed in the last year, condition 4 was applied. This explored the subjects' 
occupational socio-economic classification. A decision was taken based on both the 
respondent and his/her spouse, or, in the case of singles and data shortages, on the 
respondent alone. Eventually, if both were classified as working in the "elementary 
occupations", the respondent was defined as underprivileged, whereas in all other 
incidents, respondents were defined as privileged.  





















Figure ‎11.4.4: The tree of questions employed to differentiate between underprivileged and 
privileged respondents in the British datasets 
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Purple Line: Missing 
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Aged 26-65?  
Missing Data 
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Figure ‎11.4.5: Socio-demographic attributes of the members of the underprivileged and the 
privileged group, based on the multi-variable method (BES 1992) 
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Figure ‎11.4.6: Socio-demographic attributes of the members of the underprivileged and the 
privileged group, based on the multi-variable method (BES 1997) 
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Figure ‎11.4.7: Socio-demographic attributes of the members of the underprivileged and the 
privileged group, based on the multi-variable method (BES 1999) 
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11.4.4 The "Invisible Group" 
During the secondary analysis of existing datasets, an "invisible group" of abstainers, 
probably underprivileged ones, was identified. Without estimating the size of this 
group, any assessment of turnout among the disadvantaged population would be by 
definition inaccurate. This section elaborates on its causes, as its impact has been 
discussed earlier, in Section 7.3.  
Ideally, no statistical correlation should be found between those who had not registered 
to vote and those who refused to be interviewed. In theory, an equal a-priori probability 
for membership of these groups is a prerequisite for the construction of a reliable 
sample. In reality, not only are these subgroups correlated, but also the probability of 
underprivileged citizens being part of them is relatively high. Consequently, there is an 
"invisible group", staying outside the Electoral Register (ER) and evading the radars of 
opinion polls, usually relying on the Postcode Address File (PAF). The acute problem is 
that its socio-economic composition is not proportionate to society in general.  
The fieldwork preceding this thesis indeed showed the underprivileged were 
consistently less cooperative. Their voluntary isolation from questioning was proved 
empirically also in the 2001 Census. Hackney, for instance, generated one of the lowest 
response rates with only 72 per cent of its residents cooperating in comparison with a 
national average of 94 per cent (HCL 2004, p. 21). Turnout in Hackney for the 2001 
General Election was also at the bottom, with less than 50 per cent. The national 
average was 59.4 per cent (EC 2001, p. 11). The statistical overlap between poverty, 
abstention, un-registration, and statistical submersion pushed an entire group in society 
off the figures, even if in some cases the aim was to avoid the payment of Council Tax. 












A = {Adult Population} B = {Eligible} C = {Abstainers} D = {Unregistered} 
 
Figure ‎11.4.8: Venn diagram of the British adult population, intersected by eligibility to vote, 
abstention and registration, according to the ER and PAF sampling methods  
A schematic illustration of this conundrum is given in Figure ‎11.4.8, which is based on 
concepts from Group Theory. The starting point is simple: in order to measure 
abstention rates among underprivileged, one should find the proportion of 
underprivileged eligible to vote, who did not vote eventually (C   D). However, there 
were two sources for error:  
 First, the samples were not representative. Factually, subjects drawn from the 
Electoral Registry (ER) are by definition registered, hence those who are 
unregistered but eligible to vote are a-priori excluded (ER ∩ D = {φ}). Even 
when the Postcode Address File (PAF) is used to poll a sample, it is still 
deficient, since the database also includes inhabitants who are not eligible to 
vote at all (PAF ∩ A = {x}).  
 Second, the degree of multicollinearity was intolerable. The fieldwork 
persuasively suggests that the probability of underprivileged subjects being non-
cooperative is positively correlated with abstention. Consequently, even if the 
sampling method could overcome the first shortcoming (and it could not), the 
predispositions of the second ramification still exist. The a-priori probability of 
unregistered and abstainers being in the grey area below is higher, hence their 
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11.5 Cities, Categorisation and Voting in Israel 
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11.5.2 Data for 1999 Elections 
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